



QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
STATEMENT OF WITNESS



Occurrence #: _____

Statement no.: _____ Date: **3 May 2011**

Statement of

Name of witness: **MARTIN, Peter John**

Date of birth: _____ Age: _____ Occupation: **Police Officer**

Police officer taking statement

Name: _____

Rank: _____ Reg. no.: _____

Region/Command/Division: _____ Station: _____

Statement:

ADDENDUM TO STATEMENT

Peter John Martin states:-

1. Further to my statement of 9 March 2011, I have been required to provide an addendum to this statement by Justice Catherine E Holmes, Commissioner of Inquiry, pursuant to section 5(1)(d) of the *Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld)*. The statement is provided pursuant to a direction and relates to matters which have been specified by the Commission of Inquiry.
2. Since providing the original statement on the 9 March 2011, I have also attended the Commission's offices on 28 March 2011 where I met with Mr. Nick Bailey and Ms. Megan Pearce. The purpose of this meeting was to assist the Commission of Inquiry personnel by elaborating on matters which had been provided in my statement. A transcript of this conversation with Inquiry personnel is attached as **Annexure A**.
3. This addendum to the statement will deal with the six key areas and their various sub-questions as outlined in the aforementioned direction.

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Exhibit Number:

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Date:

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
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
1. MOGGILL / BELLBOWRIE / KARANA DOWNS / MT CROSBY
(FAR WESTERN SUBURBS)

1(a) Details of the information received by the District Disaster management Group (DDMG) and/or District Disaster Coordinator (DDC) regarding the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the far western suburbs, including the source/s of the information and when it was received.

4. I was aware on Thursday, 13 January 2011 that the community of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby were isolated due to roads being cut due to flood waters. I learned of this from information that was conveyed to me from personnel working in the DDCC. I recall that at the DDMG daily meetings these issues were raised particularly within the context of resupply efforts. When I first learned of the isolation of the western suburbs, I recall asking the XO DDC to ensure that the appropriate Police Region was notified of this and to ensure that all assistance was being provided by the region. Advice came back to me at a later time that there were a number of police officers who were isolated and now working in these communities assisting the local effort. This was confirmed to me in discussions I had with Chief Superintendent Les Hopkins of Metropolitan North Region.
5. I made a telephone call to Dr Bruce Flegg (MP) on Thursday 13 January 2011 at approximately 1720hrs, whereby he confirmed to me that the community of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby were isolated from the floodwater and further that they needed to be urgently reprovisioned. This matter is addressed later in my response in some detail.



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
CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**


1(b) Details of the action/s taken by the DDMG/DDC in response to the 2010-2011 flood events in the far western suburbs to protect life and private and public property including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.


6. Upon my telephone call to Dr Bruce Flegg (MP) on Thursday, 13 January 2011, I immediately caused inquiries to be made with the LDCC to ascertain what requests for provisions had been made and the status of any resupply efforts. I ascertained that a request for various food items, medicines and other provisions had been made and this was being processed. I also learned at this time that there was a need to acquire Australian Defence Force assets to facilitate delivery. Given the flooding conditions it was not possible to facilitate delivery utilising the resources of the District, therefore ADF assets were required. I requested that this be expedited and was advised that efforts were well advance to resupply the aforementioned communities late into the evening of Thursday, 13 January 2011 and morning of Friday, 14 January 2011.

7. I was also aware of the work that was being done by the Queensland Health representatives on the Brisbane DDMG to provision the community with medicines as part of this effort. I received a number of briefings from Queensland Health personnel on the progress of their efforts to source these medicines. On a number of occasions I addressed the DDMG on the importance of the reprovisioning efforts to the western suburbs areas.

8. I also personally (on a number of occasions) spoke to personnel at the SDCC and advised them that the acquisition of ADF assets for resupply of these western suburbs should be seen as high priority. I recall that these conversations occurred late into the evening of Thursday, 13 January 2011 and early morning of Friday, 14 January 2011. The purpose of my personal calls to the SDCC was to ensure that ADF assets were relinquished to the resupply effort of the western suburbs. I was aware that there were significant demands on these assets over the course of this operation.


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

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
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
9. On a number of occasions I also spoke to Chief Superintendent Les Hopkins (Metropolitan North Region) who advised me that there were a number of QPS Police Officers who were isolated in the western suburbs. These officers were assisting the local effort in supporting individuals who required assistance. I understand that these officers were making a significant contribution in very difficult circumstances.

1(c) Details and timing of any requests for assistance received in relation to the far western suburbs.

10. I previously mentioned a conversation that I had with Dr Flegg (MP) concerning the resupply of provisions to the western suburbs. My recollection is that this conversation occurred on Thursday, 13 January 2011 at 1720hrs. As a result of this telephone call I made inquiries and ascertained that there was already a request for assistance (provisioning of food, medicines and other property) which had been made to the LDCC. I am unaware of who specifically made this request to the LDCC and when such request was made. These are matters within the knowledge of the LDCC.
11. Considerable work was undertaken by myself and members of the DDCC to facilitate the provisioning of the western suburbs. This necessitated requests made for considerable ADF assets to deploy by both road and air to isolated communities in the west of Brisbane area.
12. In the interests of maintaining contact with key community leaders and others within the community I tasked Superintendent Brian Huxley with making personal contact with a number of these community leaders. I understand that a list of names of these key community contacts were derived and contact was made. Such contacts were made late into the evening of Thursday, 13 January 2011. Such requests did not identify any special requirements although it did confirm that the community was without power and there was concerns held for food eventually spoiling in freezers. This information was communicated on a number of occasions to the Energex representative on the DDMG and asked to


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give re-energizing the western suburbs priority. I am aware however that access to this area was a significant challenge. It should also be pointed out that there were other significant issues occurring and there were significant competing interests.

13. Although I was not personally involved in such requests, I am aware that the DDCC log records other requests from residents of the western suburbs. Such requests came from Mr Mike Kelly of Bellbowrie who raised concerns of loss of power. This occurred at 0058hrs on Friday, 14 January 2011 and is recorded on the DDC log. A further request came via a caller on ABC radio who reported to be a patient of the Sugarland Retirement Village at Bellbowrie. This caller reported allegedly that they were utilising a borrowed generator, that they had no fuel for the generator and no fresh food. Police were tasked by the DDCC with making inquiries into the concerns of the resident. Advice was provided back at 0642hrs on Friday, 14 January 2011 that the elderly resident who made the call to ABC radio did so outside of the knowledge of the residents or the administration of the centre. It is further alleged that she was upset because she had no power other than the generator and that she had not been visited by politicians. Police held the view that there were no immediate concerns for the safety of this resident.
14. The request for resupply of the western suburbs and issues surrounding the resupply effort is captured in detail in the document titled *'Issues involving resupply of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby'*. This document has been previously supplied to the Commission of Inquiry however is attached here as **Annexure B**. This document addresses this question in significant detail.

1(d) Details and timing of resupply efforts to the far western suburbs.

15. Considerable amounts of provisions which included food, medicines and other stores were sourced through the disaster management arrangements. As I recall over 4 tonnes of provisions were deployed to Moggill and Bellbowrie and over 8

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tonnes were delivered to the Karana Downs/Mt Crosby area. The deployment of such large amounts of provisions and under extreme adversity given the weather situation and flooding, meant that ADF assets were the only viable method of ensuring delivery.

16. I understand that with respect to the resupply of Moggill and Bellbowrie that the first shipment of goods was received by that community late on the evening of Thursday, 13 January 2011. This shipment was facilitated using Unimog motor vehicles owned and operated the ADF. Advice was received at 0255hrs on Friday, 14 January 2011 that all Unimogs had arrived at Bellbowrie and had delivered all the property without incident.
17. I further understand that early afternoon of Friday, 14 January 2011 a large lift helicopter was sourced from the ADF which facilitated the delivery of over 8 tonnes of provisions to the Karana Downs/Mt Crosby area.
18. On Friday, 14 January 2011 further requests were made for resupply of both food and medicines. By late on Friday evening (14 January 2011) roads to affected areas were becoming passable to traffic. Despite some of these key roads opening due to subsiding floodwaters, many of these roads had sustained considerable damage. Resupply efforts were maintained over the course of the weekend (Saturday, 15 & Sunday, 16 January 2011) to resupply both essential supplies such as food, medicines and other essential supplies.
19. The request for resupply of the western suburbs and issues surrounding the resupply effort is captured in detail in the document titled *'Issues involving resupply of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby'*. This document has been previously supplied to the Commission of Inquiry however is attached here as **Annexure B**. This document addresses this issue in great detail.

1(e) Details of any privately initiated relief efforts, including proposed aerial relief operations, and the response to such efforts and the reasons therefore.


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
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20. At about 1715hrs on Thursday, 13 January 2011, I received a phone call from Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart. Dep. Comm. Stewart advised me that Dr. Bruce Flegg (State Member for Moggill) had a request with respect to resupply his constituency in the western suburbs of Brisbane.
21. I telephoned Dr Flegg at 1720hrs on Thursday, 13 January 2011. During this conversation Dr. Flegg identified that we wanted to utilise services of the Care Flight helicopter and use this asset to supply groceries which had been donated and sourced from Caloundra and subsequently land at Moggill State School, Moggill. Dr Flegg advised that he wanted to undertake this operation on Friday, 14 January 2011. Dr. Flegg indicated that he was seeking my authorisation for such flight. I indicated to Dr. Flegg that I would need to make some further inquiries and advise him of my decision.
22. I then made two telephone calls. The first such call was made at approx. 1725hrs on Thursday, 13 January 2011 to the DDC XO. As a result of this conversation with the XO (Senior Sergeant Gareth Bosley), I ascertained that a formal request had been made to the LDCC for a comprehensive range of items of food, medicines and other provisions and these had in fact been sourced and were awaiting collection. I ascertained that there were strategies in place to provision the communities of Bellbowrie and Moggill on Friday morning (14 January 2011) and in the case of Karana Downs and Mt Crosby provision on Friday afternoon (14 January 2011). The second telephone call I made was to the QPS Solicitor (Ms Kate Bradley) with respect to the request and relevant issues surrounding this.
23. At about 1800hrs on Thursday 13 January 2011, I telephoned Dr Flegg and advised him of the decision not to authorise the flight. I explained that there were plans well advanced to provision the communities affected and that this was not only well progressed by would occur as early as tomorrow morning (pending any unanticipated delays). I explained to Dr Flegg that the powers under the DMA were extreme and special powers and could only be used in


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special circumstances and as the plans were afoot to reprovision the community tomorrow then this would mean that I was unable to authorise that application of a private asset for this purpose. I did indicate to Dr. Flegg that I was prepared to facilitate the collection of the food and other provisions from Caloundra and ensure that these were conveyed to the community. Dr. Flegg rejected this offer. Dr Flegg indicated that he was going to cancel the flight. The call was subsequently terminated.

24. A further issue which operated on my mind in not authorising the flight were the legal issues associated with Dr. Flegg's request. I was of the view at the time of the request and am still of the view that under the DMA, I am not authorised to accede to Dr Flegg's request. The reasons for this are that although the DMA authorises me to acquire resources for the purposes of responding to a disaster there is no provision which allows me to authorise someone else using an aircraft under the circumstances as requested by Dr Flegg.
25. These were by no means the only issues operating on my decision-making. Other issues included the lack of knowledge I had about practical issues such as the airworthiness of the aircraft, competence of the crew including fatigue management, operating procedures with respect to landing within the school community, CASA requirements and a range of other issues.
26. I am not aware specifically of any other private relief efforts however, generally speaking other private individuals were responsible for establishing unofficial evacuation centres and others still were involved in private self-activated relief efforts in terms of private volunteering. I have previously canvassed such issues in my earlier statement and in the interview with Commission of Inquiry personnel.

1(f) Details of the police personnel and equipment available, both operable and inoperable, in the far western suburbs during the 2010/2011 flood events including information about how such personnel and equipment were deployed and/or functioned.

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27. The Queensland Police Service has a residential police beat in the Bellbowrie area which is staffed by a police officer. In addition to this there are considerable officers and staff members who live in the Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby areas. Some of these officers were isolated during the flood event.
28. I am aware that the District Officer at Brisbane West District and the Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan North Region was aware of these officers and they were in regular contact with these officers who were being deployed to assist and work with local communities. These officers were working in difficult circumstances and were acting as local intelligence and a communication source to the planning which was occurring both within the Region and at the DDCC.
29. I don't specifically know how many such officers were isolated and operating in such area during the flood. This was something that was coordinated and managed by the District Officer, Brisbane West District. Their support was provided from the District however reprovisioning of supplies occurred from a LDMG and DDMG perspective. I am aware however that at times of necessity the DDCC requested the region (Metropolitan North Region) to undertake certain duties and that these duties were then tasked by the region to these officers on the ground. An example of this is the enquiry that was made into the circumstances of the elderly caller to ABC radio raising issue of lack of power and fresh food which was previously discussed.

1(g) Any recommendations in relation to preparing for, and responding to, future flood events in the far western suburbs.

30. Since the flood, I have tasked Superintendent Peter Fleming (Brisbane West District) with liaising with local and state government representatives as well as community groups, police and others to build capacity to deal with an event such as this in the future. He has made some inroads in terms of capacity building in this area.

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31. Clearly the major issue that confronted the communities in the western suburbs was isolation due to the extreme flooding event. Perhaps one recommendation would be that the road engineering be explored to ensure that, wherever practicable, that isolation did not occur in the future due to flooding. This would effectively mean that road and corresponding infrastructure be positioned above predetermined inundation levels.

32. A further significant issue was the access to medicines and food given that the shopping precinct was significantly inundated. This is an issue for private commercial concerns who need to consider the placement of their infrastructure however, it is recommended that there be some alternate source of foods and other essential supplies in the event of an extreme flooding event, other than those currently situated in low lying areas.

33. A further recommendation relates to power generation. Perhaps discreet and locally based alternative power generation in the western suburbs could be explored so as to ensure that there is a minimum level of power to facilitate key community activities over the course of a flooding or other disaster situation.

2. RIVER HAZARDS

2(a) Identification of those vessels or structures which became hazardous to life and private and public property (river hazards), during the 2010/2011 flood events, including in particular:

- i. the Riverwalk;*
- ii. the Moggill Ferry;*
- iii. the Drift Restaurant;*
- iv. CityCat terminals;*
- v. Dockside Marina;*
- vi. The Island;*



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vii. *Pontoons; and*

viii. *Boats or other vessels located in the Brisbane River.*

34. The flood situation was so severe and extreme within the Brisbane River area that any vessel or infrastructure which became loose had the potential to cause loss of life or damage to infrastructure either private or public. There were some specific issues of great concern. These included the following:

The Riverwalk – in which a number of large sections of the walkway became adrift and floated down the Brisbane River at considerable speed. In each case the risk to private assets such as pontoons and other vessels were high. The risk of such sections striking City Cat terminals and Bridge pylons was equally high. I am unaware of any damage caused by the Riverwalk.

The Moggill Ferry – the risk associated with the Moggill becoming loose was high. I was particularly concerned with the personal risks to the crew who were onboard and to critical infrastructure downstream. Should the Ferry strike the Jindalee Bridge or other critical infrastructure then this would have grave consequences for the crew on board as well as the structure impacted.

The Drift Restaurant – The risks associated with the Drift Restaurant becoming loose and moving downstream were high. I was concerned with such eventuality which could impact on the loss of life of those onboard including the owner and the owner's agent as well as rescue personnel. In addition to this the risks associated with critical infrastructure were high.

Dockside Marina – There were grave concerns for the Dockside Marina. Advice was received at the height of the flood that the entire marina complex including vessels was nearing the point where it would leave its current position and flow downstream. This would have had significant concerns for downstream infrastructure not to mention the damage to the marina and vessels themselves.

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The Island – was a source of great concern given the size and weight of the structure. The crew was onboard during the flood event and if the vessel had moved involuntarily from its mooring the potentiality for loss of life was great. The risk to critical infrastructure was also very high given the nature of the vessel.

35. The above issues are by no means exhaustive. There were considerable amounts of vessels and pontoons which left their positions and floated downstream causing risks to property and public safety.
36. The particular risks and the strategies employed to deal with them have been detailed in the document titled, *'Brisbane Flood 2011 – Chronology of Events Relevant to DDC, Brisbane Decision Making'*. This has been previously provided to the Commission of Inquiry and is attached here as **Annexure C**.

2(b) Details of the information received by the DDMG/DDC during the 2010/2011 flood events regarding the river hazards in the Brisbane river, including the source/s of that information, when it was received, the nature of the hazard identified and the risk/s presented thereby.

2(c) Details of the advice received from key stakeholders, such as Maritime Safety Queensland, or other external agencies, in respect of any river hazards during the 2010/2011 flood events and when it was received.

2(d) Details of the action/s taken by the DDMG/DDC in response to any threats posed by river hazards in the Brisbane River, including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.

37. Questions 2(b), (c) & (d) all relate to common themes such as the nature of the river hazard, information gleaned and from whom, identification of key stakeholders and the actions taken to resolve the threat. Given the difficulty of

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
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addressing these three questions in isolation, I will address each question within the context of the below response.

38. I would point out however that I have previously discussed such issues within the context of the interview with Commission of Inquiry personnel at the interview of 28 March 2011. Such interview including my responses to such questions is recorded in **Annexure A**.
39. I have also prepared a document titled, *'Brisbane Flood 2011 – Chronology of Events Relevant to DDC, Brisbane Decision Making'*. This document has previously been forwarded to the Commission of Inquiry and is referred to as **Annexure C**. This document in specific detail addresses the issues raised above in question 2(b), (c) & (d). I will however deal with some of the more notable issues given the considerable issues that were dealt with.
40. At 1510hrs on Tuesday, 11 January 2011, I received advice from the XO DDC (Sen. Sgt. Darren Madgwick) and Mr Justin Williams (Maritime Safety Queensland – MSQ) that the Drift Restaurant was in significant difficulty. I was advised by the XO that the restaurant was being held down by chains and that the restaurant was taking on water and now listing on one side. I was further advised that the owner/s were on board and others associated with the restaurant and that QFRS personnel were also on site. I was further advised that there were attempts being taken by QFRS personnel, at the request of the owners, to cut the chains which held the restaurant in position in order to allow it to float up and there were serious concerns raised about this course. Mr Justin Williams (MSQ) specifically advised that there were serious concerns about cutting the chains as the vessel could float downstream rapidly posing a threat to critical infrastructure. I was also concerned about reports of personnel being on the vessel at the time. Mr Williams also advised that his view was shared by Captain Richard Johnston, Regional Harbour Master and that both were of the considered view that there should not be any attempts to cut the chains. Captain Johnston forwarded an email to me on 1533hrs on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 confirming previous advices of Mr Williams and advising me that his considered



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
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view was the lines should not be cut to the restaurant given risks to downstream critical infrastructure. In my conversations with Mr Williams I asked him what would occur if rescue/salvage attempts were not carried out. His advice to me was that the vessel would, in all probability, sink at this current mooring and not move from its current position thereby obviating risk to critical infrastructure.

41. Having regard for the nature of the advice and the critical timeframes involved I made the decision, having regard for the powers contained under the DMA for all attempts at maintaining rescue of the vessel were to cease immediately and that all persons currently on the vessel were to vacate immediately.
42. Captain Johnston later sent an email to me at 1906hrs (Tuesday, 11 January 2011) indicating that the barge that has the restaurant is now aground and will not move. In this email he also indicated that he was monitoring the situation with 'The Island', which is a large, self-propelled barge moored on the opposite side of the River from the Drift Restaurant.
43. The Island posed significant challenges for me during this event. I worked with MSQ to develop a strategy to further protect the vessel from becoming loose from its current position. At 0721hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 a heavy vehicle was sourced from TMR to ensure extra security was provided to the vessel. This is just one of many instances where there was excellent collaboration between agencies.
44. As has been indicated previously the issues and risks associated with The Island were extreme. I made a request of Captain Richard Johnston and Mr Justin Williams (MSQ) to obtain expert opinion from Marine Architects and Engineers with respect to the capability of The Island to maintain its current position over the course of the flooding event. I held grave concerns that if the vessel could not be held in position then I would be forced to destroy the vessel and sink it in its current position to obviate the risk to downstream infrastructure and the risk to personal safety of the crew onboard. Marine architects and engineers were



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sourced and briefed accordingly and subsequently deployed to the scene to conduct an inspection.

45. At approx. 2020hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011, I facilitated a meeting of key stakeholders. Present at this meeting were Messer's John Kircher and Tommy Ericson who were Marine Architects/Engineers. The detail of the conversations and information conveyed to and by Kircher and Ericson are recorded at length on page 8 of **Annexure C**. Given the advice conveyed by Kircher and Ericson and others at the meeting I made the decision that I would maintain the crew on the vessel and ensure that the vessel was powered to relieve the pressure on the lines. The decision was also to continue efforts to secure the vessel to the current site and further that the vessel would be reprovisioned with fuel. I would also point out however, that I had previously made a request to the SDCC for the Royal Australian Navy to preposition to the site and to give me a capability to sink the vessel should the need arise. I am pleased to say that this course was not employed and that the vessel, having regard for the reprovisioning of fuel and extra security of the lines, maintained its position during the flood event.
46. Advice was received at about 0951hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 that a section of the Drift Restaurant had broken free and was about to impact the Go Between Bridge. Due to the size of the section of floating restaurant there was no damage caused to any infrastructure. The portion of the restaurant that broke away was not the main restaurant but a separate smaller and lighter pontoon which abutted the restaurant to the west of the existing restaurant.
47. Advice was received from Mr Justin Williams at approx. 0710hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011, that the cables which facilitate travel of the Moggill Ferry have 'let go' overnight and there were real fears that the vessel would leave its current position and impact critical infrastructure downstream. It was established that the master of the vessel was on board with his crew and that the vessel was tethered to a large gum tree on the banks of the Brisbane River. At about 1700hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 a 1.5 tonne anchor was


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
CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

sourced by MSQ and ADF assets were acquired to deliver this anchor to the site of the Moggill Ferry. The anchor was subsequently attached and the risk of the ferry becoming loose and crew being injured or killed was averted.

48. Advice was received at the DDCC at approx. 1200hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 concerning significant debris including a yacht which was trapped around the BP oil pipeline located at Whyte's Island. Advice later received from MSQ (at 1400hrs) that the yacht has been cleared from the pipeline and subsequently presented no further hazard.

49. Advice was received from the DDC XO to suggest that the Brisbane River Walkway would come away when the Brisbane River reached the 5 metre mark and therefore would float down the river thereby possibly impacting with the Gateway Bridge. I sought advice from Mr Tony Slocombe (Transport and Main Roads) regarding what would be the consequences of an impact between the floating walkway and the Gateway Bridge. Advice was received from Mr Slocombe (TMR) at about 1740hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 that the Riverwalk if it was to become loose and impact the Gateway Bridge would not cause a significant issue as the bridge was designed to be survive impaction by a large ship. Despite this advice whenever a section of the walkway would become loose and drift down the Brisbane River appropriate notifications would be made to MSQ who would in turn notify shipping in and around the lower reaches of the River. A further strategy I employed was to close the Gateway Bridge to all traffic whilst the threat was present. Once the section of walkway would float out of the proximity of the Bridge the roadway would again be opened to traffic. This provided an extra tier of safety for the public. On a number of occasions Water Police vessels and private tug boats intercepted these pieces of walkway and shepherd them through the lower reaches of the Brisbane River.

50. At 1430hrs on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 I sought assistance from the ADF and/or Mines and Energy for a capability to demolish the Riverwalk. The strategy I wished to employ was to break the Riverwalk into much smaller pieces



(Witness's signature)




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
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
CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

so that when it broke from its current position it would not breakaway in one long length. This would therefore mean that the sections of the walkway would be smaller, have less mass and would be more easily managed. In any event if there was to be an impaction with critical infrastructure (particularly the Gateway Bridge) then the risk of damage would be significantly reduced. Given that this infrastructure is the property of the Brisbane City Council I telephoned Mr Colin Jensen (CEO, BCC) and briefed him of my decision. He concurred with this course.

51. Unfortunately given the strength of the river flow and the significant issues associated with accessing the Riverwalk to place explosives, this course could not be progressed. The risks associated with loss of life in attempting this course were too great and attempts to demolish the walkway were abandoned.
52. I ordered my DDC XO to meet other police on site at the Riverwalk to conduct a reconnaissance of the situation and report back to me. Whilst conducting this operation the DDC XO reported back to me significant risks associated with the Dockside Marina complex. The risks at this time were that as the water level was rising in the river at about the same time that the Riverwalk would become loose then the Dockside Marina would experience the same phenomena. The effect of this would be that a large marina together with pontoons and vessels would become loose and rapidly drift downstream.
53. I recall assembling the key stakeholders within the DDMG and conducted an urgent planning meeting to develop strategies to minimise the risk of the marina becoming adrift. Unfortunately there was nothing that was within the capability of the District to address this issue. I telephoned the SDCC and spoke to Chief Superintendent Alistair Dawson and advised him that I was making a formal and urgent requirement of the State for any assistance they could provide. After a short period of time he telephoned me back and advised that this situation was outside of the capability of the State and that there was nothing that State could do under the circumstances.


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

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CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**


54. I also received an email from Captain Johnston (MSQ) regarding the need to develop a strategy for the recovery of numerous pontoons, boats and large debris that had been washed from the Brisbane River into Moreton Bay. Captain Johnston identified the need to develop such a plan once the crisis was averted and in the interests of getting the Port of Brisbane back functioning at the earliest opportunity.
55. There were numerous other advices received relevant to hazards on the Brisbane River. These are contained in detail in the document titled, 'Brisbane Flood 2011 – Chronology of Events Relevant to DDC, Brisbane Decision Making'. This document has previously been forwarded to the Commission of Inquiry and is referred to as **Annexure C**.

2(e) Any recommendations to mitigate or manage the risks posed by potential river hazards in the Brisbane river during future flood events.

56. The risks posed by the Moggill Ferry were caused as a result of no permanent anchorage point to chain the vessel and keep it drifting downstream. This would be alleviated with the location of a permanent anchorage point. I have had discussions with personnel from MSQ who have self-identified this issue. I believe that work is progressing on this issue.
57. Other risks caused to infrastructure were caused as a result of the risk to them leaving their current positions due to the extreme flooding event. Vessels such as The Island could have been moved from the Brisbane River at an earlier time alleviating risks to both the vessel and downstream infrastructure. The recommendation would therefore be that all vessels at risk are removed from the environs of the Brisbane River at an early opportunity.
58. Other risks relating to the Dockside Marina and Floating Walkway relate to engineering issues. I would point out that this same phenomena is relevant to private marinas and pontoons also. Engineering needs to take cognisance of the


(Witness's signature)


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CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

potential heights of river flooding and the engineering solution needs to remedy this potential threat as much as is possible. I acknowledge that this was an extreme event and is something that is now being proposed within the context of hindsight.


3. BRISBANE MARKETS PRECINCT AT ROCKLEA
(ROCKLEA MARKETS)

3(a) Details of the information received by the DDMG/DDC regarding the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the Rocklea markets, including the source/s of that information and when it was received.

3(b) Details of the actions/s taken by the DDMG/DDC in response to the impact of the 2010/2011 flood events on the Rocklea Markets, including details of the resources deployed in support of such actions and of any inter-agency cooperation.

59. The Rocklea Markets provide an essential service to the city of Brisbane and supply fresh fruit and vegetables and other food stuffs. I became aware through different sources including the media and local police of the scale of the devastation to the Rocklea Markets. The entire complex was totally effected and non-operational. Power to the complex was also non-functional. I received information that there were media reports of panic buying at supermarkets in the Brisbane area and stocks of fresh fruit and vegetables were being consumed rapidly. There were media reports that suggested that in some shopping centres that there was no fresh fruit or vegetable to purchase.

60. I was extremely concerned that the markets may be effected for a protracted amount of time and that this would be critical to the recovery effort. I knew that access to fresh fruit and vegetables was not only a practical necessity but it was an emotional and psychological issue of great importance to the 'health' of the community. I was of the view that having no fruit and vegetables was sending a



(Witness's signature)




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(Signature of police officer
preparing statement)

CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

message to the community that we were devastated as a community and a long way from recovery.

61. I therefore developed a strategy to repatriate functionality back to the Rocklea Markets as quickly as possible. This occurred on Saturday, 15 January 2011. The strategy required access to the site, clearing of the site including the removal of spoilt produce, energising the site and restoration of essential services to enable trade. I then convened a DDMG meeting and identified to all stakeholders that I wanted them to prioritise the Rocklea Markets. I tasked the ADF to enlist the services of their Engineering Corp to bring to bear heavy equipment and personnel. I requested TMR to ensure access to the site was facilitated. I requested the Energex representative to ensure that power was restored to the traffic lights outside of the complex as the first priority and then power to the appropriate areas of the site to facilitate the clean up and then trade was necessary. I also requested QFRS with ensuring that there were sufficient personnel to facilitate the clean up of the site. I also requested assistance of the Brisbane City Council given their responsibilities in waste removal. I raised this issue at a number of LDMG meetings and requested the BCC assist with the clean up effort.
62. During the flood event there were many examples of good practice particularly where agencies from the Commonwealth, State and local Government came together to work collaboratively to resolve a significant issue. There is no better example however than the Rocklea Markets. In a very quick timeframe we were able to move approximately 4,353 tonnes of waste from the markets and surrounding cold rooms. Within a very short timeframe the Rocklea Markets had resumed partial services and fruit and vegetables were flowing back into stores in Queensland. I would submit that this had the potential to provide a much needed both practical and morale boost to the people of Queensland.
63. With respect to the Rocklea Markets I dealt with this issue during the interview I had with Commission of Inquiry personnel at the interview on 28 March 2011. The transcript of this is attached at **Annexure A**.


(Witness's signature)


(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/
Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

(Signature of police officer
preparing statement)

3(c) Any recommendations to mitigate, and respond to, the potential impact of future flood events on the Rocklea Markets.

64. The Rocklea Markets are sited on particularly low lying areas and in what I would describe as a 'flood plain'. Other than relocating the markets the site offers significant difficulties in terms of mitigation from flooding. I would however recommend that there be a consideration of strategies which might assist in ensuring, should another flood of similar proportions occur again, that there be an assessment of the site to ensure that power generation and electricity supply is protected, wherever possible against flooding. This would ensure, wherever possible, that electricity restoration would occur within the quickest possible timeframes to both facilitate the recovery effort and to restore functionality to the complex.


4. EVACUATION CENTRES


4(a) Details of any policies or procedures for managing contacts with unofficial evacuation centres.


65. During the event I was made aware of several unofficial evacuation centres that were identified in the Brisbane District Disaster area. The three centres that were known to me were:

- i. Bellbowrie
- ii. Karana Downs
- iii. Yeronga

66. The Bellbowrie centre was located at the Bellbowrie State School and the adjacent Moggill Road Uniting Church. These western suburbs were isolated and inaccessible by land. The centre was operated by three off duty Police Officers who were in contact with the DDCC by phone. Power was not accessible during the event and local residents attended the centre.


(Witness's signature)


(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/
Commissioner for Declarations's signature)


(Signature of police officer
preparing statement)


CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

67. The Karana Downs Centre was located at the Mt Crosby State School and was operated by staff from the school and the local community. Contact was via mobile phone.
68. The Yeronga Centre was located at the Yeronga State School and was operated by local community members including a school employee. Contact was via mobile phone.
69. There was no official policy for managing the unofficial evacuation centres at the time of the Brisbane Flood 2011. They were established by community persons or groups as they were needed. They were also driven by isolation and the fact the effected persons could not travel to official evacuation centres.

4(b) Details of any requests for assistance received from, or in respect of, any unofficial evacuation centres in the Brisbane Disaster District during the 2010/2011 flood events and response/s thereto.

70. Requests for assistance were received by the Bellbowrie and Karana Downs unofficial evacuation centres. The requests were for re-supply of food and water items and medical supplies. The requests were actioned and resources directed to ensure that the requests were delivered. I have dealt with these issues earlier in my statement under main question 1. In particular the issues associated with resupply of the western suburbs areas are contained in the document titled, *'Issues involving resupply of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby'*. This document has previously been supplied to the Commission of Inquiry and is attached here as **Annexure C**.

4(c) Details of any issues arising out of the establishment of unofficial evacuation centres in the Brisbane Disaster District during the 2010/2011 flood events, including any secondary evacuations that became necessary.



(Witness's signature)



(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/
Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

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preparing statement)


CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**


71. There were no secondary evacuations from any unofficial evacuation centre. I was informed that there were concerns for the Yeronga Centre and consideration was given for the centre to be moved, however, I have received further information that this was not necessary. In my interview with Commission of Inquiry staff on 28 March 2011 I indicated that my view was that the Yeronga unofficial evacuation centre required evacuation however, further advice received subsequent to this casts doubt on whether this evacuation moved beyond the planning phase and therefore actually occurred.

4(d) Any recommendations regarding the establishment of potential evacuation centres during future flood events.

72. Unofficial evacuation centres have a place in emergency management and response. My view is that we should from an emergency management perspective it is unwise to do for the community those things which they are willing, prepared and capable to do for themselves. This is certainly the case with respect to evacuation arrangements. I would not like to recommend anything that was overly restrictive which discouraged the community from assisting their fellow community members. The evacuation centres which were established in the western suburbs and previously dealt with here in the submission are excellent examples where a local need drove the strategy. In these cases local police isolated from the flooding were able to assist these centres and provided a sense of legitimacy and governmental support.

73. There are risks however associated with the establishment of such centres. In particular the need to ensure that centres are established in locations and ways which do not add to the personal risks of the recipients of the service are of pressing need. It is also necessary to ensure that the LDCC and DDCC have knowledge of the establishment of such centres at the earliest opportunity. My intention is, at sometime in the immediate future, to build a scenario into the District Disaster Management training a scenario which will require coordination, support and assistance to evacuation centres both unofficial and official ones. I will be encouraging the Local Disaster Management Group to do similarly.


(Witness's signature)


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Commissioner for Declarations's signature)

(Signature of police officer
preparing statement)

5. PUBLIC TELEPHONE CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE

5(a) Details of any policies and procedures used by police communications centres in the Brisbane Disaster District to receive calls for assistance, including 000 calls.


5(b) Details of any information received by the DDMG/DDC regarding the overflow of public telephone calls for assistance received by police communications centres in the Brisbane Disaster District, attributable to overflow from police communications centres in Toowoomba and /or Ipswich during the 2010/2011 flood events, including the source/s of that information, and when it was received.

5(c) In respect of paragraph (b), details of the actions/s taken by the DDMG/DDC in response to that information, including the resources deployed in support of such actions or any inter-agency cooperation.

5(d) Any recommendations to address any potential issues with police communications centres receiving and responding to large volumes of public telephone calls for assistance during future flood events.

74. Policies and procedures in relation to the Brisbane Communications Centre in Brisbane do not fall under the scope of the Brisbane DDC. Issues relating to communication and communications centres are the domain of the Assistant Commissioner, Operations Support Command from a process perspective and Assistant Commissioner, Information & Communications Technology from a technological and capability perspective.

75. The Brisbane DDCC did not receive any over flow calls from any police communications centres as there is no framework for that to occur. I am not aware of any communication issues relevant to the DDCC functionality.



(Witness's signature)



(Justice of the Peace (Qual.)/
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(Signature of police officer
preparing statement)

CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

76. I am unable to offer any suggestions or recommendations for improvement of the current communications system given that I have limited knowledge of the existing system and have no information of any perceived problems that may have occurred during this event.


6. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

6(a) Details of the information management systems used by police communications centres in Toowoomba, Ipswich and Brisbane during the 2010/2011 flood events.


6(b) Details of any information received by the DDMG/DDC regarding the inability of the information management systems used by police communications centres in Toowoomba, Ipswich and Brisbane to transfer information, data or tasks during the 2010/2011 flood events, the source/s of that information and when it was received.

77. Policies and procedures in relation to the Brisbane Communications Centre in Brisbane do not fall under the scope of the Brisbane DDC. I am aware that there is a Superintendent, Communications Branch who reports directly to the Assistant Commissioner, Operations Support Command.

78. I am not aware of any issues or problems with respect to the functions of the communications systems or Communications Centres in the Brisbane area particularly relating to information transfer or data transfer or other issues impacting on the response to the Brisbane Flood 2011.



(Witness's signature)



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(Signature of police officer
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CONTINUED STATEMENT OF: **MARTIN, Peter John**

79. The information contained in this statement is provided on the basis of the knowledge, information and material currently available to me and my interpretation of the information sought by the requirement at this point in time.

Dated at Brisbane this 3rd day of May 2011.

[Redacted signature area]

Peter John MARTIN

OATHS ACT 1867 (DECLARATION)

I Peter John MARTIN do solemnly and sincerely declare that:

- (1) This written statement by me dated 3rd May 2011 and contained in pages numbered 1 to 26 is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and
- (2) I make this statement knowing that if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating in it anything I know to be false.


and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act 1867

[Redacted signature]Signature

Taken and declared before me at Alderley
this 3rd day of May 2011

Witness [Redacted]

Justice of the Peace /
Commissioner of Declarations




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(Justice of the Peace, Qualified)
Commissioner for Declarations's signature



(Signature of police officer preparing statement)



Transcript of Interview

and

Date of Interview: 28/03/2011
Location of Interview: Office of the Commission of Inquiry Brisbane
Transcribed by: M.N.R. Regional Office Staff

Tapes/ CD: 1 of

UI: Unintelligible conversation.
NB: Nick Bailey
MP: Megan Pearce
JR: Jeff Rolls
PM: Peter MARTIN, Assistant Commissioner
GO: Greg Obst
JB: Jacoba Brasch
PL: Paul Lack

1 NB: Um in, try to test it fashionable before I suppose we should
2 probably for the purposes of voice identification, announce
3 ourselves, my name is Mick Bailey, Queensland Police
4 Commission of Inquiry, um Principal Legal Officer.
5 MP: Ah Megan Pearce with the Queensland Floods Commission of
6 Inquiry and I'm a lawyer.
7 JR: Jeff Rolls, Council for the State of Queensland.
8 PM: Good afternoon, ah Peter Martin is my name, I'm the Assistant
9 Commissioner responsible for the Metropolitan North Region and
10 ah also District Disaster Coordinator for Brisbane.
11 GO: Greg Obst Acting Principle Legal Officer, QPS Solicitors Office.



12 JB: Jacoba Brasch, J-A-C-O-B-A, B-R-A-S-C-H, ah Counsel for the
13 State of Queensland.

14 PL: Paul Lack, L-A-C-K, Lawyer, Crown Law.

15 NB: Thank you, ah I should indicate it's Monday the 28th of March
16 2011. Ah look in relation to the issues that we want to cover I do
17 note that we have provided a statement to the Commission, ah
18 we've also written to you via Crown Law indicating in general
19 terms the sorts of issue we wanted to cover. Um those issues are
20 listed in the letter, although it's not, it was not intended to be
21 exhaustive.

22 PM: Yes.

23 NB: Um, however the, the issues that we do want to cover arise
24 generally out of your statement. Now to that end I thought
25 perhaps the most convenient way to proceed and I see that
26 you've got a copy of your statement there, obviously feel free to
27 refer to it.

28 PM: Yes I do, yeah.

29 NB: Ah I thought perhaps the most convenient way to proceed in the
30 circumstances would be to ah initially the place is simply work our
31 way through your statement and discuss in a little more detail
32 some areas of particular interest.

33 PM: Sure, I'm happy to do that.

34 NB: Okay. Um I might then just start by turning to paragraph six, ah
35 you list there some of the general statutory duties of the of the
36 chairperson of the DDMG. Um one of those of course it to
37 provide reports and make recommendations to the state group
38 about matters relating to disaster management and disaster
39 operations in the district, Um has anything in that regard occurred
40 post the flood event?

41 PM In short no, ah my intention is ah subject to the requirement of 23
42 of the Act to ah make a report, in fact a detail report ah but there
43 is a timeframe on that, my, my understanding is I still have some
44 months to be able to meet ah that particular requirement and so
45 at this stage I have not sent any report to the state group nor have
46 I generated a report on those terms, but my intention is to do that.

47 NB: Right, okay, in, in I suppose in more general terms is there a
48 debriefing process going on at the moment?



- 49 PM: There was a debriefing process that ah, that occurred with the
50 relevant members of the DDMG, and that had occurred some
51 weeks ago. My understanding is that ah the report that was, the
52 outcome of that debrief has been made available, I don't know
53 whether it's found its way to you yet.
- 54 NB: Mm.
- 55 PM: But its part of a wealthy, a wealth of material that we've provided
56 through QPS Solicitor to Crown Law and I believe it's making it's
57 way to you.
- 58 NB: Alright thank you.
- 59 PM: So there is a report of that process.
- 60 NB: Okay. Now paragraph 13 in your statement you refer to some
61 desktop exercises run by the local disaster management group.
62 You indicate that you attended those exercises. Did you
63 participate in any way yourself or was it as an observer?
- 64 PM: Ah that's a very good point, I went there as a, as an observer as
65 that request of the CEO of the Brisbane City Council, Colin
66 Jensen.
- 67 NB: Sure.
- 68 PM: But it became quite obvious that ah I wasn't there very long and
69 the scenarios were such that ah my expertise was useful to them
70 to be able to work their way through a range of scenarios.
- 71 NB: Right.
- 72 PM: So what happened was that I was very much drawn into the
73 problem solving and discussion and I found that incredibly
74 valuable opportunity to me to become familiar with the capacity of
75 council but also for council to become aware of me and my role
76 and so it was a quite useful exercise having regard for the fact
77 that it dealt with a broad range of scenarios.
- 78 NB: Right so in some respects it developed into a relation building
79 exercise that could be quite valuable down the track.
- 80 PM: That's very true.
- 81 NB: Um mentions made there of the participants from the BCC side
82 where the members of the Brisbane immediate action team, do
83 you recall who those people are?
- 84 PM: Ah they are people that have portfolio responsibilities for a broad
85 range of areas ah within Council.
- 86 NB: Right.



- 87 PM: It maybe waste management, transport services um and it's a
88 very senior level and these are the people that come together as
89 a problem solving forum, ah to be able to look at capacity and
90 look at response and preparation and also the recovery of a
91 disaster situation, so they were very senior people chaired by the
92 CEO of Council Colin Jensen, who ah, who took the leadership
93 role.
- 94 NB: So that ... if I could put it this way, effectively the heads of
95 department within Council?
- 96 PM: That was my ah, that certainly was my belief at the level of these
97 particular people. I saw them as very much director level of ah
98 key responsibilities of council.
- 99 NB: Yeah, okay. How many where there roughly?
- 100 PM: My understanding there was probably in the vicinity of 18 or so,
101 quite a large group.
- 102 NB: Um alright just moving on to paragraph 18, um you referred to the
103 fact that, that on the 9th of December 2010 the XO attended a
104 meeting with EMQ, BCC and DOCS, is that the Department of
105 Community Safety?
- 106 PM: Ah yes it is, that's correct.
- 107 NB: Okay ah and your XO you may of referred to him in your report
108 but um ...
- 109 PM: Um that's ah Acting Inspector Dave Morganti attended that
110 meeting on my behalf.
- 111 NB: Okay and it was the purpose of the meeting was to explore
112 identified gaps in evacuation procedures between emergency
113 evacuations and longer term placements.
- 114 PM: Correct.
- 115 NB: Can you just explain a bit more what, what that means and what
116 the outcomes where perhaps.
- 117 PM: In particular um the work with respect of setting up an evacuation
118 centre is well progressed, ah there are plans,
- 119 NB: Yes.
- 120 PM: for how that should occur and where those centres could be
121 located, and there is an understanding across the key
122 stakeholders in terms of um, you know, individual roles and
123 responsibilities to achieve that. The issue for us though is that we
124 know that if you stand up an evacuation centre, the reality is that



125 you are going to procure ah people that need to be evacuated
126 and you are going to also ah entice to those centres a boarder
127 range of people that some degree are going to be well catered for
128 but are probably are not going to want to leave there, and so the
129 nature of this, ah conversation was around well how do we
130 transitions an evacuation centre into potentially more of a
131 recovery centre to look at the medium of the longer term needs of
132 the people that actually use that, and more over if the centre,
133 bearing in mind that an evacuation centre is very much for short
134 term need, if these people don't have a home and if these people
135 were to be very significantly disadvantaged to the point where
136 they don't have support systems and what have you then how do
137 we look for a more medium and longer term fit with respect to the
138 need of these people, and so very much was a case of saying
139 well um the set up of the evacuation centre is the, is the domain
140 of the local government, it's at the local level, but the range of
141 support from other ah, other sectors but the reality is that medium
142 and longer term placement is the domain of DOCS, and what we
143 need to do is make sure DOCS are very, very clear as to the
144 terms of their role with respect to that, and ah, and the meeting
145 was specifically designed to have that conversation.

146 NB: Is that the first such meeting in terms of this type of thinking or is it
147 an evolving process that's been ongoing?

148 PM: I'm sorry I can't tell you that because I've only recently taken over
149 my role at Metropolitan North Region,

150 NB: Sure.

151 PM: for the latter part of October and naturally enough my ah the
152 changes that occurred with respect to legislation only came on
153 board on the first of November, so the reality is I'm not sure what
154 occurred ah before I came into the Region with respect to that.

155 NB: Yep, okay. How, how did things progress in terms of developing a
156 policy or a protocol or some form of memory of understanding or
157 what have you ... where are we at?

158 PM: Well my understanding is that there was, it was very productive
159 meeting.

160 NB: Mm.

161 PM: Um there was a general agreement ah across the room with
162 respect to what needed to occur and more over it was put into,



163 into effect, to good effect in January, in the middle part of January
164 where we actually stood up a number of very large evacuation
165 centres and transitioned a lot of, a number of people requiring um
166 more of a medium and longer term solution, and that was
167 transitioned over to DOCS very effectively so the conversation
168 that was had paid dividend in terms of the work that occurred ah
169 weeks after that.

170 NB: So it produced immediate results.

171 PM: It produced immediate, it produced very good results.

172

173 NB: Now when you talk about standing up evacuation centres, I take it
174 you're referring principally to major BCC ones?

175 PM: That's correct

176 NB: That's the RNA Showgrounds?

177 PM: That's right.

178 NB: And QEII

179 PM: That's correct.

180 NB: Did the discussions deal with any other centres or is it really
181 restricted to those major ones?

182 PM: My understanding and bearing in mind I wasn't at that meeting
183 and despite the first dot point here that talks the fact that I was at
184 that meeting, my statement indicates that it was the Executive
185 Officer that was there, so I guess to some degree that I'm relaying
186 to you is in fact third hand and my understanding of what occurred
187 at that particular meeting, so I just need to clarify that particular
188 point. My understanding is that there was a talk fairly generically
189 about evacuation centres irrespective of where they occur.

190 NB: The dot point you refer to Assistant Commissioner is the letter
191 from the Qld Flood Commission of Enquiry dated 24 March 2011
192 addressed to you, is that the letter?

193 PM: That's correct.

194 NB: That is the first dot point in that letter?

195 PM: It's the first dot point. I just wanted to make that point that I wasn't
196 personally at that meeting.

197 NB: Sure. Alright. Did your XO report to you I take it, report to you at
198 some level about that, or had discussions in full or otherwise
199 about the outcome of that particular meeting?

200 PM: Yes I have.



201 NB: Would you or he know who the responsible persons were for
202 BCC, EMQ, DOCs, or is that something you would be able to
203 ascertain?

204 PM: My understanding that the people who attended that meeting on 9
205 December were in fact the Brisbane Operations Manager for the
206 Brisbane City Council, Mr Chris Lavin. There was also the District
207 Management Co-ordinator for the Brisbane City Council who was
208 Peter Hillcoat. There was also the Emergency Management
209 Queensland Local Area Director, David Mazzaferri. There was
210 also the Assistant Regional Director for the Dept of Communities,
211 DOCs. A Samantha Hicks and Carolyn Parsons from Red Cross
212 were present at that meeting. Can I also reiterate that my
213 Executive Officer was David Morganti.

214 NB: I suppose while we're on the topic of evacuation centres, moving
215 on to paragraph 33 with your statement, you refer to several
216 smaller self activated unofficial evacuation centres which were
217 initiated in Brisbane that sprung out of local planning largely by
218 members of the community who self assessed their local need.
219 There were approximately seven of those centres. Are you able
220 to indicate for us where those centres arose, where they were
221 located and so forth?

222 PM: My understanding that the range of unofficial evacuation centres,
223 some of those were at, just bear with me for one sec, some of
224 those were schools at Yeronga, there was a centre established at
225 a church out at Moggill Bellbowrie and there were a number of
226 other reports of centres springing up. They were really quite small
227 in terms of capable volume but specifically I don't have the record
228 here in front of me at the present time in respect of where those
229 centres are, but I can easily find that. But we were getting reports
230 at the DDCC from a number of centres that were coming though
231 from local centres that were starting to spring up and request for
232 Government support for some of those centres and of course the
233 problem is for those unofficial centres is that it is to some degree
234 a concern having regard to the fact that there needs to be a very
235 sensible level of planning occur with respect of where these
236 centres are sited, because naturally enough places like Yeronga
237 and what have you to set up an evacuation centre at a school at
238 Yeronga, the last thing you want to do is to set this up that you



239 actually got to evacuate people from evacuation centre and
240 naturally enough Yeronga was fairly significantly hit by the flood
241 event.

242 NB: Did that in fact occur with Yeronga -

243 PM: That is my understanding.

244 NB: that they in fact set up a centre and then subsequently had to be
245 evacuated?

246 PM: Had to be evacuated and so resources will need to be brought to
247 bear to facilitate that and that's the problem with the well-meaning
248 people that they use evidence basis for the creation of their
249 centres. It makes it very difficult to maintain and support but
250 moreover the risk of public safety is high.

251 NB: Yes. Using Yeronga as the example, were there any other
252 centres which spring to mind that from your point of view
253 presented as, or created particular difficulties and if one of these
254 centres becomes established and then has to be evacuated
255 creates a situation that is obviously undesirable from your point of
256 view, were there any other examples of that nature that you
257 recall?

258 PM: Yeronga is the probably the most extreme example, but I am not
259 aware of other evacuation centres that were established that had
260 to be evacuated.

261 NB: How many at the point in time of which the evacuation had to
262 occur, how many people did that involve in terms of people
263 seeking shelter at the centre?

264 PM: From Yeronga? I'm not sure, I'm sorry I don't know how many
265 people there at the material time. Because the numbers at the
266 evacuation centres even the larger ones at the RNA and also the
267 QEII Stadium fluctuated wildly hour to hour.

268 NB: Alright well you can provide us details of where those other
269 organic centres sprung up.

270 PM: I am certainly happy to come back to you with the specific
271 locations of the unofficial evacuation centres.

272 NB: Well that would be helpful thanks. Moving onto paragraph 36 but
273 becomes part of 35, you refer to full meeting of DDMG members
274 was held each morning to discuss current intelligence to the
275 resourcing co-ordination and deployment issues and then you
276 refer in the next paragraph that each agency was provided with



277 the opportunity to make a report to the group. What was the
278 particular membership of the Brisbane DDMG? Who were you
279 dealing with?

280 PM: Having regard to the size and the scale of the Brisbane area what
281 I find is naturally enough even the Chair of the DDMG for
282 Brisbane is at Assistant Commissioner level where normally it
283 would be at Inspector or Superintendent level around the State.
284 The reason for the elevated level for Brisbane is naturally enough
285 the spand of control, the size, the complexity, most of the critical
286 infrastructure from a counter terrorism perspective lives the
287 greater Brisbane area so having regard for the fact that the Chair
288 is at Assistant Commissioner level the other agency
289 representatives at least to my mind are at a fairly significant level
290 as well and that seems to be right across the board. To give an
291 example, the DDMG rep from the Qld Fire and Rescue Service is
292 at Chief Superintendent level. Now you would never get a Chief
293 Superintendent at another district group anywhere in the State, I
294 wouldn't image. It would be at a much lower level, it would be at
295 officer level. We had for example from Maritime Safety
296 Queensland a fairly senior representation in terms of the Harbour
297 Master, Richard Johnson, who in very many cases would either
298 be at the meeting personally or at the DDCC at the critical time of
299 decision making or alternatively at my fingertips should I need to
300 get a specialist capability that lives in his domain. So the level of
301 those people right across the board that at least to my mind
302 seems to be at a very senior level.

303
304 NB Alright, um well as you can appreciate we've not only tried to build
305 a big picture of what occurred because the events involve seventy
306 percent of Queensland where we are trying to do our particular
307 picture of nuts and bolts. So you've got a Chief Superintendent
308 from Queensland Fire and Rescue, who is that by the way?

309 PM Um.

310 NB Is he or she a permanent?

311 PM Yes he is the permanent representative for the Queensland Fire
312 and Rescue Service assigned to the DDMG, yes, and as I said
313 the Chief Superintendent level. And when he was replaced um,
314 you know after a twelve hour shift and he was fatigued he would



315 be replaced by somebody of a comparable rank and level from
316 Queensland Fire and Rescue. And that individual is Ron James
317 from the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. And equally a
318 broad range of other representatives from Queensland Health
319 from Energex from Transport and Main Roads from Maritime
320 Safety Queensland and um the ur the Australian Defence Forces
321 were all that very senior director type of level or um under director
322 and commissioned officer level within the ADF so they were at a
323 very senior level. And that is probably unsurprising having regard
324 for as I said the span of controls and the issues that Brisbane
325 were grappling with that are quite unique.

326 NB Did you have someone from Urban Utilities?

327 PM My understanding is that we did, it is a very large group and I just
328 can't tell you who that is but I am certainly happy to make a
329 staffing list of the DDMG available to you.

330 NB That would be helpful.

331 PM Most certainly.

332 NB Now again referring back to paragraph 36, you give by way of an
333 example the sorts of issues that could have been raised and
334 developed out of session and out of session time. Energex
335 representative access to locked buildings in the BCD within
336 Brisbane. So those buildings needed to be re-energised and there
337 were access difficulties. What was the outcome? You say the
338 strategy was developed to give access, what transpired from that
339 point?

340 PM I um, at a critical time of decision making which was in the um, in
341 the immediate aftermath of the flooding as the water was
342 subsiding, Energex, the Energex rep within the DDMG made an
343 approach to me and my deputy chair of the DDMG that he
344 needed to access fairly critical infra structure within the BCD of
345 Brisbane specifically to get access to the buildings so that he
346 would re-energising either the building itself or alternatively parts
347 of the city. And what he indicated was that he was having
348 significantly difficulty in terms of accessing the sight but more over
349 getting the details of the key holders to facilitate access to
350 Energex staff into these various buildings. What he'd requested of
351 me was to use my special powers under the Disaster
352 Management Act to force entry to these premises. What I did was



353 I indicated to him that in extreme circumstances I would be
354 prepared to use those powers to facilitate that but I would want
355 certain assurances that there were things done before that
356 occurred. The first thing was that they had exhausted all of their
357 local information and intelligence sources to identify the
358 appropriate key holder and secondly that they had consulted with
359 us to make sure that we didn't have independent means to be
360 able to access those particular people through our intelligence
361 holdings and what have you.

362 NB By that do you mean QPS?

363 PM QPS yes that is quite so. The other thing that I indicated to him is
364 that I would never support forced entry to a premise unless a
365 Queensland Police officer was there receiving personal direction
366 from me with respect to access to those, to the building and then
367 access to the building would only by via the use of a locksmith
368 and not necessarily damage to the infra structure. So my intention
369 was ultimately to make sure that we ever mostly and had explored
370 all opportunities to be able to find the appropriate person and that
371 was had tried to through the good will of the key holder gain
372 access and if it was absolutely critical that I would provide a
373 direction but that direction would be to a police officer to use a
374 locksmith to facilitate access to the premise. And as a result of
375 putting that into place and as a result of that strategy we were
376 able to identify the appropriate people and at least to my mind I'm
377 not aware of any situation where I had to use those special
378 powers to force entry. Because the strategy was sound, we were
379 able to find the appropriate people. I was prepared to use that but
380 only if the circumstances were met.

381 NB In most cases I take it they were building managers were they?

382 PM In most cases they would have been building managers, an
383 appropriate person that would have had access to the plant
384 equipment that was entered that Energex would have needed to
385 have access to.

386 NB Those efforts you said commenced immediately or very shortly
387 after the flood peak that we are talking about Friday, Thursday or
388 Friday?

389 PM We are talking about here.

390 NB The thirteenth or fourteenth of January?



- 391 PM We would definitely be talking here about late on Thursday into
392 Friday and certainly over the course of the weekend where the
393 efforts were very much to do two things. They were to clear
394 access to the streets to give Energex access to the buildings and
395 secondly access to the buildings themselves to allow re-
396 energising of the properties in as quick as possible time.
- 397 NB Look I take it that Energex are the best ones to talk to about the
398 appropriate order of in which that occurred?
- 399 PM Yes most certainly and that list that I was talking about before in
400 terms of the DDMG members will particularise the particular
401 individual that we dealt with from Energex.
- 402 NB Now a further example in that same paragraph is the specialist
403 advice you received from a marine architect or engineer and that
404 advice came from someone in the Maritime Safety Queensland?
- 405 PM That is correct.
- 406 NB Is that in fact the Harbour Master you've referred to earlier?
- 407 PM No in that particular case it was the Harbour Master's
408 representative who was an officer by the name of Justin Williams
409 from Maritime Safety Queensland.
- 410 NB Sorry, now we've got a name if we could step back and talk about
411 the advice in fact that you were giving?
- 412 PM That's fine. What happened was that I had reached a stage in
413 terms of making a very critical and a very immediate decision with
414 respect to a self propelled barge called The Island and what I had
415 requested was a specialist and very detailed knowledge around
416 the capability and performance of that vessel that didn't exist with
417 the representative of the Maritime Safety Queensland. So what I
418 did was I tasked Justin Williams to consult with the Harbour
419 Master Richard Johnson to give me an expert advice from a
420 marine engineer and or architect that had knowledge of that
421 particular vessel and could give me some indication as to the
422 ability of that vessel to stay on station during the peak flood event
423 so as to not leave its current position and cause damage to
424 downstream infrastructure.
- 425 NB Where was that vessel on station?
- 426 PM That vessel was moored to it was moored on the southern side of
427 the Brisbane River around about the West End South Brisbane
428 reach of the river.



429 NB Near Orleigh Park or somewhere in that vicinity?
430 PM I'm not sure where Orleigh Park is but it is near the concrete
431 bashing plant there near the rugby.
432 NB The Hanson Plant?
433 PM Correct, it is normally situated there and in fact it was moored
434 there when the flood event had, was occurring and while it had
435 peaked.
436 NB Ultimately the vessel didn't create a problem is that right it
437 remained securely moored?
438 PM The strategy we put in place was to ultimately shore up the vessel
439 to increase the mooring points to increase the lines to the vessel
440 to tighten the vessel to resupply it with fuel and to leave a crew on
441 board over the peak tide event to make sure that it was holding
442 against the strain of the ropes so it wasn't swept down stream and
443 cause a risk to the life of the people on board the crew or took out
444 the infrastructure down stream.
445 NB I take it from everything that you've said you managed to get the
446 advice you were seeking?
447 PM I did.
448 NB I mean tasked the individual in question?
449 PM Most certainly.
450 NB You got the advice you needed or they had particular knowledge
451 of the capability of the vessel?
452 PM What I did, I facilitated bearing in mind that around The Island
453 was actually flood, I developed a strategy into actually get those
454 people onto the vessel to make an inspection of the vessel and
455 they came back to the DDCC and gave me a personal briefing
456 together with other key people that had facilitate me to making a
457 decision in respect to the vessel. And their advice was very much
458 on point and assisted me greatly in my decision.
459 NB And when did that occur on the scheme of things, do you recall? I
460 mean it may be evident from the sitreps for example?
461 PM It is evident in the sitreps and it is also evident, do you mind if I
462 have recourse to a log that I created?
463 NB Yes absolutely.
464 PM The um, that had occurred on Wednesday 12th of January around
465 about 20:20 hours, and that was the debrief of the marine
466 engineer and the architect Curtcher and Ericsson. They had given



- 467 me the briefing and I had made the decision with respect to the
468 strategy that I was going to employ with respect to the vehicle
469 being left on station.
- 470 NB The crew that remained with the vessel, were they employees of
471 The Island company?
- 472 PM My understanding was that they were the owner, the owner's
473 representatives and the private crew.
- 474 NB Did you take specialist marine advice for any other purpose other
475 than The Island, for any other particular potential river hazard?
476 For example the river walk infrastructure.
- 477 PM I took advice from Council, I received from the CEO of Council
478 with respect to that particular piece of infrastructure I had received
479 a powerpoint presentation with respect to the design of the River
480 Walk that had to be sent to me by e-mail from the CEO of
481 Council. It was quite useful but the reality was that that was a very
482 fast moving event and more over I had a lack of opportunity to be
483 able to influence that in other ways. I had sought the services of
484 the Military and the Department of Mines to ultimately break the
485 River Walk up into manageable sections and to float that down
486 stream but the reality was that at that particular juncture we were
487 unable to get any access to the River Walk because of the risk to
488 personal safety and the fact that we were unable to get a vessel
489 to the River Walk and there was no other way to access it. So the
490 options to address that had diminished greatly.
- 491 NB Sorry, you indicated you sought assistance from ADF and the
492 Mines Department?
- 493 PM A request was made of ADF and the Mines and Energy to be able
494 to use explosives to break up the River Walk bearing in mind the
495 size of it rather than have it leave its current position in one long
496 section to actually break up into manageable sections to enable it
497 to float down stream so that it wouldn't pose a risk to other critical
498 infrastructure but access was impossible and we couldn't get
499 explosives engineers to the site, we certainly couldn't get them to
500 the River Walk.
- 501 NB Safely yes?
- 502 PM Quite correct.



503 NB When that River Walk ultimately broke its moorings and started
504 down river what were your options as the DDC at that point what
505 were your options? Very few I should imagine.

506 PM That is very true and 34.47 to 35.00 missing way either in part or
507 in total would lift from its current position and it would just pop
508 straight off the pylons that were driven into the river and at least
509 some part of it would actually float down stream. Which you are
510 quite correct, the options were to ultimately put an alert out down
511 stream for river vessels to be alert to the hazards associated with
512 this. We did that, I made a request of Justin Williams of Maritime
513 Safety Queensland to put an alert out to ships to warn them that
514 particular event. We also down stream had tugs and the Water
515 Police alert to the fact that the walkway could leave its current
516 position and the Harbour Master had tasked the tug crew in a
517 quite spectacular fashion to shepherd that or at least one part of
518 the Walk Way through the lower reaches of the Brisbane River.

519 NB The Gateway Bridge.

520 PM Out through the Gateway Bridge and so that it didn't create a
521 strike hazard to the pylons of the Gateway Bridge.

522 NB Now the Harbour Master you indicated is that?

523 PM Is Captain Richard Johnson and he is a member of the DDMG?

524 NB So they were steps taken and these fellows these harbour tug
525 captains were taking up with that?

526 PM That's right, these were private tug operators who were
527 contracted by Maritime Safety Queensland.

528 NB So they were in a sense there ready and waiting?

529 PM They are, at the lower reaches of the river. They're warned out
530 and they are alerted to this fact that the walk way is going to leave
531 its current position and may pose a potential threat to the
532 Gateway. I also make the point to also prevent risk to public
533 safety particularly with people that were accessing the Gateway
534 Bridge is that each time and there were four of these occasions,
535 the section of the walk way left its position. Bear in mind that we
536 are talking here about something is very large many thousands of
537 tonnes. It is quite a fairly significant piece of infrastructure. The
538 best advice we had from TMR was that it wouldn't cause a
539 significant detriment to the bridge, the integrity of the bridge even
540 if it had a direct strike on the pylons. But as an extra tier of



541 allowance, every time one of these sections came free we had to
542 close the traffic of the Gateway Bridge, sometimes with very little
543 notice.

544 NB The Gateway Bridge is an obvious piece of infra structure down
545 stream, were there any other sort of critical assets that you were
546 watching?

547 PM Yes most certainly, there are a number of fairly large wooden
548 hulled ships including the River Queens they called, Maritime
549 Safety Queensland were moored down stream so we were forced
550 to evacuate the crews of those ships in the event that if they had
551 of struck the wooden hold of the vessels they would of most likely
552 of sunk them and with people on board the vessels their personal
553 safety was at extreme risk. So we evacuated the crews off those
554 vessels and there were other infra structure down stream such as
555 a pipe line that ran across from, an oil pipe line that ran across
556 from Whites Island that had debris and what have you underneath
557 it that we had to free to prevent it from rupturing and causing an
558 environmental hazard, so yes there is other infra structure.

559 NB What sort of debris was causing problems with the pylons? I
560 mean are we talking about you know trees and branches and
561 things or are you talking about more substantial hazards like
562 boats and on terms like?

563 PM No we are talking about more substantial hazards um. We had
564 hundreds of pontoons released from their positions upstream but
565 in one particular situation we had a yacht stuck fast against the oil
566 pipe line and concerted efforts were made to actually clear that
567 and we cleared that and made sure there was no disruption to
568 supply and no environmental hazard would be caused so the
569 yacht was cleared off the pipe line. And actually enough the force
570 associated with the river event so strong with the yacht pressed
571 up hard against that pipeline the risk of it rupturing was identified
572 as being fairly significant.

573 NB Who owns the pipeline?

574 PM My understanding is it is the pipe line associated with the oil
575 refineries at the mouth of the river. I'm not sure who owns it but its
576 private asset is more to my understanding.

577 NB Was that shut down, was the supply in fact shut down or was it
578 maintained?



579 PM My understanding was and bearing in mind that we had to make
580 the inquiry to find out what its current status was, but the material
581 time that this was occurring was that my understanding was there
582 was no oil flowing through that pipe line, which gave a degree of
583 comfort.

584 NB When you say inquiries had to be made, I take it these were
585 inquiries created from the District Disaster Coordination Centre?

586 PM That is correct.

587 NB Which is at Police Headquarters?

588 PM That's at Police Headquarters yes.

589 NB What sort of staff did you have in the senior for the duration was it
590 a fluid or fairly static of people being relieved or how many people
591 did you have supporting you and backing you up?

592 PM We had routinely at the DDC just QPS personnel; we had myself
593 and the Deputy in the vast majority of cases. Particularly when the
594 tempo is really high and this is through from certainly Tuesday
595 through to Thursday and into Friday. There was myself there was
596 another senior officer at deputy who was the Deputy DDC, we had
597 at least one potentially two executive officers at any one time. A
598 number of other senior officers was at either commissioned officer
599 lever or senior sergeant and in some cases sergeant that were
600 the heads of various cells in that area. There were a number of
601 other people looking after things for example administration on
602 logistics, other people looking after rostering. And so we would
603 have had just police personnel in some cases around about
604 twenty twenty five, in some cases even more. Plus when the
605 tempo is really high you also had the external people there as
606 well. People for example like Maritime Safety Queensland and
607 Transport and Main Roads, Queensland Health, Queensland Fire
608 and Rescue. These people were also within the confines of the
609 coordination centre and accessible to me in terms of both briefing
610 and decision making.

611 NB Did you make the decision about how many people were going to
612 be needed at any given moment or was that something one of the
613 XO's was keeping an eye on?

614 PM That is something the XO keeps an eye on and it is something
615 that ultimately I can influence and moreover the administration
616 logistics people within the DDCC then source those particular



617 people for a particular shift. So what would happen is that I would
618 inevitably leave that to the executive officer but I had a very firm
619 view and it would express that in terms of if I thought we needed
620 more staff or alternatively if we needed to have a level of
621 capability that didn't exist within that group at the particular time at
622 times they sourced that.

623 NB You were able to get access to the resources you needed?

624 PM Absolutely, absolutely.

625 NB In terms of QPS staff and others?

626 PM In terms of QPS staff whatever resources I deemed were
627 reasonable convenient to me and I could give affect to that fairly
628 significantly. With respect to the other personnel, I had significant
629 influence over the people who would attend. Naturally enough, my
630 role as a coordinator, I don't have direct leadership in my control
631 of those particular people in terms of resourcing but I could
632 influence them quite strongly in terms of, for example if I called a
633 DDMG meeting to make sure we were represented by particular
634 people around the DDMG table.

635 NB Was your ability to do that in your view enhanced by your own
636 rank, the fact that you are an Assistant Commissioner?

637 PM I believe that is the case.

638 NB That hasn't always been the case I mean that is a fairly new
639 development is that right?

640 PM No that is correct. That certainly was not the case before the first
641 of November but I have no doubt that my rank provided some
642 influence to the level of support that was garnered from other
643 agencies.

644 NB So that is a positive?

645 PM I see it as a positive thing.

646 NB Yes.

647 PM Yes.

648 NB Look, while we are on the subject of river hazards that were
649 breaking up, were there any other particular ones of note that
650 required a particular response? I mean the Moggill Ferry was
651 ultimately secured in place although that presented a hazard for a
652 time.

653 PM Yes it did, it presented a very significant hazard not only for the
654 fact that the ferry is a very significant vessel in terms of size, it is



655 very low in the water and it is heavy. Had it of hit down stream
656 infra structure it would of no doubt of definitely caused significant
657 damage. You could imagine for example the disruption to
658 Brisbane if it had taken out the Jindalee Bridge. If it had taken out
659 the Jindalee Bridge we may not had a bridge there for some years
660 while they rebuilt and when you think about the problems to the
661 south and to the west of Brisbane in terms of access and egress
662 that was fairly significant. But more important than that it was that
663 it actually had crew people on board

664 UI

665 45:06 to identify the fact that it was a one and a half tonne crane
666 um sorry a one and a half tonne anchor and three hundred
667 metres of chain. We needed a crew with a certain degree of
668 capability. I made a request with the ADF for an aerial asset to lift
669 that crane and crew and in a two part lift we took the crew and
670 crane um and anchor on site and secured the vessel against the
671 rising time and to prevent it from leaving its current position and
672 that's what we did and the vessel remained on station. There was
673 also other risk to infra structure not of least was the Dockside
674 apartment marina that had a number of jetty fingers that were
675 about to come adrift in the same way that the floating walkway did
676 just across the river form there. And in fact there were a number
677 of ships some of these were very very large vessels that were
678 attached to the fingers and were about to come off and to be
679 swept down stream with the jetty and the damage to infra
680 structure potentially could have been quite significant. And
681 another issue that we were grappling with and there were a range
682 of these, was the situations that were unfolding. Not in series but
683 these were occurring in parallel. But another issue that we dealt
684 with as well was the Oxleys on the River now known as the Drift
685 restaurant that we also had grave concerns about but the
686 potentiality for that to be swept from its current position with the
687 loss of life and the people on board attempting salvage and to be
688 swept down stream to not only damage the restaurant but also to
689 damage critical infrastructure.

690 NB Look, you may well feel it's not your position to make any
691 recommendations in that regard but from your prospective is the



692 DDC are there any other thing that could have been done to
693 mitigate the risks presented by moored boars in those marinas?
694 PM Yes there are, my view is that it is certainly, this was a very
695 significant event, you know whether it is one in a hundred or one
696 in a thousand year the reality is that it is extreme. If the pylons
697 had of been longer we wouldn't of been in such a precarious
698 situation. I'm not a marine engineer are a marine architect but the
699 reality was that we came quite close.

700 NB See with the volume was afforded such that pontoons came up
701 and over the top.

702 PM That is quite correct, the volume of the water was such that there
703 was so much water flowing down the Brisbane River and the
704 height of it was increasing so rapidly that we came, the best
705 estimates are within sixty centimetres of the entire marina lifting
706 off the pylons and ultimately being sent down stream.

707 NB This is the Dockside one?

708 PM The Dockside so potentially one of the lessons there is that if we
709 were going to mitigate against an event like this then potentially
710 that is one way that that could happen. And that is not to be
711 critical of the engineers, I'm sure that from their prospective if it
712 may not of been foreseeable that an event like this could of
713 occurred.

714 NB Were any vessels lost from their moorings at Dockside?

715 PM I don't have any knowledge of that no.

716 NB Do you have any views about getting vessels out of the river? I
717 mean the City Cats were removed I understand.

718 PM The City Cats were taken from the Brisbane River and moored at
719 Wynnum at the marina there, which was a very very sensible
720 course. Can I say to you that with advanced notice I would
721 support any attempts made by Maritime Safety Queensland to
722 remove whatever vessels they possible could out of the Brisbane
723 River and espeically the lower reaches so the early work that was
724 done in that regard was certainly pay dividend.

725 NB Moving on to paragraph thirty eight, the ADF the details of the
726 officer, who was that person to start with?

727 PM There were a number of people there but Ian Dunn was one of
728 the people and David Bolton who were the warrant officer and or
729 commissioned officer rank level. So we were fortunate to have



730 reasonably senior representation at the ADF within the DDMG
731 itself.

732 NB You don't know the ranks of them?

733 PM I believe that David Bolton was the Warrant Officer and Ian Dunn
734 I believe was Major but I 'm not one hundred percent sure I'm
735 sorry. But again their names and rank and level are on that
736 spread sheet that we are very happy to make available to you.

737 NB Thank you yes, um, now obviously you had some specific from
738 the ADF you've mentioned the heavy lift for the anchor of the
739 Moggill Ferry.

740 PM That's right.

741 NB Um, did those requests, were they formalised in the form of one
742 of these so called ...DACs?

743 PM Yes they are, in the vast majority of those cases there would only
744 be a very very small minority of requests, there were much more
745 around strategy that would go directly to the ADF but in the vast
746 majority of these cases they were the subject of an RFA which
747 was sent direct to State with respect to a particular capability that
748 was required so it was a very formal process that was recorded
749 and logged and equally each of those requests that I have made
750 have actually gone through to you as part of our holdings to the
751 Commission of Inquiry.

752 NB So the process was up to the State Disaster Coordinations?

753 PM In the vast majority of cases.

754 NB And across to, well up to what, Emergency Management Australia
755 or direct to the ADF?

756 PM Not necessarily, I believe that the process that was employed
757 usually was for me to make a request, that request could of come
758 from local or alternatively I could of identified it with my own
759 authority. I make that request by way of and RFA to State and
760 State having regard for the fact that they have access to senior
761 military there within the State arrangements would have made the
762 request directly to State from there.

763 NB Were those requests actioned in an efficient timely way from your
764 point of view?

765 PM Certainly from my prospective they were. I have to say to you that
766 I got very very good level of buy in from the ADF and their



767 assistance was very very much on point and it was quite timely
768 and I made numerous requests for ADF assets.

769 NB Just moving onto paragraph forty four you make mention of the
770 types of issues that could be raised at the DDMG meeting
771 particularly with respect to the status of essential services. Key
772 roads, power outages, telecommunications issues, water
773 sewerage, I suppose I'm asking you to plumb your memory but in
774 terms of power outages are there any ones that um were of
775 particular significance? I mean obviously getting the CBD re-
776 energised as quickly as possible was a priority, what about other
777 areas?

778 PM There were in fact and particularly, I can give you one example
779 which may seen reasonably low level but a particular set of traffic
780 lights are directly outside of the Rocklea Fruit Markets, now you
781 would say to yourself it's just a set of traffic lights on the south
782 side of the Fruit Markets what's strategically significant about that.
783 But if you can appreciate that what happened was we had
784 identified that was going to be a significant priority for us to
785 resupply fruit and vegetables to South East Queensland. If we
786 didn't get Rocklea Markets up and running we would have had no
787 fruit and vegetables and psychologically and the practicalities that
788 would have been too great for people so, this area was given a
789 significant effort. Now the amount of traffic access and egress to
790 the Rocklea Markets was incredibly intense, no traffic lights out
791 the front mean that we had to put a number of police officers
792 throughout the course of the, and a shift of twenty four hours a
793 day seven days a week on that particular point. By me tasking
794 Energex to be able to come to a solution to that particular
795 situation could ultimately free up ten police officers that I could
796 use to much much better effect in terms of the response and the
797 recovery effort. So while seemingly a low level example the reality
798 is that that sort of problem solving was being utilised many many
799 many times a day. Other and the priority in terms of energising
800 was for critical infra structure um in a hospital

801
802 PM And the DDMG was very useful for it to be able to identify the
803 priorities needed to be.



- 804 NB Ok, um what about sewage, were there any particular problems
805 involved in Brisbane of any great significance?
- 806 PM I don't recall significant issues relating to sewage, we had one
807 issue with respect to water supply where we needed to facilitate
808 chemicals to be flown to a dam but that was resolved fairly much
809 before we needed the ADF assets so that was resolved by way of
810 the water subsiding and the access being our priority. There were
811 significant issues associated with critical infrastructure associated
812 with roads and they were resolved, roads in terms of Coronation
813 Drive, that sort of thing where naturally enough the road infra
814 structure was important to obviously access to infra structure in
815 areas that were significantly affected but sewage wasn't a
816 significant issue.
- 817 NB There were concerns about the integrity of Coronation Drive.
- 818 PM Yes there were.
- 819 NB What was your role in terms of facilitating the certification if you
820 like of Coronation Drive?
- 821 PM I had no role to play in that whatsoever apart from a very
822 significant stake holder in the process. I am aware though that
823 through my participation of the LDMG meeting that Council were
824 very much aware of the issues associated with Coronation Drive.
825 They had an inspection regime associated with that and moreover
826 I made an offer to give them access to resources such as a police
827 water vessel to travel along the Brisbane River to inspect the
828 roadway that was potentially undermined. But they didn't accept
829 that offer because the water had subsided fairly quickly and they
830 could make the inspection through the land. So I was very much
831 an observer in that process and a fairly significant stake holder.
- 832 NB Yep ok, and you have indicated that from your point of view,
833 Brisbane DDC portable water wasn't an issue other than getting
834 some chemicals somewhere but that was resolved another way.
- 835 PM The most significant issue was that particularly in the aftermath of
836 the water subsiding was that a lot of water would need to be
837 made available for the cleaning effort and I know that council
838 were very much focused on public messaging around, don't use
839 the water unless you absolutely needed to because the people
840 that needed it are the ones that are going to have to hose down
841 and wash down their premises and what have you. But the water



842 was intact there was sufficient of it and I am not aware of any
843 significant issues.

844 NB So the real issue was um, priority to access to that resource for
845 clean up purposes rather than anything more serious?

846 PM Correct, having regard for the fact that we didn't have a
847 diminishing supply of drinking water.

848 NB No, and no ruptures to delivery infra structure that you are aware
849 of?

850 PM In terms of water processing I am not aware of any and that um,
851 and that certainly around the DDMG meeting which were daily the
852 effort was around maintaining supply.

853 NB Ok, um look we've mentioned Rocklea Markets as being a priority
854 and at paragraph forth six you make mention of that, could you
855 tell me a bit more about the key agency representatives who were
856 involved particularly in your action plan for Rocklea?

857 PM What had happened was that there was a range of information
858 that was flowing into the DDMG and particular the DDCC with
859 respect to the extent of the magnitude of the problems at
860 Rocklea. And moreover some of the early projections with respect
861 to the extent of the damage and the restoration work that needed
862 to be there was that we were talking about a very very significant
863 issue that was unfolding there. And moreover the consequences
864 of that would be that if we didn't get Rocklea Markets up and
865 running that there would not be fruit and vegetables in the shelves
866 of Brisbane potentially up for many many weeks and there were
867 already reports of panic buying that Coles and Woolworths outlets
868 were closing that people were walking into shops within non
869 flooded areas and not being able to find any fruit and vegetables.
870 And the morale of that is very significant as well as the practicality
871 affects. So what I did was I raised that.

872 NB Sorry, to interrupt for a moment, just in terms of the extent or the
873 scale of the issue out there as I understand it the sight was
874 completely inundated.

875

876 PM: If I could give you a word picture what you've, what you've got out
877 there is that you've got a very very large area, some under roof
878 and some that's, that's opened. But the area under roof is
879 extensively very, very large cold rooms capable of carrying, with



880 out exaggeration, many thousands of tonnes worth of frozen and
881 refrigerated produce, um largely fruit and vegetables but
882 sometimes meat, seafood and other products. The, the area had
883 been significantly devastated by virtue of the fact that the cold
884 rooms had been activated and were closed and were absolutely
885 full of produce in many cases. So what had happened was the
886 water had come in, it had flooded the entire area, the cold rooms
887 were made of Coollite and the whole cool rooms had exploded
888 outwards, um which meant that it rendered the refrigeration
889 completely useless, but more over had damaged the cool rooms
890 themselves. But the problem was that not only there needed to
891 be the restoration of the cool room facility, but the produce that
892 was in there that was now spoiled had to be removed from the
893 site and it had, my understanding something like four thousand,
894 three hundred tonnes of produce that were taken from that sight
895 including literally hundreds of tonnes of meat, seafood and other
896 ah meat related products from there over a period of time. But we
897 were able to, having regard for the fact that that was identified on
898 the Saturday morning, ah so that was Saturday the

899 NB: 15th.

900 PM: 15th, Saturday the 15th, that was identified as a priority on the
901 Saturday morning. We put a concerted effort in there with
902 stakeholders around the table, I'm sorry it's a long winded way to
903 answer your question.

904 NB: No problem.

905 PM: But the ADF were pivotal in terms of the strategy, the ADF swung
906 resources into that fairly significantly, QFRS in terms of the ah
907 Queensland based crews and some of the interstate crews gave
908 that considerable focus. There was also Queensland Health
909 representation on site, the Brisbane City Council put huge
910 amounts of resources out there and of course the Queensland
911 Police ah where there on site as well, to give that a very
912 significant focus and more over that bearing in mind that the
913 strategy was affirmed on the Saturday morning and in a limited
914 way we were able to start getting fruit and vegetables flowing um
915 through the facility, certainly on the Sunday evening into Monday
916 and come earlier that week we were able to start to get ah fruit
917 and veg start flowing onto Queensland shelves very very quickly,



918 and that was a concerted effort and part of that was facilitated by
919 the DDMG um having a conversation about the strategic
920 significance of the Rocklea Markets for Brisbane.
921 NB: Mm. Alright um, look given its strategic significant for Brisbane is
922 it, is it in fact broader than that?
923 PM: It is.
924 NB: It's South East Queensland, Ipswich it's ...
925 PM: That's very true.
926 NB: Sunshine Coast it's a staging point for a whole lot of stuff.
927 PM: It is your quite right, and from ah, it is significant for Brisbane but
928 for the Region and for the State it's absolutely pivotal cause it also
929 necessitates the ah, you know the relief of produce that has been
930 picked that's got to go somewhere, it naturally enough has to go
931 to Rocklea Market before it can be on sold and ah and a
932 distributed to, to commercial suppliers.
933 NB: Alright, alright.
934 PM: Yep quite right.
935 NB: So this was a response that went onto state disaster management
936 group level.
937 PM: No that was ...
938 NB: ... your ...
939 PM: This was looked after by the context of my group, the ah the
940 district disaster group.
941 NB: Okay. Right.
942 PM: Can I say to you though that certainly in my daily briefings ah that
943 was well and truly communicated to state that this was a
944 significant priority to us.
945 NB: Sure.
946 PM: So yes they had been in the loop in terms of the strategy but not
947 in terms of the decision making.
948 NB: ... the operational level
949 PM: The operation was very much in my domain.
950 NB: Sure.
951 (? Female): ... I'm just curious, umm, Assistant Commissioner. Where it
952 can be handled at the district level because your rank and the
953 rank of all of those with you was sufficiently senior could that be
954 done.



955 PM: And your absolutely correct and from my take on this is that the
956 rank gives you certain privileges to be able to act unilaterally to be
957 able to do things and having regard for the fact that, we're talking
958 about a very, very large area in Brisbane and you've got significant
959 resources at your disposal. If you think about the resources
960 available to the Brisbane City Council and the resources that I have
961 available to me the ADF and we had the Engineer Regiment at
962 Enoggera um ready, willing and available to assist in terms of that
963 repatriation of that site so you're quite correct.

964 NB: Yep. Right. Um you've mentioned a number of the stakeholders
965 at Rocklea what about the, the management of the market place
966 itself, I'm not sure how that operates and who owns the site and
967 so forth ... was there a presence in that sense.

968 PM: Yes.

969 NB: Or was this just the disaster management relief effort moving in
970 and ..

971 PM: No it was very much a partnership, my understanding was that
972 there were representatives of the Rocklea markets there in terms
973 of the individual interests represented but the totality of the
974 interest was represented on site, and there was good level of
975 dialogue that was occurring and more over, I don't know whether
976 you might of seen it in terms of a full page ad that was taken out
977 some ah probably going back about a month or more ago, from
978 the Rocklea Markets and people associated with the Rocklea
979 Markets thanking the ah considerable effort of the state and ah
980 local people that were able to repatriate that site. So, so there
981 was a vey much, this is as I understand it on the ground, a very
982 much collegiate a very professional response, ah and people
983 were very, very happy with the buyin from state.

984 NB: Okay.

985 PM: ... sorry the district level.

986 NB: Yep. Who, who had sort of operational command on, on the
987 Rocklea site?

988 PM: Um there were um, there was local police ah who were on site
989 and my understanding was that ah police from within the local
990 Oxley District they were on site looking after the ah, the general
991 management, but also each of the areas represent ted QFRA,
992 Brisbane City Council had senior people on site as well.



993 NB: Mm. How was the effort there coordinated, did they have a
994 strategy meetings or tactical meetings, team meetings every,
995 every, was it a, it was a collaborative sort of approach you've said
996 or was it someone actually, actually running it?
997 PM: Um I'm sorry I don't really know.
998 NB: Okay.
999 PM: Can I say to you what was happening though was ah from the
1000 district level the, ah the priority was established and I was fairly
1001 important to that. Um I pressed the resources into um to be
1002 bought to there by virtual, by virtual of the fact that I was able to
1003 co-op the expertise of the group that existed.
1004 NB: Yeah.
1005 PM: Um I know there was senior people on site from various, the
1006 areas represented, but I wasn't on site, um and I don't know the,
1007 the practicalities associated without, I was getting regular briefings
1008 back in terms of how things were going out there and that things
1009 were working very effectively, but I'm sorry on the ground I don't
1010 know to what degree that that was occurring.
1011 NB: In so far as QPS is concerned
1012 PM: From my understanding ...
1013 NB: ...
1014 PM: and I had spoken to the District Officer there, the then District
1015 Officer at Oxley.
1016 NB: Yeah.
1017 PM: Who at the time was Acting Superintendent um um Matt
1018 VANDERBYL.
1019 NB: Thank you.
1020 PM: And I had a number of conversations with him about how the
1021 effort was progressing at the ah, at at Oxley.
1022 NB: Mm, alright. Look you probably guess from the focus the
1023 questioning about Rocklea, it's an area of interest it is the fact that
1024 that was an important asset and how it was dealt with is an area
1025 of interest to the Inquiry. So um you know it in terms of
1026 operational control of the, of the area we're interested in, perhaps
1027 talking to other people.
1028 PM: Sure, sure.
1029 NB: I realise the strategic direction came from you.
1030 PM: Yes indeed.



1031 NB: There are others on the ground that we may wish to talk with.
1032 PM: Yeah, and I certainly suggest that ah, that at least one person
1033 from a QPS perspective that had knowledge of what was
1034 happening on the ground ah was in fact Matt VANDERBYL.
1035 NB: Mm, okay, thanks. Um I'd try to keep things moving along
1036 conscious of the time ...
1037 PM: No I'm fine thank you.
1038 NB: There is water over there.
1039 PM: Oh thank you.
1040 NB: Um, look just briefly paragraph 55, you mentioned Operation
1041 Safeguard, ah that, that was a, that was a success.
1042 PM: That's certainly my, my perception, I think in that in terms of um, in
1043 terms of the good will that it created and in terms of the lack of
1044 problems that we had associated with um opportunist ah thieving,
1045 um call it looting, but the, the public responded very warmly to that
1046 and the police officers, particular those from interstate they were
1047 very very grateful for the opportunity to ah, to do this very
1048 meaningful work, and there were wonderful accolades from the
1049 community.
1050 NB Mm, look certainly it's my impression that um looting wasn't a
1051 feature of the crisis.
1052 PM No.
1053 NB No, but from your prospective that is borne out from the QPS side
1054 of things?
1055 PM I hold that view.
1056 NB Yes.
1057 PM I hold that view, I think that a certain amount of crime is a
1058 naturally occurring social phenomenon I don't think that we saw
1059 anything, in fact I think there was probably more good will than
1060 anything during the flood and I didn't see any significant issues as
1061 such with looting.
1062 NB So your ...peripheral knowledge of the situation is that it wasn't
1063 your understanding?
1064 PM That is my understanding.
1065 NB I just ur, at paragraph fifty six you indicate you had a DDMC
1066 meeting each day at 0700 hours and at paragraph sixty one you
1067 mention that the LDMG meetings which you attended occurred at
1068 ten am each day. Was there any significance in the sequence of



1069 those meetings? Did it work well having them in that order given
1070 that this is a bottom up disaster management in structure or you
1071 know?

1072 PM Um, can I say to you that it didn't work too badly plus also it was
1073 in an optimum environment what you will probably do is you will
1074 probably want to reverse the order, you would probably want to
1075 have the LDMG meeting earlier and I would say that in a perfect
1076 world you would have the LDMG meeting and then you would
1077 have the District meeting and then you'd probably have State. But
1078 can I say to you that the demands on my time was so significant
1079 that I had to have the meeting when I could and I had to give
1080 everybody an assurance that if they were coming in at 0700 that
1081 we would be ready to go and they were very timely, they were
1082 short, they were sharp, they were very strategic meetings. But
1083 what would happen was I would collect my data from intelligence
1084 in the morning, this would be my normal day. I'd collect my data
1085 from intelligence in the early part of the morning and make sure I
1086 was across the issues that were unfolding through the log and
1087 what have you. I'd have at seven o'clock a DDMG meeting, and
1088 then what would happen is that I would then have a series of
1089 other meetings that would occur throughout the course of the day.
1090 Inevitably there would be a senior executive teleconference within
1091 the Police Service at some point usually in the morning, probably
1092 after my seven o'clock meeting. I would have responsibilities to do
1093 public messaging and media immediately after my seven o'clock
1094 meeting as well so I would walk straight out of my DDMG meeting
1095 and straight into a live podcast or alternatively a pre-recorded
1096 uploaded onto the QPS Facebook Website. That would take thirty
1097 minutes which was thirty minutes that was very difficult to find. So
1098 DDMG meeting, senior executive teleconference, I would then
1099 start heading down to personally attend the LDMG meeting and I
1100 attended every one of those personally. I would then have a
1101 SDCC meeting that I attended by way of teleconference; I would
1102 then attend a SDMG meeting by teleconference. I would attend
1103 another teleconference for the senior executive of the
1104 organisation late into the afternoon. And that is not to take into
1105 account other meetings that might be, that might come you know,
1106 there might be a prominent person visiting the DDCC or there



1107 might be some other demand that might come up as a result of
1108 problem solving. The tempo of the meetings was very high and so
1109 yes in a perfect world I would accept that you would have these
1110 structured in a very crafted way. But not having control over the
1111 tempo of the other meetings the one thing I could control was the
1112 DDMG meeting and I needed to have that early in the day so I
1113 could set the strategic direction of the peoples efforts that day.

1114 NB Sure, sure, how long would that DDMG meeting go?

1115 PM Not longer than an hour and sure if I could facilitate it. It was a
1116 very short sharp meeting and everybody contributed in a very
1117 timely fashion but I wasn't an opportunity for long languishing
1118 debate, it was a very fast moving event.

1119 NB Obviously the information flows up and down the chain is vital in a
1120 situation like this the sitreps is one way of doing it but the most
1121 immediate is face to face and the teleconferencing. Is there, are
1122 there any refinements that might work? I mean you've got to have
1123 inputted SDCC and SDMG level but those things all take time.

1124 PM Yes they do.

1125 NB And I presume that as the Brisbane crisis unfolded the demands
1126 on you expanded?

1127 PM That's right.

1128 NB And then as various other parts around the State in the context of
1129 SDMG and that overall strategic direction that things sort of
1130 balloon and then contract a bit, are there any easier ways of doing
1131 this?

1132 PM I don't know whether there are easier ways of doing it, I would be
1133 the first to acknowledge that each of those levels are important.
1134 As people were wanting to extract information from me it was
1135 really useful for me to again an appreciation of what was
1136 occurring in the districts that live close to me. So it really was two
1137 way information, but a lot of cases it was about me providing
1138 information to others to then do things with it. And all I would say
1139 is that the tempo of the meetings to having regard for the fact that
1140 they were so high were challenging. But I would be the first to
1141 identify that they are important, that they need to occur and there
1142 are probably not significantly better ways of doing it but just to
1143 understand the, you know those demands are intents.



1144 NB I suppose this raises an issue you've mentioned before the QRFS
1145 (QFRS) representative at DDCC um DDMG level was who was
1146 relieved from time to time was replaced by an officer of equal
1147 rank, what was the situation for you? You were relieved from time
1148 to time I take it? I mean you are working at a high level for a
1149 sustained period of time and that's not easy to do, you have a
1150 deputy, as I understand it you have a deputy?

1151 PM Yes that is correct.

1152 NB How, was there tag team going on or how does it work?

1153 PM What happens is eventually that occurs but not for the first couple
1154 of days. As this was ramping up fairly significantly and I stood up
1155 the DDCC for Brisbane on the Monday the tenth. So fairly early,
1156 so what I did was I stood that up, I went home late that night but
1157 didn't sleep and was watching the weather event, watching things
1158 starting to escalate and ultimately made a decision early hours of
1159 the morning, around about I think it was about two o'clock in the
1160 morning that I would make a request of the minister for a
1161 declaration of disaster situation. Actually I made that quite early,
1162 and I started to negotiate with the various players around the
1163 DDMG table in the early hours of the Tuesday morning. I
1164 prepared the paper work that morning, I made contact with the
1165 State, I told then that I was going to make that request and I sent
1166 the request through very early hours of the morning. Now for the
1167 next couple of days I didn't get home or take a break because the
1168 event was not an event that I could do that. It was fast moving,
1169 the Act talks about my authority and the reality is that I needed to
1170 be there and I needed to exercise those powers of special
1171 provisions if I needed to and moreover there was so much
1172 occurring that I was concerned that there would be a lot lost in
1173 terms of the continuity of the event. There is never a good time to
1174 be able to say now this is a good time to actually break and
1175 handover is going to be difficult so for the first couple of days
1176 myself and my deputy were there exclusively dealing with the
1177 events that were unfolding. Equally I have to say other key people
1178 such as the QFRS representative was there for a protracted
1179 period of time as well. The handover process didn't start to occur
1180 until a couple of days into this event, when the tempo started to
1181 get to a more manageable level and people were able to get away



1182 for a couple of hours break and to do an effective handover. In a
1183 perfect world you would work your twelve hours do a handover,
1184 not think about it and come back in twelve hours time. In hindsight
1185 I would of done exactly the same again because I can't look at
1186 this and say that there was an opportune time for me to have left
1187 at a particular stage. In fact a couple of days into this event I
1188 actually tried to get home for a, in fact I couldn't get home
1189 because my home was in danger of being inundated and flooded
1190 itself. But I stayed at a family member's home at New Farm and
1191 was there for only an hour and a half before I got a phone a
1192 critical phone call and I came back to work. So you can see that
1193 the tempo was incredibly high and it wasn't conducive to taking a
1194 normal break be it 12 hours.

1195 NB So as this event unfolded how long were on duty effectively for or
1196 for what stint?
1197

1198 NB No, no
1199 PM I would have be at work for

1200 NB Umm, so as this event unfolded I mean how long were you
1201 effectively on duty for in one-in one stint?

1202 PM Umm I would have been ah, I would have been at work for
1203 umm...well put it this way I-I would have been in the DDCC itself
1204 for a continuous period of umm probably umm ah thirty six, forty
1205 eight hours umm

1206 NB Ah so ah I-I think you said umm you activated the DDCC at about
1207 eight o'clock on the Monday morning

1208 PM On the Monday morning that's correct

1209 NB Very, in the early hours of the Tuesday morning the request for
1210 the disaster declaration

1211 PM That's correct

1212 NB was up and running

1213 PM That's correct

1214 NB You'd gone home that night but you nat-naturally couldn't sleep

1215 PM That's right

1216 NB Umm you're back at work very early on the Tuesday morning

1217 PM That's right

1218 NB And then when-when do you get relief after that sort of thing?

1219 PM Umm well



1220 NB Relieved

1221 PM Well umm it probably would have been about umm... ah

1222 potentially ah late Wednesday night, Thursday morning

1223 NB umm and who took over?

1224 PM Umm, ah Paul DOYLE an Assistant Commissioner form Ethical

1225 Standards command

1226 NB Right

1227 PM Umm, umm offered some relief

1228 NB Right

1229 PM ah and also my a-a executive ah, my deputy ah DDC umm I sent

1230 ah him home at one particular point after he'd been working there

1231 for a protracted period

1232 NB Mm

1233 PM umm I sent him home and then he came back and he relieved me

1234 umm so I managed to get some support from senior people but

1235 the problem was, that even if I had access to these senior people

1236 and I could have easily requested them, the problem was, is that

1237 this was an event you couldn't just hand over

1238 NB Mm

1239 PM I wouldn't have handed it over, nor would I have gone home even

1240 if I could have, because the event was such that the continuity

1241 was incredibly important with it

1242 NB Mm

1243 PM And I-I left there at earliest opportunity that I possibly could have,

1244 having regard for the fact the umm the event was of a that-that

1245 level of magnitude

1246 NB Mm... Ah look I'm not being critical I just want to understand and-

1247 and I certainly appreciate your point of view about umm ah how

1248 difficult it is to manage these events

1249 PM Yes

1250 NB And continuity of knowledge, you get to a point where it's all up

1251 here ah and as much as you might try to commit these things to

1252 paper

1253 PM Mm

1254 NB and try and keep people in the loop there's a yeah. Is there any

1255 ah answer to that tension of ah someone in your position?

1256 PM I think umm I think this was a very extreme event

1257 NB Mm



1258 PM And in the vast majority of ah cases umm and certainly disasters
1259 that have previously been responsible for either real or training
1260 umm you can ah deal with it you can start really a normal tempo
1261 twelve hours on twelve hours off whatever the case may be. The
1262 point that I make is-is that this event was rapidly increasing,
1263 rapidly increasing the information and the intelligence was flowing
1264 so rapidly and the consequences were so great and the scale was
1265 so great.

1266 NB Thanks

1267 PM That it was anything other than a normal disaster

1268 NB Mm

1269 PM umm and so it was quite unique and umm in hindsight this is not
1270 an issue that's resolved by resources its-its just ah its an extreme
1271 event and requires an extreme response

1272 NB Yep, alright. Umm look moving on paragraph sixty two umm each
1273 daily DDMG entry meeting you shared with staff the strategic
1274 assessment of the best, most accurate and up to date intelligence
1275 available. I take it the intelligence you were getting was coming
1276 for your constituent members of the-of the disaster management
1277 group principally

1278 PM ah that was only one data source umm other data source
1279 included umm intelligence that was being provided through the
1280 umm the logs ah that were being kept from the umm, umm the
1281 local group ah plus ah umm SES umm also umm we were getting
1282 umm ah situation reports from State as well is what was
1283 happening around the state so the strategic assessment was not
1284 only what was happening locally and across the district but what
1285 was happening across the state as well, so I was very much a
1286 strategic snapshot

1287 NB Yep alright, so you were getting information from local level

1288 PM And state

1289 NB And state

1290 PM And across the district

1291 NB Yep

1292 PM And coalescing as a very early ten or fifteen minute ah précis to
1293 the ah do the DDMG meeting

1294 NB Ah what about other agencies? Such as umm Bureau of
1295 Meteorology, were you getting any direct input from them?



1296 PM I was umm what was happening was I getting a SEQ ah technical
1297 situation report umm on what they were doing and ah what they
1298 were experiencing and I was also getting a direct first hand
1299 information from the Bureau of Meteorology ah directly through
1300 the teleconferences

1301 NB Mm hmm

1302 PM Which is another need for umm ah you know participating in
1303 those teleconferences I was getting ah direct intelligence from
1304 them and also through the state ah SIT reps as well

1305 NB So these teleconferences that were the ones conducted at um
1306 SDMG level is it

1307 PM ah yes they were and SDCC umm and they were also coming in
1308 by way of the state sitrep that was coming over night that we ah-
1309 ah would have access to

1310 NB alright

1311 PM As the revised estimations were coming through

1312 NB Right. Ok...right umm look I might now turn to paragraph seventy
1313 four. Umm...you...in the context of the discussion about ADF
1314 assets and requests made there umm you mentioned umm... the
1315 situation ah in Bellbowrie, Moggill, Karana Downs, Mount Crosby

1316 PM Mm

1317 NB Umm...as I understand it the features of those areas of Brisbane
1318 were the, there was physical isolation due to flood water
1319 inundation ah and the loss of power,

1320 PM Mm hmm

1321 NB Loss of electrical power ah and I suppose those two features
1322 alone made, made these fairly significant area

1323 PM Mm hmm

1324 NB Ah in terms of, in terms of assistance are you able to make any
1325 comment about umm, the level of tele-telecommunications that
1326 were functioning in those areas, were there difficulties in that
1327 regard, to your knowledge?

1328 PM I-I really cant I'm sorry I-I don't know what was happening from a
1329 telecommunications perspective out in those areas

1330 NB Right

1331 PM I-I do know that those that we did have umm access ah to those
1332 areas by way of ah, ah radio and umm ah and a telephone
1333 because we were finding out what was happening out there and



1334 where the umm informal ah, ah recovery centres were being set
1335 up there to offer support to the community so there was some
1336 intelligence flying back to the DDCC about those areas
1337 NB So in terms of intelligence radio I-I take it you're talking about
1338 emergency services?
1339 PM I-I'm certainly talking about ah certainly QPS
1340 NB QPS
1341 PM That's right
1342 NB QPS
1343 PM Yep
1344 NB Alright and telephone what sort of intelligence sources were
1345 coming through via telephone?
1346 PM Ah-ah I was ah of the view that umm ah that ah were ah police
1347 officers out in that area that were stranded that were working with
1348 the local community and ah informal and formal community
1349 leaders umm who were umm providing support to the community
1350 umm by way of umm in fact there was one ah umm chappy there
1351 who was a reverend who had set up a umm communication or a
1352 coordination hub at a church there
1353 NB Mm
1354 PM That people were dropping in to share information where there
1355 were BBQ's being established to umm support the local
1356 community and police officers were assisting ah throughout those
1357 communities where support needed to occur, that was being fed
1358 back to me
1359 NB do you know were your police stations in those affected areas
1360 were the contactable by all regular means of communication or
1361 not?
1362 PM Umm the umm
1363 NB Sorry you know phone, fax, email
1364 PM The
1365 NB Or were they out?
1366 PM The only, the only police station we ah sorry we don't have a
1367 police station in the affected area, there is a police station at
1368 Karana Downs
1369 NB Karana Downs UI thinking



1370 PM There is one at Karana Downs and there is Police Beat it's a
1371 residential Police Beat effectively a house with a small office ah
1372 that is an established at Bellbowrie

1373 NB UI

1374 PM And umm and I just can't tell you umm specifically what the
1375 nature of the communication was, although I was, I was
1376 personally of the view that we were in contact with the, the police
1377 officers out in those areas

1378 NB Mm

1379 PM Who had been, who had been cut off but I really can't put my
1380 hand on my heart and say that, that's absolutely so it may have
1381 been through other means, but I believe that we were in
1382 communication with them

1383 NB Alright. Umm...obviously there are a great many Brisbane
1384 suburbs that suffered levels of inundation I mean

1385 PM Mm hmm

1386 NB Yeah Graceville and St Lucia and Yeronga and umm West End
1387 and so forth, all of those suburbs as-as I see it would have had
1388 access routes out or egress routes or ways to get to other parts of
1389 the city

1390 PM yes

1391 NB Or what have you umm Bellbowrie and some of those areas out
1392 there had a-had a fairly unique problem that they were completely
1393 isolated for a period of time at least. Am I right in that perception?

1394 PM Other areas were isolated but ah they were momentarily as the
1395 flood water peaked and dropped they were equally cut off but
1396 they were, but ah, ah restored in terms of transport reasonably
1397 quickly you were quite correct

1398 NB Alright

1399 PM Umm at least from a Brisbane perspective, Moggill, Bellbowrie
1400 umm Mount Crosby, Karana Downs was unique in that regard

1401 NB So, so

1402 PM Which is why there was a unique solution put in place

1403 NB Alright so

1404 PM UI prevision that community

1405 NB It presents as a-an area of Brisbane that had perhaps UI the most
1406 extreme situation

1407 PM Umm I-I



1408 NB In terms of loss of power and isolation,
1409 PM I-I
1410 NB I understand for example in Bellbowrie that the supermarket in
1411 there, in there local sort of shopping strip
1412 PM I-I was
1413 NB The shopping strip itself was inundated
1414 PM it was, that's quite correct I would say that those areas were
1415 exposed to umm challenges that other areas weren't, in terms of
1416 the umm ah the-the lack of access and ah particularly the lack of,
1417 of reprovisioning of food and what have you, which is why other
1418 strategies were put in place
1419 NB Ok, so could we say that umm if-if you had a suburban worst case
1420 scenario Bellbowrie was probably it, in this particular event? Was
1421 that the most challenging sort of I'm-I'm not suggesting it-it was
1422 the single greatest challenge you faced but it-it as suburban areas
1423 go that had, were flood affected that was ah, ah fairly significant
1424 one
1425 PM It was-it was significant challenge
1426 NB Yeah. Alright.
1427 PM Yes that's true
1428 NB umm in-in that context and I'm wondering whether I can sort of
1429 raise a couple of general propositions with you and whether-
1430 whether or not there were any, any matters of general application
1431 that may arise out of that area. Umm what about the information
1432 to the public regarding umm the expected extent of inundation ah
1433 the rate of rise, ah and-and the particular local affect of flooding
1434 would, that-that would be desirable would it not?
1435 PM Ah yes it would
1436 NB Is...as I understand it that-that information is not readily available
1437 in a meaningful way to-to members of the community umm
1438 perhaps I can put it this way, that for example a lot of the
1439 information coming out of the Bureau of Meteorology referred to
1440 ah a city gauge ah the expected flood height at the city gauge at a
1441 particular time here at Moggill and Bellbowrie we are dealing with
1442 inundation that was going to come earlier ah and umm the
1443 relevance of a reading of the city gauge some hours later may not
1444 have been that great to those people umm I-I just put that a



1445 general proposition and what I'm working towards is the idea that
1446 more precise local flood data
1447 MP Isn't there a Moggill gauge?
1448 NB Look I'm-I'm not sure umm
1449 MP Oh I'm, I just can't, the utility of the answer I think depends on the
1450 question, and if there's a Moggill gauge if UI
1451 MAN1 Well it certainly shows there is no other UI work on that
1452 assumption, if it false
1453 MP Yeah
1454 MAN1 The-the evidence is useless
1455 NB Mm hmm look umm alright I'll-I'll take it back to a more general
1456 level thinking in terms of
1457 MP Nick I'm not trying to me critical, just-just for the answer to be of
1458 use to you
1459 NB Yeah
1460 MP Get the question right that's all
1461 NB Umm it's certainly information that's-that's specific in terms of
1462 suburban affects would be desirable in terms of expected flood
1463 peaks and times and things like that
1464 MP Ok
1465 MAN2 I would agree with that
1466 NB What I'm working towards is that people then can make I suppose
1467 as an informed decision as possible about what they do, whether
1468 they self evacuate or decide they're going to stay or what have
1469 you and- and ultimately people have that right unless some sort of
1470 mandatory ah direction or evacuation is put in place umm what,
1471 what about umm, what knowledge to you have as the DDC or
1472 what knowledge do you have access to as the DDC concerning
1473 you know potential evacuation routes and loss of those routes
1474 and things like that?
1475
1476 PM In short that would depend on the nature of the request for
1477 information that I made so I've gone to great pains to paint a
1478 picture where this was a very dynamic event, but it was also fast
1479 moving and it was rapidly escalating as the revisions of the water
1480 event was unfolding. I take your point in terms of the best
1481 optimum environment would be that you would give the
1482 community one clear and unambiguous view in terms of what this



1483 meant. But the reality was that in our planning this was a
1484 constantly changing situation and rapidly escalating over hours
1485 and days to the extent that we were getting revisions of if this was
1486 a three and a half cumsec event four, four point six, five, where
1487 are the maps for six because we might get to six, no we've only
1488 done them for seven. Well we need to run the model for five what
1489 about five and a half, what about six, what about seven. At one
1490 stage there we were having dooms day scenarios predicted, an
1491 event somewhere around twelve thousand to thirteen thousand
1492 cumsec. Twelve thousand cumsec doing twelve thousand cubic
1493 metres of water per second coming down the Brisbane River, now
1494 it's one thing to say that but if you can give the community that
1495 and say what does that mean, well it doesn't mean anything. But
1496 if you can grab the map and you can get that map in an easily
1497 digestible format out there to the community and say, well what
1498 this looks like, this looks like a nineteen seventy four event plus a
1499 metre. That is going to mean something but the problem is, that
1500 requires a whole range of things to come into play not the least of
1501 this is the fact that we were having trouble nailing this down. Now
1502 I'm not a hydrologist, I'm not a water expert; my role in terms of
1503 disaster management pre supposes that I have good information
1504 at the front end. And there are so many variables here not least of
1505 which is what was happening at Somerset, what was happening
1506 in the catchment, what was happening at Wivenhoe in terms of
1507 the inflow of the head water and what they were releasing.
1508 Combined with the down stream effects of the Lockyer and the
1509 Bremer River and all of those things work combining to give us a
1510 certain event that was happening in Brisbane and it was very very
1511 fast changing and it was very hard to corral this thing in too
1512 because of the magnitude of what we were likely to encounter,
1513 very difficult.

1514 NB The intelligence you were getting from sort of Moggill Bellbowrie
1515 was principally through QPS officers is that right?

1516 PM It was through QPS officers and local residents, in some cases
1517 the media. So local residents contacting media outlining their
1518 current predicament but we were very much aware of what was
1519 happening out there and the concerns of the local residents.



1520 NB Well how so, how so apart from being aware of the media apart
1521 from having officers who were there and were in at least radio
1522 contact, how complete a picture do you think you had?

1523 PM Well I had some picture, what I can tell you is that they had, that
1524 they were isolated by way of roads being cut, there were lack of
1525 other options in terms of access to the area and that the Moggill
1526 Ferry was not operating, that there were some houses numerically
1527 not high but there were some houses that were inundated with
1528 water. That there were chemist shops you know pharmacies that
1529 were out of action and couldn't be accessed for food, certainly the
1530 police were reporting that the vast majority of the community were
1531 in good spirits. I did know that the power was out, I did know that
1532 food was a particularly, food such as milk, those sorts of things
1533 were going to be an issue particularly as we moved into the next
1534 twenty four, thirty six, seventy two hours so I did have some
1535 picture.

1536 NB There were re-supply efforts conducted there and the ADF were
1537 called in to assist with that?

1538 PM Yes.

1539 NB I understand there was for example well you make reference to
1540 aerial assets and unimogs, what precisely was deployed?

1541 PM The community was initially resupplied of Moggill and Bellbowrie,
1542 about four and a half tonnes of food and that was used ADF
1543 assets because we couldn't get in there any other way. They had
1544 to load, to break the pallets of food up, I think four and a half
1545 tonnes of food is about four or five pallets of food and it was
1546 broken down into each of the unimogs and they were deployed to
1547 Moggill and Bellbowrie, distribute it to the community. Because of
1548 the issues of isolation for Karana Downs and Mount Crosby we
1549 actually delivered about eight and a half tonnes of food there in
1550 one heli lift with a heavy lift helicopter that picked up the food low
1551 slung on the aircraft and deployed out to Bellbowrie um out to
1552 Karana Downs and out to Mount Crosby.

1553 NB How was that coordinated locally on the ground?

1554 PM My understand was there was the request at the local level, they
1555 had facilitated that, the request had come up to me because it
1556 was out of their capability and I'd made a request of the ADF.
1557 When it was deployed to the ground there was an arrangement



1558 there where by local civic leaders and police officers were on the
1559 ground to facilitate the receipt and collection and I understand
1560 there was a local regime where police assisted in the distribution
1561 of food. That is my understanding but bearing in mind I don't have
1562 a complete picture of that.

1563 NB When you say the local request came through what was the exact
1564 mechanism of that and who was it from?

1565 PM From the local group, from the LDCC specifically, so the LDCC
1566 had advised my group that they were going to reprovise those
1567 particular communities, that they had sourced food and they had
1568 the food available to be deployed but they had no means of
1569 getting that food to them. Now that was outside my capability so I
1570 made a request of ADF assets for that.

1571 NB So the relief effort was initiated through LDCC?

1572 PM That is correct.

1573 NB I see, in all cases I think there were a couple of resupply efforts?

1574 PM There were a couple of resupply efforts and they were dealt with
1575 at the initial request of the local level and escalated up to State
1576 through my group.

1577 NB Right, did you have any contact with the SES or were you
1578 involved in SES tasking at any stage?

1579 PM My group was and certainly there were a number of requests and
1580 I know that because not necessarily because I was personally
1581 involved but my executive officer and other key people were
1582 dealing with those requests as they came in and they were using
1583 Task Tracker to specifically task SES to facilitate rescues and
1584 assistance to the community, but generally that was looked after
1585 by the local group.

1586 NB So fundamentally they had responsibility for tasking the SES
1587 rather than you?

1588 PM Yes.

1589 NB There was some crossover at a certain point?

1590 PM Yes that's right

1591 NB: Just moving on, in relation to the issue of communications,
1592 paragraph 78 of this statement, you refer to some minor
1593 technological enhancements that could be made in terms of
1594 interoperability of internet and email service for external
1595 stakeholders. Can you just explain what you have in mind?



1596 PM: When we had the debrief the Qld Health or a Qld Health
1597 representative raised an issue, in fact it was a very sensible issue,
1598 what she raised was that the DDCC itself didn't have the means for
1599 her to be able to plug in her laptop and to access without
1600 going through QPS firewalls and what have you access to Qld
1601 Health website or her own

1602 **(RECORDING CUTS OUT MOMENTARILY)** ...what could have
1603 enhanced her capability was if she had the access in that room to a
1604 data socket where she could hook up her laptop and have access
1605 to those systems. Moreover I thought that was a very sensible
1606 solution and we have already started a process to look at how we
1607 could facilitate that and if that makes her life easier and if that
1608 enhances her capability then I think that is a perfectly sensible
1609 solution and we're looking at it.

1610 NB: And is that something simply in terms of addressing the equipping
1611 the DDCC?

1612 PM: Very much so. I see it as a reasonably simple solution and it is
1613 one that I couldn't envisaged that would have been an issue and I
1614 guess it shows the utility of having a debrief where issues like that
1615 people feel comfortable in putting forward and are very happy to
1616 look at that like we have done and I think we can offer
1617 enhancements there.

1618 NB: Alright. An indication has been made that one point and I think
1619 this was during the 10th and 11th of January timeframe when
1620 Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley were unfolding and there
1621 were issues in connection with the operation of Police
1622 Communications in Toowoomba and then Ipswich and sort of
1623 various overflow volume occurred from Toowoomba to Ipswich
1624 and then onto Brisbane and some difficulties were encountered in
1625 terms of the information management systems in use at the
1626 different locations and whether or not they could be accessed and
1627 understood by other centres. Are you aware of that?

1628 PM: No, no I'm not. I am not aware of the specific issues nor am I
1629 aware of any impact that that had on the Brisbane effort.

1630 NB: Right. Just to give you a bit more information about that which
1631 was referenced as being the Toowoomba Information
1632 Management System, I assume that is what it stands for IMS,
1633 Ipswich IMS and Brisbane CAD.



1634 PM: Oh yes, I know what that means and in fact that is the calls that
1635 come in from the public requiring a police response. Usually fairly
1636 urgent response whereby calls come in and a crew, or a police
1637 response is tasked accordingly.

1638 NB: Right.

1639 PM: But I'm not aware of those situations occurring within the Brisbane
1640 context. They may have, but I'm not aware of that.

1641 NB: Okay, alright.

1642 PM: That certainly hasn't been communicated to me.

1643 NB: Now just moving on to volunteers, and those in context of
1644 community response ...

1645 MP/JB: Ah just before you do that, can we just clarify one thing, the letter
1646 that went to the Assistant Commissioner on that point of
1647 communications refers to problems. Now you at paragraph 78
1648 use a different phraseology, I'm just UI, I would like complete this
1649 comment?

1650 PM: Yes, thanks for raising that. I didn't really see it as a problem so
1651 much. What was raised with me and I won't put words into the
1652 Health representative, I won't put words into her mouth, but what
1653 she did was I got the sense that she was able to work productively
1654 but was more talking along this would offer an enhancement to
1655 her capability and with this minor issue resolved then she would
1656 have greater capability so yes it's not necessarily problems so
1657 much and in fact there were very few problems that came out of
1658 the debrief, it was very helpful suggestions in terms of things that
1659 could possibly enhance the performance.

1660 NB: Yes right.

1661 PM: Yes, thank you for that.

1662 NB: Just turning to the issue of volunteers, paragraph 84. You say the
1663 volunteer effort, I regard potentially best practice, what are the
1664 features that lead you to that conclusion, that view?

1665 PM: I guess like a lot of people I've been astute to the response to
1666 disasters in various areas across the globe, particularly those
1667 which have occurred in recent times, but I don't know where I
1668 have seen an effort of the scale of this that were able to garner
1669 the support of so many volunteers so quickly, bearing in mind the
1670 peak tide event occurred on the Thursday morning and when
1671 you've got the commencement of business on the Saturday



1672 morning and pressing like something like 16,000 people into a
1673 volunteering regime where people were registered and
1674 transported, that their needs were met in terms of going to
1675 affected areas and helping people and what have you, this was
1676 an extreme effort and I have no doubt that the community was
1677 very comforted by that, but moreover there was a lot of work done
1678 in a reasonably compressed time frame to really start the recovery
1679 effort and it was a very significant effort and I mean that most
1680 sincerely and I don't know if whether I can point to another event
1681 of a scale like this around the globe where they were able to
1682 garner that much support so quickly. And that first weekend was
1683 just breathtaking and for every person who had registered there
1684 was probably, this might be speculative, but there may have been
1685 3 or 4 or a dozen people that didn't register and just turned up
1686 with a pair of gum boots and a mop and helped out as best they
1687 could.

1688 NB: Were you involved in any way the co-ordination of those efforts or
1689 was that more something done at local level?

1690 PM: It was occurring at the local level and of course I was a member
1691 of the local group and was providing my input into the strategy
1692 and was very supportive of the effort of local group in terms of
1693 facilitating that.

1694 NB: Who in the local group took the lead on that?

1695 PM: I would say that the Lord Mayor was significantly instrumental in
1696 driving the volunteering effort.

1697 NB: What about actually managing the effort?

1698 PM: Managing the effort, his senior officer, Peter Rule, I think was
1699 probably the officer within council who was particularly tasked with
1700 facilitating that.

1701 NB: From your perspective as a member of the local group do you
1702 have any comments or observations on the way in which the
1703 effort was co-ordinated, whether things could have been done
1704 better for example?

1705 PM: It's um ...

1706 NB: I appreciate you've got an awful lot of people putting their hands
1707 up in a very short space of time

1708 PM: Probably ...



1709 NB: ... and it's measure of trying to direct the effort to best effect, but
1710 any comments, observations you might make.

1711 PM: Probably the comment that I'd make one of the most significant
1712 issues was the issue of traffic control, um and it was handled very
1713 very effectively, we put in place a traffic management strategy to
1714 deal with this. But can I say to you that um I don't believe
1715 anybody would of anticipated that the take up rate of volunteers
1716 would have been so so extreme, it was quite remarkable and in
1717 fact the earlier projections um of how many people we would
1718 probably get was widely surpassed, um widely surpassed and so
1719 that came with it, um you know wonderful amount of work but not
1720 um you known not ... which there was some logistical issues
1721 associated with getting that many people in to do productive work
1722 safely, having regard for the traffic congestion around the
1723 registration hubs. Ah but there was an effective strategy put into
1724 place as much as could be done.

1725 NB: Alright. Um look apart from traffic congestion, what other
1726 logistical issues ... bottles of water being bought in food, or was
1727 this all sort of very organic, people taking care of themselves.

1728 PM: Ah people were largely responsible for themselves other then,
1729 then registration, transport and some basic um, um assistance ah
1730 that was being provided, probably one of the challenges was,
1731 were that just so many people volunteered, putting the people
1732 where they needed to be to do the greatest um impact ah positive
1733 impact was a challenge in it's own regard. But by large I think
1734 people reported it was a very worthwhile experience, so the
1735 individual that received the assistance were very grateful for it and
1736 also the, those that volunteered it met their altruistic needs and
1737 they felt fulfilled and rewarded and they came away you know
1738 very happy, that they were able to help in a very structured
1739 regime.

1740 NB: Well that's what I'm interested in, I suppose you say, it was a
1741 structured regime how was that achieved so quickly.

1742 PM: Ah the public messaging was very, very strong, the public
1743 messaging went out there in terms of telling people um where
1744 they needed to go um what they needed to bring.

1745 TAPE STOPED AT 1.54.15 RECOMMENCED AT 1.55.05 DUE TO
1746 A GLITCH.



1747 PM: ... but the work with respect to the volunteers um had started even
1748 before the flood waters had started to subside.
1749 NB: Mm.
1750 PM: Um the local group were very very much progressing the work very
1751 early with respect to that.
1752 NB: Alright. Alright, look I think that covers what I wanted to raise with
1753 you Assistant Commissioner, um have you got anything else you
1754 ... Alright so thank you for your time and your involvement, um
1755 naturally we've both got our own recording.
1756 PM: Which is fortunate there's a couple of things I, I undertook to follow
1757 up and what I'll do, I um get that additional information and I'll
1758 make sure that I get that across to you.
1759 NB: Yeah, yeah. Um the log that you've created can I just, sorry ask
1760 you about that, it's a, is that like a personal diary log, the DDC's
1761 personal log is it or ...
1762 PM: It's a, it's a log a chronology of events and it captures my um the
1763 context of my decision making and the decision that I made, now
1764 my understanding is that I've made that available through the
1765 material that has come across, but I'm very happy to make that
1766 available to you and as I said it's a compilation of a range of
1767 sources not least of which are personal notes it's um emails um it's
1768 the ah the log of events that's captured at the and in some
1769 cases my decision making that had occurred having regard to the
1770 context of what was occurring, but as I said I'm very happy to make
1771 that available to you.
1772
1773 ?: ...(ui)..
1774 NB: Ohh I see.
1775
1776 UNINTELLIGIBLE CONVERSATION
1777
1778 NB: Well thank you again Assistant Commissioner I thank you for your
1779 time.
1780 PM: Yeah, pleasure.
1781
1782 ?: Thank you.
1783
1784 END OF RECORDING.



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Issues involving resupply of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby

Date	Time	Issues
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1507hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Request supply of medication and food to Mt Crosby. Food to be supplied by Helicopter. Food arranged by LDCC and transport air drop required. • Forward request to SDCC as priority. Medical supplies not being furnished as no scripts provided. • All enquiries to contact the requesting Dr BARKER and Karana Downs Police have been unsuccessful. Food delivery only to be delivered. • Jan DANIELS ([REDACTED]) from LDCC has arranged food and it is waiting at Coles depot. DANIELS was informed that helicopter was arranged but was not given drop off address. • Inquiries were made with Andre at SDCC where job was received during afternoon shift. He was advised by one of the police liaison officers that airlift had been organised by police POC as part of his handover. • Inquiries with George SHAND (POC [REDACTED] x 8171 are that no request received and no air assets available tonight. If load is under 1 tonne, EUS can lift; if over 1 Tonne ADF needed. • SDCC (Andre) resent Job to POC. • Original request included medical supplies (no scripts sent). Qld Health will not supply medicines, only food drop at this time. We are unable to contact doctor or details. 13/01/2011 – 20:30 hours • Additional medical list provided. Contact details are Dr Joan BAKER ([REDACTED]) and Dr Andrew LOK. Neither doctor is contactable now. BCC CEO can confirm the doctor. 13/01/2011 – 21:10 hours • Request from XO for urgent high priority request to be made for rotary fixed wing aircraft on the morning of 14/01/2011 prior to 08:00 hours to deliver supplies to Mt Crosby. • NOTE – This matter has been brought to the attention of the Commissioner and is a high priority tasking as previous request has been mislaid by SDCC regarding resource being booked. 13/01/2011 - 21:30 hours • Contacted by Chris LAVIN ([REDACTED]) Brisbane City Council re food and medicine drop to Mt Crosby. LAVIN has advised that supply of above can now be delivered on 14/01/2011. Further advice Craig LOGAN ([REDACTED]) that Dave BAKER (Doctor's husband) has organised the school as a drop-in centre. • There is no one sleeping in the school. They are being billeted by community. Community has organised food, however the drop will be needed on the morning of 14/01/2011 as they are running out of nappies and formula. • Negotiations with Qld Health - Terese LEE ([REDACTED]) related to Qld Health accepting the verification of the doctor's legitimacy. This led to LEE negotiating with a doctor to provide the medication for the Mt Crosby drop and with the proviso of the prescription being provided post delivery.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LEE indicated that Qld Health doctor may accept the MNR A/C's verification of this request. A request has been made to Jan [REDACTED] from LDCC to provide weight and cubic for proposed delivery of food. 13/01/2011 – 22:00 hours • Dr BAKER phoned Terese LEE – Queensland Health. LEE reviewed the medication list that had been emailed. Dr BAKER changed some requests for quantities of medication. • LEE advised doctor that she was arranging for pharmacist at RBWH so that Dr BAKER could give an oral prescription for medications. Written prescriptions need to be provided to air transport crew when medication is provided. These scripts are to be given to XO DDC for on forwarding to QHealth representative. Dr BAKER was advised that she did not hear from anyone from RBWH so she is to call LEE back tonight (before 07:00 hours). 13/01/2011 – 22:50 hours • Advised by Jan DANIELS that food weighs 9.27 tonne, 17 pallets and 32.2 cubic metres. • Coles Distribution Centre is located at 22 Stradbroke Road, Forrest Lake [REDACTED] – Rebecca or Kaye). This is a 24 hour distribution centre. • Coles will transport food if required to ADF helicopter. • A request has been made for the scripts for medicines to be transported from their supplier to Coles Distribution Centre so they can travel together. • QHealth are awaiting confirmation of pick up time. This will be from RBWH main pharmacy, ground floor contact Karen ALLEN ph [REDACTED] (Head pharmacist).
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1600hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Michael McGahan - BWD MIR - Organise medical supplies and scripts - Bellbowrie Evacuation Centre have scripts - list of 6 medical supplies - Intersection Moggill Rd and Kangaroo Gully Rd - can be transported by ADF. Supplies to be delivered or picked up'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1620hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Email rec containing PDF file of 6 prescriptions for meds required at Bellbowrie Evac Centre . Email forwarded to A Dobbrick at Qld Health who will liaise with BWD MIR re collection'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1715hrs	DDC received telephone call from Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart that Dr Bruce Flegg (State Member for Moggill) had a request with respect to resupply of local people within his constituency. Request was to make contact with Dr Flegg and discuss.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1720hrs	DDC telephoned Dr Flegg and ascertained that he wanted to obtain the services of the Care Flight helicopter to obtain grocery and other items (which had been donated and were awaiting collection at Caloundra) and then deploy these to the Moggill State School at Moggill. Dr Flegg indicated that he was looking for my authorisation to enable this to occur. He indicated that it was his intention that there would be one flight and that this flight would be tomorrow (Friday, 14 January 2011). DDC indicated to Dr Flegg that he would need to consider the request and give him a telephone call back as the DDC was unaware of the current arrangements regarding supply of provisions to Moggill, Bellbowrie and Karana Downs/Mt Crosby.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1725hrs	DDC telephoned DDC XO and ascertained that there were strategies in place to re-provision the communities of Moggill and Bellbowrie tomorrow morning (Friday, 14 January 2011) and Karana Downs and Mt Crosby tomorrow afternoon (Friday, 14 January 2011). Ascertained that the LDGM had received a request for a comprehensive range of items of food, other items and medicines and were in the process of sourcing these from Coles at Acacia Ridge for deployment to the area tomorrow.

Thursday, 13 January 2011	1740hrs	Made inquiries with the QPS Solicitor regarding legal issues surrounding the use of the aircraft and the DMA provisions.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1755hrs	DECISION – Given that there were plans afoot at that stage for the provision of food and other goods including medications to the affected communities then this would obviate the need for the use of the aircraft. On this basis and given that the DDC of the view that the DMA did not give him the authority to approve the use of the aircraft in these terms the decision was taken not to authorise the flight in accordance with the DMA and his authority as DDC, Brisbane.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1800hrs	DDC telephoned Dr Flegg and advised him of the decision not to authorise the flight. DDC explained that there were plans well advanced to provision the communities affected that this was not only well progressed but would occur as early as tomorrow morning (pending any extraneous issues). Explained to Dr Flegg that the powers under the DMA were extreme and special powers and could only be used in special circumstances and as the plans were afoot to reprovise the community tomorrow then this would mean that I was unable to authorise the application of a private asset for this purpose. The DDC indicated that he was prepared to collect the food and other provisions from Caloundra and ensure that these were conveyed to the community. Dr Flegg responded angrily to this and voiced his strong opposition to the position taken by the DDC. The DDC again reiterated his position that he would be prepared to have the property collected from Caloundra and deploy it to the affected area. Dr Flegg indicated that it was too late and that he was now going to cancel the flight and that it would be the DDC's fault that this community was not going to receive vital foods, medicines and other supplies. Dr Flegg then terminated the phone conversation.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1800hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Contact by BWD MIR advising that supply list for Bellbowrie had been changed. Requested clarification from A/Insp MADGWICK re new items required. Also advised in relation to quantity of medical supplies previously requested. XO to contact MIR.'
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1818hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Advice from Bellbowrie Evacuation Centre only four persons remain at centre. All other evacuees have now sought alternate accommodation.'
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1820hrs	A journalist from the ABC telephoned the DDC on his mobile phone and wanted comment as to why he would not allow the community of Moggill, Bellbowrie, Karana Downs and Mt Crosby to be resupplied food, medicines and other essential supplies. Explained to the journalist that there was a strategy to resupply the community the next day and on that basis the DDC could not give authorisation for the use of a private aircraft. The journalist indicated that this was different to what he had been told and had no further inquiries.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	2032hrs	DDC log indicates the following: 'Phone call received at 20:32 hours from Insp Mark WHEATLEY requesting information relating to water levels expected at Moggill and Bellbowrie allowing them to be accessible by road and when this was expected to happen. Speak with Steve ATKIS BCC. Advice that at 8am flood level at BRG will be 2.8m and at this level Moggill Rd expected to have water over the road at Rafting ground Rd and at Pinjarra Hills Rd. Advice that alternate route via Kangaroo gully Rd will be water free if able to pass Rafting ground road. This information passed onto Insp WHEATLEY at 20:55hrs.'
Thursday, 13 January 2011	2155hrs	DDC log carries the following: 'Phone calls made to residents at Bellbowrie/Pullenvale/Moggill at request of XO from information provided by Mr FLEGG. Contacted all persons and all who could be reached stated no assistance required however without power. Two persons provided list of requests for delivery to Mt Crosby State School and Uniting Church. All are above flood waters and had enough food for one day. List of persons called is filed with hard copy documents.'

Friday, 14 January 2011	0029hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: '3/1 - 18:00hrs - Briefed by Snr Sgt MADGWICK regarding current job concerning provision of food resupply to Bellbowrie and Mt Crosby. Advised that previous request for aviation support had not been actioned and that communities were in need of urgent re-supply. Liaise with ADFLO - advised 1 x unimog currently tasked to resupply Bellbowrie. Advised 8 x pallets awaiting transport. Vehicle only capable of one shipment even date consisting of two parts. Request ADF provide two additional Unimogs to complete transport of 6 remaining pallets even date. Advise request would be considered. Liaise with Aviation PLO, George SHAND, Re airlift to Mt Crosby. Advised no air assets tasked or available tonight. Unknown if air assets could be sourced for 14/1/2011. Advised SHAND of urgent requirement to secure aviation support. SHAND advised that aviation request had prioritised and that other request currently took priority. Brief AC MARTIN and AC DOYLE. Appraised of Commissioners' perspective re urgency of matter. 13/1 - 21:00hrs Conference with Supt WAUGH, ADF liaison, George SHAND, XODDC, A/Supt HUXLEY - Aviation support taskings reviewed. Commitment to provide airlift support 14/1/2011 for Mt Crosby secured. ADF confirmed. Additional 5 x Unimogs tasked with completing food resupply to Bellbowrie even date (13/1). Liaison with Qld Health rep. Confirmed requested medication would be supplied for airlift on 14/1/2011. Liaison with SDC. Confirmed aviation tasking. Picking list supplied to SHAND currently awaiting'</p>
Friday, 14 January 2011	0058hrs	<p>DDC log indicates the following: 'Two inquiries - First from Mike KELLY of Bellbowrie ph [REDACTED] Wished to discuss issues associated with the emergency response with the Bellbowrie area. Relayed information concerning his particular neighbourhood. He advised they had been without power for over 48hrs. Of the 200 homes in his neighbourhood four were inundated. The key issue is the loss of power and not the flood. Their reasonably self sufficient if they had power. He also advised that when the road is open that from past experience they will need traffic control in the area. The second inquiry from Doug COLEMAN ph [REDACTED] of Moggil - He advised that there are about 10% of the homes in his area are inundated and that the loss of electricity is a key issue. He is concerned about the mis-information regarding the resources supplied to the neighbourhood and that they are running out of gas and have concerns that without power they will lose their deep freezers. He believes they can maintain the status quo for a period of 24 hrs. People in the area are seeking urgent information about power supply as he believes this is the key issue effecting their area. Both were received at 23:00 on the 13/1. A/Supt HUXLEY contacted both informants at 00:30 contacted Julien JONES at Energex on [REDACTED] JONES advised that Energex are currently working through their priorities for restoration and will supply BDDC with that information in the morning. Energex advise they are working on a priority basis and currently have approx 70,000 customers without power. The issue is associated with 2 x 11,000V feeders. There are also significant issues with the requirement to conduct physical inspections prior to power being re-supplied. Energex are working on a media strategy to supply the affected areas with the relevant information and this information needs to be supplied both to COLEMAN and KELLY 14/1. COLEMAN and KELLY to be advised of the above outcome on morning of 14/1'.</p>
Friday, 14 January 2011	0243hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Phone contact to be made with Snr Sgt Steve CRABBE ph [REDACTED] - to confirm his ability to attend and meet resupply helicopter at Mt Crosby including receipt of medications to be supplied to local doctor. Alternate contact is Leanne of Karana Downs Police ph [REDACTED] To be tasked to operations in morning. Arranges to be made locally to provide assistance to unload helicopters.'</p>
Friday, 14 January 2011	0255hrs	<p>Notification received from S/Sgt Debbie NICHOLSON - DDO BWD - 5 army Unimogs arrived at Bellbowrie evacuation centre.</p>

Friday, 14 January 2011	0252hrs	<p>For information purposes.</p> <p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Request from Sen Sgt Steve Crabbe at Bellbowrie Evac Centre.</p> <p>1. Request a media release for Bellbowrie residents that food will be available at the Evac Centre after 0700hrs Friday.</p> <p>2. Request for some advice on what the police involvement will be in distributing the food. At present there are 3 Senior Sergeants working at Bellbowrie Evac Centre. These are Sen Sgt Steve Crabbe, Sen Sgt John Henderson and Sen Sgt Mark Paroz.</p> <p>Phone numbers are Crabbe: [REDACTED] Henderson [REDACTED] Paroz [REDACTED]</p> <p>We are also arranging for some photographs to be taken of the ADF unimogs making the delivery. When the QPS members have access to email they will forward copies of the photos to police media. A phone call was received from Media at 0245hrs requesting same.</p> <p>The ADF unimogs left Indooroopilly at 0130hrs so they should almost be at Bellbowrie. They are travelling via dirt roads through the back of Pullenvale so ETA is not known, but they cannot be far off the Evac Centre'.</p>
Friday, 14 January 2011	0349hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Request for medical supplies received at DDC. Checks with DDC reveal there is an existing job in priority que for Mt Crosby Delivery for the morning of the 14/1. Recorded for information purposes. SDCC advised.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0425hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Checks to be conducted on early morning on the 14/1 with Mt Crosby Evac site to confirm who is on site to assist. Checks may need to be made through Southern Region'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0600hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Information received from Chief Supt DAWSON - Callers are contacting the ABC in regards to conditions at the Sugarland Retirement Village at Moggill. Callers are complaining about having a borrowed generator, no fresh food, and no fuel for the generator. XO requested tasked to ops to provide generator and/or fuel to fix situation. - AS/Sgt McAlister contacted BWD MIR - nil assistance required all under control coordinator of village advised all needs are being addressed'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0600hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'BWD Situation Report - petrol stations running out of fuel in the Indooroopilly area - Loss of power to Bellbowrie & Moggill areas - Potential for looters - Traffic threat - condition of Moggill Rd'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0640hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Police response required to the RBH pharmacy to collect a drug order and then convey package to [REDACTED] Forest Lake (Coles Distribution Centre) and deliver them to the Black Hawk helicopter doing air drops. DDC to be advised when this is complete. Task given to comms. 0160 escorting from final request MNR Traffic Unit collecting package and doing whole job'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0642hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Inquires re woman in distress on ABC Radio - Inq made with DDO S/Sgt Curtis with former Sgt Kevin SCHREMMER at the Sugarwood Grove Garden Villas Retirement Village Bellbowrie adv that the Retirement Village is totally self sufficient. CURTIS adv SCHREMMER that food distribution would commence at the Bellbowrie Evac Centre at 07:00hrs if they require further food. The elderly resident who contacted the ABC did so without the knowledge of other residents or the Admin of the centre -She is frustrated because they have no power other than the generator and is upset because the politicians haven't visited her - SCHREMMER advised the retirement centre would require further medical supplies which can be transported to them by the ADF
Friday, 14 January 2011	0900hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'From Premiers Office - Ascertain whether Moggill Distribution Centre was adequate to

		service the area or whether a second distribution centre was required. Contact made with BWD DO - advice received that distribution centre is adequate there is 4wd access and roads may be re-opened later in the day. Additional distribution centre not required.
Friday, 14 January 2011	0953hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Inquiry by A/Insp Symes Re contact made to Deputy's office from persons at Karana Downs had no food - food drop being conducted to Karana Downs convenience store - enquiring persons details obtained and will be contacted by DDCC to advise them of this'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1040hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Received request for further supplies for Bellbowrie Evac Centre - additional to supplies provided this morning - list fwded to logistics for sourcing and delivery'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1245hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Gordon from SDCC contacted to confirm onsite arrangements for Mt Crosby air delivery - advised that info from onsite contact is that there are sufficient off duty police, SES personnel to assist with the unloading and security of the goods - SDCC confirmed that we are satisfied with the current arrangements nil further'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1255hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Moggill Rd at Station Rd & Coonan St is gridlocked due to persons using Moggill Rd outbound from Bellbowrie. Also Moggill Rd & Wybaleena St is one lane only in/out bound and under supervision of police. Assistance Req from media to inform people to stay off roads unless extremely necessary. From BWD MIR - Liaised with media and release to be developed and actioned by PMLO'
Friday, 14 January 2011	1459hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Craig Logan of BCC (LDCC Incident Controller) requesting a large helicopter to do drops to up to 25 isolated properties in the Bellbowrie/Moggill/Karana Downs areas. Needed for food/medication & possible evac. Request assessed. Due to limited details, i.e no properties identified, request itemised ect. Request made to SDCC for provision of a rotary wing asset for conduct of an areal survey of the Bellbowrie and Karana Downs area to identify isolated properties and damaged infrastructure. Request sent to BWD MIR requested to task vehicle to conduct assessment'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1512hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'XO requesting aerial survey of Bellbowrie - Moggill - Mt Crosby areas to identify isolated properties; damaged infrastructure and current road closures. Fwd to SDCC for action and POQ for information'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1610hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Supt Hogan was advised that the final food drop had been completed at Karana Downs.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1700hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Dr Grant ELMER need supplies - minor operation-. Angie DOBRRICK [redacted] organise for QLD health to contact dr Grant re medical supplies required for minor op. Goods to be delivered to Bellbowrie QLD health with organise supply and del'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1740hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Received from: Tim PETERS (DDO BWD) [redacted] confirm food drop to Bellbowrie is still QPS or council. Request LDCC QPS not involved'.
Friday, 14 January 2011	1920hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Received: BTMC: major roads are being re-opened to assist in the flow of traffic. As roads are opening they are being updated on DMR website. 131940.qld.gov.au - info provided by BTMS [redacted] Roads re-opening Milton road @ 18:44, Jindalee-Centenary Hwy @ 18:52 with reduced speeds, outbound closed after Sinnamon road exit. Pinjarra hills- Moggill road is open all the way to Brisbane, Clem 7 open -FREE TOLL-. Milton Road @ 18:44'. (emphasis added)
Friday, 14 January 2011	2041hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Phone call received Comm ATKINSON- advised further conversations with Dr Bruce FLEGG local member Bellbowrie Dr FLEGG has requested QPS arrange all power to be re-connected for milk and bread to

		<p>Karana Downs and Bellbowrie shops and for fuel to be supplied to local fuel station which is currently out Comm ATKINSON requested that inq's be made to the feasibility of meeting these requests, requests referred to LDCC and currently awaiting response. Query regarding Energex refer to LDCC for advice as to the number of homes currently disconnected. Current efforts to reconnect, estimated time for reconnection of fuel referred to LDCC for consideration for sourcing re supply, resupply of bread and milk referred to LDCC for consideration.</p>
Friday, 14 January 2011	2136hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Aerial survey was conducted of Bellbowrie only a hand full of residences possibly unable to leave area. Streets include Dillagall, Illoura, Derribong, Pullen, Housten, Glenhurst, Aitcheson, Riverside'.</p>
Saturday, 15 January 2011	1455hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Fax request received from Dr ELMER to source a list of medical supplies and prescription drugs to be delivered to the Bellbowrie Evac Centre. Angie DOBBRICK has been contacted from QLD Health and advised that the medical supplies and prescription drugs will be available from 1000hrs 16/01/2011 at RBH Triage front counter for collection and delivery. Arrangements made for transport to Bellbowrie Evac Centre. Email sent to [REDACTED] of the received faxes to organise supplies through RBH'.</p>
Saturday, 15 January 2011	1603hrs	<p>Further fax request received from Dr ELMER to source additional list of medical supplies and prescription drugs to be delivered to the Bellbowrie Evac Centre. Angie DOBBRICK has been contacted from QLD Health and advised. Additional supplies will be made available as per previous.</p>
Saturday, 15 January 2011	1921hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'An aerial search of areas to the west and northwest of Brisbane today with the ADF. Grooms was transported in a Blackhawk helicopter and patrolled the mountain range areas between Brisbane and Wivenhoe, Somerset and North Pine Dams. Mount Nebo, Mount Glorious, Mount Samson and Lacey Creek. Noted three vehicles that appeared washed into Lacey Creek. There appeared to have been a significant amount of water in the water course but that has now subsided. Transported via Navy Sea King to Upper Brookfield, Karana Downs to Lake Manchester, landed in Waverley road and were drove by a local to [REDACTED] Waverley road, the resident Paul was not home but left water, bread and long life milk for the resident in his kitchen. Advised local residents that the SES had resupplied them earlier that morning via flood boat. The locals were very appreciative of the support. Of note we probably need to determine a set signal for assistance when aircrews are flying over. The food we provided was donated free of charge by the Aldi Supermarket at Carseldine. Stephen C. E. Male. Contacted Dayboro stn S/C Troy NOTWITSKI advised that the sighted cars belong to locals who had parked them beside the creek prior to the creek bursting their banks. No persons were inside at the time they were washed away. Nil further action required'.</p>
Sunday, 16 January 2011	0240hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Fax received from Dr ELMER of Moggill Emergency Medical Centre for supply of drugs and medication. Faxed scanned and emailed to Angie DOBBRICK of QLD Health for action'.</p>

Brisbane Flood 2011 – Chronology of Events Relevant to DDC, Brisbane Decision Making

Date	Time	Comment
Monday, 10 January 2011	0800hrs	Decision taken to activate the DDCC, Brisbane – work begins to notify DDMG members and to recall personnel to staff the DDCC
Monday, 10 January 2011	0900hrs	DDCC personnel arrive and commence setting up.
Monday, 10 January 2011	1232hrs	Received advice by way of email (Sitrep No. 1 – Redlands ECC) regarding a wall collapse at Wellington Point, within the Redlands Shire.
Monday, 10 January 2011	2314hrs	Sent an email to all DDMG members advising of my intention, subject to their concurrence, to seek from the Minister a Declaration of a Disaster Situation.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	0200hrs	BOM forecast (received from the Flood Information Centre) and reflected in the Brisbane LDCC Sitrep is for a 4,600 m ³ /s event (inundation of a broad range of areas.)
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	0600hrs	Forward a request for the Declaration of a Disaster Situation to Minister for Police and Corrective Services. (Prior to this consulted with BCC, Redlands CC, EMQ and Deputy, DDC.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	0700hrs	Minister approves the Declaration of a Disaster Situation pursuant to the DMA. Communicated to both Councils and DDMG members
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	0721hrs	Email sent out calling for a urgent meeting of DDMG members (time to be advised during day)
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1000hrs	Premier and Minister make a declaration for a State-wide Declaration of Disaster Situation
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1000hrs	First of the daily LDMG meetings held at 157 Ann Street, Brisbane (meetings would be held daily up to and including Saturday, 22 January 2011)
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1100hrs	DDC chairs the Brisbane DDMG at Police HQ Brisbane.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1221hrs	MIR activated at Police HQ – Sitrep Number 1 disseminated. (Recovery of bodies and investigation response in the Lockyer Valley)
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1318hrs	Advice by email from SEQ water that modelling is for a 3,970 m ³ /sec event
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1500hrs	DDMG sitrep No. 4– advice received from BOM and FIC – ‘current water levels for Brisbane river remain predicted for 6000 cumecs, however may get to 6,800cumecs and 4.2m by Thursday....Potential for 6,500 properties to be inundated and up to 15,000 evacuated’.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1510hrs	Received advice from Sen. Sgt. Madgwick (XO DDC) and Justin Williams (MSQ) that the Drift Restaurant formerly known as ‘Oxleys on the River’ was in significant difficulty. DDC advised by Sen. Sgt. Madgwick that the restaurant was being held down by chains and the restaurant was taking on water and now listing on one side. He also advised that the owner/s were on board and others associated with the restaurant and that QFRS personnel were also on site. He further advised that there were attempts being taken by QFRS personnel at the request of owners to cut the chains which held the restaurant in position in order to allow it to float up and there were serious concerns raised about this course. Justin Williams (MSQ) advised that there were serious concerns about cutting the chains as the vessel could float downstream rapidly posing a threat to critical

Brisbane Flood 2011 – Chronology of Events Relevant to DDC, Brisbane Decision Making

		infrastructure. Mr Williams also advised that this was the Regional Harbour Masters view and that both were of the considered view that there should not be attempts to cut the chains. DDC asked Justin Williams (MSQ) what would occur if rescue/salvage attempts were not carried out and advice was provided to DDC that the vessel would, in all probability, sink at its current mooring and not move from position thereby obviating risk to critical infrastructure downstream.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1520hrs	DDCC Log carries the following notation: CRITICAL ISSUE - Oxley floating restaurant - advice from Maritime (Justin Williams) that the restaurant is being held by one anchorage point and assessment by Maritime Qld is that the structure could be unanchored which would cause it to float downstream possibly damaging infrastructure, or left at anchorage and the waters will sink the restaurant. AC Martin briefed by Maritime. OIC Water Police also briefed. (Note that the restaurant was being referred to by its former name Oxleys on the River).
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1525hrs	DECISION - The decision was taken by the DDC Brisbane, having regard for the powers contained under the DMA for all attempts at maintaining rescue of the vessel were to cease immediately and that all persons currently on the vessel were to vacate immediately.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1530hrs	In the BCC Strep of 1530 hrs advise is that 'the BoM have communicated to us the following: The predicted height at the high tide tomorrow is 4.5 mAHD at the Brisbane City Gauge. Based on the likely Wivenhoe release strategy (6,400 m ³ /s this evening 8:00pm), the predicted peak flood height at the Brisbane City Gauge is between 5 mAHD and 5.5 mAHD, (10,500 m ³ /s). The timing of this predicted peak is 3AM Thursday morning 13/01/11.'
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1533hrs	Email received from Regional Harbour Master Richard C. Johnson which indicates, 'I have been advised that the floating restaurant Oxley on the River is currently being held attached to the bank by one line only. I also believe that there are attempts to cut this line to set her free. In consideration of the vital infrastructure downstream that can be severely damaged I recommend that the line to the Oxley on the River is not cut. I have asked for a tug "MAVIS" to be despatched to assist and she is on her way and should be there within the hour. I have also directed the tug "ARNHEM" to position herself in the South Brisbane or Town Reaches of the Brisbane River until further notice so that we are able to deal with such issues quicker'.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1550hrs	DDCC Log has the following reference: OXLEY FLOATING RESTAURANT - DDC advised of situation and has directed that all salvaging/pumping of vessel to cease. Tug boats are on scene - it is envisaged that once water remains on the vessel that it will sink upon it's own pontoons-water police on scene and have received direction at 1600.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1600hrs	Technical Situation report received from SEQ Water which indicates 'inflows into Wivenhoe in excess of 12000 cumecs. Maintain current release 5700 cumecs as long as possible but due to the high level in the dam may change frequently due to inflows, this is being reviewed every 30 minutes and releases adjusted accordingly. Close sluices at Somerset Dam to store more water however will affect upstream areas'
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1800hrs	Technical Situation report received from SEQ Water indicating 'our strategy revolves ensuring dam security and is around trying to prevent initiation of the first fuse plug at EL 75.6m. If this happens we will get a rapid increase of about 2,000m ³ /s in outflow from the dam in addition to the gate release which could be as high as 10,000m ³ /s at the time. Sluices have been

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		closed at Somerset and this will result in high upstream water levels affecting Kilcoy. Somerset is at 104.41m holding 671,000ML and 176.6%. In the last twelve hours totals of up to 370mm have fallen in the area around Wivenhoe Dam. In the last hour, rainfalls between 15 and 30mm have been recorded in the same area. At 1600, the BoM advised that falls between 50 to 100mm are still forecast for the 24hrs to 1600 Wednesday 12 January 2011 for the North Pine and Somerset/Wivenhoe catchments. Current inflows are about 9,000cumecs. At 1730 Wivenhoe Dam was 74.92m AHD holding 2,200,000ML and 190% and rising slowly and releasing about 6,700m ³ /s.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1809hrs	Forwarded an email to Richard C. Johnson (Regional Harbour Master) advising that the DDC had made decisions consistent with his advice with respect to the Oxleys on the Wharf.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	1820hrs	Advised that the Redlands ECC will close down overnight and re-commence early next day (Wednesday, 12 January 2011)
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	19:06pm	Received an email from Richard C. Johnson (Regional Harbour Master) which indicates 'Thank you for your email. Unfortunately the two tugs were both compromised by the lack of clearance under the bridges and were not used. Also the run of the current adjacent the Oxley was excessive for the tug to remain safely on station. However, we are currently endeavouring to secure the two pontoons upstream to the bank. It was reported to me that the barge that has the restaurant is aground and will not move. We will monitor the situation in the morning and concentrate on The Island which is moored at the opposite bank to the Oxley on the River. Justin Williams our Marine Officer will continue to represent MSQ at the DDMG'.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	2219hrs	Email received from Dan Spiller SEQ Water indicating that 'Note that Wivenhoe Dam levels have stabilised and are now falling slowly. Without further rainfall, release rates will be reduced progressively. The first reduction will be to 7,100 cubic metres per second'.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	2304hrs	LDCC Stirep as at 2200hrs indicates the following: 'the forecast Brisbane River levels provided by Bom in their latest advice do not differ from the previous advice other than at Jindalee which has been forecast 0.5 m lower than the earlier prediction. After discussion with BoM the FIC has decided not to rerun these levels to update the BRFFS used by the contact centre since further flood level rises are still possible anyway. The current advice correlates to 10,500 cumecs and at least 5.5m AHD at City Gauge. BoM will provide further advice at 12am and will reassess at that time'.
Tuesday, 11 January 2011	2343hrs	Received the Technical Situation Report from SEQ Water which indicated the following: 'Our strategy revolves ensuring dam security and is around trying to prevent initiation of the first fuse plug at EL 75.6m. If this happens we will get a rapid increase of about 2,000m ³ /s in outflow from the dam in addition to the gate release which could be as high as 10,000m ³ /s at the time. Sluices have been closed at Somerset and this will result in high upstream water levels affecting Kilcoy. Somerset is at 104.90m holding 705,730ML and 185.8%. Somerset should peak at around 105.2m (1974 peak level was 106.5m). At 2300 Wivenhoe Dam was 74.92m AHD holding 2,219,000ML and 190.4%. The FOC has begun an appropriate closure sequence to reduce releases. Releases will be reduced throughout the night to track dropping levels. Another reduction will commence around 23:30 to 6,100cumecs. Further reductions will occur over night. Assuming no further rain, the dam peaked around 74.97m AHD which was around 600mm below the first fuse plug initiation level'.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0228hrs	LDCC Stirep received by email indicates: 'BoM are liaising with SEQ Water re Wivenhoe Dam releases to try and determine the impact of the flash flooding in the Lockyer River on the Lower Brisbane River flows. Worst case scenario at this stage is 3.5m AHD (5000 m ³ /s) at the City Gauge. This includes the effect of the atmospheric anomaly on tide levels. The Bureau's


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Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0516hrs	<p>current official advice is 3.0m at the City Gauge occurring on the afternoon high tide. They will not be updating their official advice until 8am Tuesday when they have more certainty around their forecast’.</p> <p><u>SDCC Sitrep indicates the following:</u></p> <p><u>Brisbane/Ipswich:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major flooding is starting to occur with widespread road closures throughout the region. • Five evacuation centres on standby in Brisbane, and RNA Showgrounds activated with capacity of 3000. • There are now 4 Evacuation Centres in Ipswich (Show Grounds, St Joseph’s School, Ripley View (Church) Ipswich Grammar) housing approximately 1,100 as at 0100 hours. • SES, QFRS and QPS are undertaking evacuations in the Oxley Creek area. • Brisbane River and Moreton Bay were closed to boating traffic at midnight. Any emergencies on Moreton Island will need a helicopter response. • Campers on Moreton Island have been relocated to Tangalooma Resort. • As at 4am, Energex reported 48,437 customers without power across Brisbane, Gold and Sunshine Coasts. The majority of these are attributed to flooding.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0537hrs	<p>Email received from Dan Spiller SEQ Water (together with Technical Situation Report) indicating the following: ‘Wivenhoe Dam is currently at 188%, having peaked at about 191% (74.97m AHD, about 0.6m below the first fuse peak). Somerset Dam is at about 190%, which is its peak level. Releases are now at 4,300 cubic metres per second (about 370,000 ML/day), having peaked at 7,500 cubic metres per second (about 650,000 ML/day) for a couple of hours’.</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0651hrs	<p>Email received from Regional Harbour Master, Richard C. Johnston stating the following: ‘I would like to suggest through the DDMG that a plan needs to be put in place for the recovery of the numerous pontoons, boats and other large debris that has floated to Moreton Bay. This plan needs to be put in place as soon as possible so that the port is brought back into operation as soon as it is safe to do so. If we leave it for a few more days the flotsam and jetsam will have spread to a wider area of Moreton Bay, making it extremely dangerous for navigation and possibly reducing the port’s capacity to recover quickly. MSQ is not properly resourced to do the recovery ourselves, we would need to contract the task out to a commercial company and it should be part of the disaster management and recovery plan. I will start looking at some options and come up with a plan’.</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0700hrs	<p>DDC chairs the Brisbane DDMG at Police HQ Brisbane</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0710hrs	<p>Advice received that the cables that facilitate travel of the Moggill Ferry have ‘let go’ overnight and there are real fears that the vessel will leave its current position and impact critical infrastructure downstream.</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0710hrs	<p>Information received from Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) that a heavy vehicle is attending to the mooring of ‘The Island’ entertainment boat which is at risk of breaking its moorings (south side river opposite Oxley’s Floating Restaurant). Justin Williams (MSQ) has liaised with Tony Slocombe who has identified a vehicle from RoadTek to be used to reinforce the lines.</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0723hrs	<p>Advice received that Redlands ECC opened at 0700hrs even date.</p>

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Wednesday, 12 January 2011	0951	Reports received that Oxley's Restaurant has broken free and is about to impact the Go Between Bridge. SDCC and Water Police Advised. Telephone call received from eye-witness (A/C Paul Doyle, who reported that it was not the main part of the restaurant but rather small pontoon to the side of the restaurant.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1026hrs	DDCC log identifies the following: 'Moggill Ferry. MSQ has been in contact with Ipswich DDC Supt Pitman who has been provided with contact details of heavy vehicle driver and arrangements are being made through Ipswich MIR to assist in access to the Moggill Ferry. Master of ship is on board. (Email fwd to A McAllister)'. Advice received from Ipswich DDC that access to the Moggill Ferry via Goodna is not possible as the area is now cut off.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1026hrs	Advice was received from Maritime Services Queensland (MSQ) that the Regional Harbour Master Captain Richard Johnson has issued a direction under the district plan for a tug boat to protect the BP oil pipeline located at Whyte's Island given that it is a high priority piece of critical infrastructure.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1154hrs	DDCC Brisbane Strep refers to BP pipeline at Whytes Island which has significant debris around it and a yacht stuck under/against it. Information is that the pipeline has not yet breached but inspections are being carried out.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1307hrs	Email from Brad Smith (Premiers) to Nicholas Elliott (???) indicating the following; 'I have discussed issues relating to access to the CBD and any possible 'lock down' as suggested by a number of people both with the QPS and Mal Grierson (who has also spoken with Colin Jensen this morning about this matter). No 'lock down' of the CBD is proposed. Each building is being assessed on a case by case basis and individual decisions are being made. For example there is no need to close the Executive Building, however, the Queensland Health Building will be. A situation may arise where an emergency determination has to be made regarding safety and a decision is made to close the CBD. There is currently no such proposal'.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1400hrs	DDCC Brisbane Strep (Number 10) indicates that with respect to the BP pipeline at Whytes Island – the yacht has been removed and the debris cleared. There is no damage to the pipeline and the pipe is currently not active.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1425hrs	DDC Brisbane diary (page 64) identifies 'received advice at 2.25pm: walkway would come away @5metre mark and float down the river possible impaction with the Gateway Motorway pillars.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1430hrs	DDCC log articulates the following: 'received from AC Martin - ADF support sought to assess Brisbane River Walkway with a view of controlled demolition'. Diary note of DDC Brisbane (page 64 that A/C Brett Pointing was telephoned regarding acquisition of ADF assets to demolish the walkway)
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1458hrs	DDC Brisbane telephones CEO BCC and advises that there are grave concerns for the Floating Walkway and that attempts will be made to use explosives to demolish the structure and to ensure that it is reduced to smaller pieces so as to not cause a problem for critical infrastructure downstream. CEO advises that he understands the position and concurs with the course being taken. He also advised that he had been in contact with the walkways designers and they might have been able to develop a strategy to secure it against the river flow. The river height and flow and access to the site would prevent this however. (DDC Brisbane diary reference page 68)
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1526hrs	Received an email from Colin Jensen (CEO BCC) with a powerpoint presentation and technical information about the Riverwalk. Email message indicates the following: 'Some background info on the Floating RiverWalk which may be useful for the ADF. Our contact (structural engineer with knowledge of the RiverWalk) is: Chris Beckley

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		<p>Acting Principal Engineer Structures City Assets Branch Brisbane Infrastructure Brisbane City Council </p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>1600hrs</p>	<p>Technical Situation Report received from SEQ Water indicating the following: 'Somerset Dam has peaked at 105.11 m AHD at 08:00 on 12 January 2011 and the dam has been discharging over the spillway. One sluice was opened at 1030 12 January 2011 and the dam is discharging 1,440 m³/s. Sluice gates will be utilised to drain of the flood storage compartment during the next 5 days. At 3pm Somerset was 104.94m and 708,505ML at 186.5%. Wivenhoe Dam peaked at 74.97 m AHD at 19:00 on 11 January 2011 with a corresponding discharge of 7,450 m³/s The releases from Wivenhoe Dam have been temporarily reduced to 2,500 m³/s at 07:30 to allow the peak of Lockyer Creek to enter the BrisbaneRiver. After the downstream peak in the lower BrisbaneRiver has passed, releases will be increased to maximum of 3,500 m³/s. This release will then be maintained to drain the flood storage component within the required 7 days. At 3pm Wivenhoe Dam was 74.81 m AHD at 2,201,636ML and 188.9% and fluctuating slightly due to the releases coming from Somerset but relatively steady'. DDCC log indicates the following entry: 'Briefed by Capt Scott Revell ADF re - air drop of anchor to Moggill ferry confirmed collection at 1700 delivery shortly after - MSQ reps to be onsite at pickup and drop off to coordinate'. (Justin Williams (MSQ) sourced a 1.5 tonne anchor from the Rivergate Marina for deployment to Moggill.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>1600hrs</p>	<p>DDCC log indicates the following entry: 'ADF - Team has been tasked to scuttle 'The Island'. Team and equip will deploy from Sydney 2100hrs. ETA 2230hrs. Require vessel to assist. - Water police briefed. Details passed'. Erratum - Entry should reflect that ADF was asked to assess the feasibility of sinking the vessel.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>1615hrs</p>	<p>DDCC log identifies the following: 'Jeff Downs Chief Insp Mines and Energy discussion re controlled demolition of riverside walk - working party including A/insp Bosely, Designer, mines and energy'.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>1700hrs</p>	<p>DDCC log identifies the following: 'Tended onsite briefing Riverwalk New Farm with Jeff Downs - Chief Explosives Officer, Mines and Energy - DEETER and Chris Beckley BCC Infrastructure, EORT and Councillor Hinchcliffe re management of Brisbane River Walk during flood. Identified additional marina on opp side of river which also posed risk, liaised with QMS re provision of Tugs, liaised with Bowen Tugs and Barges re provision of 3 tugs - tugs dispatched at 1700hrs - agreement taken to dismantle riverwalk and to move pieces down river by barge, concern raised re marina on opp side of river which would separate from pylons at 4.5m River walk estimated to separate at 5mtrs - briefed AC Martin approval given for plan to be actioned. Mines and Energy responsible for explosive component with support from OSC'.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>1709hrs</p>	<p>Amended Stirep from LDCC arrives (changes made to properties inundated) and indicates the following: 'final prediction of flood peak as advised by the BoM is 5.5 m AHD at the Brisbane City Gauge on Thursday 13/1/2011. Peak will arrive at around 4am Thursday and last for around 12 hours before beginning to fall. Predicted peak discharge at Brisbane City gauge is 9,500 m³/s at the peak on Thursday. High tides on Thursday are at approximately 4am and 4pm. However, as per LDMMG direction,</p>

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		<p>planning has continued for an alternative scenario peak of 12,000 m³/s. Based on the 9,500m³/s peak, the total flooded properties is now estimated at approximately 23,300 including 18,776 residential properties. The above count is for property flooding not house flooding. Based on a 12,000m³/s scenario, the total flooded properties is estimated at approximately 47,355 including 40,185 residential properties.</p> <p>Meeting held at DDCC Brisbane (1st Floor Police HQ) regarding the floating walkway. Present, DDC Bne, C/S Kerry Dunn, Deputy DDC, A/Inspector Bosley, XO; Mr Slochom (DTMR) and others. Advised with respect to options concerning the floating walkway. Advised by DTMR representative that the best advice from DTMR engineers is that a release of the pontoons and the impact of the Gateway pylons would not cause a significant issue. Quote 'The bridge was designed to be impacted by a reasonably large ship'. (DDC Brisbane diary entry page. 68).</p>
	1740hrs	
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1750hrs	<p>DDCC log states the following: Advice from Insp Aitken – Patrick (Quirk) has contacted the regional harbour master- there are two courses of action. The large barge which is part of the Oxley restaurant is secure at the wharf. The first option - two pontoons (upstream and walkway) seem to be unsafe. We can wait for the river to rise, tow the pontoons down river, if the river rises, the tugs can't return. Option 2 - plan - tugs will go up river with a mooring party, they will secure the pontoons and walkway pontoons to the land at secure points which alleviates the above risk. This is the preferred course of action. If they don't do anything, the pontoons will come down the river with the possibility of colliding with the Merivale and/or Gray St bridges, causing structural damage which will require inspection even if no damage. Action Taken - One tug deployed unable to complete due to height. One tug is going to attempt to secure pontoons and assess situation. Possibility that no action is possible</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1831hrs	<p>DDCC log indicates the following: 'Advice received that tugs were unable to navigate the Brisbane river past the Gateway bridge due to flow rate. Plan modified following receipt of advice from Anthony Schomberg QMS that the Gateway Bridge had been constructed to sustain the strike of a fully loaded vessel and that the riverwalk does not pose a threat. AC briefed including Insp Aitken BCD - strategy now altered due to helath and safety concerns re staff placing charges, the risk of river ops and the lack of barge. The Riverwalk is now to be left in tact and allowed to drift from pylons on river rise. Advice from Paul Schmidt TMR from walkway design team, is that structure is anticipated to break up after leaving pylons and will seperate into smaller pieces when flowing down river. Advice provided to QMS re potential additional debris around the Buwler Island oil pipeline. Tugs to be deployed to deflect debris from pipeline piers'.</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	1845hrs	<p>DDC log indicates the following: 'PHQPOC advised that scripts for chopper delivery to Pinjarra Hills/Indro will be available for collection from the emergency control centre @RBH in an hour'</p>
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	2020hrs	<p>From notes recorded in diary of DDC Brisbane (page 67) Meeting held at DDCC (1st Floor Police HQ). Present include but not</p>

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		<p>limited to DDC, Brisbane (Martin), Deputy DDC (Dunn), Supt Huxley; XO, Justin Williams (MSQ), Inspector Cuskelly (RDO MSR), Sergeant, (Water Police) Messers John Kircher & Tommy Ericson (Marine Engineers), Chief Supt. Ron James (QFRS), etc. Meeting examined the issues relating to 'The Island'. Examined the current fuel usage and capacity (currently 4 tonnes of fuel and uses 100kgs per hour) has 24-30 hours duration with existing fuel. There are currently 7 lines on 4 pillars and 3 additional lines will be put down forward to secure vessel. Strategies such as tensioning up the line and additional anchor available as last resort. Extra concrete blocks to hold down land anchors have been provisions. Engineers advise that the vessel is capable of being held on station under power until the threat is past. Advise also that the crew are competent and vessel serviceable. Fatigue management has been considered and reprovisioning of fuel would need to occur though. The Marine Engineers also expressed concern with sinking the vessel as they could not guarantee that this could be done quickly and efficiently. Still might pose a problem as it slips from its current position as well as might break up and superstructure might career downstream. Advice is that the vessel can 'make the tide' under power and therefore their considered opinion was that crew to be left on board and power maintained. Extra lines put out to secure the vessel and provision of fuel. The Marine Engineers and Justin Williams outlined the Harbour Masters view and preferred position which was to leave the vessel on station. DECISION – DDC Brisbane determined to continue to maintain the crew on the vessel and ensure that the vessel was powered to relieve the pressure on the lines. The decision was also to continue efforts to secure the vessel to the current site and further that the vessel would be reprovisioned with fuel.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>2034hrs</p>	<p>Technical Situation Report received from SEQ Water by email indicating: 'Somerset Dam has peaked at 105.11 mAHD at 06:00 on 12 January 2011. One sluice was opened at 1030 12 January 2011 and discharging 1,410 m³/s. Sluice gates will be utilised to drain of the flood storage compartment during the next 5 days. At 5pm Somerset was 104.86m and 702,953ML at 185.1%. Wivenhoe Dam peaked at 74.97 mAHD at 19:00 on 11 January 2011 with a corresponding discharge of 7,450 m³/s. The release from Wivenhoe Dam was reduced to 2,500 m³/s at 07:30 12 January 2011 to allow the peak of Lockyer Creek to enter the Brisbane River and this release has been maintained since. After the downstream peak in the lower Brisbane River has passed, releases will be increased to maximum of 3,500 m³/s. The release is expected to commence Thursday and then be maintained at this level to drain the flood storage component within the required 7 days. The releases will not result in any renewed rises at downstream locations. At 5pm Wivenhoe Dam was 74.82 m AHD at 2,203,223ML and 189.1% and fluctuating slightly due to the releases coming from Somerset but relatively steady.</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>2129hrs</p>	<p>Email sent to the SDCC from the DDCC instructing the following: 'Urgent priority request for Rotary Fixed Wing Aircraft to drop supplies to Mt Crosby prior to 0800 14/01/2011. This matter has been brought to the attention of the Commissioner as is a high priority. For further info please contact A/Insp Gareth BOSLEY From DDCC on 3015 2592'</p>
<p>Wednesday, 12 January 2011</p>	<p>2225hrs</p>	<p>LDCC Sitrep received indicating the following: 'The primary focus is accommodating residents who have been evacuated from their homes. Planning has begun for the post event response. Latest prediction of flood peak as advised by the BoM is 5.2 m AHD at the Brisbane City Gauge on Thursday 13/1/2011. Peak will arrive at around 4am Thursday and last for around 12</p>

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		hours before beginning to fall. Predicted peak discharge at Brisbane City gauge is 9,500 m3/s at the peak on Thursday. High tides on Thursday are at approximately 4am and 4pm. The total flooded properties are now estimated at approximately 18515 including 14682 residential properties. The above count is for property flooding not house flooding?
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	2226hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Info from Anthony SLOCOMBE from Waterways Planning & Infrastructure that the riverside walkway is likely to float off it's piles in the next few hours. DDC advised'.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	2231hrs	DDC log indicates the following: 'Request supply by ADF of off road fuel tanker capacity diesel for re-fueling of Barge in Brisbane river est 3000lt per day required. 4x4 or 6x6 trailer required. Est 10T of diesel on first delivery. Faxed to SDCC 10:35'.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	2325hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Info from Insp AITKEN that as of 2315hrs river walk had broken away at New Farm. DDC advised'.
Wednesday, 12 January 2011	2330hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - A/C MARTIN has spoken to Supt WAUGH and directed closure of the Gateway Bridge until such time as the riverwalk has passed the Bridge and it has been determined that there is no evidence of structural damage'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0015hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - A/C MARTIN queries the use of a tug to deflect the portion of walkway heading towards the Gateway Bridge. QMS advised it was not feasible due to speed of the current. Sections observed to pass the middle of the bridge. QMS advised and bridge reopened'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0212hrs	LDCC Sitrep received indicating the following: 'Based on the latest BOM Update (13/1/11 @12.27AM): the current Brisbane City Gauge reading is 4.36m and rising slowly with the high tide. The latest BOM advice indicates a peak at the city gauge under 5m AHD. FIC will monitor city gauge and provide the latest advice from the BOM on the city gauge as they become available. BOM also indicated that at Jindalee, a peak of 13 metres was observed at about 7pm Wednesday. The revised number of effected properties from this reduced peak will be known after 4am. Current predictions are that the following low lying suburbs which were the first to flood such as Paddington/ Rosalie/ Aucherflower/ Milton will be the last to recede due to their downstream location'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0240hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advised that a further 50m section has broken from the river walk and was heading towards the Gateway Bridge. A/C DOYLE authorised the closure of the Gateway Bridge pending the safe passing of section'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0325hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advised that Gateway has reopened following the passing of most recent section of riverwalk. Section did strike a moored yacht causing it break away from it's mooring. Nil further damage or incidents of concern known'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0350hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advised by Andrew BUTT - Maintenance Manager at Docksider. 17-20 vessels in marina ranging from 50 foot - 23 foot. 40 Fingers on their marina. He believes they will need another 30-40cm before the marina comes away'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0400hrs	DDCC log reflects the following entry: 'DDC - MSQ have contacted "The Island" boat. They are current holding station, not using much engine power to hold station. No signs of stress in the immediate lines. Only experiences a 6-8 inch rise overnight'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0405hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advice from Comco that a 200m section of the riverwalk was seen near Merthyr Rd

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		floating downstream. Advice from A/C DOYLE to close Gateway and for Water Police to follow until it has cleared the bridge. Comco advised that Water Police already tasked to do so'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0410hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advice that in addition to the 200m section a 400m has also been seen in the river also'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0425hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Request Supt FOGG dispatch vehicle to advise Riverqueen crews of risk associated to large segments of riverwalk traversing the river. Advised the boats are morred in the Hawthorne Reach. This is where the segments are currently located - advice would not be able to be passed in time. Marine Ops advised that Riverqueen advised by VHF and are aware of situation. Broadcast also conveyed to commercial shipping in relation to shipping hazard caused by floating walkway. Broadcast by Marine Services'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0440hrs	DDCC log indicates the following; 'DDC - A/C MARTIN has requested that MSQ issue an alert to commercial shipping via VHF. Notice to mariners will also be issued re walkway problems in the river. The River Queens have been identified as an immediate threat for the current hazards and are on standby'. Justin Williams (MSQ) made the request and has actioned to shipping.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0450hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'DDC - Advice that Riverqueen's have now been evacuated by Brisbane Water Police'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0600hrs	DDCC Brisbane Sitrep (Number 15) identifies that the last section of 400m of floating walkway is being escorted down river by tug and water police vessel.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0700hrs	DDC chairs the Brisbane DDMG at Police HQ Brisbane
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0715hrs	<u>Deceased Person:</u> [REDACTED] Male person has entered flood waters on Bowhill Rd Willawong at approx 0715hrs 13/1/11. The deceased has appeared to struggle in the flood waters before his head went under and did not resurface. QPS crew on scene within minutes. A search was conducted in an attempt to locate the deceased however was unsuccessful. At 0950hrs rescue crews located the deceased's body approx 15m from the entry point. QP1100032737 refers.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0745hrs	Advised by email that the Redland City Council ECC Centre resumed full operations again today at 7am, after a skeleton crew manned the Centre overnight.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0751hrs	LDCC Sitrep received indicating that: 'the latest prediction of the flood peak based on advice from the BoM is 4.6m at the Brisbane City Gauge. The peak at the city gauge is yet to be officially declared and will take some time to confirm; this is below the 1974 flood peak of 5.45m. Based on the BoM advice, the estimate of total flooded properties have been revised down from approximately 19,000 to 15,000'.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	0835hrs	DDCC log indicates the following: 'Info from Supt Huxley that the Captain for the Moggill ferry is agreeable to anchor to the airlifted to the ship. POC advised. Supt Huxley has liaised with MSQ. Email request sent to SDCC approved @ 0930hrs'
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1000hrs	DDCC Sitrep (Number 17) reports that 'The Island' is holding position and the lines are intact. Arrangements for refuelling are currently underway. As soon as it is safe to do so arrangements will be made to move the barge to safer position.
Thursday, 13 January 2011	1125hrs	DDCC log reflects the following: 'MSQ – Urgent request to supply specialist Navy personnel to assist in an urgent fuel transfer operation at Hookings St, West End. The "Island" requires immediate fuel to hold station at its' current moorings to limit the risk of infrastructure. – has been tasked'.

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	Friday, 14 January 2011	<p>Recovery Report #3 is relative to predicted peak flood as advised by the BoM being 4.50 m AHD at the Brisbane City Gauge on Thursday 13/1/2011. The total number of flood affected properties for Recovery Forecast #3 is estimated at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approx. 5,930 (3,352 residential properties) of which <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 5,755 are partially flooded (3,303 residential properties) and ○ 171 are still completely flooded (49 residential). <p>For Recovery Report #3 the total number of properties recovered since the peak of 4.5m AHD is estimated at 27,092 (22,611 residential properties). This is an increase of 4775 properties (3,686 residential) from Recovery Report #2.</p> <p>Email forwarded from AXO to DDC (Bosley) with respect to resupply of communities. Message indicates that on 13/1/2011 The Brisbane DDC received a request to re-supply the communities of Bellbowrie and Mt Crosby due to both communities having been isolated by flood waters. It was predicted that community numbers were approximately 2500 and 7500 respectively.</p> <p>Since this time arrangements have been made to re-supply the communities accordingly.</p> <p>Bellbowrie.</p> <p>8 pallets of food stuffs supplied by Coles. First shipment consisted of 2 pallets loaded onto and transported by 1 x ADF Unimog reaching Bellbowrie at approximately midnight. 2 x additional Unimogs were subsequently requested to complete task. 5 x Unimogs were supplied and loaded. At 02:30 vehicles were still on-route to Bellbowrie. The arrival of these vehicles will result in a total of 8 pallets of food stuffs being available within the community.</p> <p>Mt Crosby</p> <p>Arrangements have been made for resupply via air on 14 /1/2011, pending approval by ADF. This will consist of 14 pallets of food stuffs being air lifted from Coles Distribution Centre to Mt Crosby State School, including medication. Arrangements are to be made for local police to organise receipt of helicopter. Advice received to date is that confirmation of air operations and timings should be available at approximately 6am even date.</p> <p>A copy of the re-supply picking sheet is attached to the email for information.</p>
	Friday, 14 January 2011 0700hrs	DDC chairs the Brisbane DDMG at Police HQ Brisbane
	Friday, 14 January 2011 1558pm	<p>At 8am Friday 14th, the Bureau of Meteorology advised the expected peak level will be between 2.2m-2.4m with the high tide Sunday. Summary of Recovery report 3 for 0800, Sat 15/1/11. The total number of flood affected properties at 8:00am on Saturday 15th is estimated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • approximately 5,926 (3,352 residential properties) of which <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5,755 are partially flooded (3,303 residential properties) and - 171 are still completely flooded (49 residential). <p>The total number of properties recovered since the peak of 4.5m AHD is estimated at 27,092 (22,611 residential properties).</p> <p>LDCC Stirep indicates the following: ' At 8am Friday 14th, the Bureau of Meteorology advised the expected peak level will be</p>
	Friday, 14 January 2011 1708hrs	

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		<p>between 2.2m-2.4m with the high tide Sunday.</p> <p>Summary of Recovery report 3 for 0800, Sat 15/1/11</p> <p>The total number of flood affected properties at 8:00am on Saturday 15th is estimated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • approximately 5,926 (3,352 residential properties) of which - 5,755 are partially flooded (3,303 residential properties) and - 171 are still completely flooded (49 residential). <p>As at 8:00am this morning, the total number of properties recovered since the peak of 4.5m AHD was estimated at 22,317 (18,925 residential properties).</p>
Saturday, 15 January 2011	(PM)	<p>Received telephone call from a resident at Mount Ommaney Drive, Jindalee regarding water damaged property which was discarded as a result of the flood. Resident was concerned that if they throw the product out then the insurance company would not pay out and the BCC trucks were coming up the street to collect discarded property. Advised that the Insurance Council of Australia was advising residents to document the property discarded (photographs and samples of floor coverings, curtains, etc.) before discarding. Resident was very stressed and therefore indicated that the Council would not allow soiled property to be accumulated for health reasons and the DMA have powers recover the community. Directed that the property be discarded after appropriately being documented.</p>
Sunday, 16 January 2011	1000hrs	<p>Raised the issue of resident concerns regarding discarding property affected by floods and potential issues of insurance companies at the LDMG meeting. Discussed at the meeting with Lord Mayor and the Deputy Premier and determined that residents should be referred to the ICA statements and then discarded appropriately. Again confirmed the views of the ICA – email sent from Colin Jensen confirming the advice. (1145hrs and 1253hrs)</p>
Monday, 17 January 2011		<p>Recovery process well underway.</p>
Monday, 17 January 2011	1629hrs	<p>Advised CEO BCC (Colin Jensen) by email of Operation Safeguard.</p>
Tuesday, 18 January 2011	0800hrs	<p>The Queensland Police Service has had the support of other policing agencies for anti-looting and high visibility patrols of flood affected areas in Brisbane. We have secured an additional 100 officers from New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. They will be working from 18 January 2011 (morning) on a 24hr 7 day basis to augment the work of QPS in these areas.</p>
Wednesday, 19 January 2011	0700hrs	<p>DDMG met for the last time</p>
Thursday, 20 January 2011	1600hrs	<p>DDCC stand downs (reverts to XO maintaining the telephone)</p>
Saturday, 22 January 2011	1000hrs	<p>Last LDMG meeting at 157 Ann Street, Brisbane.</p>
Friday, 4 February 2011	1100hrs	<p>Debrief of the Brisbane Flood Event 2011 and performance of the DDCC and DDC due to occur (postponed due to TC Yasi to a date to be advised).</p>
Wednesday, 16 February 2011	1300hrs	<p>Debrief of the Brisbane Flood Event 2011 and performance of the DDCC and DDC occurred. Facilitated by A/Chief. Supt. Bob Gee at Ground Floor Conference Room, Police HQ, Brisbane.</p>