BURROWS
QUEENSLAND FLOODS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Matters concerning the operation of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

Tuesday, 3 May 2011 at 10.00am

At level 30, 400 George Street, Brisbane, Qld

Interview conducted by: Det Snr Sgt Mark Reid

Private interview of John Douglas Burrows
<JOHN DOUGLAS BURROWS, interviewed: [10.06am]

DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 10.06am on Tuesday, 3 May 2011. This is a recorded interview being conducted at the offices of the Queensland Floods Commission between Mark Reid of the Commission and John Douglas Burrows.

What I'd like to do initially, just for identification purposes, is if everyone in the room can state their full name and details and we will work our way from there. I will start with myself. My name is Mark John Reid, I am a Detective Senior Sergeant of Police, currently attached to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. My registered number is 6091. John, could I have your full details, thanks?

MR BURROWS: Yes. My name's John Douglas Burrows. I'm currently a station officer employed at the Anzac Avenue Fire Station, 201 Anzac Avenue, Toowoomba, and my number is 012740.

DET SNR SGT REID: Jenny, if I could just get you to identify yourself as well, as you may have inquiries or want us to slow down at some point.

MS JANSEN: My name is Jenny Jansen and I am here for transcription purposes and I am employed by Merrill Corporation.

DET SNR SGT REID: John, is there anyone else in the room who hasn't identified themselves?

MR BURROWS: No, nobody else.

DET SNR SGT REID: Q. What I propose to do today is have an informal discussion with regard to a number of issues that you have highlighted through a submission or previous interviews with the Queensland Fire and Rescue union or regard to the running of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service or your personal dealings with the same. A. Yes. That is the United Firefighters Union.

Q. Yes.

A. I just want to make sure - it's not in bed, so to speak, with the QFRS.

Q. No, no, no.
A. No. It's the employee representative.

Q. Yes, that's correct. What we will go through today - I have a number of issues that I want to discuss from a prior interview that you conducted with Queensland Fire and Rescue - oh, with the --
A. United Firefighters Union.

Q. -- United Firefighters Union.
A. UFU.

Q. Where you have brought to the surface a number of issues that you are concerned about, and that interview took place on 24 February 2011 at Toowoomba. So, during the interview there will be a number of occasions where I will ask you to go to, say, page 15 and then we will briefly look at what you have said in that prior interview. Rather than reinventing the wheel, we will look at what you have already said and just clarify a few points. I have read through the previous interview and I have read through a number of comments from one of the lawyers who also has an interest in what we are talking about, and she has also highlighted to me a number of things that she wants us to discuss today as well.
A. Okay.

Q. So if we can take our time, if we can get - just for the recording - one of us talking at a time and not talk over the top of each other. If at any stage either myself or yourself talk about things perhaps that I don't understand or you don't understand, we need to pull each other up straight away and say, look, I don't understand the question that you have asked, or I might say to you I need you to explain to me in some detail what you have just said. Okay?
A. Yes.

Q. So completely informal. I find that's probably the best way for us to get through quite a large amount of information. If you need a break at all, let me know. If you need a cup of tea or coffee, we will have a break. As you said, you had a late evening.
A. It's all right. If the need dictates, you have me all day.

Q. Very good.
A. And tomorrow as well, if you wish.
Q. Fantastic. All right. As you have outlined, your full name is John Douglas Burrows. What is your date of birth, John?

A. [redacted]

Q. You have indicated that you're the station officer, Anzac Avenue, Toowoomba and your registered number is 012740. How long have you worked for QFRS?

A. Since 1998 but prior to that I worked for the Country Fire Authority for 29 years and nine months, which gives me a total service of about 42 years.

Q. All in Queensland?

A. No. The 29 years and nine months were served in Victoria.

Q. How many years have you been the station officer up in the Toowoomba district?

A. Since I took up the position in 1998.

Q. For the rest of our discussions, do you refer to the areas as districts or do you have divisions for each station? So if we say the Toowoomba district, or are they broken up into smaller stations?

A. There's two stations within the Toowoomba area that are served by permanent staff. The rest are made up by auxiliary staff. The two permanent stations are Station 11, which is Kitchener Street Fire Station, located in Kitchener Street, Toowoomba, and Station 12 is located in Anzac Avenue, and Harristown is technically the suburb. Then we're supported by stations such as Oakey, Goombungee and Highfields, which are all auxiliary stations.

Q. The two, Kitchener and Anzac --

A. No. Kitchener and Anzac are all career, 24/7 stations.

Q. Yes, sorry, but Kitchener and Anzac --

A. Are in area 1.

Q. -- how many staff does that comprise?

A. In both of those two stations?

Q. Yes.

A. Approximately 48. On duty at any one time between the two stations are a total of 10, made up of three officers
and seven firefighters.

Q. Is that on a rotational 24-hour shift?
A. That's on a 10/14 roster. That is correct, it's a rotational shift.

Q. What level of swiftwater training have you received?
A. Interestingly enough, when I was employed in initial employment within QFRS, I was brought in for a number of special skill sets that weren't within Queensland. Swiftwater level 1 and level 2 technician is what I acquired when I was overseas, as sponsored by the Country Fire Authority. I moved to Queensland and within a very short space of time, Queensland didn't recognise my international qualifications for the swiftwater rescue. However, me being - unfortunately - generous to a fault, I was asked by the then State special operations coordinator, a Mr Gary Littlewood, would I write the swiftwater awareness training package for the State of Queensland.

Q. What time period are we talking about here?
A. It would have been about 18 months into my employment, so I--

Q. Sorry. What year would that be?
A. That would be around 1999 to 2000 I wrote that, in conjunction with another training package. It was accepted in its entirety for its subject content. It was exclusively put together by myself and was rolled out across the State as a swiftwater awareness package. Around 2000, they were very concerned that they actually might get some rain in Queensland and with that would come floods. So, somebody somewhere, at some point in time, believed that I knew a little bit about swiftwater rescue. However, the qualifications that I brought in from interstate, that were both interstate recognised and internationally recognised, were not recognised in Queensland.

Q. Is that policy still current?
A. Yes. I'm still only what's classed as a level 1 swiftwater operator, which means that I can go within 3 metres of an embankment or a swiftwater environment. I'm meant to have a PFD, which is a personal floatation device, on and be tethered. I can only, technically, work as part of a team that's being coordinated by a swiftwater technician level 2.
Q. Is your training package still current or has it been modified?
A. It's been modified marginally but there's still a lot of my photos that I took originally in there and a lot of the subject content is still the same. As I said to a firefighter a couple of days ago, swiftwater still doesn't change. People still drown in the same way as they did 15 years ago when I first started the swiftwater rescue and it hasn't changed. The techniques are the same. Some of the equipment may change but that's it. A river is a river; a flood is a flood; a catastrophic event is exactly that, a catastrophic event.

Q. You explained what a level 1 technician can do. Can you explain to me if there are any further tiers? What does a level 2 swiftwater technician do?
A. If I may, I'll just go back. Within Queensland Fire and Rescue there's three levels of swiftwater. There's swiftwater awareness, which is designed to stop the first responder - being the firefighter - from drowning in the event. In other words, it's to give them enough information to stop them from jumping into a swiftwater situation with what we call our structural turn-out equipment. In a few of the bits and pieces, we suggest that those people dress like that, dress to drown. It's for structural firefighting, it's not for sloshing --

Q. By that you mean your large boots, your large pants, your overcoat?
A. Your over-boots, your over-pants, your coat and your structural firefighting helmet and gloves. It's a recipe for disaster.

So you have an awareness level. Then you have a level 1 setup, where you basically do in-water throw-bag recoveries. Then level 2 is where you work as part of the rescue team. The main difference is that you are able to do in-water effected rescues and you do a little bit more on-rope. You're making up ferry angles and you're using the power of the water to propel the rescuer out to the patient and, if you have the right team on the other side, they'll pick the patient up, put a PFD on the patient and the power of the water will then propel them to the reception party on the far bank. So instead of fighting the water, we're letting the water do the work for us. That's the main difference.
You have an awareness level, you have what happens if you fall in the water level, and then you have the swiftwater rescue technician level 2 where they're actually effectively operating within the water environment.

Q. What qualifications or what training needs to take place to become a level 2?
A. Currently at this stage, as far as I'm aware - again, in around 2000, they, being special operations, said for a person to be considered to be a swiftwater level 2 technician, they had to actually be able to climb a rope. So what they requested was that they be a vertical rescue technician. So within Queensland they insist that people climb up and down a rope and know how to do some basic roping rigging.

Now, that doesn't suit all people and, as I said in my statement, I have a couple of blokes on station who are excellent surf swimmers but, purely because of this limitation that they don't want to go and climb a rope or hang their backside over nothingness, they don't want to be a swiftwater technician. In effect, it puts us in a logjam. We could have a lot of people who would be very comfortable working in a swiftwater environment who are being prohibited at this stage, purely because there is this core belief that all things technical rescue have to benchmark off the vertical roping component.

Now, within a lot of the roping components - oh sorry, I'll step back one. Within swiftwater components, there aren't many situations where you will have to do advanced rigging - that's where you're moving in with a Tyrolean traverse and having to do a mechanical advantage system to effect the pick-off of the person. Most of the knots that are taught for basic level 1 vertical rescue on station will stand the person in perfectly good stead to do the level 2 rescue technician's work for the bulk of it. However, because there is at this stage level 2 technicians supporting them if there is a more advanced level of rope rigging to be set up, they would be available to rig the system up.

Q. I would have thought a lot of the work would be purely horizontal.
A. Most of it is. I would suggest probably 99 percent of it is horizontal. We, in Australia, haven't got - other than up around Tully and further up towards Cairns, and
that, we haven't got the very sharp creek beds. Where we are, predominantly out around Toowoomba, it's very easy for a team to be set up each side within either throw-bag distance or a shot-fired rope-thrower distance. That can throw up to 400 metres - if and when they decide to actually put them in. These things have been requested some years ago and can be confirmed by both David Woods and Tony Guse, who were, respectively, the technical rescue coordinators within the south-west region. They had requested that equipment be purchased.

Q. Do you know when they would have requested that equipment?
A. Look, it would be five or six years ago now and it was brought about because of a number of other technical rescues that we were engaged in around Toowoomba; whether it's roping down a cliff, or whatever. Unfortunately, Toowoomba being on the top of a hill, we have a few little areas around the place. Even at Crows Nest Falls we would do probably, on average, one in-water rescue there every 12 months because people like to dive off a 30 metre cliff into a pool, that's appropriately named the Devil's Pool, and not know what's in there. The locals tell us there's truck tyres and huge logs. They snap their spines and we have to go and --

Q. Collect them
A. -- collect them. If we don't, the police divers get them where they're still stuck underneath the logs. But we can't help that sort of --

Q. Behaviour.
A. -- behaviour, no. Yes?

Q. The interview that you had on 24 February, are you happy to talk about everything that you mentioned in there?
A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Because I can understand that sometimes talking within your own group can be easier than when we start to talk about it, when it can become a public document from here on in.
A. Well, unfortunately, I think a lot of this needs to be publicly aired, because we were operating on our bootstraps, there was no strategic support from our senior on-calls and it had become - in Toowoomba, anyway - a bit of a standing joke that some senior on-calls you couldn't
get at all. I have a document that will support what I was saying the other day. Toowoomba is about nine and a half hours travel time - sorry, the south-west region is about nine and a half hours road travel time across, yet to look after that they have an eastern and a western senior on-call, so we may, in fact, have a person in Charleville who is making strategic decisions for Toowoomba, which is nine and a half, 10 hours away.

Q. I would have thought --
A. So I'm quite happy to answer anything that you wish.

Q. Fantastic. I'll probably go through in some detail about situational awareness in regard to those issues that you have just described.
A. Yes.

Q. Before we go off and talk about the brass tacks issues, can you just give me a rundown, starting from firefighter up to commissioner, without going into too much detail, just so that I can understand the structure of QFRS?
A. Yes. Well, the structure at QFRS starts - are you wanting within the urban or the rural, or both? Urban are the people who work where the bulk of the structures are; then you have your vegetation firefighters, who are predominantly your --

Q. Rural.
A. -- rural.

Q. If we could just stick to the urban, initially, and then if we need to talk about the rural fire brigade, we will.
A. Yes.

Q. But if we can just stick to your main environment, initially, that will be great.
A. Okay. My main environment is the township and surrounds of Toowoomba. You have a daytime population of about 210,000 and a nighttime of about 155,000; we have major transport rumbling through the joint and growing exponentially at about 21 percent per year, as far as the transport risks are concerned.

Now the structure is, as I say, that we have these manned stations in Toowoomba, which is only two, manned on
a 10/14 basis. They're made up of a station officer and a
number of firefighters on each station. At Station 11,
which is Kitchener Street, you have two officers; one will
man the primary pumping appliance, which is 311 Alpha, and
the second officer and one firefighter will man what is
normally known as 311 Lima, which is a specialist rescue
appliance.

Now, those guys support anywhere in the region. So
depending on how lucky you feel at the time, you may have
the truck halfway to Cunnamulla when we actually have
something go down in Toowoomba. It just is a very thinly,
overstretched resource. Then we have --

Q. Would that be the appliance and the rescue vehicle or
just the rescue vehicle?
A. The rescue vehicle, with the one officer and one
firefighter on it, may be anywhere in the region and/or
interregional. We were - and it does get back to
operational tempo as well - that increasingly both our
Alpha appliance from Station 11 and the Lima appliance were
supporting down into what's called the western end of the
Lockyer Valley, right the way down to Gatton, for a number
of the swiftwater events before January 10.

Q. Where does western region finish, from an eastern
point of view?
A. South-west region ends halfway up the Toowoomba range.
So south-east region, which is administered out of the Gold
Coast - which is a fair drag away - starts from there and
goes down the Lockyer Valley, down to the Gold Coast; the
south-east region as it's known. Now within the
structure, which I think you're wanting me to try to paint,
we then have an area director over the top of us. Now, if
he's not on duty, we have a senior on-call and that --

Q. Is the area director a fire --
A. He's a --

Q. Had been a fireman at some point?
A. Yes. Some of them it may have been many years ago.
I don't know whether you want me to raise it now or not
but, unfortunately, the bulk of them are not even
swiftwater awareness trained and these people are the ones
who are making strategic decisions. My analogy to you as a
detective, it would be a bit like the Commissioner of
Police, never having fired a firearm in his life, being in
charge of the next big terrorist event and saying, righto, we're going to use deadly force. He would not know the nuances of that application and, unfortunately, and I've got it with - what I've brought down is support documentation to my statements. Our assistant commissioner, our chief superintendent, superintendent, all the way down our senior officer chain are not qualified at any stage, phase or format in swiftwater.

Q. Is that due to the new - only having been implemented in the last 10 years or 12 years?
A. Well, 10 years or 12 years I don't believe is a reasonable excuse not to remain operationally aware. I'm not saying that I required them to go and --

Q. Do the course?
A. -- do the course, but even their transcripts of their core skills maintenance for senior officers, the bulk of them haven't done the mandated training as directed by the commissioner, which is Lee Johnson. So for me, as a professional fire officer, I really am not fussed what rank you sit at; if you are going to be a leader of men and women, you have to know what you're talking about. So, even if it means if it's a two-day course, you sit in on the day one and do all the theory awareness training and know that when I'm talking "river left" and "river right" - when they hear that on the radio from an operational crew that's turned out, they know what is being talked about.

Q. Do you think that would improve their situational awareness and their decision making processes?
A. Absolutely. Absolutely. If you haven't even been given the basic awareness on the specialist subject that you're looking at, the only other information that they can fall back on is their career experience over perhaps the last 20, 25 years, which may or may not relate to swiftwater rescue.

Q. Depending, I suppose, where they have been stationed as well?
A. It's just pure luck - or unluck, as the case may be - as to whether or not you're on the day everything goes pear-shaped, or not. A lot of them are still relying on what they did 20 years ago.

Q. If I can just take you back to the area, you talked about your area director.
A. Yes.

Q. Where do we go from there, as far as structure?
A. We go from there up to the chief superintendent, which
is --

Q. So the area manager, is he a superintendent?
A. Yes. That is normally Steve McInerney but on the
lead-up to that day, the only person who seemed to be
around was an acting inspector by the name of Wally Rye.

Q. Where is he from?
A. He's from pretty much everywhere. He seems to be the
permanent relieving area director. He just flits around
from pillar to post. Again, by documentation, he's not
qualified in the area of swiftwater.

Q. Is he from the western district, the south-west --
A. He's from the eastern district but in the days and
evenings leading up to January 10 - his permanent residence
is normally at Stanthorpe, which is about 140 kilometres
away. So it may have been hosing down in Toowoomba and
area, and birds may have been singing and the stars
shining, as far as he was concerned. If you haven't got
one of these senior on-calls actually on the fire ground,
how on earth can they make a strategic decision based on
information that they're getting from our Fire
Communications centre, which is located in one very small
corner of an ambulance communications room. I kid you not,
it is an area that is 10 square metres for two operators.
This room that we're sitting in here would be approximately
two-thirds the size of Fire Communications.

Now, the operators, particularly when things are
really hammering along - there's only two of them there.
They can't afford to give a huge list of detail to the
senior on-call because there's triple-0s coming in, there's
radio messages to do, there's transcripts to log. They
have to say, "Well, this is what's been requested. Can you
contact the officer on the ground?" They just haven't got
the depth of people in the room nor the space, nor even
the acoustic insulation. Ambulance might have ten people
in ambulance world and they're all talking and there is not
a divider to stop acoustic overspill.

Then you get down to the 10th and we had three other
people from the fire service who decided that they would
come and sit in that 10 square metre space and try to prompt operators who were doing the best that they could, who were probably more situationally aware than they were. They were having debates between themselves as to what should happen next, they were on mobile phones, they were on radios. All of this - as you know if you've ever worked in or stood in the communications centre, the whole noise and the vibe of the place just steps up and up in tempo, to the point where you've had to have operators say, "Look, could you please shut up. I can't hear what's being said." It's inappropriate. But, anyhow, I can get into that in more detail later on.

Q. Where is the Firecom office situated?
A. It's in Herries Street, over the top of the main ambulance.

Q. In Herries Street?
A. Herries Street, yes. So it's in Toowoomba.

Q. We'll come back to that.
A. Yes.

Q. We were at chief superintendent. So the chief superintendent, does he look after the region or is he still an area --
A. The chief superintendent, by location, is actually in the area but, by intent, he is in charge of all of south-west region. Then over the top of him you have the assistant commissioner, which is Tom Dawson; then over the top again at State level, you have a deputy commissioner.

Q. The assistant commissioner, is he your regional resource?
A. He is south-west regional assistant commissioner, so he is earmarked for south-west region.

Q. How many regions do you have across the State?
A. Oh, you're going to get me now.

Q. No, that's okay. I just thought you may have been aware.
A. No.

Q. More than one, obviously?
A. More than one. Yes, more than one.
Q. The commissioner is --
A. Is Lee Johnson and he's located in Brisbane.

Q. Now that I can, sort of, understand the structure, what we might do is go to your previous interview.
A. Yes.

Q. I'll give you the page number and then generally what the block will relate to. So, for argument's sake - the first one I was looking at - we're going to break it up into preparedness; as you said, we'll discuss situational awareness; we'll have a look at some command and control issues, which you've raised. Along the way, if we can, I'll try to steer you through some of the things that I think the Floods Commission feel are important and I will ask you some questions along those lines. Without trying to go through and re-read each paragraph, if we can make reference to, say - we'll start with page 15 and I think it will relate to paragraph 62.
A. You mean to say I sat up 'til quarter to 2 and you've skipped the first 15 pages? Hang on. I've got a fair bit of stuff here.

Q. You'll find that we'll come back; we'll go back.
A. Okay.

Q. What we're trying to do - we'll just look at general preparedness first. I have a copy here as well, if you like --
A. No, it's all right.

Q. -- which is not split.
A. It's just that I have stuff that's linked back to documents that will support what I've been trying to say.

Q. No problems.
A. If that's all right.

Q. Yes. No, no problems at all.
A. Because Laura did say bring down everything.

Q. Yes. Fantastic.
A. I think about three trees fell in the forest last night. 15, yes, I've got.

Q. Page 15. We'll start with 62, which is this fellow here.
A. Yes.

Q. The paragraph that I wanted, initially, to talk about with regards to resourcing states:

We have, over a protracted number of years, tried to increase the resources, that's the human resources, available to get out of the door to do a job.

You said that in 1976 there were 12 firefighters on shift. In 2011 you've got 10 firefighters on shift. You've talked about an increase from 56,000 people to 156,000 at nighttime and 210,000 during the day, in regard to the structures that we've talked about and the increase in the transport department, and whatnot.

A. Yes.

Q. But you've also gone on to indicate that 1.5 administrative staff have now increased to 80 administrative staff within that same region. What I want you to do, if you could, is quickly give me a precis of how you've arrived at that. What was the main thrust of what you were saying there? Obviously, that admin staff are increasing but operational staff are not increasing?

A. And the size of the population of Toowoomba and the number and type of jobs that Queensland Fire and Rescue are responding to are increasing. Back in 1975/’76 - all the documents were derived from historical records from the fire service and the union's own research, and those sorts of things, and out of the Bureau of Statistics.

It just seems strange that Toowoomba's response capacity has not increased, as you said quite correctly, it's decreased in capacity. It's getting taller, broader and we're going to far more complex and different types of incidents, and the fire service has just not responded to it. Now do you want these two documents tabled to yourself or do you want me to leave them within this, where it's linked back to --

Q. As we go through them we might label them. So we'll write number 1, number 2, so that we will know exactly --

A. I've actually done it myself, fairly crudely.

Q. Okay.

A. Document 13 relates to --
Q. Give me one second and I'll go and get some flags.
A. All right. I've tried to be helpful.

Q. Very good. Fantastic.
A. It was more for myself than yourself.

(Det Snr Sgt Reid left the room and subsequently returned.)

Q. I suppose the first question I want to ask, though, is what - we'll flag those so then we'll know in what order we've talked about them. Let's call the first document you're going to refer to document 1.
A. Okay.

Q. So if we could flag it "D1". So, what do you think has caused the - or has inhibited the growth? Is it staffing, for argument's sake? What's the major cause that's stopped growth?
A. I think, unfortunately, management just didn't look at the response capacities that are required. In Toowoomba now, Queensland Police can certainly go to more than one incident at once and Queensland Ambulance can go to more than one incident at once, yet Queensland Fire, if we have one structural fire - and that's a house fire or a small building fire - all of our resources in area 1, which is Station 11 and Station 12, by their own standing orders for safe work on the fire ground and those sorts of things, are fully committed.

We have no capacity to do more than one job at once, unless the guys on the fire ground actively go, "Nuh, it's right, we think we'll be right.", and struggle through with what we've got on the first job and we'll send another truck off to the next job. Which is all right until somebody gets hurt. Then management will jump up and down and say you shouldn't have started that fire fight or that incident until you had sufficient and adequate resources on scene - which I do not disagree with, that line.

Q. Yes, yes.
A. However, they know that a firefighter, if somebody is trapped in a car or being swept down a creek, will invariably say, "Guys, do you think you've got the structure fire under control", or, "that incident under control with what you've got?" "Yep." "Okay. You're good for us to go.", and we'll go to the next one, which
invariably means that when we get - we're spreading the resources ultra thin, to the point where it is dangerous.

Q. Is that implied by management, that practice?
A. Yes, it is and why I say it is implied is because when it happens, where people quite blatantly breach their own zero harm policy - and Mr Dawson has said on one occasion that we're not to commence an interior attack unless we have three appliances on scene. Why I suggest that management do condone that practice is that they don't say to the guys after the event, "Why did you split the response up and go to two separate jobs" or "three jobs". So they allow the practice to occur. Why? I suppose it suits their needs.

Now, if somebody is injured, they will just fall back on their sword and say, well, under the zero harm policy you shouldn't have, naughty boys. So we're stuck between a rock and a hard place. Firefighters live in the community which they serve, by and large, and the last thing they want to have occur is to have the community say why didn't you go to my moment of crisis, why were you busy at a structure fire, or something else, why didn't you come over.

Q. Who makes the critical decision to split the appliances?
A. It's invariably the operational crews on the ground.

Q. What rank would that person be?
A. Station officer.

Q. Okay. If I'm the second fire of the night, which starts 25 minutes after the first fire, what would happen to me in Toowoomba if you, as the station officer, decide not to split the crews for safety reasons? What happens to my home or my business property?
A. Well if that fire started, as you said, 25 minutes after, statistically --

Q. Well, make it 10 minutes.
A. No, no. 10, 25, it doesn't matter. Sorry. We've only got two stations; they're committed at that first incident, doesn't matter what it is, and the incident controller has said, no, the resources have to stay there for safety. It means then that 10 or 25 minutes in - whichever you want to go with - our fire communications
centre is then obliged to page our Toowoomba auxiliaries or
the Highfields auxiliaries or even the Gatton auxiliaries.
Now, statistically, our Toowoomba auxiliaries will take
24 minutes after being paged to get onto the fire ground.

This morning is an example. We were working a RTC -
road traffic crash - out on the Gore Highway; I called
auxiliaries in; we had two respond, in total, over a period
of an hour and a half. Four is the minimum required to
respond --

Q. To turn out?
A. -- into an urban area. So in answer to that, the fire
call goes down; 24 minutes later, at best, you may have
Highfields or the Toowoomba auxiliary crew rock up. Now,
you said it was a fire. If it's actually somebody trapped,
flashover occurs about seven and a half minutes in, where
the compartment the person is in is completely consumed.
But two and a half minutes into the fire starting, if the
person is not out of the structure, they will succumb to
smoke inhalation. So 24 minutes in, when they get there,
the people are either out or deceased.

Q. What would be your recommendation then?
A. The recommendation is that, quite plainly, we need
another permanently manned station in Toowoomba,
particularly coming on the back of the developments out
towards Charlton where they're putting in a huge,
multimillion dollar transit interchange. It's going to
have the rail come up from Victoria and then there's going
to be semitrailers, and Christ knows what, there and rail
going down to Brisbane. It's the inland rail corridor head
that will serve Queensland.

Q. Have you seen any documentation, as far as strategic
plans or any of the QFRS planning documents for your
particular region and area?
A. No, we haven't and probably part of that is that
Queensland Fire and Rescue have breached their own business
rules. We're meant to have, as station officers and
captains, a meeting with our superintendent or managers
further up at least five times a year. They haven't
happened for three and a half years.

Q. What's the thinking behind that?
A. I think it's to save money, to be brutally honest.
There was one run three and a half years ago by a manager
and, to be honest, it was a disaster. It was a talkfest. We weren't allowed to couch our concerns as operational fire officers and station officers, and the Assistant Commissioner said, "No, it's a waste of money", and he elected not to do any more of these mandatory, under their own business rules, station officer meetings, which is the only time as a work group that the four shift officers can get together and talk about issues.

Q. That's what I was going to say. How do you get the opportunity then to, say, air grievances and I suppose, for want of a better term, rapport build amongst the officers, so that you can discuss issues from a particular shift or a particular type of activity, be it road traffic crashes or be it swiftwater rescue? When do those discussions take place between middle management, as yourself, station officers and whatnot?

A. They only happen on changeover of shift. So it's entirely dependent upon the enthusiasm of the off-going shift officer to actually hang around and have a talk - unlike, say, the nursing profession where they have to come in half an hour early to do a handover. Quite literally, if somebody doesn't want to talk, they can blow in at five seconds to start of shift. It's like the old cartoon series with the sheepdog sitting there: "Hi, Ralph", click, and off he'd go; nothing to say and out the door they go, when in fact there's a whole heap to be said.

Q. What I was more interested in, though, are the longer term issues. When do you, as a station officer, talk to other station officers about your longer term issues; your longer term concerns with regard to appliances, equipment and that sort of thing? Rather than just a shift to shift basis, I'm talking more your longer term issues?

A. Unfortunately, the only medium that has been left to a lot of the station officers is to use the union executive in the Toowoomba branch to take up those issues with management, which isn't really their job in the first place, but it was the only consistent conduit to management and even then, if management didn't want to meet, it didn't happen.

Q. Do you think that your area - if we just look at Toowoomba, rather than moving down into Grantham - your sphere of control, do you think that you guys were prepared for the incident that took place in Toowoomba on 10 January - as far as resourcing, I mean, not as far as a skill set,
so to speak.
A. No, and why I say "No" quite blatantly - the guys on
the ground did a brilliant job. However, from
recollection, I think there were only 15 of us who actually
worked that day. Two other guys that I know of, plus
myself, in effect, turned up at the station.

Q. And that's out of a possible 40 --
A. 48. So, for I don't know what reason, there was not
the call go out, "All staff report to station."

Q. Recalled to duty.
A. So we did not have 48 human assets on that job.

Q. Who would be responsible for a callout of that nature,
a return to duty request?
A. At that stage it was acting - Wally Rye. He was from
and I'm only going by recollection. It's actually in the
documents further down. He was requested earlier in the
morning to stand more swiftwater qualified people up on
stations and that was denied. Interestingly enough, Oakey
army --

Q. When?
A. About 7.30.

Q. Am?
A. Am

Q. On the morning of the 10th?
A. On the 10th. Interestingly enough, the assistant
commissioner stood up - in other words, manned - three
auxiliary stations. None of them are even awareness
trained in swiftwater operations.

Q. What was the purpose of having the auxiliaries on
standby?
A. Don't know because, as far - unless it was just to
slop around in the flood. But they were not swiftwater
qualified, so they - even though some of them came down and
did a little bit, because unfortunately it was all hands to
the wheel, so to speak. But going on from that, the
assistant commissioner elected to man up his regional
operations control centre and he put additional people in
the fire communications centre.

Q. This is all in Toowoomba?
A. In Toowoomba. But he did not, or failed to actually bring back additional staff to duty until after 1700 that night, and that was only on the insistence of the local branch UFU secretary, who said, "Tom, if you don't have another crew manned up on each of the stations tonight, the media are going to know about it in the morning." In other words, having to pressgang him into doing it.

Q. "Tom" being?
A. "Tom" being the assistant commissioner.

Q. The assistant commissioner for the region?
A. For the region.

Q. What's his surname?
A. Tom Dawson. I had a fairly robust conversation with him as well that evening. The town had been slammed by that stage.

Q. Were you being supported by the superintendent, by the manager, at that point?
A. No, because the acting area director had vanished midstream, so to speak. With the singular most disastrous event to hit Toowoomba, the person who was in charge of the operations on the ground vanished.

Q. That's the acting --
A. That's Wally Rye. Any other service, any other time, he would be up on a dereliction of duty charge.

Q. Had he, at any point, or your chief superintendent - had anyone indicated their intent to you at any point on what their thinking was, say, at 7.30 for not standing up any further staff or for --
A. They just said, "No, your request for additional staff is denied." There was no intent. Yet we knew from other people around the place that the Oakey air base, which is the army base, their Weather Bureau person had said to the CO out there "We need to evacuate the base" in the morning. So there was situational awareness out there.

The crews on the ground knew that something was happening. The ground was completely saturated. If you spat onto the lawn, your saliva would run off. There was absolutely no capacity for water absorption in the soil at all. We had a number of events where we actually had to drag people out of - even the intersection of Kitchener and
James Streets, where, unfortunately, there were the two
people who died, and that would be on City Safe TV footage
as well.

Q. It is.
A. Prior to January 10, it was just cycling up. It was -
my best description is it was a timeline to disaster and
yet nobody noticed the trigger points. The senior
officers, unfortunately --

Q. Well, who were the --
A. The bulk of them had gone on holidays. They'd gone on
three weeks Christmas leave.

Q. Who were the seniors working on the 10th? So when you
say --
A. Wally Rye.

Q. No, no, sorry. He was the superintendent?
A. Mmm

Q. Oh, so when you talk about the "senior", when you ring
for approval for further appliances or anything, you're
talking about your superintendent as the senior?
A. No, sorry. He's our acting inspector, that's Wally
Rye, so he is our acting area 1 supervisor, for want of a
better description

Q. So who do you get your approvals from? As a station
officer, who do you call?
A. We get our approvals from him

Q. Sorry. I misunderstood what you had meant in regard
to the senior and the superintendent, so now I'm clear on
that.
A. There's two ranks. They can be either an inspector,
if they're a lower rank, or a superintendent, if they're of
a higher rank. Then you have your chief superintendent,
then your assistant commissioner. But on that particular
day there didn't seem to be any dissemination of who was
who in the zoo; it was quite literally left to the
operational crews, and a number of weeks prior to that.
Because the senior officers would not make a decision on
how we were going to respond to these swiftwater incidents,
the agreeance across all of the shifts - everyone would
just ring up and say, "Oh well, yeah, that sounds like a
good idea that C shift are doing, we'll do that too.",
without any approval from senior managers. What was occurring was if we had a swiftwater incident down the range into south-west region, it would normally - the rescue appliance would only have two people. Now, two people are not a swiftwater rescue crew by any stretch of the imagination.

Q. From what I understand, you need two 2s and a 1 - is that correct - to constitute under your directives? Would that --

A. No, no. You've got one truck, with two people in it; that's the rescue truck. You need a minimum of six people to form an effective swiftwater rescue team because - and do you want me to explain how it works?

Q. Yes, definitely.

A. Okay. So you've got - when you get to the incident - don't worry about where the resources come from other than the fact that they have to be trained. It's no good, basically, taking an auxiliary who isn't trained. You may as well take Joe Blow off the street.

You have an incident controller, then you have an upstream spotter, you have two downstream spotters as a minimum, and then you'll have two or three in-water people who are assisting - and that's just on one side. You may need to split them up so they come round from each side so that, as I was saying before, where you're using the hydraulic effect of the water and you're setting up a ferry angle, which is a rope at a diagonal across the water source or the feature, they communicate to each other. A minimum of six.

Invariably, we were responding with two but we made a strategic decision, in the lack of any direction on the issue from senior management, on the two station floors that if the rescue appliance with a crew of two in went out the door, the nearest - either Station 12, which is Anzac Avenue, or Station 11, which is Kitchener Street, if they were the nearest to where that rescue was responding to, they would back it up as well. So it was only the guys on the station floor who came up with, well, this is the only way we're going to keep our own members safe is if we send another truck with trained people in it to back them up for all things safety.

Q. What level were those decisions being made at? You
talked about the on floor. What --
A. At the station.

Q. Yes, but what rank is --
A. Up to station officer. We just seemed to - the only way I could describe the feeling, it was like a computer locking up when you were talking to some of these senior on-calls. The light was blinking and you were getting no output.

Q. I notice that at page 3, paragraph 16 you're referring to your meetings that you're required to conduct between your station officers, meeting five times a year.
A. Yes.

Q. How were you and other station officers making strategic decisions about what you were going to do in the coming week or the coming month? Like, how were you making your decisions?
A. We were just ringing up between the stations and saying, you know - I work with two other officers down at Station 11 and you'd ring up and go, "Yep, looks as though it's going to be a bugger of a day. How do we want to do this?'", because we had no direction.

Q. So just simply negotiation on the day?
A. That's it.

Q. No structure at all as to how --
A. No guidance from above. None at all.

Q. I suppose you would have two things that you'd be concerned about in the wet; one would be road traffic crashes and the second would be your swiftwater response. So was that left up to you and the other two officers, as you've mentioned, to simply discuss how you're going to address them at the start of each shift?
A. That's correct. It was just complete seat of the pants.

Q. In that same paragraph, and we're talking about page --
A. Did you want this one?

Q. Page 3, paragraph 16.
A. Do you want that to be document 3?
Q. Yes. If you could explain to me what that document is?
A. The document that I am pointing at - which I have labelled as "Doc 1" but I'll label as document 3 for yourself - is where I've sent an email to my assistant commissioner, believing that we're breaching our business rules and I sent it to him on 31 December 2009, where I raised - and I'd had a number of officers saying, "Look, when are we going to have a station officers meeting?"
They tried to say, "Well look, let's make it an industrial issue.", because we just wanted to be able to talk about important things that affect senior - middle level managers.

Q. Yes, okay. Definitely.
A. So will document 3 work for you?

Q. Where's document 2?
A. Sorry. Document 2 is the one behind that one. I'd better put that one there.

Q. Okay, yes. If we can throw document 2 on the other one as well, that would be great.
A. Okay.

Q. Just for the record, document 1, can you just briefly outline to me what document 1 relates to?
A. Document 1 relates to what you were talking about before, as to the population level, the claim--

Q. The demographics that you were --
A. The demographic; the claim made by, at that stage, the United Firefighters Union that in 1956 we had - sorry, 1976 I should say. We had about 55,000 and we had 1.5 administrative staff supporting a total of 12 firefighters and officers per shift. Now, in 2011, we have 10 firefighters per shift for a population that's tripled - well, pretty much that size.

Q. Document 2, what does that relate to, John?
A. Document 2 is relating to yet another - it was a request, actually, for a - a brief to the then Attorney-General, which was Kerry Shine, where the union had made submissions to him and said, look, it's just craziness that we can only handle one small job at once, and the town has grown that much that --
Q. All right. If you could label that --
A. As document 2?

Q. -- as document 2, and then we'll go on to label document 3.
A. Which I've just done.

Q. Which you've just done. Anyway, we were at document 3 and we were referring to you - you've notified your assistant commissioner --
A. Yes.

Q. -- that you think that there appears to be a clear breach of - did you say "policy" or did you --
A. Business rules

Q. Business rules, in regard to your station officers meetings; is that correct?
A. That's correct.

Q. What response did you receive?
A. Nothing. I spoke to Mr Dawson face-to-face. I said, "Did you get my email?" He said, "Yeah." He said, "They're a waste of time. Not going to happen."

Q. And you think that may be because of, what, financial reasons or productivity reasons?
A. I don't know but I would've thought - call me crazy, but when the commissioner of an agency, within the business rules - and he signs off as the signatory of the business rule that he endorses it. If he says that there is to be a minimum of five meetings per year, I would think that he would like to expect that there is actually being five meetings per year, so that you have a clear communication line between senior managers and middle level managers. If you haven't got the meetings, you haven't got communications occurring. You will have seen in there - years and years ago, I was taught by another agency the principles of operations, and one of the principles was that administration was not to hamper operations.

Q. I remember reading that in here previously.
A. Okay, and it is still relevant. It's been ripped straight out of the Australian army doctrine years ago, but you had these principles of operations that administration was not to hinder operations. We still have today - if I elect to make a second alarm response, which means I want
more trucks, instead of me being taken on face value,
42 years into the job, that if John Burrows is looking at
something and says, "Oh dear, we need more resources",
currently that is only approved after the fire
communications operator tracks down, then is able to
contact, the senior on-call to go, "Look, there's just been
a request for a second alarm. Will you endorse it or not?"

Q. And what would the --
A. And they might be hundreds of kilometres away.

Q. Okay. What could the turnaround be, time-wise, in that
urgent - I should imagine it would be an urgent request?
A. Well, we've responded with lights and sirens, so
somebody somewhere has categorised it as an emergency
incident. Then, based on either what we know of the injury
or the potential for injury, we can elect to upgrade or to
downgrade it - as can Firecom they can upgrade it. But
they can only upgrade it or downgrade it, the same as us,
if they ring the senior on-call. Unfortunately, with the
senior on-calls, some we've never been able to contact, so
zero response, even though they're being paid an on-call
allowance to be available via their mobile phone, via a
pager, via a radio, via a landline.

Q. Are there certain officers who are more prone to --
A. Yes.

Q. -- contact failure than others?
A. Absolutely.

Q. Are there certain officers who are more reliable than
others?
A. Yes, and unfortunately it has to be said because the
guys on the floor are saying, "John, it has to be said."

Q. Are they aware --
A. The acting area director on the day was renowned for
doing a 'Where's Wally'. His name's Wally and he'd just
bugger off.

Q. As in the cartoon - the --
A. Where's Wally.

Q. Yes.
A. Even on the day, even in the debrief afterwards, two
weeks after, Mr Dawson said, "Yeah, well, we really don't
want to talk about that." This guy just buggered off. It's the only way I can describe it.

Q. Just quickly - and we've touched on it previously - you've got seniors who are quite possibly or could quite conceivably be nine and a half hours away from your incident.
A. Making a decision.

Q. Making a decision.
A. Without sighting the incident at all.

Q. How do you think that affects your operational appreciation or your situational awareness in regard to that?
A. On a number of occasions - the only way I can describe it is extreme frustration. We are the people on the ground. The number of times where we've still been cutting people out of cars who have been entrapped and we are getting calls from Firecom, "Could you please contact the senior on-call?" You contact him and he says, "Oh, I want the appliances back in the Toowoomba area as soon as you can." "Yes, sir, but we are still working the job. We are still cutting the people out of the vehicle."

Because they don't elect to come on, they're actually breaching their own incident control structure where they're meant to say that the person who is in charge, that's me as the first responding officer, as the incident controller - if he wants to modify it, he actually has to get up out of his bed, get in the car and tootle along to actually see what's doing before he says, "I didn't like that" or "Let's change it."

Q. Well, that's not going to be possible from nine and a half hours away, is it?
A. Well, perhaps they need to be considering to put somebody in the areas where you've got a higher density population. You've got, as I said before, major population base, so why haven't we got a senior on-call who is exclusive for the Toowoomba and surrounds, who is going to service the western end of south-east, down to, say, Gatton and out towards Dalby way.

Q. Would that be a recommendation that your - obviously you've discussed it with other station officers and other staff. Is that something that you would think would be a
reasonable recommendation?
A. Well, they can do either one of two things: they can either go and reside at the stations or within close proximity to the situations, or comply to their own operations doctrine, policies and procedures and trust the incident controllers word back.

Q. I see you pointing over there towards a document. Should we now introduce that as well? Is that - do you have - you’re making reference to --
A. It’s - it will be hidden, unfortunately, wherever we were talking about it. It’s there.

Q. What we might do is during a break we’ll locate it --
A. Find it.

Q. -- and once we’ve located it, depending on where we are --
A. We’ll mark that document whatever it is.

Q. Yes. Okay?
A. Yeah.

Q. So we’ll make sure we come back to that. We’ve looked at situational - you know, operational appreciation, and whatnot, and we’ll move on from there.

Previous requests for additional resources. If we go to page 4, reference 16, you’ve talked here about, "I’ve got quite a few documents that detail the number of times" that a number of concerns have been put forward in the past in regard to sufficient resources to safely handle more than one structural fire. Have we already dealt with those documents? Are they part of the ones that you and I have spoken about previously, documents 2 and 3?
A. Yes, where - the submissions.

Q. I just wanted to make sure, for thoroughness, that we do cover that.
A. Yes.

Q. So those documents have been forwarded, as you said, to the assistant commissioner and they’ve --
A. And to the Attorney-General, Kerry Shine.

Q. But the ones that went to the Attorney-General, were they through the firefighters union or were they directly
sent by you?
A. They were sent by the firefighters union.

Q. You talked about a structure fire where your appliances are going to obviously show up. When you talk about a road traffic crash or a swiftwater event, are they equivalent to a house fire in regard to the turn-out, you know, for manning for that turn-out?
A. Similar, and why I - and I'll --

Q. I mean, would you only be able to attend - even if it was one road traffic crash or one swiftwater rescue, can you only attend one incident at a time?
A. Yes. We can't be everywhere at once.

Q. No.
A. I know that's sounding silly. What I'll do, if you like, is I'll tender that fire communications centre directive that relates to --

Q. Okay. What are we up to, 4 or 5?
A. 4.

Q. I think we're up to 4, yes. And what document is this?
A. It's FCCD-Q3-113, which is the State communications standard, and if you actually rummage through up the back here, it actually details that for a swiftwater rescue, QPS will be notified and QAS will be notified. Now, neither of those are qualified or competent to enter the water.

Q. No.
A. Notify the senior on-call, but it says one pumper on turn-out and one special rescue truck.

Q. Which you were talking about --
A. Yes.

Q. -- your Alpha and your Lima?
A. Which, by default, is exactly what we ended up doing, so that what was happening in the area was the special was being sent but with no backup and we've said, no, it's broaching all things safety; two people are not a rescue team in that environment. It's just a recipe for disaster. I can talk about losing Peter McCarron later on and that was the longest minute and a half I ever had. But that is the State directive on swiftwater response. So that's
document 4.

Q. Okay. Let's label that document 4.
A. Unfortunately, in the lead-up to all of this, there were an increasing amount of responses by the specialist rescue where there wasn't trained support personnel following them up. We had an incident out at Dalby before that and it was only fortunate that one of our technicians, who was working day work, heard it. Yes, he went against a directive and self-responded, but he ended up being the only person out there who was qualified to do the job, with a person trapped midstream at Dalby. It all went a bit pear-shaped. The flood boat that they tootled out with first off got high-sided and was swamped, so they ended up spending about two hours sitting on the bow of the boat, waiting for another SES float boat to come out from Chinchilla, I think.

Q. We'll go through and discuss that quickly.
A. Yep.

Q. We were going back through preparedness. What were the nature of the resources that you think you were lacking? We were talking about when you've sent documentation away, talking about, you know - I think we touched on it earlier but what, primarily, do you think you're lacking within your area?
A. Well, I'll start at the top and work down, if that's all right?

Q. Yes.
A. I believe we were lacking in senior officer understanding of the type of incidents that were being responded to. That can quite clearly be confirmed by their own learning manuscripts, as to whether they're competent or not in those areas. So the human resources at the top were lacking in the skills and an understanding as to what they were meant to be doing. Then you get down to the station levels. I believe we didn't have enough resources, as in the physical resources in the station. We didn't have enough in-water equipment; we didn't have --

Q. By "in-water", what do you mean?
A. PFDs, throw bags. It was only about three days prior that the acting inspector brought up a boat, an inflatable boat that was just oar powered. But we haven't even got enough gear that if it is wet, we can cycle that lot out,
dry it and replace it with spare equipment. There is not the spare equipment. There's been no uptake of recommendations that have been made over a long period of time to buy more equipment, so that we have --

Q. Do you have access to those documents?
A. Again, you'd have to talk to either station officer Tony Guse or station officer David Woods. I know that for a long time they were very, very frustrated at the requests for equipment that were being denied. The operators on the ground --

Q. Sorry, Tony Guse and what was the second chap's name?
A. David Woods. They were both, for a period of time each, the south-west region technical rescue coordinators, so it was their job to try and keep us up to a good operational capacity. But then you get down to the floor itself. As I say --

Q. By "the floor" what do you --
A. Well, the station. Sorry, not the station physically. We call it the workshop floor. There are a lot of people, as I said before, who would've been quite happy to have been trained to a higher level of swiftwater who were being prohibited because of this - you had - I think it got down to financial because if you're a qualified rescue technician, you're paid a 2.5 percent allowance on your fortnightly wage. For somebody like myself, that is about $59 a fortnight. And the expectation is you have to keep your skills up, and those sorts of things, in those particular areas. But I think there was actually a financial or budgetary cap State-wide as well as regionally-wide. As I say within my notations there, it would be akin to having only one person on a fire appliance being competent to wear breathing apparatus and the other three having to sit outside and watch the one person work. Why not allow --

Q. Due mainly to, what, budgetary constraints?
A. That's right. There was a cap on how many - it was invitation only as to who got to do it and then it was only - there were set numbers. Initially it started at eight, then it grew to 10 and I think it may be to 12 now. But if 48 of the firefighters all want to do swiftwater, why not train 48 so that you've got 48 who are capable of doing in-water swift, instead of having a whole heap of bystanders - including myself, the way things have
transpired. Technically, I shouldn't have entered the water at all.

Q. So you're looking at, I suppose, training and then the upkeep of that training?
A. Sure.

Q. And your financial concerns from an area and regional --
A. But interestingly enough, I think the Commissioner, Lee Johnson, must have had what he calls his wee small hours of the morning light bulb moments, when he came down and addressed a gathering, it would have been of about 60 urban search and rescue technicians at Cannon Hill when we were being deployed to the Brisbane floods. He said, "Well, gentlemen, in the last two months you've saved more people from floodwater than the agency has dragged out of house fires in the previous ten years." It was saying volumes that he probably was having a little bit of a panic attack that, oh dear, we perhaps should have trained a lot, lot more because, for bang for buck, more people have been dragged out in the last two months in the floods out of swiftwater incidents than there had been out of structure fires - which is supposedly our core business - in the last ten years. That was said in front of about 60 people at Cannon Hill.

Q. Well, it appears to me that your core business is exponentially changing --
A. Yes.

Q. -- from turn-out for house fire to turn-out to road traffic crashes, to turn-out now to, I suppose, an ongoing swiftwater rescue response. Would that be a fair assessment?
A. Well, when I started 42 years ago, I started as a vegetation firefighter with occasional structure fires, then the next flavour was LPG gas, then we had chlorine, then we hazardous materials responses, then it just grew like Topsy. We had confined space, then we had trench rescue, then we had swiftwater, then we had urban search and rescue. You're right, it's just gone like Topsy, possibly without people asking how many human resources do we need to train for a fairly massive event.

Within the swiftwater environment now, I've come up with categorising it at three levels of swiftwater. You've
got the swiftwater that is within the confines of the creek or channel feature. Then you've got the swiftwater that's overflowed and could be broad acreage. In Toowoomba, some of the walk-ins were over a kilometre to get to the patients. Then you've got the catastrophic swiftwater, that if you had technicians in the mainstream like in Toowoomba, they would have died. The only way you could have effected a life rescue of somebody trapped midstream in that would be if the person was trapped against a pole or on a car and you had helicopter access.

But helicopter access for swiftwater is always considered to be the absolute last resort because helicopters, with a bag fan over the top, if they're hovering below about 500 feet and they have a carburetor problem and it goes cough, they tend to handle like a house brick and they crash and kill the crew on board and the person they're trying to save. In the urban environment of Toowoomba, there is no way that they could have tracked down the creek at the speed it was doing to effect a pick-off without getting snared in something. They would have lost their crew member and probably lost the aircraft if the observer wasn't quick enough to fire the winch sever bolt.

Why I believe that if anyone was actually in that water themselves, why they'd die, is I unfortunately had the delight of finding the lady around behind the flour mill in Toowoomba.

Q. Donna Rice.
A. She started at --

Q. Kitchener and James.
A. -- Kitchener and James fully clothed. When I found her, and she'd only gone a fairly short distance, she didn't have a stitch on her - not a stitch. So it was the washing machine from hell that poor woman had been through.

Q. Yes. You mentioned that everything is growing, and you have indicated that; the levels of your turn-outs are changing and growing. What documentation can we point to that looks at strategic growth of staff and resources in keeping with the population? Have you seen or read anything at all from--
A. No. From management - all that I know is that over the years, out towards the western side of the Toowoomba
airport they've bought and sold two station sites. I haven't got it with me and I do apologise, but there is documentation from the mid-80s from the then Toowoomba fire brigade's board that makes recommendations for a third and fourth station, as a matter of urgency, to be built in Toowoomba. They were never acted on. That was with a population then that would've been lucky to be nudging 90,000. So somebody, be it the commission or the board then, had obviously identified that they just didn't have the operational capacity to be able to respond to more than one job at once.

Q. You talked earlier about a lack of guidance or a lack of direction being provided by senior management in regard to turn-out for swiftwater rescue. What sort of guidance were you seeking?

A. We were just seeking endorsement of the resources that we were requesting, and by that - again, it's within the documentation; it's all somewhere there.

One night, I think it was around the 6th, I was working a job out on the Oakey Pittsworth Road. We had four personnel trapped in four different vehicles on this very broad, flooded causeway. It was absolutely hosing down again. We'd just effected the rescue there. Mid-rescue, I'm getting, as the incident controller, pinged by the senior on-call saying he wants all personnel and all appliances to return ASAP and I've had to say, "We are still working the rescue. They will return when we've got the people out of the water and when we have accounted for all persons."

Again, he's sitting 140 kilometres away and it probably wasn't raining. I don't know what they think sometimes; whether we like standing out in rain that is just sheeting down, as we say, for shits and giggles. We don't do that. We're out trying to look after that.

Q. What date was that? Do you recall?

A. I've got it in here as well (indicating).

Q. Prior to the 10th?

A. Yes, prior to the 10th. What really disappoints me there is that Station 11 - I was at Station 12 that night. Station 11 had to respond to another - there was actually two separate incidents, but one was down towards the southside of Pittsworth with a person sitting up on the...
roof of their car, midstream in a creek crossing, and Station 11 had to respond to that. The fire communications tempo was to the point where pretty much every second time we'd call them they'd say, "All units wait out on triple-0s. All units wait out on triple-0s." They were just being flogged. So you had to say, with just two people in there and nobody else assisting them, the quality of data entry may have been suspect. They did a brilliant job. To their credit, the girls and boys did a great job there.

But we then went down - or I went down to Station 11 to stand by, because I'd got our auxiliaries to stand by at Station 12. As soon as I've walked in the door I said to the guys, "This is fucking bullshit." I've gone in and they've filed in after me, obviously seeing that I'm seeing red, and I've rung the senior on-call, which was acting inspector Wally Rye, and I've quite civilly said, "Wally, Firecomis being flogged. We've just dragged" - and it's in all of my statements. "We've dragged four out of the water, we've got another two separate swiftwater rescues queued up; mate, we need to go to level 2 incident management system." Which, again, is all embedded in all this stuff here. It's over there (indicating). "And we need to set up an incident control centre because Firecom is being punished so badly." And I was just gobsmacked --

Q. Do you recall the date? This is the one we're still referring to, the one at Oakey Road?
A. Yes, I've got the date, yes. He said, "But it's dark.", and I said, "Turn the fucking light switch on." Now there was no disrespect meant to the senior officer but I knew exactly where he was; he was sitting on the side of his bed, "Oh but", and I knew that it was code for 'But the senior officers have all buggered off for their Christmas break for three weeks' and that he didn't have the physical resources or the time to be able to drive 140 clicks in from wherever, to boot up the ICC. It was farcical.

Q. When the ICC gets up and running, what further resources will they provide for you?
A. What a properly functional incident control centre, an ICC, will do is it gives Firecom the ability to do nothing other than take the emergency call, dispatch the crew and then say "Appliance X, your operating channel is Y", so that they then talk to the incident control centre on
channel Y, back and forth, and the incident control centre runs that incident, so that Firecom can then focus on, right, what resources have I got, what do I need to dispatch to the next job that comes in.

But as it was, Firecom was having to make strategic decisions for the lack of anyone to actually give them any guidance. They didn't have the time for someone to say what has John actually got out there. They didn't have the time for the waffle.

Q. So the ICC manages, for want of a better term, your incident and then Firecom will look after, say, the management of your call-out for your auxiliaries --
A. No.

Q. -- or further turn-outs?
A. Yeah. What they'll do is they'll take the call from the incident, the triple-0 hits. ESCAD, which is the Emergency Services Computer Aided Dispatch system - so they'll take the call, look it up under ESCAD and it will come up with that recommendation under the FCCD directive of one pump and one special - if we've got it at that stage - dispatch it and then as they hear them going out the door, they'll say, "You are to communicate directly with Highfields ICC on channel" such-and-such, UHF or VHF.

Q. Say they've set the ICC up, for argument's sake, on that particular evening. Firecom then won't look to try and retask you again because you're already being managed, for want of a better term by the ICC? Would that be a fair assumption?
A. That's correct, so it makes it --

Q. So he'd then go to the next station officer from Highfields or from say - you're 11?
A. Yes - oh, Station 12.

Q. So he'll go to Station 11, for argument's sake, if they haven't turned out to assist you? Is that how it would work?
A. No. What they do is they look at each incident in isolation, so that they know that - let's say I'm on a job with 311 Lima. They know that those two assets are still on the job until I book a code 4. Code 4 means that I am available for retasking again. So I'm communicating back and forth to the ICC about all the nuances of the job that
I'm working, so that Firecom hasn't got all of this incessant chatter, phones and that sort of thing, going on. For the incident to go code 4, it means that the resources that I'm in charge of, the pump - as each pump or an appliance goes code 4, they are then available for retasking. So all that Firecom has to do is look at this, it's green, and say, mmmm Pittsworth is the next nearest or Oakey is the next nearest, or whatever, and the computer does it for them they respond them to that job. That's all that they needed to do.

Q. I've got two quick questions, so if we can stop there, we'll go back quickly and cover these two. During that period leading up to the 10th when there was the discussion in regard to upgrading capabilities, and whatnot, for swiftwater rescue, you've mentioned at page 4, area 20 that there had been some conversation in regard to water boat capacity or water boat - you know, a platform for response there. What ended up happening with that?
A. Well, as I said to you, about three days before, Acting Inspector Rye borrowed a second-hand archangel, as they're called, from Cannon Hill I'm led to believe - somewhere down in Brisbane - and it was brought up and strapped onto the back of an F350 fire appliance that we're using as a second swiftwater vehicle, for want of a better description.

Q. Was it powered?
A. No.

Q. Had there been discussion prior to, say, the incidents of late December, early January in regard to water platforms for your area?
A. There had been but we hadn't budgeted for it.

Q. Is there any correspondence or any documentation that would support the applications for that equipment or for consideration for that equipment?
A. Again, I would suggest that the person in that particular instance who you would contact would be Station Officer Stewart Lange, who is the current technical rescue coordinator, south-west region. And, yes, the section that you're talking to there on page 4, part 20 is where the area director from area 3, which is Graham Cooke, had been instructed to come in and under no circumstances deviate from teaching me, for the second time, our operational management system which is our new computer system that is
very hard to use. So we're sitting --

Q. When was this? Prior to --
A. Yes.

Q. What was the purpose of him coming in to teach you the --
A. To teach - he was one of the OM instructors on how to work this computer system that is not very good.

Q. Why would you need to be able to work the OM system?
A. As a station manager, I have to be able to do the inputs into that OM system for fire reports. It's basically a time and motion tool, even though management said it will never be used as a time and motion tool. In some other regions they're wanting every minute of the day accounted for. It's an electronic diary, for want of a better description, but we also use it for building inspections, asset management tracking and fire reports.

Q. Does it track critical decisions?
A. No. It's pretty dumb in that way. But as I say, with that section you're referring to, it was very, very disappointing to be sitting next to Graham and watch him become increasingly more and more restless. I said, "Look, Graham, this is what will happen. The Lima has gone out from Station 11 and both of them are not swiftwater level 2 trained." I don't know why, but it's just the way it was. Then I heard Cameron Ashmore - and I believe he did the right thing, even though some people have actually counselled him for self-responding. He ended up being the only level 2 technician --

Q. Self-responding from where?
A. He responded from the rear of 201 Anzac Avenue. He was in a day work position. When I say self-responded --

Q. On what date are we talking, sorry?
A. Again, it's contained within some documents in there. I've got the dates but I haven't got it --

Q. Can we check both of those dates when we get the opportunity?
A. Yes, when I get a chance to rummage through. Anyhow, he's sitting there for a period of about an hour and a half. It sort of went down, I suppose, about - my guess is around the 10.30 mark. The incident controller out there
was Ian Tuppick and he was doing a brilliant job, painting
the picture very well. He initially said, "Look, we have
this person who is stuck midstream at Dalby, sitting on a
tree." Then next minute you hear him come back and say,
"We've been in conversation with the Queensland Police
Service; they have spoken to the SES, they have no
qualified operator of their flood boat, however a
Queensland Police vehicle is going down to get the flood
boat."

So I'm saying to Graham, "This is not going to end
well." My belief is that somebody is going to go, yep, I
know boats - bit like the ad on TV - and will take this
thing out into a flood environment, which none of them are
trained in, on a platform. Next minute he says, "Yeah,
we've got three people on the SES flood boat." I didn't
know who was driving it. I don't believe it was our
swiftwater technician. But then within about two minutes
he said, "The boat's capsized, filled full of water." The
three people are sitting on same tree. On the bow of the
boat is the person they were trying to rescue. So they
then had to wait about two hours for the Chinchilla SES
boat to come out and pick up the four of them in the end.

Q. So who was on the boat?
A. A couple of auxiliary firefighters from Dalby who were
not swiftwater trained at all, plus our technician.

Q. So only the three?
A. The three of them.

Q. Whose decision was it for those three to go out in it?
A. I don't know but on camera, in a piece to WIN News
later in the evening, the swiftwater technician, Cameron
Ashmore said, "If the boat had actually turned the other
way, it probably would've killed us."

Q. So was he the chap who self-responded?
A. Self-responded.

Q. How would he go about self-responding? Like, how
would he have heard about it?
A. The guys have got either their radio or a scanner
going in their workplace. So he's working, he was on duty,
but --

Q. In, you said, 201?
A. At the rear of 201 Anzac Avenue, which is behind the fire station. At the rear of the fire station we have breathing apparatus, service section --

Q. That's your Station 12, is it?
A. Yes. We have a regional training section and we have an operational support section. He was working in the operational support section as the i-Zone officer, who are in charge of urban rural interface fires. It had been bucketing down with rain, so there obviously wasn't too many urban rural interface fires. So the only thing that he probably didn't do is actually let his boss know that he was going, he just jumped in his vehicle and went.

Q. So who would that be, the station officer?
A. No, he was the station officer.

Q. Oh, okay. So who --
A. But he didn't tell his --

Q. Who would he tell - not by name, but what rank? Who would he tell?
A. His acting inspector. So he didn't tell him he told Firecom that he was going. But I would back his decision to the hilt because Graham Cooke made a couple of calls to the assistant commissioner and said, "Look, you know I really should be getting out to Dalby. It's starting to flood, I've got a person stuck up a tree.", and he was told, "No, you'll keep doing the training."

Q. So Graham Cooke is the fellow who was --
A. Who was doing the instruction.

Q. What's his rank?
A. He's a superintendent.

Q. So he's primarily there, supposedly, to help you with your operational management system?
A. Only on that particular day, but he is in charge of area 3, which encompasses Dalby, and Dalby is where his office is normally stationed.

Q. Was he there specifically to train you on the day?
A. Yes. He came in from Dalby to train me, and we're listening to it and I said, "Graham, this is how it's going to go down.", and he's going, "No, no.", and the next minute everything that I said, that I reckoned was going to
happen, happened. Then by probably around midday he has just said, "Tom, look, I need to go. We've now got our own rescue crews stuck in the tree."

Q. Is this the end of December or early January?
A. It would be early January.

Q. And we'll chase the dates --
A. We'll chase those dates.

Q. -- in our break.
A. Yep.

Q. If you can have a quick peek through.
A. Yep.

Q. So did he go back to Dalby?
A. Yes.

Q. He did?
A. Yes.

Q. After initially being told --
A. "No, you stay" and keep training me.

Q. -- to stay and finish the training.
A. Yes.

Q. Is it that important?
A. Well, again, what did I say with the statement before with the principles of operation? Administration does not get in the way of operations. That was a clear example of administration - the training of me - having the priority over a life rescue.

Q. How did the two auxiliaries get out or how were they called out to assist?
A. Well, the whole Dalby auxiliary station were turned out to it.

Q. Do they have a permanent --
A. No. I suppose, for want of a better description, they're retained. In other words, they get paid when they turn out or respond. They're not volunteers, they are urban firefighters but at this stage they haven't had any swiftwater training at all.
Q. Captain Tuppick.
A. Ian, yes.

Q. Qualified - okay. So there were no SES available to --
A. Operate their flood boat.

Q. -- operate the flood boat. The police went and got it?
A. Yep.

Q. And then it was used by your staff, and he was the only swiftwater rescue technician?
A. Who was qualified, on site, so that's why I say - I know there is no such thing as the wisdom of hindsight, but I believe he used foresight and identified that there was not the qualifications on the rescue appliance that was going because one of the shifts for a number of months had no level 2 technicians on it at all, so you had a one in four chance of having nobody correctly trained on that rescue appliance. So he actually did the right thing and provided some degree of qualified guidance on the scene.

Q. I think you've gone on to discuss there that the SES platforms are for still water --
A. They're for broad area flood work.

Q. Deep V, shifting --
A. We had discussed, just on-shift with Stewie Lange and that sort of carry-on, why for those big, broad acre jobs didn't we something like an inshore rescue boat; in other words, very similar to the surf lifesaving society.

Q. IRBs, yes.
A. IRBs, that are very manoeuvrable, they've got a shroud on them to stop them getting gummed up with weed and also from slicing and dicing people.

Q. And running over your staff.
A. Unfortunately, there's a lot of the SES boats that haven't got covers on their props. But they're far more manoeuvrable and you can skid them around in a running water environment, but they would also have been brilliant for these large, broad acre jobs. I know in talking to - I can't think of the name of the crew that lost the young child; that made contact with four and lost one.
Q. Ashby and Bland.
A. Yep. They walked in for over a kilometre. Now, you're going to be stuffed, walking through mud and deep water and being pushed up against barbed wire fences. It would have been really, really nice to have had a semi-rigid V-hull underneath and inflatable on the outside. Why I say semi-rigid is it would give you the ability, to a degree, to be able to skate over barbed wire fences that you can't quite see.

Q. Yes. Well, Ian Bland, one of the officers, indicated there's not a throw bag in the world --
A. No.

Q. -- that could have got them out there.
A. Yes, and I know we're talking about another incident, but I had the conversation with him and he had it with a number of people. At that stage, we didn't have PFDs for children. We have no paediatric PFDs. I know in that particular case he tried to wrap an adult PFD around the child and, as he said - I think he described it that the child took off as though they had a jet behind them when he hit the main current - gone.

Q. They were up so high in the water.
A. Well, possibly that too, but he just said there's no way you'd've caught them. But that's sort of, I suppose, getting back to equipment as well. There just seems to have been - see, the swiftwater training within Queensland has been conducted at Tully, which is a natural rock-strewn creek. None of the training is done on anything resembling a flood where it has broken the banks. I did suggest years ago that it cost them an absolute bomb to go to Tully, to fly everyone in the State up to Tully; why didn't they go down to the Olympic kayak course in Sydney, where you can - based on the amount of volume with the pumps --

Q. Regulate it.
A. -- regulate the water to replicate different sorts of categories of swiftwater rescue, so that they could actually walk through the creek first or the kayak course - I think it's in Penrith - and say, righto, here's all the features; what sort of hydraulic effect will that have when the water flows down. It didn't seem to generate any sort of enthusiasm
Q. It would help with recognition, I suppose, as well. Different features would give you different outcomes.
A. It goes back to what I was originally taught. I was taught over in the white Feather River in northern California and the instructors there could ring up the hydro dam operator and say I want a category 1, category 2, category 3, category 4. Well, we could walk through the natural river features first and say, well, this might perform an eddy. Then the water would come through; no, it's not an eddy, it's a V. So you were learning.

The other side of it, too, is my concern is that sooner or later they'll probably lose somebody in Tully because it's an uncontrolled river.

Q. Yes. That makes sense. That makes sense. Do you need a break?
A. I do.

DET SNR SGT REID: All right. The time now is 11.51am We might take a five minute break.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is about 12.01pm and we will resume the interview.

Q. There were two incidents that we were going to look at for the dates. Firstly, if we could look at the Dalby incident and the other one being the Oakey incident, where the four people were stranded. I just need those two dates, if we could, so we might as well --
A. I'm going to have to have to rummage through, unfortunately.

Q. That's okay. We have plenty of time.
A. Remember I - sorry. If I may?

Q. Yes.
A. You can have that (hands document). Remember I was talking about requesting from level 1 to level 2 incident to the ICC?

Q. Yes.
A. You can have that.

Q. I might mark the page there for my reference.
A. And the same is referenced in this training document
here. That is what's known as our FIG, which is a field
incident guide, so that it's available for everyone to
refer to. But there it is there (indicating), just
basically tells you what it does and that sort of guff.

Q. Just talking about the ICC generally?
A. Yes, but what it does - if you have a look there, it
transitions from level 1, which is our normal, first out
the door response, unless there's been a predetermined
level response to it. But a level 1 incident is that, and
then we go to a level 2 within the incident management
structure.

Q. Excellent.
A. I'll see if I can find this other stuff.

Q. That's good. Probably for me, that's how I understand
the ICC to work, so that's probably very helpful. Probably
not so much when it goes around the corner to some of the
Floods Inquiry staff.
A. I'm quite happy to give you the entire folder, the way
I've got it crudely marked, if that's going to help you.

Q. That would be fantastic, as long as we can flag it.
A. Yes. Because what I've pulled out for you is the ICC
activation protocols; in other words, was I working, I
suppose, within the incident directive or outside, and what
needed to have occurred. It also talks about who is in
control and when that control is transferred. So, you
know, I would have to suggest that within their own
document, people who are making strategic decisions offsite
really aren't entitled to do that by their own document.

Q. Can we label that - what are we up to, number 5?
A. Yes.

Q. So document 5 for us - I think you have it labelled
"Doc 7", but document 5, for my purposes, relate to your
seni or officer.
A. And also incident activation - incident control centre
activations. But it also refers, down in part 4 of the
directive, to transfer of command and control from the ICP
to the ICC and who will do that. But it also, further
back --

Q. Sorry. The "ICP" being?
A. Incident control point. So what happens is --
Q. Which would initially be you?
A. Which is the first attending appliance. So that if we - do you want an example?

Q. Would they generally be a station officer, the ICP?
A. It is whoever is the most senior person on the appliance. Let's say we have an incident at 400 George Street and I'm the first appliance that pulls up. I say, "Firecom this is 312 Alpha; 312 Alpha is ICP; IC", incident controller, "SO Burrows; incident known as George Street control." So then everyone knows "George Street control" is at - you don't have to say, "From 312 Alpha, at 400 George Street", da, da, da. It's a way of putting a little bit of abbreviation --

Q. And continuity, for into future transmissions?
A. Yes. You own that incident, so to speak, so that even if my boss comes up and says, "Look, John, I now want you to be operations", and he assumes the role of the incident controller, it is still known for the entire duration as "George Street control".

Q. Got you. Okay.
A. I'm just trying to find --

Q. So the two were Oakey Pittsworth Road and the Dalby SES boat flip over.
A. You know I may not have that one. I might have to send it to you.

Q. Actually, let's agree to --
A. To find it.

Q. -- find that. You might have a chance to look for it later on. So we've got the two incidents. We're just looking for the date, as I said, for the Oakey Pittsworth Road and that was, I think you mentioned, four separate lots of people rescued.
A. I have that one. I printed it last night. It's just a matter of finding it, please.

Q. The second one being the Dalby --
A. The Dalby and the Oakey Pittsworth.

Q. Now, Station 11 is Kitchener Street?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was tasked initially with turning out to that particular job, the Oakey Pittsworth Road job?
A. You had Station 13, which is Oakey.

Q. Auxiliary?
A. Auxiliary, because they were coming in from the north-western side of the incident. Station 12, which is myself, was tasked to come in, along with 311 Lima, out from Toowoomba along the Oakey Pittsworth Road. Then, because I was concerned that we mightn't get to the right side, I responded that station - sorry, Pittsworth. I can't remember its call sign, its numeric number, but it was Pittsworth that came in on the southside. As it turned out, we also had a swiftwater technician who was on holidays. Stewart Lange contacted the senior on-call, who authorised him to be recalled to duty, because we all take our gear home anyway and he lives in Pittsworth, so he responded to the incident from the southside. So we pretty much had it surrounded.

Q. With that particular incident you tried, through Firecom, to push to have an ICC put in place in regard to that particular incident?
A. Well, not just that particular incident but because of the operational tempo. We had another two separate locations in-water rescue incidents lined up as well.

Q. Where were they?
A. One was to the south of Pittsworth as we were starting to go back, and the other one, I can't recall where it was but it was within our, sort of, immediate response areas. But there was nothing left in town and we'd been then given a directive by the acting inspector that when we'd finished, we were to return.

Q. Can the ICC be stood up and stood down quickly?
A. There it is (indicating). Talking to the people at Highfields, they reckon 20 minutes to get the ICC set up. They've got staff trained up there, auxiliaries, to fulfil the functional roles and that's the four functional roles, of incident controller, operations, planning and logistics officers and any support that's needed. So, in essence, to get all of that happening, all they need to do is bring in a pump crew because we've all been trained in incident management systems.
Q. Where would they have set the ICC up?
A. At Highfields Fire Station. It has laptops sitting up there; all they have to do is plug them in, turn them on, boot them up and then say to Firecom, "Highfields ICC is on air." I have found that document.

Q. And they did choose not to do that, I understand?
A. They weren't directed to do it.

Q. No, no. The --
A. Yes, the management said, "But it's dark." It's that one there (indicating).

Q. Let's label that document 6.
A. That would be about 6, "D6".

Q. That relates to the Oakey Pittsworth incident?
A. The incident number is QF3-10-111965. So you want D6.

Q. Okay. I think we've covered in some detail there --
A. I'll leave that in the folder.

Q. Oh, definitely. Leave them in the order that you had them but I'll label them just for us.
A. Yes.

Q. That relates to the Oakey - what was the date, sorry?
A. The date of that was 26/12.

Q. Because I do know that there were a number of, I suppose --
A. We had jobs before that.

Q. -- flooding events in that December around Christmas.
A. We had it before that as well. There were events.

Q. Okay. Just the continual rain.
A. As I say somewhere in my statement, I think, when I've detailed what I did on the day. You know, I had two kids and we went for a drive to get a DVD. I was going to call them videos - that's showing my age now. The three of us, and they're both teenagers, didn't have a mobile phone between us. We elected to go down to what we call the goober trap, which is where all the dummies drive into the water and get flooded, and we watch them get stuck - and here's the airport bus, stuck. That's how my day started.
Q. Yes, and then you knew - you've indicated that you
decided something. You went back to work and --
A. Well, the only responsible thing to do, because it was
hosing down so much and nobody was stopping because you had
very deep water on all of the roads around Toowoomba, was
to make my way up around Curzon Street and down Herries
Street to the fire station and report it. I believe you're
duty bound to report an incident --

Q. Yes, definitely.
A. -- when you had eight or nine people trapped in an
airport bus. I don't know. Do you drive away? I don't
think so. I don't, anyway.

Q. No. I agree. It has here, on that same tour - so I
suppose we're going back and we're still referring to -
which is quite long - page 4, area 20 right through to page
7, area 34. You make reference to a motorcyclist in a
causeway at the Toowoomba Cecil Plains Road.
A. Yes. I need to find that one for you too.

Q. No, that's okay.
A. No, I've got it here but I'll just have to find it.
I'll look as I talk. On that particular evening we
responded, it would have been about 45 minutes before last
light, to a report of a motorcyclist on the Toowoomba Cecil
Plains Road on Milmerran Creek in a swiftwater event.
Obviously "fire bird", which was its call sign - I can't
recall but it might be in the document in here. Fire bird
is a rotary - in other words, a helicopter - asset and if
it's called fire bird, it's leased, or something, by QFRS,
"fire" being its designator. But with the "fire bird" call
sign, it means it is only recognisance. I'm suggesting or
suspecting it may have been used for flood recognisance,
because we have in our area a number of firefighters and
station officers who are trained air observers and they may
have been used for impact assessment for the floods around
that period. So flooding was occurring around that time.

Q. Do you recall the date for this Cecil Plains incident?
A. Oh, I'll find it.

Q. Just to give it context.
A. I can't recall the date. I'll find it. It's on the
fire report. Sorry. That's that other document I was
referring to, that proves that they actually do east-west
senior on-calls.
Q. Okay. Where are we up to? I think we were up to 6.
A. I'm sorry to be jumping all over the place.

Q. No, that's okay.
A. I've put my "Doc 3" that supports page 3 that I've highlighted down next to document 3. So do you want to call it document 7?

Q. We'll call it document 7 and it will give us some rise as to how we've gotten to there during our interview.
A. I apologise for the random harvest of information.

Q. So that relates to your on-call --
A. The way they do it. That is their call roster from July 2010 to December 2011. That's to give you an idea as to how they do it.

Q. And that's your "Doc 3"?
A. That my "Doc 3".

Q. Had you spoken to Firecom or did you speak directly to fire bird?
A. I'm fairly sure that the pilot or whoever was on board was showing a little bit of initiative because I would've been probably no more than two minutes into my response, I was next to the Toowoomba race track, the turf club, and they've identified themselves to Firecom. They've said, "This is fire bird" X, Y, or Z, "we are still running, we have 45 minutes of endurance and are available for tasking." I've heard that and I've said, "Firecom I require fire bird to respond to this incident.", and it never did.

The story that I got back is that the request had to go from Firecom to Regional Operations Coordination Centre, then to the State Operations Coordination Centre, then to the air desk for tasking. Yet, in their own documents - if I can find it. It'll be in here somewhere. Yes, it must be there. Air operations - aircraft operations - sorry. I refer to incident directive 1.3, titled Air Operations, Activation, under 3.1 part A:

All requests for aircraft support are to be made through the relevant Firecom dispatching resources to the fire or the relevant regional fire communications
centre established. Requests for aircraft support may be made by the incident controller.

I was the incident controller.

Q. You've indicated it may be made by you, a request, but it doesn't then go on to say who can give approval for that to occur.
A. No. It says:

Aircraft operations extending beyond two hours must then be authorised by the assistant commissioner.

In one of my previous roles I worked as the i-Zone training officer and --

Q. Sorry. i-Zone?
A. Urban rural interface officer. You know, scrub next to houses, burn down, death and destruction.

Q. Yes.
A. We would always reinforce and State air operations had always reinforced that the aerial assets were to be considered nothing other than another QFRS appliance that could be utilised. Okay? So in this particular incident I had an appliance, a fire bird, sitting, still running at Toowoomba airport with three-quarters of an hour endurance.

Q. Available for tasking directly by you?
A. And I requested it to be responded to the job and it was not sent. So some --

Q. Sorry. Can we go back to your "Doc 9"?
A. My "Doc 9".

Q. Which now becomes our document 8.
A. We're calling it document 8. Now, that's on activation.

Q. Yes, and that relates to air resources, air operations.
A. That was also in line with incident directive 1.14, which is titled Regional Support For Aircraft. The part that I highlighted is 4.2 and it just stipulates local airport use and the conditions and terms of using it, and
that sort of carry-on. So it was sitting at our local airport, it had just landed from something and it had 45 minutes of endurance. It would have been spot on. It probably would have been over the job in six minutes.

Q. Why wasn't it utilised?
A. No idea.

Q. When does the ROCC become involved?
A. Well, the --

Q. You've got Firecom--
A. The ROCC shouldn't. The ROCC is technically an information collection centre for all of the ICCs that are running. So the ROCC shouldn't be set up unless it has ICCs to support. So if I'm working in the field and I put a request into the ICC that I want another two strike teams, that request goes on a logistics request form over to the ROCC and they go, righto, that ICC said they want two more strike teams, and they make it happen that way.

Q. Was there an ICC running with you on that particular day?
A. Not that I'm aware of, although I don't know. Further in they describe it as being in almost like a ghost mode, which I've never seen. Again, I have documents that clearly articulate what modes it should have been and they've come up with something that is not within their own documentation. They had one person who might have been sitting there, instead of it being fully functional and supporting all of the ICCs around the region that, at that stage, were working in flood mitigation works from Charleville all the way in, Condamine, Dalby, etc, even into Warwick - the station out there got flooded out three times. You had, on a lot of occasions, nobody working there of a nighttime, which I thought was taboo, and one or two people during the daytime.

I'll see if I can find it. That might be the one there. It is. Okay. That particular job that night where I went out onto the Toowoomba Cecil Plains Road, that was QFRS incident number QF3-11-002953 and the date was 10/1, so it was going into the pm. So Toowoomba is being smashed and I've put a request in for a helicopter that was on the bitumen at Toowoomba airport, still running, saying he had 45 minutes endurance. It says here at 1746:

Because if they're not instrument rated, they have to be on ground ten minutes before last light. So they had plenty of time. Now that request was denied. So that's my "Doc 8" which would be your document 10.

Q. No, we're up to document 9.

Q. Correct. Was that a life-threatening situation?
A. Yes. Well, we were told that a person had been swept off their motorbike. In talking to the gentleman later, he decided that it sounded like a lot of fun to ride into floodwater that was 1.7 metres in depth on his motorbike for no other reason than to ride into it because it looked like fun, and he was a middle-aged gentleman on a trail bike. I think on the back end of that somewhere - "Owner of the Honda motorbike had attempted to cross a flooded causeway that was 1.5 metres deep and stalled."

A truck driver then drove in and effected a rescue. So he disconnected his trailer, drove his prime mover in - at his own peril - and effected the rescue. I've stated on a note there, "Recommend that rider be fully charged for all QFRS resources that responded.", and there was four resources. We were getting to that stage where our tolerance for stupidity was getting very, very short.

Q. A hundred percent. All right. We're still on preparedness. Acting on weather information and previous swiftwater rescues, passing weather info onto operational crews, crewing up stations adequately. Okay?
A. From a Weather Bureau's perspective to an end user's perspective, we didn't get that automatically, we went onto the BoM sites and watched the weather radar and things. At the station level, the boys did a good job - boys and girls - but as far as the senior officers disseminating any information to us? No.

Up until the 10th, we were on our own. With 311 Lima, it has an on-ground response time of up to four hours on any of those western roads. Right? We could not get any
road closures from what should have been Planning within an
ICC or an ROCC environment prior to the incident going
down. We were having to ring or get onto the CB to talk to
truckies to find out which road was closed, open, etc, for
us to be able to respond out to those incidents. We did
not have any preplanning on routes that were open versus
routes that were closed, to get to reports of car
accidents, Hazmats - hazardous materials.

Q. Were you aware of anyone who you had contact with who
was actually participating, say, in your local disaster
management group meetings?
A. No. But if they were, they weren't bringing any
information back to us. We're only the response crew

Q. Because usually Queensland Fire and Rescue will have a
member on a local disaster management group; QAS will
usually have one. Were you aware or had you spoken with
anyone who had been privy to any information from the local
- -
A. I had heard, and it's only anecdotal, that the person
who was sent was removed from the local disaster management
group meeting because he was fairly useless and had to be
replaced by a junior officer to do the task.

Q. From a station officer's point of view, had you
received any warnings about whether - in that lead-up
between, say, New Year through to the main event, which
took place I think on the 10th, had you been getting
updated as to what your operation or your preparedness
should be or how many staff you should have on deck?
A. No, but interestingly enough - and, again, I have a
document here somewhere, it's a thing with a big elastic
band around it - in talking, prior to the main event, to
Neil Goodman and Tom Dawson down the ROCC at the start of
one morning - -

Q. Neil Goodman, what is his - -
A. He's a station officer who at that stage was still
acting in the business support unit down the back at 201
Anzac Avenue. Mr Dawson said that - -

Q. He's your AC, is he?
A. He's my assistant commissioner. He said, "You know,
we probably should be starting to treat these swiftwater
events like we do the wildfire events.", where there's
actually four levels of, let's call it operational tempo.
Level 1 is business as usual; level 2, we start to wind down on some of the stuff that's occurring around the place - I'll just take that elastic band off, at risk of it going somewhere - and then you get to level 4, which means that - well, I'll go through them if you like, because I've just found the page. Will that help?

Q. Yes.
A. So characteristics of a level 1. It means that, basically, alert level 1 is normal conditions - and this is for a wildfire but this is where he said, "Look, we probably need to be applying this to other incidents such as the swiftwater." The fire activity is normal for that time of the year and the conditions are such that there is no adverse threat of fire. Rural urban fire brigade management team consult regularly to establish future forecast.

A level 2 alert is - the above table is a guidance, and the appropriate wildfire alert level should be determined based on the fire index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the urban rural fire management team, with consideration given to the number of active fires in the region. In the view of a swiftwater event, you're starting to talk about, well, the number of swiftwater jobs we're doing.

Q. Yes.
A. So you should be saying, well, it's not raining, so it's level 1. It's started to rain, yes, we've started to drag a few people out, so we might want to go to a level 2. Then you go to a level 3 alert level. The above table again is a guide to the appropriate wildfire alert level. It should be determined based on the fire index and a combination of variables and discussion between the rural urban fire management team and consideration given to the complexity and number of fires burning within the region.

Now, one of the very common resource tools that fire managers use to determine these alert levels is they get onto the Bureau of Meteorology. They will give them, if they wish, a spot weather forecast. So they could say this is where we are in Toowoomba, what's the fires going to be like on this particular day. They can go, mmm, looks as though it's going to kick off a bit. Now, the exact same Bureau of Meteorology technology is utilised for swiftwater.
Then you go to level 4. Basically, yes, this is the
highest alert level, consideration of firefighter safety
and communications and communities. What it does - if I
can find it again - is it tells you at different levels
what is occurring on the station. At wildfire alert level
4, as Mr Dawson had in the past, he stood up all of his
stations for what he thought was going to be a very bad
fire day. Yet we have this trend upwards of operational
tempo to swiftwater rescues and nothing occurred other than
on the 10th, when probably catchup was occurring.

But at level 4 we don't do any inspections. We sit at
the station and the very first thing we do is we check all
of what we believe is going to be the operation specific
equipment. So if it's been bucketing down with rain, we're
not going to be checking the knapsacks for grass
firefighting, we're going to be checking all of our
swiftwater rescue equipment. The regional swiftwater
rescue coordinator would be talking to the assistant
commissioner and saying, "Tom, based on all the information
we've received, I think" and "I make recommendations that
we need", as they did on the day, to crank up the levels of
manning on the different stations. And it didn't within
Toowoomba.

Q. You indicated to me earlier that that hadn't taken
place at all.
A. No, no. And the firefighters on the station, Station
11, had in fact - I think it was Mark Haddow, from memory,
who requested of the senior on-call that we needed more
people on the station at 7.30 in the morning.

Q. What is his rank?
A. He was acting station office at that time, but he is
also a swift water technician.

Q. He was at 11?
A. He was at Station 11 on that day. But they had
requested additional resources be brought to bear. As I
say, at a level 4 alert level, everything else stops, we're
waiting for the hit, waiting to be slammed with something.
All the incident prediction that should be coming out of
the Planning section the night before, saying, righto, if
something happens, these are the reserves we have of
trained people, and that sort of thing, it just didn't
happen on the 10th. So, that's why I'm sort of suggesting
that wildfire alert document. Mr Dawson said, you know, that's probably the same style of methodology that we need to be looking at for swiftwater.

Q. That you should have been looking at?
A. That's right.

Q. Let's make that --
A. It's my "Doc 11".

Q. And it's our document 10. To me, that makes good sense. I suppose from a police service point of view, we try to limit it to particular events. We just simply look at it as an incident and then, you know, your situational awareness then for --

A. But I would imagine within the police that if somebody says we're going to have CHOGM tomorrow, your operational tempo and the way you'd move would probably change. You may not have as many RBTs around the countryside.

Q. Correct.
A. And you're more focusing on security of the Heads of State.

Q. Yes.
A. So yours is also preplanned. You'd have a template that looks a bit like that (indicating) on how to do it, and somebody meets and makes a decision on where are we going to get the logistics to make that particular document work. It's no different. That's for increasing awareness and operational responses to wildfires and Mr Dawson said - guess what.

Q. What do you think on the 10th, for argument's sake - you talked about Mark Haddow saying at 7.30, look, we're in a bad position at the moment due to ongoing weather, and whatnot.
A. Yes.

Q. With your 48 staff, where should you have been, do you think, on that morning of the 10th?
A. Full recall of staff, all shifts.

Q. In preparation?
A. All shifts. Absolutely.

Q. Would it be any different if it was - if you had
40 degree days, the wind's blowing at 30 knots from the west, what would be the situation for, say --

A. All stations would be stood up, that's auxiliaries as well as manned stations, and the ROCC would be activated. If it was an extreme catastrophic day, as they're talking nowadays, you'd have the ICC set up in readiness and you would have air observers up, in anticipation of flying to the first puff of smoke. The same could occur with swiftwater.

Q. Should that have been the equivalent response on the 10th?
A. Yes but, for whatever reason, they failed to act. They had the information; they manned up the non-critical areas, the administrative areas - apart from Firecom but then they overloaded Firecom as I said before. Instead of having the supervisor and two operators there, they put another three spectators into that environment and it ended up being a shouting match. Instead of them taking the due diligence to set up their already prestructured ICC at Highfields, they elected to take the easy way out and sit at the fire communications centre.

Q. When did they stand the ICC up, what date?
A. On the 10th at about 11.30 - oh sorry, no. They didn't stand the ICC up on the 10th. It didn't go up. Everything was being done out of either the ROCC at the back of Anzac Avenue Fire Station or from Firecom. There was no sectorisation of the jobs.

Q. Did Mark Haddow intimate that it would be a good idea for an ICC to be set up at 7.30, or should a manager have taken that to the next --
A. Look, any manager worth his salt should have.

Q. Who was the manager on the day?
A. Wally Rye.

Q. You mentioned earlier in our previous discussion --
A. But Tom Dawson also approved putting a couple of people and rural training officers into the regional operations coordination centre. Now, you must make the distinction there that the rural training officers field of expertise is vegetation fires only. They never have been and never will be trained in swiftwater awareness. It's not their skill set. Now, how the hell can you be thinking strategically with somebody who does not know the first
thing about a swiftwater environment? In fact, on that particular day, those three people who were initially working in the ROCC were then sent out into the water to do something, which is completely against and again I've got the reference documents - the agency's zero harm policy. Why would you send somebody out into a known disaster with zero skill sets? Because if something had happened to them, the assistant commissioner would be in a world of hurt at many levels.

Q. I'm still not understanding why the ROCC was overviewing everything when I thought that the ICC would have been set up initially to prepare --

A. Well, the only thing I could put it down to is laziness and convenience, because the ROCC is in Toowoomba Central and people could walk back and forth from regional training, from the business support unit, or the assistant commissioner could drive there, and it's only 4 k's to drive whereas Highfields is about 21 k's - it's not convenient.

But that's the system that they set up so, unfortunately, the ROCC, for the bulk of the incidents, was working as Toowoomba's ICC, which it was not designed to do, because you're either working at a strategic level and supporting, as I said before, with requests coming in from ICCs and dealing with those and putting them up to State and vice-versa, because the ROCC gets the intel, sends it to the State operations coordinations centre, which then briefs our commissioner, then the D-G - the Director-General - who then briefs the Premier in Cabinet.

Now if the ROCC is getting bogged down in - and they were. They were responding appliances off - there's a redundancy set of radios in the back of the ROCC and they were responding appliances out of the back of the ROCC on the radios. So you had Firecom wondering who the hell is going where, they're trying to do their direction of appliances and you've got these guys sitting there - who are rural guys, who don't know what they're doing - saying, oh no, we'll send them here, there or wherever.

They didn't understand the first concepts of swiftwater jobs. They didn't understand that if the POO, as we call it, which is the point of origin - and is probably appropriate for the people who are reported because they're in the poo. One appliance will go to that
location where they were last seen, but there should be people in appliances put downstream as intercept teams.

As I say in my statement, the water had to be, on my guesstimate - probably some expert has done it with video footage but, on my guesstimate, it was doing 55 kilometres an hour. Why I can state that is that in Chalk Drive years before that, myself and another bloke by the name of Dave Woods - I said, "Come on. It's rained a little bit, so let's go and see how fast this water is flowing.", and in Chalk Drive we paced the foamliner out of a pushbike helmet doing 43 kilometres down that constructed culvert.

Now anything that's constructed, that's man-made, will be far, far faster than a natural river bed. A natural river bed will inherently only produce a speed of up to about 17 kilometres an hour --

Q. Are you talking about East Creek now?
A. No. East Creek is man-made but the creek itself, once it gets back into a natural creek environment, will only do about 17 kilometres an hour. But if you have a concrete lined, man-made culvert or an open drain, it can do up to 70 kilometres an hour.

Q. I'll quickly touch on some other subjects before we move on. You said that at a Brisbane taskforce the commissioner got up and spoke about, in that two months period, the swiftwater rescue having saved more people than from house fires in the previous --
A. In the preceding ten years.

Q. -- ten years. What was that taskforce in regard to?
A. I was part of the urban search and rescue team and we were tasked with doing rapid building assessments, which was looking at the damage levels of any of the flood impacted buildings, and that information was going back via an electronic device called the Trimble, which GPS'd our location, we took a happy snap, and those sorts of things. It was a way of being able to get information back very, very quickly to government level so they could prioritise where the effort to recover would be going.

Q. What was the date for that taskforce?
A. It would be two or three days after the 10th.

Q. So we're thinking around 12 and 13 January?
A. Yes, around that. I could get precise but do you want that?

Q. Yes, if you could. That can go on our list of things that we can chase up. From page 1, paragraph 6, you talk about crews on the ground, and we talked about this earlier --

A. Yep.

Q. -- so we probably don't need to go into too much detail. But the crews on the ground were far more situationally aware in regard to what was happening in the lead-up to the events. So there was no communication of impending event from the senior management --

A. That's right.

Q. -- you've indicated?

A. Yes.

Q. How were they going about getting that situational awareness, your crews?

A. It was based on firsthand operational experience. As I said, we were going - I believe we started early November with the rain cycles and minor flooding, minor flooding, then moderate and then it built up to major. We were just going to more and more of these flash flood events. So we were the people on the pointy end, even though the managers can read the fire reports and the incident reports for the previous week, 24 hours - whatever period they want - and they should be going, "Oh look, we're starting to get a trend up on swiftwater response cycles. We should be", as I said before, "perhaps looking at a way of manning or crewing up for it.", and they didn't.

The guys on the floor knew it was coming. We'd been to multiple events where we had water through houses that had never had water in them, we had cars stuck on intersections that had never had water over that intersection before, let alone having people sitting up on the roof.

A number of people who have lived in the town for years said that they had never known water to go over the James and Kitchener Streets intersection. That's probably, in part, because 25 years ago when they might have started in the job, the catchment area that led into the township of Toowoomba was predominantly farmland, so it had some
degree of retention capacity. Now it's predominantly house
roofs --

Q. Road curbs.
A. -- roads, driveways, so any flash event with a high
volume of water, instead of it being slowed up, as I said
before, through natural features, it flashes very, very
quickly at high speed and no amount of retention basins
that they've got in Toowoomba will stop another occurrence
of that flash event. It was interesting reading in the
Toowoomba Chronicle, it would have been a month afterwards
- everyone's said, "It's a 1 in a 500 year event". No it's
not, by the historians. It probably happens, on average,
every 25 to 30 years. This bloke detailed in a two-page
spread, bullock drays being washed down Ruthven Street.
Now, a bullock dray doesn't float like the modern car.

So these events have been occurring but what's
occurred, I believe, is that since then we've compounded it
by allowing the natural - and it's only about a 3 kilometre
catchment area that leads into the township proper and it's
been built over.

Q. So you're saying, for your situational awareness for
your staff, it's a combination of, say, their experience
and their observations? Would that be that be a fair
assessment?
A. Yes, coupled with the increasing number of incidents
that we were going to.

Q. Were those --
A. Both within Toowoomba and down in the Lockyer Valley.
We were going to more and more of those.

Q. Was this situational awareness being passed on to
senior management? Were they aware of it?
A. Well, they would know every time we've said, "Look,
we're going down the Lockyer. We need a recall crew", and
invariably were told, "No, wait and see." In other words,
to back up, to fill in Toowoomba because, as I said before,
we're chronically under-stationed and under-staffed for the
size of the town. So we would request more people to be
brought in just in case we had another incident and,
invariably, there would be another incident.

But yes, these guys were going down more and more and
it just wasn't being picked up. The senior management, if
they are exercising the due diligence that is required, they're meant to be looking at the fire reports that are coming in on their computer, so that when they --

Q. That was my next question. How do they become aware or how do you report to, say, the next lot of managers up, so the superintendent?
A. It works on a number of levels. If the superintendent is on duty or the senior on-call, he's going to be hit with a pager message or a mobile phone call or he's listening to the radio messages. He should, if he's any sort of a manager, have that sort of stuff just whirring away in the background. Oh, hang on, I've got four trucks going to somebody stuck in water; I might need to go down and have a look at that. But invariably they wouldn't. There were very, very few occasions when our senior on-calls would actually go and have a look for themselves. They're very quick to say, "Get back. I'm giving you a direction you will get back into town as soon as you can.", but they weren't there to make that call.

So, in absence of themselves, they should have been trusting the officers who were responding, and the officers who were responding were saying on numerous occasions, "Hey boss, we need to be doing more." "We need to be getting another truck in." "We need to be doing" this or that, and it just wasn't happening. As I said, there were a number of officers who were locked into this 'I'm on holidays for three weeks'.

Q. So for each incident you attend, you complete an incident report?
A. Yes.

Q. Are they all then forwarded - are they funnelled through your --
A. Area director, who has to also read it and sign it off as well electronically. But, as I say, if it's a significant event as well, the assistant commissioner gets a page of any event, so he is usually - or should be, via his pager - situationally aware of what's been going on because his pager is being hit all the time.

Q. Both of those managers are seeing not just your incident from Station 11, but --
A. Station 12, yes.
Q. Oh, sorry. From station 11 --
A. Yes. It doesn't matter.

Q. But all of the areas as well?
A. Yes.

Q. So it seems odd that they're not making the decisions then to, you know, upscale the staff.
A. Well Charleville, I think, and Dalby had in the area of hundreds of water incidents - only a couple of swiftwaters, but hundreds of incidents. Now, surely Blind Freddy would've felt his pager vibrating and say, hmm something is happening. You didn't have to see it; you could have read it on the pager and said, yep, things are starting to cycle up; we better get more resources in.

Q. On to resources, how many level 2 swiftwater rescue members are there in Queensland? Are you aware?
A. I'm not aware.

Q. How many within your area?
A. Eight of the level 2s.

Q. Level 2s?
A. Yes, and about 45 level 1s.

Q. Do you have a recommendation on how the structure should look for your area in regard to swiftwater rescue response?
A. I believe the people who are appropriately trained in those areas are the only people who should be able to make the call on the level of resources. If Stewart Lange, who has the grand title of regional technical rescue coordinator, is to fulfill his role correctly, people need to trust his skill sets. In lieu of senior management not being trained, if he says, "Look, I think we need three teams at Dalby", that's it, because he is basing it on his expertise. If other people aren't trained, how can they say yes or no to a request from a person who is trained?

Q. How many should you have within your area, not just on any given shift? We keep talking about 48. How many of those 48 - keeping in mind that we can't have everything that we need all the time; finance just doesn't allow it. Realistically, how many do you think you need within your area to be able to function at a reasonable level, and I'm talking level 2s.
A. A lot of it gets back to skills maintenance. You've got some auxiliary stations out there that are lucky to be able to get two or three people in there all the time to train or to even respond. So it's a case, potentially, that a little information, in this case, can be deadly because they may have nobody to back them up. As I said before, it's my belief that you need a crew of six to make a swiftwater in-water rescue team.

You could fix it up one of two ways. You've got the Toowoomba airport. You could build a third station adjacent to the Toowoomba airport, which just happens to now have a dedicated rescue chopper sitting there. So it doesn't take much of a stretch to say, well, if we built a fire station with the technical rescue people sitting next to the helicopter pad, they could, amongst other things, respond with the aircrew to all points west, at - what does a chopper do - about 180 knots. It is far, far quicker than ground units will get in and they can be dropped in situ.

Swiftwater equipment doesn't take up much weight. The largest weight is the crew. But then you might want - it takes four minutes to drown, so I'm not sure whether if you were to strategically put swiftwater rescue teams full-time - although they're not, they're only auxiliaries - at your major stations, whether that's going to help. Again, how do you keep their skills maintenance up?

Q. Yes, but that's not something that's happening at the moment, is it?
A. No. They're not being trained because, from a State perspective, they were concerned that if we can't keep their skills up, they become a potential liability. If they haven't worked in - like, in some of the areas it hadn't rained for ten years. Then if suddenly it rains and they haven't done any training around water for ten years, they could drown.

So there's the cause and effect; every action has an equal and opposite reaction. You train them ten years down the track, they'll think that they're still current in competencies. It's a bit like the police. If you carry a sidearm, you have to go to the range and bang a few rounds down range to prove that you still have proficiency. It is no different in this life-saving exercise. Is that the best analogy I can give you?
Q. Indeed, indeed. We've already gone through and talked about the ROCC and the zero harm policy.
A. I've got that here. Do you want the zero harm policy?

Q. Yes, if you wanted to cover it, but we have touched on that.
A. It's all buried in here somewhere.

Q. Do you think we need to discuss that any further?
A. The zero harm?
Q. Mmm
A. Well, I suppose --

Q. Other than suffice to say that you said it looked as though there had been breaches of directives, and whatnot, in regard to that policy?
A. Well, on the particular day - there's that ROCC document. On that particular day because of just the extreme tempo of life rescues that were there, there was not one of the guys who responded who said, "No. The zero harm policy", and, "I'm only a level 1 swiftwater technician which means that I can't go into the water." Because it was broad bank style of water and then you had the main channel, there was a lot of people who went into situations that technically they were not trained to go into.

However, they knew the hazards and as the commissioner keeps saying, you carry out on the ground a dynamic risk assessment. Are we going to get away with this or not. We've got six people sitting in the middle of James and Kitchener Streets. Do we just say sorry, we can't go in, or do we support the rescue technician level 2 and go in a little bit downstream where we might be up to the knees or even our waist and where we can at least throw some sort of throw bag out if somebody is swept away, intercept them and let the water pendulum them back into the bank that we're standing on.

There were a lot of people who did a lot of things that, if it was just one swiftwater rescue and only one person or two people trapped, you wouldn't have had that number of people go in. But because there was only about 15 who actually went initially from the two stations, it was all hands to the pumps. By our own estimate in the
incident debrief that happened two weeks later - which was
in contravention of their own directives that say it should
happen within 48 hours - the guesstimate is that we saved
90 and lost two. That's only a guesstimate because we just
didn't have a chance to go, "Gudday. I've just dragged you
out of the water. Can I have your name and address?", as
we're meant to do. We just didn't have a chance.

Q. Where does that leave your staff, though, from a
liability point of view when they're breaching directives
that perhaps management may imply can be breached if the
situation arises?
A. Well, you really probably wouldn't want to know the
general feeling - well you do, you want to know the feeling
on the floor.

Q. Yes.
A. There was quite a few people who said, "Look, if
management is going to hang us out to dry for doing the
right thing in the community that we live in on the day,
they can get fucked." I can't put it any more succinctly
than that.

Q. No, no.
A. Because the emotion was there. Are you going to stand
there and just watch people sweep away, knowing that you
may be able to do something? It's interesting that - I'd
sent an email to Tom Dawson, it would've been two and a
half years before that, from the Black Saturday Inquiry.
Did you happen to see the reference?

Q. No.
A. It's come back to roost something fierce. I'll find
it. It all gets back to administration and operations, and
that sort of carry-on. I'll see if I can find. It will be
around the wildfire stuff, I think.

Q. Whilst you're looking and I don't mean to distract you
--
A. No, it's all right.

Q. -- whilst you're doing that, you mentioned before that
when they manned up, so to speak, the ROCC to try and meet
the incoming information for Firecom or to assist Firecom
you've indicated that they haven't then manned up the
operational personnel to correspond with that?
A. They put the incorrect skill set into that regional
operations coordination centre.

Q. I know, but I mean externally as well.
A. No, no, they didn't man up anyone.

Q. I mean outside, from an operational standpoint.
A. No. For the people who were actually going to do and
effect the rescues, they weren't manned up.

Q. Would you like a break? While you're looking for
that, we'll come back and restart --
A. I've just found another.

Q. Sorry, you've found it?
A. No, I've found another document. I'll just whack on
one of these tags. It gets right back to not enough
manning.

Q. So what are we going to flag? We'll go on and flag
that as document 11, if we could.
A. Okay.

Q. What is it?
A. It's titled "Dumb Luck", to our assistant
commissioner, and it's with regards to the ongoing
difficulties where we go to one incident and crews get
injured and the assistant commissioner says, oh well, you
need to wait until you get three on, and that sort of
carry-on, on the fire ground. So it's from our branch
secretary and it was then sent to me.

Q. Can we mark that document 11?
A. Yes.

Q. What have you numbered it as yours, or haven't you
numbered it?
A. "Doc 2".

Q. When we come back, we'll start straight onto the
debrief.
A. Yep. I'll see if I can find that other one.

DET SNR SGT REID: You and I will look for that, but we'll
break now and then we'll chase up the other documents. The
time now is 1.02pm and if we could be up and ready to go by
half past.
LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 1.31pm. We will resume the interview.

Q. We have been speaking briefly in regard to documentation prior to the interview commencing and you have gone through and marked a number of documents that you think are relevant that we also need to include as part of your interview today. Rather than wait to go through each one, as we discussed, we might go through - I think we're at document 12 onwards - and read them into the record and label them as we go.

A. Yes. What I have attempted to do prior to coming down here is got all of my transcript and then put in all of the, what I thought was supporting documentation in emails or standing orders or incident management directives, etc, and I have scribbled on the top. In this case, where we're starting off is "Doc 2", but we must have it in there already as document 11.

Q. Yes.

A. So that one's done.

Q. Yes. I think that is the last one we did. I think we're up to document 12.

A. All right. Document 12 is my "Doc 4" and what I've done is in the margin is the notes that I've got, that I will give you to you. I'm quite happy for you to take them because I can replicate the whole lot again with five or six hours work. It's relating to an escalation of an incident, level 1, level 2, level 3 and the incident management system. Do you want me to go through some of the bits that are relevant?

Q. Yes.

A. As I say, it's looking at level 1, which is where I'm on a truck and I'm the first attending ranking officer. It says that the level 1 incident officer in charge takes control and informs the relevant fire communications centre of the nominated incident control point and provides the appropriate situation reports. It was a bit like that analogy that I gave you of 400 George Street, and that sort of carry-on.

Then, where a higher ranked officer arrives and assesses the incident to be within the scope of the
existing level of control, the higher ranked officer need
only advise incident control of their arrival and that they
will not be taking control. So they can or can't take
control if they elect to. When this occurs, the higher
ranked officer may, at their discretion, be delegated
another role, leave the scene or remain to observe.

Now, I can't find the other document but it quite
clearly articulates that the senior officer, if he elects
not to come onto the scene or take over on the scene, it
says that it clearly does not abrogate his responsibility
as the senior officer. So if he doesn't elect to go to the
scene and it goes to hell in a handbasket, it still sits
with him even though he may be nine and a half hours or
140 clicks away, or whatever. If the assessment determines
the existing level of control is not adequate for the
incident, the higher ranked officer, after appropriate
briefing - which is in what we call a SMEACS format. It's
an acronym for situation, mission, execution,
administration, communications and safety format.

The current incident controller shall
immediately assume the role of incident
controller.

So, if my boss comes on and he thinks that I'm making a
mess of it, he can say, "John, give me a SMEACS briefing,
tell me what your incident action plan is", you may hear it
referred to as IAP, and then he can take over if he elects
to and say, "John, you're operations." Normally they put
you in charge as the operations officer because you've been
there from when you've arrived to when they've got there.

Further down the track in part 3.2F:

The incident controller will request the
establishment of an ICC and will maintain
control until advised of the establishment
of the ICC.

So the buck stops with me at a level 1 incident. If I want
it to go to a level 2 incident, I request it, and it's
hopefully then up to the person who's supporting me who
comes on scene and says, "Yep, I support that", or if he's
got enough faith in me from a remote distance, says "Yep, I
totally support that."
Then it goes through a whole heap of documentation where it's kicking up to a level 2 incident.

An incident shall be reclassified to a level 2 incident by a senior urban officer or senior rural operations officer.

So they're able to verify that. And the same deal with the level 3. The incident control centre - this is relating to - and it's got flow charts on how it works.

Q. Yes, I've got that one there.
A. So this gives you a little bit more detail. Have you got a reference number on that one? You can keep that. Do we want to give that a tab, the FIG that you've got?

Q. Oh sorry. This?
A. Yes.

Q. Yes, definitely.
A. That's yours to keep, so do we want to give it a tag as well?

Q. If we're reading directly from that. The one you are on is document 12, I think, because I don't think we have labelled the front of that.
A. No, we haven't yet, no. It details that:

The incident control centre must be fully operational before transfer from a level 2 incident control point occurs. If a level 2 control centre is functioning, the only change is in staffing. The incident control centre may be predetermined in regional response plans or may be identified for suitability in relation to the incident location.

So it again gets back to preplanning. So you'd like to make that one?

Q. Leave your green tags on there because it's highlighting the paging.
A. Yes. So you want to make that?

Q. Document 13. Document 12 your field incident guide with reference to IMS 2.3, page 11, which relates to
incident management system

A. Doc 12 or 13?

Q. Yours is going to be 13.
A. So that's that one. Remember I said before that we had a number of people who were either being placed into the regional operations coordinations centre who were not qualified --

Q. Yes.
A. -- or were then being sent out into this extreme weather event, not being qualified. I've got them as my "Doc 5", I've still left them as "Doc 5", and there's two of them

Q. Let's make that those documents 14A and 14B.
A. Okay. That was for Wayne Waltisbuhl, and the second bloke is Paul Storrs. So that's documents 14A and 14B; is that correct?

Q. Yes, please.
A. The next one that I was talking about relates to an email that I sent to my assistant commissioner on 24/7/2009 and it's titled "Just a couple of observations out of the Victoria Black Saturday fires."

Tom just a couple of observations out of the Victorian Black Saturday fires and a couple of sobering comments that I've found.

This was from the Royal Commission. Paragraph 1:

Conformity to rules was the enemy of judgment, commonsense and moral responsibility.

The next one I put in there was:

There was a failure by media to distinguish between the firefighter on the frontline, who were rightly lauded, and the competence of those who were controlling the fight.

I've said in the closing paragraph there, and there's only three of them
However, in conversation with some QFRS managers, there is a belief that this would not happen in Queensland. What's your thoughts and have we prepared ourselves to ensure this doesn't happen?

Q. What was the response?
A. Tom seemed to think that, no, that sort of stuff wouldn't happen in Queensland. Unfortunately, I do have the happy knack of being the prophet of doom. This is straight out of the Victorian Royal Commission into another massive scale incident.

Q. Regardless, as we discussed, of what the incident is?
A. Irrespective. So I was just trying to - the only intent with that was to inform and say, "Look boss, could something like this happen potentially in Queensland?", and the answer was, "No."

Q. Okay. Let's mark that up. Your "Doc 12" will be my document 15, and that relates to your email to --
A. To Tom Dawson, the assistant commissioner.

Q. -- Tom Dawson the AC.
A. The next one is learning histories of my senior officers in my immediate area, and there's seven of them where they are not qualified even at swiftwater awareness level. So all that I wanted to introduce that for is because how can these people be making strategic decisions on something that they have not been trained in.

Q. I'm in agreement with you one hundred percent. Are you prepared for the fallout that may result --
A. I believe it's --

Q. -- from a senior - and it's probably not something I want to go into in too much detail.
A. No. It's --

Q. Are you happy to provide those documents and --
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. We'll leave it at that.
A. Because if you wished, as a Commission, I would believe you could subpoena the records anyway.

Q. Definitely, definitely.
A. So all that I'm doing is supplying them to you.
There's seven, so do we want to go 16 --
Q. Let's put those seven documents as documents 16A, 16B, etc.
A. There's seven of them
Q. If you could just read the seven names --
A. Okay. We have --
Q. -- and their positions?
A. Tom Dawson, assistant commissioner south-west region; Edward Lacko, business management unit south-west region.
Q. What's his rank?
A. Inspector. Lawrence Bell, who is the manager for strategic development south-west region; Paul Evans, inspector and manager, community safety unit; Steve McInerney, inspector area 1; Walter Rye at that stage was acting inspector area 1; Bruce Smith is the superintendent south-west regional training; Lindsay Hackett is the chief superintendent.
Q. For your area?
A. For our area, yes.
Q. Let's bundle those together as document 16A right through to document 16G, and then we can put a clip on those.
A. Okay. There's the zero harm documents, if you want them and also the ROCC activation protocols.
Q. Yes. I think we've covered, I suppose - unless there's something in particular you want from the ROCC, we can introduce both of those documents and then --
A. Yes. But it goes back to you getting into the debriefing or briefing phase later on. I've put a little tag here where Mr Dawson said the ROCC had been running then, loosely, from 27/12 working on a low profile.

Now within their own documents, the activation levels of the ROCC - I cite incident directive 7.2 relating to ROCC activation protocols. It says that you have four activation levels; one is watching brief, the next one is alert, the next one is standby, and then the next and last is activation. There is no such thing as the term "low profile". That gives you, unfortunately, a bit of an idea
that I don't believe that they were taking the whole build-up seriously.

Q. Let's label your "Doc 16" my document 17.
A. That's the zero harm policy?

Q. Yes, please. Document 17 will be the zero harm policy. Your "Doc 17" will be my document 18 and that relates, as you've pointed out, the incident directive for ROCC activation protocols, which also comprises, as you've pointed out, the response the commissioner has made at page 22 - is it 98 up here?
A. Of section 98, that's correct.

Q. You've highlighted that as well.
A. Yes, and I've called it my document reference "Doc 17".

Q. Okay. Excellent.
A. Just for your viewing pleasure as well, because we're getting into incident debriefing, I've attached Guide 7, which is operational debriefing.

Q. Excellent. Is that labelled separately?
A. Not yet.

Q. Let's make that document 19. That pretty well covers us, I think. That was our last one.
A. I think so.

Q. Let's get straight onto the debrief. Page 22, section 98:

I'll give you a quick brief of what I picked up from the debrief that was conducted on the 12th of February. It was chaired by Steve McInerney. You had Dawson, Hackett and Smith there.

Dawson is the AC?
A. Yes.

Q. Hackett is?
A. Chief superintendent.

Q. And Smith is?
A. Superintendent south-west regional training.
Q. And Steve McInerney?
A. Yes.

Q. Who is he?
A. Steve McInerney is a superintendent but he's - he was area director, but on holidays.

Q. He wasn't present then for the main incident?
A. No. So I think, as per their ops guide, he may have been brought in as the educated third party facilitator.

Q. His position was being filled by Wally; is that correct?
A. That's correct, by Wally Rye - who, as I say there, was very conspicuous by his absence.

Q. Did he attend that --
A. No.

Q. He didn't attend the debrief either?
A. No. I don't know why but, as I said, there were a number of debriefs conducted, which is contrary to their own document, where we should be getting everyone together --

Q. In one. Who was present at this? You said this took place two weeks after the 10th?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the date?
A. It was conducted on 12 February.

Q. Oh, sorry. Conducted on 12 February, yes, sorry.
A. So it happened on the 10th - it's almost a month.

Q. Yes, nearly a month after the event.
A. Yes. My understanding of debriefs was that you're meant to try and do them within 48 hours and keep people relatively quarantined from each other so that when you actually - (a) it gives you a chance to get witness statements without them being corrupted by, "Oh, I didn't realise that", etc.

Q. Yes.
A. You, being a serving police officer, would know how easy memories are able to be swayed and corrupted. And it went almost a month afterwards.
Q. If they saw fit to have this "low profile" ROCC operating from 27/12, what period did the debrief explore?
A. They only wanted to talk about the 10th. They would not allow discussion of all things leading up to the major event.

Q. Do you think that they should have been discussing from the start of the incident - which, by the looks of it --
A. November. Most definitely.

Q. Just to look at the overall response.
A. Yes. The idea of an operational debrief, if it's run correctly, is that it's to go, basically, what did we do well and how could we improve for next time. It's not meant to be a witch hunt, pointing the finger, the bone, or whatever you like; it's meant to be so that we can learn from what we did and how we could do it better - quite simply - and then to get it down on paper.

However, it was interesting that when it was being conducted, they had one of the admin staff who was a JP and people were told, "You will do your stat decs now", and most of the guys said "No", we're not, because it - they all just felt as though they were being, you know - (a) it was a guided discussion not a debrief and, instead, being strong-armed into signing something that they felt further down the track was going to be held up in court. Unfortunately, it would have been about two weeks ago one of our guys who was going to appear in Toowoomba had been taken away and talked to by QFRS solicitors and given a piece of paper that highlighted that you also have to be very aware of the code of conduct, which --

Q. Do you know who that officer was?
A. Yes. David Crighton, and he actually had the decency to bring it to my attention and, unfortunately, it's an attempt to gag the people from open --

Q. What rank is he?
A. A senior firefighter, but he's also a level 2 rescue technician, etc.

Q. Where is he attached?
A. He's at Anzac Avenue Fire Station.
Q. So at --
A. Yes, he works on my shift.

Q. -- at your station.
A. Yes.

Q. Is that appropriate, do you think, of Queensland Fire and Rescue to --
A. No, it's not appropriate and I know that through the efforts of John Oliver, the UFU State Secretary --

Q. Sorry, UFU?
A. United Firefighters Union. He contacted a number of people in political circles and the QFRS came out with a thing basically saying, "We're sorry that we put out that thing to" - that was really an attempt at a gag order, because they want to control what's being said.

Q. Do you think that the debrief highlighted any issues that needed to be addressed or was it --
A. It was a guided discussion and a guided discussion, depending on who is doing the guiding, will only go one way and that's the way that the person is leading it. We wanted to talk about preceding incidents working up to it; that was knocked on the head.

Q. Did you get the opportunity to bring up your --
A. Concerns?

Q. -- concerns?
A. Yes.

Q. Or any issues?
A. Yes, but --

Q. How was that received?
A. Shut down.

Q. Who by?
A. The people that - Steve McInerney, who was running the debrief, and/or other people around the place who were from the senior management group. We weren't allowed to have a robust discussion. All that it ended up being is, "Right John, now you talk about what you did on the 10th."

Nothing before, nothing after, just the 10th. I wasn't even allowed to talk about what I did on the night where I had the issue with the helicopter sitting at the Toowoomba
airport, etc.

Then we were told, well, how can we be talking - we had some of our fire communications staff there for 12 February, but we did not have Firecom transcripts or voice recordings. We were told by Mr. Dawson that the whole lot had been quarantined, that we were not to have access to it. In fact, for a long, protracted period of time there were at least 80 fire or incident reports that we couldn't access. Even now - what are we - into the fifth month, there are still reports pending on 10 January that haven't been completed yet because this operational management system is so pathetic that the guys can't get the data in. It has issues with its electronic brain and we haven't completed them yet.

So even with the number of fire reports that we went to, it depends on how Firecom enter it in. It could be smoke, water removal, which is still water; it could be swiftwater, it could be life rescue. So there's a whole heap of categories and it was fairly hard to actually capture with any degree of certainty how many incidents we responded to.

Q. Can they all be retrieved from the operational management system?
A. Well, as I said, some of them haven't even been completed yet, but we have not been as a union, for instance - and I would think, in the interests of being able to present an open and robust case, it would be really nice to be able to actually have a voice transcript from Firecom as to what occurred on the day.

Q. Does your CAD system actively capture all the taskings of all the fire units on any given day?
A. It attempts to but again, see, 94 percent of the time - which is the bulk of our work - two operators are, sort of, sufficient in Firecom. But when you get that 4 percent which is a level 3 incident, which this job certainly would be, it wasn't up to speed. They failed to set up ICCs around the place to support the Firecom. They were, in fact, later on the 10th in the evening, sending trucks back to addresses to check whether it actually had been closed off or not; in other words, well, is there somebody in the card.

Q. Because the CAD wasn't reflecting the completion or,
as you said, code 4?

A. Nobody knew. Nobody knew. As I say, the
disappointing part about it is that for us to be able to do
anything - even with the debrief, we should have been able
to sit down for that two hour window and just listen -
listen to the operational intensity.

See, a lot of the radio traffic would also have been
missed - not intentionally - by Firecom. The trucks
themselves have three separate radios on board. You have
channel 61, which is UHF frequency, which is our talk
straight back to fire communications. Then we have a
yellow radio, which is a VHF channel 69 repeater that
bounces off Picnic Point, and we use it as a truck-to-truck
chatter. Then we have fire ground channel 1, which is UHF
channel 1.

As soon as we go off channel 61 to channel 69 or
channel 1, there is no automatic tape logging of the voice
indent; there's nothing there. On that day you couldn't
have used a notebook or anything like that to record
everything down because the inside of the trucks couldn't
have got any wetter if you'd hosed them out. We were
climbing in and out of the trucks in wet suits, in life
jackets, throwing ropes back in, and that sort of carry-on,
and it was just awash with water. So we lost a lot of
data.

I have been on to Mr Dawson for some period of time,
saying, "We need" - and I told him before we even had that
incident, "If we have a major incident, my concern is that
as soon as we go on to another radio channel, we've lost
the automatic voice capture that we have in Firecom." So
there was certainly heaps and heaps of discussion but it
wasn't going through Firecom. Firecom in the end, we
basically let them off the hook and just said, "Righto,
we're code 4, available for tasking." We'd go off and chat
to each other on the truck radios and then, "Yeah, code 4
again, available for retasking again."

Q. Was it lack of resources within Firecom or negligence
on their part in regard to the failure to be able to record
or adequately put details back into your CAD system?

A. Both because, as I said before, I've had the
discussion with the AC on many occasions and with my area
director about my concerns that when we go off the Firecom
recorded radio frequency, we lose automatic logging. So,
yes, we didn't have the physical resources at Firecom to log it as soon as we go to alternate channels; however, if the ICC had been bootstrapped up, they would have been able to at least manually log all those sorts of things, but because there was no ICC set up, it didn't happen. But then you look at it from the management side of things, and we've discussed it previously on a couple of occasions, and you would have to suggest negligence.

Q. By Firecom or by the administrative body overlooking or overviewing Firecom?
A. By the senior managers, because Firecom themselves can't go, oh, we're going to buy a nice DVD voice recorder and put it on to channel 69 or channel 1. It has to be approved by the senior management group. So unless they go, mmm, that's a good idea and put it in, it doesn't sit at Firecom. Firecom can't go down to the local Dick Smith and say I'm going to buy an automatic data logger.

Q. Do you have correspondence to support applications to buy any equipment?
A. That'd be another one I'll have to look at.

Q. Okay. You'll make a note of that?
A. I know I certainly had verbal with him.

Q. Even if you can have an idea of when that verbal took place.
A. Yes.

Q. Now I understand that you guys responded to Grantham on the 9th?
A. I didn't personally but one of our crews did.

Q. One of your crews did?
A. Yes.

Q. What would necessitate them having to go down and respond?
A. Just, again, it came in as a life rescue swift water, and Grantham and Helidon, they're all in the far-western periphery of south-east region and they're almost like the forgotten country cousins to the west.

Q. Right on the border, yes.
A. So the thing is that Toowoomba Station, Station 11, is within two kilometres of that eastern boundary. Our
boundary is within two kilometres of the western edge of south-east region. So our fire service boundaries don't align with QAS boundaries or QPS boundaries when, in fact, we could very, very easily and very comfortably provide - and we had been doing so for a long period of time - operational support right the way down to Gatton and beyond, down to Plainlands, for major prangs - sorry, RTCs - hazardous material incidents, fires, that sort of thing, because we're so close.

Q. Who regulates the tasking of your staff for that, to go outside of your area?
A. Well, it comes in via this emergency --

Q. Into Firecom?
A. It comes into Firecom but it comes in via south-east, so if south-east says, right, the next - we'll talk about rescues for a second. The next nearest rescue appliance may, in fact, be Ipswich - which it is, a technical rescue appliance. Now, if it's off the run or off doing another incident somewhere, south-east ESCAD, which is the Emergency Services Computer Aided Dispatch system says, righto, the next nearest is Toowoomba, so it quite literally rips it down the range.

However, we have had some senior officers - and Mr McInerney is pretty good at it - saying, "No. Turn it around. I'm not letting my appliances go down to south-east.", which I find bizarre. We are the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, not the Toowoomba fire service or the south-west regional fire service. My belief is that if somebody says, look, you're the next nearest truck, you're going to Tully, that's just the way the computer is telling me to go. Why do we have these human beings who want to inject and say, look, I know better than a computer. If somebody is stuck in a car or being swept down in swiftwater, why on earth are we getting people saying, no, I'm not going to let the truck go down the hill - and it has happened on numerous occasions.

Q. You've mentioned further on in that paragraph:

But as was pointed out earlier, as soon as we go down to Grantham we've lost any sort of operational capacity there.

I assume by "there" you're referring to Toowoomba; you've
lost your operational capacity for Toowoomba because you're responding to Grantham?
A. Yes, because unfortunately there's a very dominant thing within senior management where they go, well, let's just wait and see what they've got. Now, even to go down to the bottom of the range at Withcott and turn around and come back again is half an hour. So you can potentially have one crew left in Toowoomba, which is Station 12, looking after the next big thing in Toowoomba, purely because a senior on-call or on-duty has failed to go, right, better get the auxiliaries in - which we know, as I said before, takes 24 minutes to get on to the fire scene, if there is something there.

So we have no support for the first responding appliance. If they're working a breathing apparatus safety team, which is known as a BAST team, etc, they're going against the commissioner's best intentions to say, look, we need at least a BA safety team on the ground if it's a structure fire, and the assistant commissioner has said, well, we need three trucks at the fire scene if you're going internally into a structure fire. So it means then that we've got the tyranny of time. You can't afford, as an emergency service organisation, to be saying, well, let's just see what they've got.

Q. So is that financially motivated?
A. That's the only thing I could put it down to because if it wasn't financially motivated, they wouldn't care. The third pump that comes in anyway are auxiliaries, so they're as cheap as chips. They're, I think, about $20 an hour each and they only have to pay them a minimum of an hour's recall.

Q. They're drawn from Warwick?
A. No, no. These are people who are going about their day-to-day business in Toowoomba and they're auxiliary members. So they come into Anzac Avenue Fire Station and, if work will let them go, they're available to go.

Q. What are their home stations, your auxiliaries within Toowoomba?
A. Anzac Avenue.

Q. They actually belong to --
A. Anzac Avenue but they are called Toowoomba auxiliaries. I don't know why because they have always
been attached to --

Q. Okay. So Highfields, of course, are a part-time --
A. At Highfields, yes.

Q. And that's an auxiliary station. Oakey's the same, is it?
A. Oakey's the same. Pittsworth, Goombungee --

Q. Got you. I didn't understand. So you guys have access to auxiliaries within your own area?
A. Yes. However, because - particularly where we had the global financial crisis kick in, there were more and more employers being less and less predisposed to letting their employees just quite literally bugger off to a fire. Even the fire service themselves, some of their own employees they won't let them go to a fire. They expect Joe Bloggs public, business owner, to let their people go, but when push comes to shove, oh no, no, we need you to fix this computer.

Q. That makes sense to me now. I didn't understand that your station actually had its own auxiliaries.
A. Yes.

Q. So that's fine. There's a comment on page 23, 106:

AC said or he knew that on the 20th of the twelfth that we were proceeding towards a major flood event.

I'm interested as to how you arrived at that --
A. It was just in conversation with him; you know, because the ROCC was running, we had floods around the place; again, unless you were deaf, blind and mute - it was on the TV. You had Charleville flooding and it flooded twice; you had Dalby flooding twice; you had Condamine flooding twice. Now, if that wasn't saying that we're heading for a major flood event, I don't know what is. All of the signs, as I keep saying, were trending upwards; all we needed was something to come together and conspire against us, and it was on. The ground, as I said before, was completely saturated.

Q. Where did you have that conversation with him?
A. That would have been down outside the ROCC.
Q. You've mentioned at page 9, section 44, "And the stations I'm talking about are stations" --

A. For whatever reason, on the 10th management failed to act on an operational level to man up the stations where you had your trained assets.

By that, are you referring to swiftwater --

A. That's Stations 11 and 12.

Q. Talking about swiftwater rescue?

A. That's correct.

Q. And the stations I'm talking about are Stations 21, 11 and 12"?

A. 21 is Warwick, 11 is Kitchener Street and 12 is Anzac Avenue.

Q. "They stood up three auxiliary stations. None of them are trained in swiftwater entry."

A. That's correct, or awareness.

Q. I think we discussed that earlier and I am still perplexed as to why they were stood up, other than to help, possibly, for clean up, or whatnot. I'm not sure.

A. I have no idea. It's as though they went to sleep. They knew something was coming. As I said before, they put a total of six people at Firecom, they put people in and manned up the ROCC; they didn't establish an ICC on the pretext that something was going; Tom had already stated before that, well, perhaps we need to start dealing with these like we do with the wildfire alerts; in the morning, the acting inspector refused to Mark Haddow, I think, to bring more people in on the station. Then on the day when they got slammed, we've got people sitting around, saying "It's raining. I wonder when we're going to get a call." They never got the call because Firecom was too busy and the other guys were just sitting around in Firecom having a debate on how they should be running it.

Q. From your point of view, on the 10th were you guys self-tasking? Were you going out and finding your own work?

A. It was a mixture. Blind Freddy - when I pulled up at the station, it wasn't hard to realise that something was going on because as I pulled up, across the road there were
sheets of asphalt surfing in the water running down the street and then slowly falling backwards over car bonnets. At that station that I pulled up at, the F350 and the Alpha appliance had responded and there were three unmanned appliances still sitting there. So, we could have brought in on both stations probably another five crews to be able to stand by for that day and respond that day.

As you were saying before, you asked whether we were self-responding or going from one job to the next. In some instances we were. Others, we're driving down the road and here's people hanging off BBQs and all sorts of things. But the bulk of the appliance response was coming out of Firecom and they'd tell us. We were trying to keep it very brief with any situation reports because if you start to go through the whole dance of, "This is 312 Alpha; 312 Alpha is now the ICP", etc, etc, you're cutting into emergency air time that may need to be used.

Q. Yes, yes.
A. And, unfortunately, later on I think I had the delight of being about the first bloke in the State to use a, "Red, red, red."

Q. We'll go quickly through that shortly. Did you receive any other warnings on the day? Obviously we talked before about Mark Haddow has --
A. Has requested.

Q. Has requested. Specifically, did he ask for swiftwater staff --
A. Yes.

Q. -- to be recalled to duty --
A. Yes.

Q. -- or staff generally to be recalled to duty?
A. No. He requested that swiftwater rescue technicians be recalled to duty before it happened. Interestingly enough, there's about 12 level 2 rescue technicians, of which I'm one, and we never received a pager message or an SMS text. The way it's set up, if anything happens and we're required to return to station to respond, we get a text or a pager message. Now, they weren't activated. I just find that, again, very strange.

Q. Who would be responsible for the activation of those?
A. It would come from Firecom at the approval of the area director.

Q. Didn't you indicate earlier that the area director couldn't be found on the 10th?

A. The area director went AWOL.

Q. To this day, do they know what happened to him on the 10th?

A. Well, he was in Firecom and then - to use a phrase - he just buggered off and didn't tell anyone. His assistant commissioner didn't know where he was.

Q. To where?

A. No -one knows.

Q. So who was performing his role in his absence?

A. Bruce Smith was sent forward by Mr Dawson and he ended up at the corner of Margaret and Dent Streets with a crew, just reporting back with a mobile phone. I think really the first that the ROCC knew how serious the job was was when they saw a news flash on one of the TV channels on the TV in the ROCC. They weren't situationally aware until they saw the news flash.

Q. When was Wally Rye next seen again on that day?

A. He wasn't.

Q. Had he finished work for the day or --

A. No. He just vanished. I've got no - I'm not going to fabricate anything because I just - nobody knows where Wally went. I don't know whether he went home, whether he went to get a bag of dog food for his dog, bits and pieces for his wine-growing venture - I've got no idea - but as I said to you before, I just can't for the life of me see how the hell a leader of men can bugger off and not tell anyone in the most severe, singular, critical event that Toowoomba has ever faced. He's been promoted now, he's now the inspector at Goondiwindi, area 4.

Q. We talked earlier, in relation to wildfire events within the south-west, that Mr Dawson has in fact put everyone on standby in regard to Bureau of Meteorology alerts.

A. Yep.

Q. Regardless of the type of incident, as we've talked
about, was that done on this occasion?
A. No.

Q. Can you give any reason, do you think, why that wouldn't have been done?
A. The only reason - no. Because, on the one hand, they obviously knew something was coming because they were manning up the ROCC, Firecom and manned up three auxiliary stations, so I don't know whether they forgot or thought that they were saving money by not bringing extra staff in.

Q. From a higher level point of view, would they be required to keep incident management logs or critical decision logs as to why they made certain decisions to start to have staff brought into the ROCC, for argument's sake?
A. Yes.

Q. And why they didn't fire up the ICC or why they haven't called out operational staff, is there anything where they need to record any of that?
A. Well, areas you could perhaps go looking is every fire officer has a fire service official notebook. So even if he's sitting, as the acting area director was, on his bedside in Stanthorpe at 12 o'clock at night, he should be recording that he had a conversation with Station Officer John Burrows, who requested an ICC to be kicked up and we need to go to level 2 incident. That's just due diligence.

In the ROCC, as well as the ICC, they are required by their own training documents to maintain incident logs. So every person who is doing any of the functional roles, whether it's the incident controller, planning officer, logistics - what's the other bloke? I forgot - ops, they are all meant to keep their own operational logs. It's been thumped into them time and time and time again with all of the IMS training.

Q. You made mention in here with regard to sick leave caps being put on.
A. Yep. I think I might have mentioned it was just dumb luck that it happened at the time of the month it did.

Q. What are sick leave caps?
A. Again, it must be just an economy measure but firefighters, the expectation is that when you call them, they are one hundred percent fit. No offence, but I can
come into the environment that we're in now with an ingrown
toenail, a bugged knee, sore back, headache and I can
still pretty much stagger through the day. But if I then
go and throw 34 kilograms of firefighting equipment on top
of my own personal body and go charging into a structure
fire with a little bit of the flu or something, chances are
I'm going to fall over myself and let the team down that
I'm working with as well. So we are a hazard.

Yet in Toowoomba they've put on these sick leave caps
so that between the two stations, we have 18 sick days for
the month. So if we were to get to, say - let's say
there's a flu epidemic that comes through and we did try
and have the conversation but couldn't get an answer out,
and there is a fair number of the staff crook, as soon as
we've done the 18 sick days, the response goes back to four
officers and firefighters at Station 11 and four at Station
12. It means that the special rescue appliance is off the
run until the end of the month and we start in the first
day of the next month.

As I say, the analogy is that you don't have teachers
saying, oh, I'm sick, you're going to have to send the
class home, or a nurse saying, oh, I'm crook, send the
patients home. Yet here we are, a frontline emergency
rescue service, and we need to be, sort of, telling the
public, yeah, if you really get stuck on a complex job,
we'll come back to you next month when we've actually got
the manning to be able to put the emergency appliance, the
rescue, on the road.

It just seems craziness. They're saying, in one
respect, zero harm; we want you to stay home if you're
feeling a little bit off. But we're being penalised for
exercising due diligence and saying, yeah, I'm feeling a
little bit seedy from whatever ailment I've got. It cuts
into those 18, bam as soon as that happens. If that had
been later in the month, the rescue wouldn't have gone out
the door. We wouldn't have had 10 people on, we would've
had eight, and that's why I describe it as "dumb luck".

I just can't see, for the life of me, why people's
lives and their businesses and the environment are being
compromised because the firefighters are actually doing the
right thing and staying home when they're feeling a bit
crook.
Studies suggest that we're no better and no worse than the average public servant. But the difference with us and a public servant is we're throwing on 32 or 34 kilos of extra gear that keeps heat in, and that sort of carry-on, and we're lumping around cutting tools that are over 32 kilograms in weight and having to hold them over your head to cut into a truck or something like that. It's a fairly physical environment, so if you're off, you shouldn't be there.

Q. I had a couple of quick questions here which were passed on to me by Laura from our legal unit, which we've done.
A. Yep.

Q. Station 11, Kitchener Street, which is permanent. Station 12, which is Anzac Avenue, that's permanent with auxiliaries?
A. Yes.

Q. Station 21 is Warwick auxiliary?
A. No, it's a permanent day crew.

Q. Permanent day crew?
A. They used to be 10/14 crew.

Q. You mentioned that before. 10/14 relates to?
A. There's somebody there 24-hours a day, seven days a week. Now, for whatever reason that's been cut back to day response, so the people of Warwick and all the heavy industry and traffic that passes through there, yes, they get a first great response during the day, then --

Q. Don't crash at night.
A. Yeah, don't crash at night. But the normal response out the door of an evening is a seven minute delay. As I said to you before, with things like structure fires, that can mean the difference between life and death.

Q. You mentioned before in regard to the rescues that the assistant commissioner said that, you know, there'd been 90 rescues made, which is more than the house fire rescues in the last ten years.
A. No, he didn't say 90. He said we'd done more rescues in swiftwater in the last two months than we had done in structure fires in the preceding ten years.
Q. What areas was he referring to?
A. The State.

Q. The State?
A. The State. He was giving the big rallying of the troops speech; go forth and count houses and spread the word, but I just want to let you know that this is what's happening.

Q. Were there any other relevant stations that were operating during the floods? Was Oakey up and were they recalled to duty?
A. Everyone was working once it hit the fan. Highfields were but Highfields, I think - did they get caught down towards Murphy's Creek? I think they got - actually, they were fortunate enough that they got cut off by a landslide, and why I say fortunate is because if they'd actually got access down there, I think we would have been talking about four to five firefighters deceased with the - there was a wall of water that went ripping down through there. They actually didn't get in front of the storm event, because if they'd got down there, I don't think they would have got out.

Q. Okay. So Highfields?
A. Highfields, most definitely. I can't recall the rest.

Q. Oakey?
A. I'm not sure because Oakey was in the middle of evacuating a - I was going to call it a 'twilight home' - nursing home.

Q. Did any of your appliances, during the peak - the 10th and 11th, so to speak - go down the hill at all?
A. Yes. Well, there was a - initially, because the storm came in from the north-east --

Q. Sorry. By "down the hill" I mean leaving Toowoomba and going down the --
A. Going down the Toowoomba Range.

Q. Yes, down into the Valley.
A. Okay. Just with the dynamics of the storm cell that came through, it came in from the north-east. I think Crows Nest, which is 45 minutes out of town, may have got a call. Then Highfields and Toowoomba responded to a swiftwater incident down in Murphy's Creek. As I say,
Highfields got stopped because of a landslide. I'm pretty sure --

Q. Was that on Murphy's Creek Road?
A. Yes. I'm pretty sure 311 Alpha heard that they had been stopped and then were about to go around to go down the Range, and 311 Yankee is the call sign, which is just that F350 that I've been talking about before. It went, with Mark Haddow and somebody else, down to the bottom of the range. Stewart Lange had been told to take his car home because he lives at the bottom of the Range. He responded and only got as far as a shop just to the Brisbane side of Withcott, called Tomatoland, and he assisted about 80 people by himself.

The guys who went down the range, they said that there were cars actually washing past them as they were going down. The only good thing about that appliance was it's a four-wheel drive with duals on the back. They've got down to the bottom, noticed that - they're just about to turn around because they knew that they couldn't get in to Murphy's Creek and then, you know, I've put in the debrief there what Mark Haddow said. He said it was as though the Range was trying to kill them - rocks, logs, walls of water, the lot - and that they battled all the way up to the top, and then he ended up stopping at that intersection of James and Kitchener Streets.

Q. You've mentioned here that Dave Lethbridge at 1230 and then 1300 had run the senior on-call, which was Wally Rye, to set up the ICC and finally at 1300 he was told he could set it up but not man it. What does that mean?
A. It's sort of like an ICC you have when you're not manning an ICC, isn't it.

Q. Where was the ICC going to be set up?
A. Highfields. As I say, it was all prearranged. It's got all the equipment there, as I said before; it's got laptops. Dave said, look, it takes us about 20 minutes to set it up, but for whatever reason - it'd be a bit like saying, yeah, we know we've got the ICC there but we're not going to resource it, and that's exactly what happened.

Q. Who made that decision? Wally Rye?
A. Mmm

Q. Do you know when Dave Lethbridge has actually spoken
to Wally Rye?

A. No. You'd have to talk to Dave. That came out in the
debrief itself. I don't know whether I've got any detail
on that, but it came up in the debrief. I think I wrote
reams, or tried to. It was interesting. In the debrief,
management were very, very happy to have a tape recorder
there but we weren't allowed to have one.

Q. When was the ROCC activated for south-west region?
A. I couldn't tell you but it would have been in December
when the floods were hitting the rest of south-west.

Q. Where does Firecom for the south-west region operate
from?
A. It works from over the top of the Herries Street
Ambulance Station.

Q. Where does the duty manager of operations for the
south-west region operate from?
A. What, duty manager of Firecom?

Q. Yes.
A. It's bizarre, because there's just not enough room--

Q. No, sorry, duty manager of operations. That would
have been Wally Rye, wouldn't it?
A. Yes. He works out of Phillip Street.

Q. Phillip Street. Which is?
A. Behind Station 11.

Q. But lives at?
A. Stanthorpe.

Q. Management did not increase staffing levels by
bringing back off-duty personnel.
A. No.

Q. You've talked about that at page 1, area 6. We've
talked about it earlier. What should have been done? In
our previous conversation, you indicated that they had
failed to call anyone back out.
A. Well, what they should have done is based on the
Bureau of Meteorology reports and all of the trending up of
frequency and type of events, including the night before
where I think Tony Guse went down and I think he actually
saved the lady who then died, the rural firefighter. He
saved her the night before and she went the next day, which
is pretty tragic.

Q. Where was that, down at Grantham there?
A. Yep. But you'd need to talk to Tony on that - if you
are. I don't know whether you are or not, but he would be
the one to talk to on the events at Grantham the night
before. Sorry. Where were we again?

Q. We were just talking about having staff returned to
duty.
A. Yes. What should have occurred is based on,
otherwise the operational tempo and the information that
was coming from external sites such as the Bureau of
Meteorology. They should have stood up and manned all of
the appliances on station. Then, when it hit on the day,
knowing what was occurring, they should have then recalled
all staff to duty.

Q. As you mentioned, that wasn't done.
A. It didn't happen, and a couple of firefighters, Peter
Robinson and Shane Rankin, actually responded to what they
were hearing on civilian radio. They thought, no, this is
just crazy; we're going to stroll in and see what's
happening. Then when they stroll in and ring up Firecom
"Right, you're on duty.", but nobody actively recalled them
to duty, they self-responded, which is technically the
wrong thing to do but I think, morally, it's the right
thing to do, given the circumstance.

Q. Yes, okay. On the 10th, you mentioned that you went
for the DVD.
A. Yes.

Q. Then self-responded to the station to report the
airport bus incident?
A. That's correct.

Q. Just give me a run-through of what you did for the
remainder of the day.
A. The remainder of the day --

Q. Which will probably then lead into your --
A. Yes. Well, the remainder of the day, I got a bit a
serve because I mentioned the fact that I actually did have
two girls in tow, which was my daughter, who's 16 - and
she's got a very mature head on her shoulders - and her
mate from across the road. I said, "Girls, if the water starts coming into the fire station, you go up the back ramp of the fire station", which is higher, "and if it keeps coming up, climb up the steel training tower", which is as solid as could be and, you know, if they got swept off the top of that, there would be nothing left of Toowoomba. So they were fine.

I've rung the job in, the Firecom operator has mentioned to Wally Rye, who was in the Firecom centre, they've gone, "JB's at Station 11.", and he's gone, "Right. Tell him he's on duty. Pete McCarron is coming in." Peter McCarron is another swiftwater rescue technician. So probably a period of about --

Q. Is he a level 2 or a level 1?
A. Level 2. So I said, "Pete", when he finally came in - if you can imagine me trying to fit into a wetsuit your size, it didn't work well but, anyhow, I got into something. I said, "Look, Pete, there's only the two of us. I'll drive, you run the job as the officer." So we went - because by the time he got in, the water was almost coming in the station and, in fact, it was running in a couple of the areas, but the girls --

Q. Can I stop you there. All the other appliances are gone or tasked?
A. No. There were three appliances in the station.

Q. As in empty or unmanned?
A. Unmanned. So there was assets and we're talking some appliances, like 311 Juliet, that are good, deep-fording, large appliances that would not wash off the road. They could have emulated what we've seen in some of the footage and that would be to drive out, basically making a portable work platform and say, "Here, climb aboard.", and tootle off again.

Q. James and Kitchener Streets spring to mind for me --
A. Yep. We're talking 18 tons of truck. It's just not going to - unless the culvert underneath has collapsed, it's not going to get swept away. Also, the Juliet has a 15 metre boom on it, so that you could still park in a safe location, potentially, and extend out over the water, drop in, pick the person up and bring them back. There is a whole multitude of things that could have been done.
The other appliance that was there was 311 Lima, which is the rescue - it was actually a Kilo because the other rescue was off the run. We have a lemon of an F550 that has cost them a fortune to try and keep on the run and has never been very good or reliable - but, yeah, that's another story. So we had three trucks. There was the potential, if we wanted to, from Station 11 to have fielded another 12 personnel.

Q. And that just required a recall to duty order?
A. A recall to duty. Absolutely. As far as I'm aware, there was another truck still available, which was 312 Zulu, at Station 12.

So anyhow, I got there, was told to wait for Peter, talked to Pete, we got kitted up, we put our PFDs on and not so well fitting jackets, and things, and we then turned out of the station and just - I said, "Look, Pete, let's just go down towards Kitchener and Margaret Streets." Just as we're going out the door, Firecom have responded us to a report of two persons trapped on the top of a roof of a vehicle at the corner of Hill and Dent Streets. We've gone down to the corner of Hill and Dent and got out of the truck. We have no waterproof enclosures for our portable radios.

Q. Are they on issue?
A. No, they're not issued. We haven't got waterproof housings for our portable radios.

Q. At your station at all?
A. No.

Q. Do they have them in your technicians vehicle?
A. No.

Q. Why is that? Why --
A. Obviously an oversight with equipment supply. I know that they've been asked for but, again, somebody further up the food change has said no.

Q. Geez. Radios won't work in wet weather.
A. Oh, they go all right for a while but, unfortunately - just talking on radios for a second, Mark Haddow was extremely frustrated because his radio had obviously got an absolute flogging and got a gutful, and Firecom could really only hear about every second sentence, and we're
talking about the life-critical event that was going down at the corner of Kitchener and James Streets, and he wasn't able to adequately communicate. It was just atrocious, the comms.

But anyhow, we pulled up around in Hill and Dent Streets. I've said to Pete, "Look, there's nobody else. I'm going to have to back you up." I said, "Look, I've done this stuff before, it's just that these guys don't want to recognise my skills. I'm follow you. I'll have throw bag as well so that if you get swept away, I can throw it to you."

Anyhow, we tried to go up on the western side of the lee of the buildings on Dent Street to try and use that as a bit of a barrier against the flow of the water. We got up to the corner of a mower shop on the corner there, tried to go around the corner and it was chest deep and just too strong. We saw the two girls sitting on the car and there was all sorts of debris coming down.

We've elected, well, we're going to have to relocate and go around to Grange Street and Dent Street and as I've turned around, it's just one of those things that flash through your mind, Grand Central Shopping Centre is probably - the carpark there is about four levels high. It looked like a stadium on grand final day, with people just lining up with phones and cameras and just watching the grand spectacle.

So we've gone back - I've backed up there, gone around to Grange Street, come in through Hertz car rental and went out through a personal door onto Dent Street. The civilians had actually attached probably about a 6mm cord from I don't know where, but somebody out on the pole had tied it off to something loosely. The civilians were doing a top job of holding it fairly taut but the ferry angle meant that if Peter went out there, he would go out there very, very quickly and we wouldn't be able to recover them.

But the girls - one, the middle-aged woman, she was basically trapped just under breast height and she was being bent in half by the pressure of the water and it was just ballooning over the top of her, and she was in real distress and Pete said, "Look, I'll just have to go." I said, "Mate, I'll put a tether on your back and worst comes to worst, I've got you." But he's just made contact with
the girl and another car has come down and crashed into the vehicle. She - and this is what Peter said. She just looked at him and said, "I'm sorry", and let go. Next minute, Peter's gone. Then I'm watching to see what was going to happen with the girl still standing on the roof. Next minute, she's into the water as well. So I've tried to wade --

Q. Were you still tethered to him at this point?
A. I was tethered to him but as soon as I saw it happen, I knew exactly what had happened. We had got these throw bags and PFDs straight from the manufacturers and they'd been sealed so that it kept them dry, because it had been raining so much. As soon as Pete's got swept away, I've gone to hold onto his float rope, the tether rope, and - boom - it's just come undone. Peter said, in hindsight, I just hoped to Christ that JB wasn't going to hang on because there's no way, with the force of water, if I was hanging onto him that he would have been able to survive. But what had happened is the manufacturer had actually tied an overhand rethreaded knot instead of a figure 8 knot and as soon as I've seen it come off him off the back of his harness, I knew exactly what had gone wrong. The knot had been tied incorrectly and someone --

Q. So you guys hadn't been responsible to check the --
A. We didn't have time to check the gear.

Q. Okay.
A. No, because we were told to get into the truck and go, and assumption, unfortunately, is the mother of all disasters and meant that - well, it was probably fortunate in one respect, as I said, that Peter wasn't retained there, but in it - so I'm left there by myself, I've had to ford back in chest deep water against the current and, as I said in my statement, it would be the longest minute and a half that I've had to do. I didn't have a radio on me and I couldn't have had a radio on me because it would've been drowned.

I got back to the truck and the radio was just chock-a-block with radio traffic and I've just injected with, "Red, red, red.", which is our call for a firefighter in immediate danger. We do not use it in training. It's only to be used with a real-life emerging incident. So I've reported that Pete's been swept away - that's Peter McCarron - and the two civilians are gone. I've got on the
radio and I've said, "Look, I require intercept teams set
up down at Margaret and Dent, Russell Street down near
Schofield Street and Jellicoe Street.

Q. Margaret and Dent, is that the corner - is that where
the shopping centre is?
A. That's right.

Q. How far upstream were you from the shopping centre?
I'm just trying to get my bearings.
A. We were one and a half - when we were - we were almost
two blocks back, upstream

Q. So you've got Repco and those areas there. Are they
further - the shopping centre car park --
A. You have Herries Street, Grange Street heading north,
then Hill Street heading north again, then you have
Margaret Street, which is the other side of Grand Central.
So you have Hill Street, which runs on the south side of
Grand Central, Dent Street runs north/south and, yes, he
was basically two blocks back. I didn't know, because we
hadn't seen them pull up there at that stage, but 311 Alpha
was actually downstream

Q. Do you know who the two females were?
A. Not at the time.

Q. Have you since --
A. Peter came out and he was absolutely shattered. He's
come out - and I'm sorry if I offend - and he's gone, "JB,
I don't just want to fucking do this shit. This is
bullshit." For a little while - it took him a while to get
back onto a level playing field again. He rang his wife
very, very upset because he thought at that stage that he'd
made contact and lost two patients in the water.

Q. Did he get swept - how far down did he --
A. He went from Grange to Hill Street. He eddied out, as
we call it. In other words, he went into a survival float
position, which is on your back, your feet down, watching
for obstacles. Then when he's seen the chance, he's rolled
over onto his stomach and swam with the current, at a
diagonal, into Hill Street. I thought I'd lost him. By
the time I'd backed the truck up, because there was only
me, and they've got plenty of people wanting to come down,
and I'm tooting the horn and backing up - I didn't hit
anything, which I thought was pretty good - and next minute

Transcript produced by Merrill Corporation
Pete comes tootling around the corner in a wetsuit, muttering and cursing.

Q. Where were the two girls?
A. The two girls - one - I think both of them ended up being picked up at Margaret and Dent Streets, but I'm not sure.

Q. Do we know who rescued those two girls?
A. I don't know. I don't know whether they self-rescued or were recovered or not. But for some time after that we were really unsure as to whether we'd lost the two or not.

Q. As well as Peter, obviously?
A. Yes.

Q. So when you've got onto the radio and called --
A. "Red, red, red."

Q. -- "Red, red, red.", what happened from there?
A. Again, the operational crews on the day were brilliant. There was no ifs, buts or maybes. Everyone said, righto, 311 Alpha is going to here; I think 12 Alpha went down to Russell Street; I think 17 Victor went to Jellicoe Street. It just worked well. It hadn't been preplanned, it just ended up being what I asked for. Unfortunately, within the services, if one of your own looks as though they're in strife, everyone tends to rally and that's exactly what they did. They didn't drop the ball on the other rescues that had to be performed, but we knew that within the mix and the chaos, we had one of our own going down the stream as well.

Q. What's the time period between him losing his feet and going and then coming back to you?
A. Five minutes.

Q. That's a long time.
A. It is a long time.

Q. He has no communications at that point?
A. He had no communications, and I had no communications until I got back to the truck. So I've climbed back in the truck soaking wet, called the "Red, red, red.", and, as I say, by the time I've backed it up, which would have been about five minutes to get all the way up, after walking out, Pete's just coming around the corner, muttering and
cursing about the whole deal.

Q. Do we know the names of the two girls? I don't think we do.
A. I don't.

Q. So they've turned up down at Margaret and Dent?
A. Yes.

Q. Not sure how?
A. I don't know how.

Q. What equipment would have made a difference to you at that time?
A. More staff.

Q. No, I mean from an equipment point of view. We'll come to the staff. First off, you mentioned the lack of comms.
A. Well, if we had some sort of a boat.

Q. So the platform?
A. A work platform

Q. Which would entail what, an IRB style that we discussed before?
A. Sorry. Can we just - I need to have a break again.

DET SNR SGT REID: No dramas. The time now is 2.50pm and we'll take a short break.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

DET SNR SGT REID: The time now is 2.55pm. We took a short comfort break.

Q. As I said, we're not far away.
A. Yep.

Q. We've looked at our control and command issues, we've looked at our supervision, perhaps, and a lot of other issues. We'll go through and just finish your role in regard - yours and Peter's on the day.
A. Yes.

Q. We were up to, if I remember rightly, IRBs I think.
A. Yeah. But, see, to deploy that you need a certain
number of people as well.

Q. Correct.
A. As I said before, for each effective rescue, you needed to have had six people per rescue site to do it safely and to do it within our own guidelines, and to have - pretty much the only crew on were the on-duty crew. That's an ask too far and that's why Peter and myself went, as we did, with only two. Yes, a work platform would be sensational.

Q. Bags for the radios?
A. Waterproof enclosures for the radios; spare equipment on the stations so that if you do actually get called in and you haven't got your gear with you, you can dive into a set of kit.

Q. Do each of you guys have PDFs and wetsuits at home?
A. Some elect to store it at the station they're currently working at, so they may have been, in fact, at Station 12 and they may not have been able to get across to Station 11 to get their gear.

Q. Ideally, you should have more than one set, by the sounds of it?
A. Yes. As I said before, even with some of the stuff that we looked at, there had been no thought to, well, what happens if we have children, which we did have at James and Kitchener. There was no juvenile or paediatric PFDs. Comms was impossible. A lot of the guys were using their own mobile phones to contact people.

Q. Do they have mobile phones in all the trucks?
A. At that stage it was a bit of a yes and no. There seems to be a bit of a predisposition to only putting mobile phones in the trucks that are going out the door all of the time, which means that the other trucks that are sitting back doing nothing, if they're actually going to be used, they may or may not have a phone in them. So it's a bit of a random harvest. But, as I say, other than requiring more physical resources - human resources on the site --

Q. Well, as you've pointed out with the boat, all the equipment in the world would be great but if it's not underpinned by adequate staff --
A. A resource to respond.
Q. -- or skilled staff --
A. That's right.

Q. -- it's a waste of time.
A. It goes very moot, and I suppose that can be evidenced if we go back to the Dalby incident.

Q. Yes.
A. They have a beautiful flood boat but nobody responded. So you can have the best of intentions in the world but if you're not prepared to resource with the human element, that asset, it may as well sit down at the boat show.

Q. Yes. In hindsight, do you have a list or recommendations for a list that needs to be looked at, probably with people like Stewart Lange and some of the other officers. Is that something that will be looked at for the resourcing, say, for next year, the upcoming storm season or fire season?
A. There's been wish - sorry, there's been recommendations made to special operations at Cannon Hill but, as far as I'm aware, there's been no supportive equipment purchased, supplied or even any intention given from local management. Yeah, well, we survived that and I think, unfortunately, the mindset is that that's a 1 in 500 year event, we won't need that stuff again.

Q. What about staffing?
A. Well, they say they're supportive but talk's cheap. Unless we've got the boots on the ground, as the Army saying goes, it's moot. Unless we've got extra staffing, extra stations - and with the stations, if you put them at the corners of the compass, so to speak, of course you're going to have a more robust response capacity because then if one part of the road is blocked, another vehicle can come in. You can come in on the left and right-hand sides of the swiftwater in this case. They're going around in circles, doing a lot of talking, but there's not much action actually happening.

The overriding thing is that I personally believe that if anyone wants to be a swiftwater rescue technician and make entry into the water, they should be allowed to undergo that course and just do a basic upskills in the roping area. The bulk of the rescues don't involve three dimensional roping in to get the person out, and that, as I
said before, could be quite adequately supervised or conducted by one or two of the rope technicians who would be on scene as well.

Q. The rescue of the SES person from down - it looks like Margaret --
A. Yes.

Q. Was that Margaret and Dent?
A. Margaret and Dent, yes.

Q. It was quite well filmed, from what I understand.
A. Yes. He was just lucky that the tree that he was bear-hugging didn't collapse like the previous two that were swatted.

Q. Yes, on either side.
A. And unfortunately he said to one of the civilians, "I know what I'm doing in water.", and off he tootled. I don't know what he was doing in the water but if he'd actually got swept away, he would've been in a world of hurt.

But anyhow, we went round to - after I picked Pete up, we went round to Jellicoe Street because I thought, with the speed of the water, if they're still in the water, that might be where we'd see them. But when we got there, it was just rooster-tailing across the bridge there. It would have been three to four metres over that point there and just careering through, just rooster-tailing. With all the debris and everything else, we said, well, if somebody is in there, there is no way - short of a helicopter - we could get them out.

We then went back to the Toowoomba railway station adjacent to Russell Street, in the car park there, stood up on a platform and had a look to see if we could see somebody. It had actually slowed up a bit because it went out on the broad expanse of the rail yard. We wanted to see if we could see anyone sitting up in the rail yard, and that sort of carry-on. I tried to use the binoculars and they were absolutely useless.

One of the recommendations I made out of a job before that is that we actually bought a decent day/night spotting scope with thermal imaging capacity on it, so that you can go, yep, there's a heat source over there; is it a dog or
is it a person. Why I dropped onto that is because a bloke from Channel 9 news at that Oakey Pittsworth job was able to count how many people were in each of the cars from 700 metres away, using his camera on a tripod.

Q. At night?
A. At night. Whereas we're looking like the keystone cops. We had no idea how many people were out there, but he could see. He came up to me and he said, "JB" - because I get on with him pretty well. His name's Peter Collins. He'd have the footage of that one. He said, "Look, there's two in this", "There's three in that", sort of thing.

Q. Okay. I'll chase that up.
A. Peter Collins. I can probably even give you his number, if you want.

Q. The Oakey rescue, Peter Collins, and he's Channel 9?
A. Yes.

Q. So Stewie --
A. I was just going to get Pete's number.

Q. Actually, I'll grab that off you at the end.
A. Okay. So anyhow, we went back to the rail yard and then I'm standing next to the Norville Hotel, which had been slammed pretty much, and across the stream there's two guys - I'm fairly sure that they were in an intoxicated state - just in shorts, standing on top of a two-storey structure. It was just a flat deck that they were standing on. They hadn't realised the entire western side of the structure had been washed away, so it's hanging like a loose tooth. We had no adequate loud hailer, the truck that I had, its siren and PA were out of operation and so it was extremely hard to get their attention to go, hey, gentlemen, get off where you are, it is extremely dangerous - and it took a fair bit to do that. So we finally did that.

We went around, back past Dent and Margaret Streets and I was really amazed that what probably 20 minutes before that was an absolute raging torrent, it looked as though the tide had gone out at the English Channel. You had little bits of debris sitting around, cars sitting on their roofs, and that sort of carry-on, and people going --

Q. "What the"?
A. "Did we just see that, or what?" So Pete and I then went east up Margaret Street, got up to as far as Hume Street thinking that life was wonderful, then we got redirected to five people standing on a four-wheel drive's roof in - I call it the Defiance Flour Mill but it might be the Allied Flour Mill, or something, on the corner of -

Q. It is Allied.
A. -- Chalk and Ruthven Street. So we've gone in there. 317 Alpha, with Captain Lethbridge in charge, was there. I strolled in and started to take a little bit of control with Pete. Pete was still very shocked with what he'd seen because he still thought that he'd lost the two.

Q. Lost those two girls, yes.
A. So I was, to a degree, being a little bit insular of Pete and didn't want to push him into going out. We had another couple of crews come in who were swiftwater technicians. They escorted those five people out to safety. That's when I noticed we had these rural guys running around in the water. I don't know what they were doing but they had apparently been sent out from the ROCC to do something.

Then I'm walking around the side of the silo, just to see if there was anything else happening, and some people who were standing on a two-storey office block to the west side of the site were, sort of - as the water was going down very quickly one of them said, "Look, I think there's somebody underneath the slab over there." So I stayed on the concrete, walked around and that's when I found the middle-aged lady and she'd been jammed under a piece of - well, two slabs of concrete that only had a gap about this far apart, and up against a piece of RSJ steel and been jammed in there. If the steel hadn't caught her, she would have been pushed right up underneath and you wouldn't have found her until, unfortunately, someone had detected an odour.

We handed that over to QPS when they got there, and the ambulance. I'd checked for signs of life and there was none that I could detect, and the way that she was contorted anyway, and that, you know you are just going through the process.

Q. Yes, yes.
A. So we then went back to - got on the truck and I said,
"Look, Pete's pretty upset." So I took him back to the station about 4.30, went home, got a quick shower, then went back to work and started at 5 o'clock at Anzac Avenue Fire Station, and then worked until 9.30 the next morning and we had another swiftwater rescue out at Westbrook. I'm still, to this day, convinced that there's somebody sitting in a car in one of the very deep holes in Westbrook Creek that hasn't been found yet because the two people who reported it were standing up on an elevated house, looking straight down the creek and they were adamant that they saw a person on the bank in conversation with a person in the car and the car has just vanished. That's pretty much the end of it, other than the job we all went out to.

Q. So we've just discussed equipment. It simply came down to not enough staff on and not enough planning?
A. Not enough staff, not enough equipment, not enough planning, not enough preplanning. We do what are known as local area plans for structure fires, industrial incidents, and those sorts of things. Myself and Peter Bradow had a fairly decent discussion with our rescue coordinator and we said, "Why haven't we got local action plans for swiftwater events?" Up until after they'd had the debrief, they weren't going to happen. Now I'm led to believe that they're working flat out doing local action plans.

Q. Who is preparing those? Who would be responsible for those?
A. I had heard - the person who's writing them up is Cameron Ashmore but I think, ultimately, it then has to be signed off by the assistant commissioner. But my training from 15 years ago said that if you're going to do this properly, you plan it. That's the point of origin there. Right. Pull out the play sheet. Righto. You see it down the beaches, for instance. You have those signs that give reference points.

Okay, you don't need the signs but at least you go, righto, we're at the corner of Herries and Kitchener Streets; that might be local action plan number 10. Pull it out. Right. Okay. One truck goes there, next truck goes to Margaret Street, next one goes down to the bottom end of Neil at Dent so they can do a bridge intercept. All those sort of features are already preplanned into the process. But that sort of thinking hadn't been put out there. It was reactive rather than proactive.
Q. You made reference in here to the male clinging to the tree. You mention "Stewie". Is that Stewart Lange? You have here that he had to elect to have a level 1 assist, a level 2 in the water, due to the width of the water, a dynamic rescue assessment was conducted - oh, it is. Stewie Lange was the person who called in the south-west technicians.
A. Yep.

Q. And the seniors didn't know. What does that mean?
A. The seniors didn't know that he'd called them in because they just - there was obviously a communication breakdown somewhere. The guys on the floor knew that things were going to hell in a handbasket but, as I said to you before, from what I'm aware, the assistant commissioner didn't know how bad it truly was, even though the radios were running off the scale, until he saw it on TV.

Q. You mentioned that twice in one day you had "Red, red red." What was the second case?
A. No, I only went "Red, red, red" once.

Q. Okay.
A. There was a second time and I think it was just before he vanished. I didn't hear it but a number of the guys at the debrief said they heard it. Wally Rye had called "Red, red, red.", and everyone's gone, oh, a firefighter in immediate distress. "Righto, crews, I want to know where you all are." He just used it to find out where everyone was, which is a totally inappropriate usage of that because if you start doing it, it buggers up the impact and the urgency of a red, red, red. A red, red, red is exclusively for a firefighter in immediate danger, for every other firefighter to basically rally and support and try to save him. The way we work within the fire service is rescuer first, bystanders second, the victim or the patient third because usually in some way, shape or form they've had some part in their own predicament.

Q. In regard to Peter McCarron's incident with the equipment coming loose, is that something that's going to be addressed in future in regard to safety for the officers? Is the equipment going to be checked in advance and --
A. It should be but it can actually be fixed, because you know - it's what's known as a terminal end on a line, so there's no reason why you can't get a thimble and a swage
put in there to get rid of the human factor of the knot
being tied correctly or not. So it can actually be put
there so it's there, clip on, clip to the person and it's
done.

Q. What are you guys going to do for future reference,
say, for that particular piece of equipment?
A. I don't know. I'm only a level 1 in that particular
instance, so I have no sway in that.

Q. Is that something they will address, though, I would
think?
A. I don't know. I don't know.

Q. You mentioned earlier about your fire service
personnel who are good swimmers but don't want to --
A. Climb a rope.

Q. -- be involved in vertical rope climbing training, and
whatnot. What do you propose or what do you think should
be done in regard to that?
A. Well, I think that's a matter of urgency because it's
going to take the lead-up to the next time it rains which
could be today, tomorrow or nine months time when we start
to get into the wet season again. Those people who say,
"I'm quite happy to put my hand up to become a swiftwater
rescue technician.", should be encouraged to do the course
and there be no cap or limitation on how many people do the
course, because what we're doing is we're reducing the
human asset that we can deploy onto the job.

Q. I think we discussed road closures earlier, but what
would you like to see in future from the ROCC point of view
about trying to keep up-to-date with the road closures, and
whatnot? Is that something that needs to be addressed from
the local --
A. Well, what the ROCC needs to actually do is instead of
being in this - whatever brief they call it, a watching
brief or a shits and giggles brief, or something, they need
to actually do their job diligently. If ICCs are up around
the place, they need to be supporting the ICCs with the
correct intelligence, and that is including road closures,
weather prediction and all those sorts of things. They
shouldn't, particularly in Toowoomba, be trying to do an
ROCC and an ICC rolled into one. It is a recipe for
disaster.
Q. So they should be kept --
A. Separate.

Q. A demarcation between the two?
A. All of the documents say that that's what you do; you
don't throw it into the mix. You then can't have objective
decision making occurring if they're trying to do
on-the-spot tactical decision making. They're meant to be
doing strategic not tactical.

Q. Would you like to see the officer that's attending the
local disaster management group meetings filtering the
information down to the station level?
A. Absolutely, because --

Q. Is that happening?
A. It didn't until after the event and it's stopped
again. Now it just seems to have dried up.

Q. Is that something that needs to be addressed, to
improve that flow of information from a multi-agency group
down to your --
A. Another one of the principles of operations that was
hammered into me 40-odd years ago: communications is the
lifeblood of operations. Invariably, where things fail is
where communications weren't occurring; whether they
weren't hearing the requests from the floor up or the other
way down, but it was one of those principles that still
stands me in good stead. Communications is the lifeblood
of operations.

Q. Moving on to communications, would you like to see the
region looking at your station officers meetings to return
to some semblance of order, so you're meeting on a regular
basis with the other station officers to discuss, you know,
current issues or concerns?
A. It's vitally important. It has to happen. Again,
they're throwing their own business rule out the window but
they're quite happy to go and hang people out to dry if
they breach it in other areas.

Q. Is that something that your group are going to push
from a station officers point of view?
A. Well, they've all been requesting for the last three
and a half years to the point where they've just given up
asking because it's falling on deaf ears. We were told
there was meant to be one in March this year and it's never
happened. How can you communicate if you're not getting
together?

Q. Yes, I agree. There's another note that's been made
here that important decisions were made by management in
locations removed from the event without acting on the
advice of operational staff. I think we've probably done
that one to death in regard to our earlier conversations
about --
A. But me, as a middle level manager, I've been away and
done assessment to be able to handle a certain number of -
or size incident. I've got a tick in the box; I've been
accredited to do that. What I think unfortunately needs to
occur is that until the senior on-call or the senior
officer physically arrives at the incident scene, he has to
implicitly take for granted that if I say, "Look, I want
ten appliances", John gets 10 appliances until he goes and
says, "No, he actually needs eight because I've just pulled
up and had a chat and asked what he's going to do with
ten." But until he verifies the request physically, by
attending, I believe that there shouldn't be this
operational override from people who are kilometres away.

Q. That, of course, will require a change in the way that
they have their on-call staff or senior staff? They've got
to be somewhere near where you are?
A. Not necessarily.

Q. Well, how is a fellow from Charleville going --
A. They trust the person who has been trained to make the
tactical decision.

Q. Oh, no, no, sorry. You're misinterpreting the
question.
A. Oh yeah.

Q. When you talk about the command and control of an
area, I think they're going to have to look at assessing
how and where your seniors are actually operating, if
they're going to continue to use the model that you've --
A. Yes, this east/west model. They've chopped it pretty
much in half, so west makes a decision and then east. Yes,
it means that they might have to get back to being on call.
If they're the area director of area 1, they're on call.

Q. For their own area. We talked about the rural fire
brigade staff who were deployed first in the ICC and then
from the ICC down --
A. In the ROCC.

Q. Sorry, the ROCC. Then they were deployed with you -
well, not with you, but down into the floodwaters. How do
you think they're going to address using those staff in
future?
A. I don't, because they clearly breach their own zero
harm policy. They did not have the correct attire, all
they had was wet weather gear on and structural helmets,
which told me in spades that they had not been trained
because that's not what you're meant to wear in that
environment. You're dressed down so that if you actually
do happen to fall in, you might have half a show of
swimming. What they were doing there, I have no idea.

Q. What are ADSOs and BITSOs?
A. ADSO is acting - AD - hang on. I'll write it down.
What were they?

Q. BITSO.
A. The BITSO is a brigade training rural officer or fire
officer and the other one is a higher level of training
officer. They're just rural training officers. They're
just employed to train rural firefighters in vegetation
fire suppression.

Q. Are they QFRS staff?
A. Yes, they're full-time but they're not urban
firefighters, they're not urban trainers, and that's the
distinction. They train the guys in the yellow trucks who
do a top job to put out vegetation fires and to hopefully
stop a fire moving into a structure. As soon as it goes
inside a structure, it is urban because they haven't got
breathing apparatus, thermal imaging cameras and all sorts
of other equipment required to keep them safe.

Q. We talked about communications earlier. The Firecom
network was overloaded. You talked about what they tried
to do to repair that. I think we also discussed that the
people who they put in to help Firecom were arguing in the
background and the noise became --
A. Yep.

Q. Possibly not the right people to have been there and
not the right environment to have put them in?
A. That had occurred in prior incidents and senior
management defended their actions by saying, "We'll go wherever we like." Now whether it's operationally sound, they wouldn't, sort of, entertain for a second that with all these people standing having a conference quite literally at the backs of the chairs of the operators was being counterproductive to the output of the room.

Q. One of the last issues --
A. Sorry. On Firecom it is plain as the nose on your face that it needs to be relocated. It is no longer fit for purpose. If you're going to want to even put the Firecom supervisor, who sits over in regional headquarters - I think you asked that but we never answered that. She sits a kilometre away, so she actually hasn't got any day-to-day input into what the hell is happening.

Q. So they should be taken out of that emergency services environment and go into a purpose-built --
A. Into a purpose-built fire communications centre. There is plenty of room down the back of Anzac Avenue Fire Station to go over the ROCC, so that if you wanted to walk on the wildside and have a continuity person, one of the Firecom operators who have taken the initial calls, when another relief person comes in, can walk downstairs into the ROCC and can say to any of the senior officers, "This is what's been happening so far." So they are potentially the most informed two-legged asset that they could have and then it's a nice secure site where they would have plenty of room. It's been talked about on and off ad nauseam for probably the last 12 years.

Q. We've talked about equipment and once again all the best equipment in the world needs to be underpinned with the suitable staff.
A. We need to have enough staff to be able to deploy the equipment.

Q. We've covered a few areas that you think, on the short-term would be essential pieces of equipment.
A. Yes.

Q. That being communications equipment, thermal imaging equipment --
A. Yes, day/night thermal scopes.

Q. We talked about aerial appliances.
A. Yep.
Q. Water-based appliances.
A. Yes, either --

Q. Have I missed anything there?
A. Either manually propelled or IRB.

Q. Once again, suitable staff to be able to operate and manage those appliances.
A. Yes. I wouldn't think it would be hard to get too many volunteers if you say, righto boys, we're down to Surfers beach for the weekend to learn how to work an IRB. I think there would be a queue at the door.

Q. They talk here about operational equipment being removed from 311 Lima or Kilo and it was being taken out west.
A. That's right. We didn't have enough equipment so they were quite literally thieving.

Q. Robbing Peter to pay Paul?
A. Yes, which meant they'd left us short on the appliance that we got caught on.

Q. Have they addressed that situation?
A. No, not that I know of.

Q. Are they going to address that situation?
A. I don't know. It's another one on the wish list.

Q. Who will be responsible for addressing that?
A. The assistant commissioner because he ultimately signs off on any equipment purchases. It's not the person who would be out slopping around in the water who could sign off on that; he has to get the approval of the big boss.

Q. Swiftwater boats we've talked about. Helicopter resources we've talked about.
A. Vital. It is vital and I just find it lunacy that in a State the size of Queensland, with the population densities that we have in some areas and then also the tyranny of distance in other areas, that we haven't got a police chopper that's fitted with fit-for-purpose FLIR system - forward looking infrared - to be able to spot at a distance somebody clinging to a stock feeder or the roof of a car because, if nothing else, a human body stands out like a beacon. Even the thermal imaging handheld stuff
that we've got on the trucks is only limited, with a fairly short range, but it can pick up a half a degree temperature variation. So if they're still alive or just recently deceased, we're going to spot them - or somebody is going to spot them.

Now, whether that helicopter asset is actually, potentially, in disasters like this cross-crewed where you can put a couple of swiftwater technicians up with QPS officers, I don't care either way. Again, as I said before in my submission, we seem to have this logjam where we have beautiful rotary assets - and we're very fortunate in Toowoomba - sitting at Oakey but we can't employ them because of the bureaucratic logjam you have to get through to get stuff up there.

Q. You were going through the directive earlier and it was quite obvious that as long as it's under two hours, that you or the station officer should be able to delegate them if they're available?
A. Yes, but that's only for the ones that we hire or a civilian one that we drag in. We can't access the military stuff. In talking to one of the ex - well, he was the CO at the time out at Oakey, Rocky Hall, who is the commander out there, he said "Nothing would please me more than to be able to say to the boys, righto, we've now got a civilian rescue scenario on the books." He said instead of flying aimless circuits around and around, the crews love the challenge. Right, we have to throw this off, the fuel tanks on, spec it up; we're now doing this sort of mission.

Q. That's something that needs to be addressed, obviously, at a higher level than you and I?
A. Oh, yes.

Q. But something for consideration at least?
A. Yes, because we've got all of this buck sitting out there but we're getting no bang out of it. It's just sitting there.

Q. Yes, definitely. I've covered everything that I had made note of and that Laura had made note of. Is there anything in particular that you feel we haven't covered?
A. No, I think we've --

Q. Gone through it all?
A. -- gone through it.
Q. I think we might finish then. As I said, I'd like to thank you for your time. We really appreciate everything. You've been very meticulous in the information that you've brought and it's really helped me, from an understanding point of view, so I have no doubt it will help the Commission, once they get the opportunity. If you or I, over the next day or two, could address those couple of issues and mainly in regards to dates, and whatnot?
A. I actually won't be back to access anything until Sunday of this coming week.

Q. That's okay. If that's the case --
A. So I'll probably need - well, not "probably". I'll need your email or contact number, whatever works.

Q. I will give you both at the end of the interview.
A. And I was going to get that contact for you, wasn't I.

Q. Yes, indeed.
A. It's 0439709526.

DET SGR REID: Fantastic. As I said, thanks very much for your time today. It is right on 3.30 and we will terminate the interview.

AT 3.30PM, THE INTERVIEW CONCLUDED.

.3/5/11 117 J C BURROWS
Transcript produced by Merrill Corporation
How Safe do you feel?

The United Firefighters Union believe that the public that live and travel through Toowoomba and surrounding communities are at risk from injury or death due to a chronic shortage of operational, front line firefighters who’s crewing levels have remained unchanged since 1975 which is two front line fire fighting /rescue pumper.

It appears to the public that the fire stations have plenty of fire appliances, which is correct, but the reality is we have no first response firefighters to respond in them.

In the Toowoomba area

- Current crewing levels only permit safe operations to be carried out at one incident at a time.
- Highest road traffic crash rate per capita in Queensland
- the population has grown by 2.5 times to 144,000
- The traffic volume has increased to a heavy transport passing any given point in James St, every 20 seconds, 24 hours/day on average

How Lucky Do You Feel?

Do you realise that depending on what time of the month you may get a limited response to your emergency?

In South West region we have 18 sick relief days per month.

When we have run out of sick relief days the specialists appliances are taken off the road. These appliances are cross crewed with 1 Station Officer+1 Firefighter for the four appliances leaving the other 3 un-crewed in there event of another emergency the levy paying public will have to wait for specialist appliances from Brisbane

- 311L (Heavy rescue/technical)
- 311S (Breathing Apparatus/Hazardous materials/Command and Control)
- 311Y (4x4 Bushfire/Grassfire Light Attack)
- 311J (Telescopic aerial pumper)

This means that the new station looks impressive, but in reality is a high priced storage shed.
We as firefighters are no fitter or slacker than the general population when it comes to work absences and illness but we have a draconian system that to the United Firefighters Union seems to completely overlook the basic reason why we are here, and that is to serve the public who pay for our emergency response. You won’t die from a paper cut if you’ve got a head cold, but you can sure as hell pay the price if you’re wearing breathing apparatus at a structure fire!!

If a teacher books in sick they don’t send the class home!

If the local council has a report of sewerage running down the streets they don’t say “we’re out of sick leave, see you next month!!”

It seems absolutely absurd that the public we are chartered to serve under an Act of Parliament are now accepting the following situations:-

1. If you are going to have a Heavy Rescue incident, make sure its early in the month (we can’t guarantee a response at all latter in the month)
2. If we have a grass fire/bushfire make sure it’s early in the month.
4. Technical rescue (Swift water, Cliff Rescue, Trench and Confined Space Rescue) make sure you book them early in the month.

The possibilities are endless, but in the interests of cutting to the chase the following has occurred and the U.F.U. would like to know why these types of managerial frugality are occurring?

- Assistant Commissioner breeches agreement and won’t pay for operational backfill?
- Protracted incidents with no coverage in your area of response?
- Slow Auxiliary responses to pagers (up to 28mins to crew up at station)?
- Removal of Operational crew from the duty crew to day work, with no notice?
- On a regular basis there is no heavy rescue response capability between Brisbane and the N.T. and N.S.W Borders (an area 1.5 times the size of Victoria)

The United Firefighters Union find it obscene that management are playing Russian Roulette with people’s lives, breach their own agreements and hide under the fact that the caring and compassionate side of the average fire-fighter will get them out of any liability because we will still have a go with the limited crew available.

If we get away with the emergency response without injury or loss of life we’ve saved management from their failure to act responsibly in the interests of the community. If a fire-fighter is injured in the attempt to save life of property, management hide under the
“Zero Harm” and WH&S legislation and the 90 percentile and will use the Incident Controller and crew as scapegoats to cover their willingness to gamble with the public and firefighters lives.

Management have now directed that the specialist/s appliances will be taken of the road and unavailable for response instead of maintaining crewing levels in order to save lives.

Management are hell bent on saving Dollars instead of saving lives.

Are the United firefighters Union the only ones to believe that we should have robust crewing on ALL appliances?

The United firefighters Union have nothing to gain other than increasing the safety of the community and firefighters.

John Burrows
Toowoomba Brief

Background

Toowoomba and the areas of response have doubled in population since the last increase in manning to approx 155,000 people.

This increase occurred when Anzac Ave Fire Station was built in 1974 and a crew of 4 were relocated from Kitchener St. At this time the operational crew numbers were 60, this has decreased until today we only have 48 operational fire-fighters and officers.

During this time the Administration staffing levels have increased from 1.5 people to an estimated Administration staff number of approx 73 people.

Current Situation

The QFRS Assistant Commissioners View’s

I making this submission we totally support the Assistant Commissioners views relating to the increase in appliance numbers and crewing and are not at odds with his views:-

Assistant Commissioner Tom Dawson was quoted as saying in The Chronicle June 10, 2010:-

He said he had been lobbying the Commissioner in Brisbane for more resources in his five years in the job.

“I am optimistic we are getting close to some growth in Operational capacity” Mr Dawson said.

Capacity

When making a capability comparison between the other emergency services:-

Police – can respond to multiple incidents.

Ambulance - can respond to multiple incidents.

QFRS – has only the capacity to respond to (1) one house fire/car accident at once.

Toowoomba also has the Regional responsibility of the provision of Specialist Response equipment(4hrs by road, rest of Region fly out) such as :-

- Heavy Rescue Response
- Technical Rescue -
  - Swiftwater rescue
  - Trench rescue
  - Industrial rescue
  - USAR
  - Vertical rescue
  - Confined Space rescue

- Breathing Apparatus support
- Hazardous Materials incident support
- CBR technical response
- Command and Control

While the crews have no hesitation in responding to these complex incidents it comes at a cost and that is the available on shift crew manning will drop from 10 between the 2 stations to 8.

We have now been advised that even due to operations there will be NO call back to man the remaining Specialist appliances once the 1st Specialist crew have gone.

As recently as 10/6/2010 this drop in operational capacity was highlighted when a chemical incident closed the Gore Highway at Millmerran and the Specialist crew from Toowoomba were on scene for 20 hrs. This meant that while the Breathing Apparatus Hazmat appliance was at this incident, management refused to provide crewing for the Regional Heavy Rescue appliance.

**Other impacts**

**Thinning of Resources**

The satellite townships of Pittsworth, Oakey, Goombungee and Highfields ALL have suffered from lack of response capacity due to low or NO manning which results on a increasingly regular basis in one or both of the Toowoomba Area appliances being out of town for extended periods of time leaving Toowoomba with only one pumping appliance.

The staff call back or Auxiliary call back system is slow and in the case of the Toowoomba Auxiliary's the average response time to leave the station is 16.5 mins, and on scene time is 24mins. Additionally the response numbers are not always at the standard required for Queensland's largest inland city.

**Transport Risks**

In conducting a draw down from the Dept of Transport website there is now a heavy transport travelling through the main feeder of the Warrego Highway (James St, Toowoomba) every 20 seconds with every conceivable type of Dangerous Goods load.

This volume is increasing exponentially at 21% per year.

**Highfields**
This area is increasing rapidly and is currently not being serviced correctly in line with the Fire Service Levy.

The Levy that is being charged is a A2 Class, which means that this satellite town (17klns from Toowoomba) should be staffed by 24/7 crews is currently not, and is in fact being serviced by what is the equivalent of a D Class levy.

**Charlton Transport Interchange and Industrial Area**

This area located on the western fringe of Toowoomba has been earmarked as the location for the major transport interchange and is developing rapidly.

There is a number of hazardous transport or chemical storage facilities in this area; one has 19,000t of hazardous materials in storage.

**Rapid Coal and Gas Industry Expansion**

As has recently been announced by Government the South West Region is undergoing exceptional growth in the areas of Power generation, Coal mining and transport, Ethanol production and Coal Seam gas production.

The knock on effect is an increased risk potential in:-

- Transport Incidents (Road and Rail and gas pipelines)
- 34,000 gas wells to be drilled in the next 10 years
- Heavy rescue incidents at Power stations, Coal mines or gas well heads
- Increasing volumes of Hazardous materials being produced or transported such as:-
  - Ammonia
  - Ethanol (15 – 20 million litres/ plant, one in operation 8 are planned)
  - Explosives
Conclusion

Currently in the Toowoomba area we have a very limited operational capacity to service anything other than one house fire, one hazmat incident or road traffic crash.

The community to which we serve and are part of deserves a far better response capacity in a timely manner than is currently served with a minimalist service that has no reserve capacity to respond to more than incident at once safely.

Finally we have been advised by our Assistant Commissioner that we should wait until a 3rd appliance arrives before interior operations commence at a structure fire to reduce Firefighter injuries under Zero Harm.

Knowing that the 3rd Pumping appliance will take an average of 24 mins to attend, how defendable will be our current position be when we inform the public that due to economic rationalism a internal rescue will not occur and a person dies, or a person trapped under a truck or train is going to have to wait until Ipswich get there if there is no crewing available for that rescue appliance.

The list of potential news headlines goes on and on, Dalby can get more people and appliances out the door to an incident.

We need a 3rd fully crewed 24/7 pumping appliance NOW, not 10 years from now, as not only has the horse bolted, but its died of old age.
John Burrows

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Breach of Business rules
Attachments:

A meeting would be good with yourself as there are a number of issues to be discussed.

Tom Dawson
Sent: Thu 31/12/2009 6:00 PM
To: John Burrows
Subject: Re: Breach of Business rules

Good afternoon John,
I can assure that there has not been any breach of any business rules.

My understanding is that appropriate shift meetings have occurred in recent years. Such areas under SIOPP have been covered and I can also provide feedback that targets in Areas 1 and 2 have been sound.

John I would appreciate talking with you regarding this area. Remco is also seeking a meeting so let's get one organized. How is the first week in 2010 for you?

Also John the Station Officer meeting arrangements that I experienced over 4 years ago were a real concern to me that's why I strongly support the shift and SIOPP approach.

Any way John I look forward to our meeting.

Tom Dawson
AC SWR

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson
Cc: Tim Akers; Paul Cannington; Darrin Kerr; Warren Buckley; Robert Buckley; Timothy Connolly; Robert Wing; Athol Knox; Steven Horvath; Nell Goodman; Cameron Ashmore; Grant Hodges; Peter Werder; Gervase Paul; Stewart Dundas; Peter McCarron; Peter Bradow
Sent: Thu Dec 31 16:36:03 2009
Subject: Breach of Business rules

Tom,

It has now been almost 3 years since our last Station Officers meeting.

Numerous S/O's have approached me to determine what is going on?

In looking through the Business Rules it appears that at a minimum there should be:-

- 4 Stations Officers Meetings (one/quarter as a min)
- 1 meeting to discuss the MFO's etc

Why haven't the required number of meetings been conducted, and when is the next meeting to be held as per the business rules?

I look forward to hearing from you in the New Year

https://bnefes01/exchange/jburrows/Deleted%20Items/1A29503BF6F911646491674BB974C32C651110...
1. PURPOSE

To provide information and guidance when responding to emergency calls for assistance to incidents involving the rescue of persons from swift or static water.

2. APPLICATION

Applies to all Fire Communications personnel who manage emergency calls for assistance.

3. DIRECTIVE

R WATER – Rescue Water All Types

All QFRS Firecom personnel will adhere to the following procedures when responding to this problem type.

This procedure applies to incidents involving the rescue of persons from water including swift water rescue. This may have occurred due to flooding, storm water, swift water, difficulties in surf, possible drowning, falling into a river, lake, flooded drain, etc. Also includes incidents in static non-domestic water supplies such as dams and reservoirs.

Water rescues require the attendance of specially trained Swiftwater Floodwater Rescue (SFR) Technicians and Equipment. Firecom personnel should anticipate potential swift water rescues by monitoring weather situations such as prolonged heavy rain, impending storm activities or flooding.

4. PROCEDURE

The following information provides the minimum response to this incident type:

- Call taking:
  - Answer the call as per Emergency Call Management
    - When you have confirmed the problem type and location:
  - Ask the caller
    - What happened?
    - Where exactly is the person/s? Is the person/s in the water, in a tree, in or on a vehicle?
    - How many persons are involved?
    - Type of watercourse (i.e., river, dam, floodway or seaway)?
- **What** is the best access for rescue vehicles?
- **Is** the person injured?
- **Can** you communicate with the person?
- **Is** the water rising or falling?
- **Which** bank is the person closest to? *River Left Bank* or *River Right Bank*?

*Caller to face downstream and advise which bank the person is closest to*

---

River Left Bank

Direction of Flow

River Right Bank

- **Instruct** the caller to meet the brigade

- **Despatch:**
  - **Initial Assignment:** One pumper on turnout
  - One specialty rescue/rescue appliance on turnout
  - **Notify:** QPS
  - QAS
  - **QFRS Notify:** Senior Officer
  - **Consider:** Technical Rescue response procedures
  - Contacting Local Government Authority
  - Accessing floodboats or helicopter

- **Record:**
  - All actions on CAD

- **Action:**
  - All requests from attending crews

5. **POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS**

- Was the call managed appropriately? If not, what action needs to be taken?
- Did Firecom personnel follow the correct procedure for this incident? If not, what action needs to be taken?
- Does the procedure require review?
- Has all the relevant information been added to the incident report?
- Is a debrief appropriate for this incident?
## QFRS FIRE COMMUNICATION CENTRES RELEVANCY

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1. PURPOSE

(a) To outline the activation protocols for an Incident Control Centre (ICC) within a region.

2. APPLICATION

(a) Applies to fire officers and volunteers involved in the activation and operation of an ICC.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

(a) The Incident Controller must be aware of incident developments and be prepared to increase management capability to ensure effective control and command. Maintaining situational awareness will assist the Incident Controller in the anticipation of incident growth beyond the immediate resourcing and functional management support.

(b) When required the Incident Controller will seek to establish greater incident management capability by transferring incident management from the ICP to a dedicated mobile control/command vehicle or an ICC (either pre-determined or improvised).

(c) When required, the QFRS will provide a QFRS Liaison Officer to any other agency involved in managing the incident and specifically the Local Disaster Management Group (if activated).

(d) The functional standards of an ICC are detailed in Incident Management System 2.7.1.

4. DIRECTIVE

4.1 Transfer from an Incident Control Point

(a) Control of the incident will be maintained by the Incident Controller at the ICP until such time as the ICC is fully functional.

(b) Relevant functional roles in the Incident Management Team (IMT) will be delegated and all incident information will be made available to the team prior to activation of the ICC.

(c) The person identified as the Incident Controller will maintain command and control during the transfer from the ICP to ICC or a new Incident Controller will assume command and control at the ICC.

(d) Transfer of command and control from the ICP to the ICC will be communicated to the relevant senior officer and Fire Communications Centre and to all personnel (QFRS and other agencies) on the incident ground.
4.2 Activation

(a) The activation level of an ICC will be determined by the relevant senior officer after an assessment of the incident or emergent situation; and will notify the Assistant Commissioner of the activation. For wildfire incidents, the Assistant Commissioner will consult with the Regional Manager Rural Operations in determining the level of activation and taking into consideration the Wildfire Alert Level for identified areas.

(b) When an ICC is activated, the Incident Controller is responsible for the appointment of appropriately qualified officers to perform the role of the Incident Management Team (IMT).

4.3 Stages of Activation

(a) The activation levels of an ICC include the following:

- Alert
- Activation

(b) Alert - involves ensuring an ICC is ready to be activated. During alert the nominated person will ensure the following is carried out:
  - Check, prepare and verify the ICC can be activated, e.g., check inventory, communications and other infrastructure.
  - Check the availability and accessibility of the current incident management forms, i.e. INCFORMs, and incident management room tabards and brassards.
  - Identify staff who can attend the ICC within 1 hour to perform the relevant functional and support roles.
  - Continue to monitor the developing situation/s either on-site or off-site.
  - Regularly inform the relevant Assistant Commissioner and other stakeholders of unfolding events.
  - The nominated person is not required to remain in the ICC.

(c) Activation - involves expanding the operations and staffing of the ICC to meet the current and projected situation. The nominated person is to remain in the ICC during all hours.

4.4 Stand Down

(a) The stand down of the ICC will be determined by the Incident Controller considering the size and scale of the operations. Stand down of the ICC may be staged at the discretion of the Incident Controller. Debriefing of the ICC operational activities will follow the full stand down of the ICC.

4.5 ICC Relationship with the ROCC

(a) An ICC provides a vital role in communicating incident information to the ROCC (if activated), the Assistant Commissioner and Fire Communication Centre; and confirming the receipt of information from the ROCC.

(b) An ICC receives support from the ROCC for the management of the incident(s).

(c) An ICC does not generally communicate with another ICC, however it is the responsibility of the ROCC to share information between ICCs when necessary.
4.6 Reporting Requirements

(a) The first report from the ICC to the ROCC (if activated) or to the regional fire communications centre must be issued within the first two hours using the Situation Report (INCFORM 15).
(b) After the initial Situation report, an Incident Action Plan (INCFORMS 1-7) is then required for:

- Every operational period; or
- More frequently if a major change has occurred or a notifiable event such as significant injuries, fatalities, service vehicle accidents, significant structural loss, stock loss.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service - Incident Report

Incident No: QF3-10-111965  
Start Date: 26/12/2010  
Status: COMPLETED  
Completed Date: 23/02/2011

Confidential Information for internal use only

Incident Details
Incident Number: QF3-10-111965  
Incident Status: Completed  
Incident Level: 1  
Alarm Level: 1  
Dispatch Level: Normal  
Start Date: 26/12/2010 21:00:17  
Stop Date: 26/12/2010 23:12:40  
Alarm Raised By: 99-Other agency not classified above  
Notification Method: 11-Exchange telephone call direct to authority  
Reporting Officer: Mason, Rodney Alan  
Entering Officer: Burrows, John Douglas (SO2)

Firecom Region: 3  
Response Area: IRONGATE ROSSVALE RFB  
Levy Class:  
Duties Compl. Date: 26/12/2010 23:18:42  
End Date: 26/12/2010 23:18:42  
Last Updated: 23/02/2011 17:13:57  
Total Time: 0 Days, 2 Hrs, 18 Min, 25 Sec

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<th>Att. End Time</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule, Michael John</td>
<td>014231</td>
<td>FF / AUX-FF2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AUX</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26/12/2010 21:08:11</td>
<td>26/12/2010 23:13:51</td>
<td>2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Payroll</th>
<th>Position/Rank</th>
<th>Crewed</th>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Driver?</th>
<th>BA Worn?</th>
<th>Dispatch Time</th>
<th>Att. End Time</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burton, Geoffrey Bruce</td>
<td>027042</td>
<td>FF / AUX-FF2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AUX</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26/12/2010 21:08:11</td>
<td>26/12/2010 23:13:51</td>
<td>2 hours 5 minutes 40 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Payroll</th>
<th>Position/Rank</th>
<th>Crewed</th>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Driver?</th>
<th>BA Worn?</th>
<th>Dispatch Time</th>
<th>Att. End Time</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callsign/Rego:</td>
<td>311Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Appliance Type:</td>
<td>Light-weight quick response (2 &amp; 4WD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Urban Light Attack - Light - Urban Special Appliance Specials</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Capability:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org Unit:</td>
<td>SW111 Toowoomba</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode:</td>
<td>SW111 Toowoomba</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Frame, Scott Douglas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Position/Rank:</td>
<td>FF / S-FF</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crewed:</td>
<td>Yes Shift: B10</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Lange, Stewart Theodore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position/Rank:</td>
<td>OIC / SO1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crewed:</td>
<td>Yes Shift: B10</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Attendance No:</th>
<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Callsign/Rego:</td>
<td>312A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appliance Type:</td>
<td>Urban pumper with RAR Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Capability:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Org Unit:</td>
<td>SW112 Anzac Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Lobwein, Gary John</td>
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<td>Payroll:</td>
<td>001460</td>
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<td>Name:</td>
<td>Sullivan, Chris</td>
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<td>Payroll:</td>
<td>017105</td>
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<td>Name:</td>
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<td>Position/Rank:</td>
<td>OIC / SO2</td>
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<td>Crewed:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Douglas, Paula Jane</td>
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<td>Payroll:</td>
<td>023390</td>
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<td>Position/Rank:</td>
<td>FF / FF-1</td>
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<td>Crewed:</td>
<td>Yes Shift: B10</td>
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| Dispatch Time: | 26/12/2010 21:04:00 |
| Mobile Time: | 26/12/2010 21:05:33 |
| Arrival Time: | 26/12/2010 21:34:55 |
| RTS Time: | 26/12/2010 23:17:30 |
| To Station Time: | |
| Code 30: | No |
| Code 40: | No |

Driver? Yes | BA Worn? No |
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:00 |
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:30 |
Total Time: 2 hours 12 minutes 30 seconds |

Driver? No | BA Worn? No |
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:05:00 |
Att. End Time: 26/12/2010 23:17:30 |
Total Time: 2 hours 12 minutes 30 seconds |
Attendance No: 5
Callsign/Rego: 317V
Appliance Type: Water tanker (including 4x4 and 6x4)
Description:
Primary Capability:
Org Unit: SW117 Highfields
Mode: Attended

Name: Noble, Karl Maxwell
Payroll: 007127
Position/Rank: FF / S-FF
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10

Name: Ashmore, Cameron James
Payroll: 002361
Position/Rank: OIC / SO1
Crewed: Yes Shift: B10

Driver? Yes BA Worn? No
Dispatch Time: 26/12/2010 21:31:52
Mobile Time: 26/12/2010 21:38:32
RTS Time: 26/12/2010 23:16:56
To Station Time: No
Code 3C: No
Code 4C: No
Total Time: 1 minute 56 seconds

Other Attendance
Other Agencies Notified? Yes
Notified by Firecom? Yes
Last updated by: jburrows
Last updated date: 1/2/11 9:02 PM

Agency | Name | Notification | By Firecom
--- | --- | --- | ---
A56 Electricity | Not Notified | No
A57 Gas | Not Notified | No
A58 Water | Not Notified | No
A59 Police | QPS Notified & Attended Yes
A60 Ambulance | QAS Notified & Attended Yes
A61 SES | Not Notified | No
A62 Other Fire Service | Not Notified | No
A63 DERM | Not Notified | No
A64 Voluntary Rescue | Not Notified | No
A65 Charities | Not Notified | No
A66 Gov Welfare | Not Notified | No
N/A Fire Investigation Unit | Not Notified | No

Police Attendance
| Station Name | Name | Phone Number |
--- | --- | ---
TOOWOOMBA | NA | 

Printed by jburrows 5/2/11 11:15 PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exposure Number</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>HazMat Involved: No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firecom Problem Type</td>
<td>RESCUE WATER ALL TYPES</td>
<td>Mob. Property Involved: Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Type</td>
<td>363-Swift water rescue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions Taken</td>
<td>210-Rescue, provide assistance, remove from harm</td>
<td></td>
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### Block A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Event</th>
<th>363</th>
<th>Swift water rescue</th>
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<tr>
<td>Most Serious Event</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Road complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8 Method of Notification</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Street, road, way (public)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A10 Agency/Person Raising Alarm</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callers Name</td>
<td>PHIL BICK</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>TOOWOOMBA</td>
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<tr>
<td>A12 Local Government Authority</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A14 Occupant's Name</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>A19 Complex Type Code</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>A20 Fixed Property Use Code</td>
<td>26/12/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>A21 Type of Owner</td>
<td>21:00:17</td>
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<tr>
<td>A22 Type of Occupant</td>
<td>2010-12-26 00:00:00:0</td>
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<tr>
<td>A6 Date of Call</td>
<td>23:12:40</td>
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<tr>
<td>A8 Time of Call</td>
<td>26/12/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>A25 Stop Date</td>
<td>26/12/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>A26 Stop Time</td>
<td>23:18:42</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A27 Duties Completed Date</td>
<td>26/12/2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A28 Duties Completed Time</td>
<td>0 Days, 2 Hrs, 18 Min, 25 Sec</td>
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<tr>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>-27.552931</td>
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<td>End Time</td>
<td>151.612839</td>
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<td>Total Incident Time</td>
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<td>Latitude</td>
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<td>Longitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBD Grid Reference</td>
<td>ARIA Remoteness</td>
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<tr>
<td>iZone Classification</td>
<td>A39 Number of CABAs Worn at the Incident</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>In urban levy area?</td>
<td>A29 Peak num. personnel at scene</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>A35 Mutual Aid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No mutual aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>A36 Weather Conditions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A37 Delayed Arrival</td>
<td>71 - Weather, severe conditions incl. flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td>A42 Problem Encountered</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lack of on-scene information; li</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problem Encountered Details</td>
<td>UNABLE TO DETERMINE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN WATER DUE TO APPROX 500-600M FLOODWAY</td>
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### Block D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>No injuries or fatalities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rescues</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Block J

Mobile Property 1 of 3
Property Type: 10 Passenger road transport vehicles; \(\exists/\)
Make: Mitsubishi
Model: Triton
Registration Number: [Redacted]
Owner Name: NA
Phone Number: NA
Owner Address: Unobtainable - Person on other side of flooded water unable to get details

Mobile Property 2 of 3
Property Type: 10 Passenger road transport vehicles; \(\exists/\)
Make: Ford
Model: Ranger
Registration Number: [Redacted]
Owner Name: Toowoomba Regional Council
Phone Number: 07 4691 1388
Owner Address: Campbell Street Oakey QLD 4401

Mobile Property 3 of 3
Property Type: 10 Passenger road transport vehicles; \(\exists/\)
Make: Toyota
Model: Landcruiser
Registration Number: [Redacted]
Owner Name: NA
Phone Number: NA
Owner Address: Unobtainable - Person transported by QAS before details were able to be taken

ESCAD Wordback

26/12/2010 21:00:20  Multi-Agency QAS Incident #: 02188369
26/12/2010 21:00:43  LINTHROPE CREEK, 3-5 KMS SOUTH OF CECIL PLAINS RD, 50CM WATER, CAR STALLED IN WATER. PITTSOWRH QPS RESPONDING. 1 MALE IN CAR, UTE.
26/12/2010 21:02:02  [Page] Dispatch page sent to Unit:314A, Sent From: BNEVCPRSTO
26/12/2010 21:02:13  [INR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:03:15  [IANA] QAS Advised. RAE- UPDATED ON INC
26/12/2010 21:04:01  [INR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:05:29  [INR] Unit Assigned to Incident.
26/12/2010 21:05:56  WB  311Y [IWB] RESPOND 312A
26/12/2010 21:07:10  WB  MTEL SENT STN 12 AUX
26/12/2010 21:07:30  AX  Address LINTHORPE CREEK verified by Latitude / Longitude
26/12/2010 21:07:30  NR  [IAX] Auxiliaries Notified. STN MANNED AND ADVISED
26/12/2010 21:09:05  TO  312A [IWB] COULD YOU GIVE BEST ACCESS FROM STN 12 PITTSWORTH OR OAKLEY
26/12/2010 21:14:32  WB  311Y [IWB] DO WE HAVE ANY WORD AS TO NUMBER OF OCC. FCO ADV AS 1
26/12/2010 21:14:32  WB  311Y [IWB] WE HAVE PERMISSION FROM SUPT FF CRIGHTON FROM PITTSWORTH TO RESPOND AS LEVEL2 ON THE PITTSWORTH SIDE
26/12/2010 21:17:01  WB  312A [IWB] REQ PERMISSION TO SPEAK DIRECT 313A
26/12/2010 21:18:07  WB  312A [IWB] FF CRIGHTON RESP FROM PITTSWORTH. 312A ADV 313A NO FF TO ENTER WATER WHO AREN'T SWIFT WATER TRAINED
26/12/2010 21:21:23  WB  QPS - HAVE SPOKEN TO OCC IS SITTING ON TOP OF CAR. A 2ND CAR HAS BECOME STUCK - UNKNOWN NUMBER OF OCC. ACTUAL INC IS LOCATED ON OAKLEY PITTSWORTH RD.
26/12/2010 21:22:10  WB  DAVID CRIGHTON ADV HE IS RESPONDING IN OWN VEH
26/12/2010 21:22:38  ANA  [IANA] QAS Advised.DEE ADV OF LAST AND THAT 2ND CAR NOW ALSO TRAPPED IN WATER AT SAME AREA
26/12/2010 21:25:06 ADV 6 AUX FF STANDING BY AT STN 12. SO ASHMORE ARRIVED AT STN 12. RETURNING HOME
26/12/2010 21:28:26 WB 314A [IWB] THIS INC KNOWN AS MT TYSON CONT. CAPT MASON QIC. CONTROL VEH 314A. 2 VEH INSIGHT. 1ST 3-500M 2ND 6-700M CAN SIGHT 1 PERSON ON ROOF OF ONE VEH CURRENTLY TRYING TO GET CONTACT WITH THAT PERSON
26/12/2010 21:28:49 IC [IC] Incident Controller Name - : MOUNT TYSON
26/12/2010 21:30:02 WB 312A [IWB] QPS REQ. ADV QPS ON ROUTE TO INC
26/12/2010 21:31:50 WB 311Y [IWB] HAVE 2 LEVEL ON STAND BY AT STN 11 RESPOND SO ASHMORE PICKED UP BY 311L. CARL AND TONY GOUSE IF THEY CAN RESPOND IN 317V
26/12/2010 21:34:13 CM [ICM] INSPIR RYE ADVISED ALL DETAILS
26/12/2010 21:34:55 K8 311Y [IK8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge. MESSAGE BROKEN
26/12/2010 21:35:02 WB ATHOL NOTIFY SOC CALLED BACK ANOTHER OFFICER FOR 311L DUE TO 317V RESPONDING TO JOB
26/12/2010 21:36:16 ANDMO [IANDMO] DMO Notified. DRO HACKET INFORMED
26/12/2010 21:38:32 TO 317V [ITC] Vehicle Responding. MOBILE TO STN12 PICK LEVEL2 SWIFT WATER
26/12/2010 21:38:46 IC [IC] Incident Controller Name - : SO BURROWS
26/12/2010 21:39:24 KB 312A [IK8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge. IC IS NOW 312A. AT THIS STAGE ONLY ABLE TO CONFIRM NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN WATER. ABLE TO CONFIRM 2 VEH
312A [IWB] IAP IS SW TECHS DONNING UP FF CRIGHTON TO STH 2L2 TECH TO NTH INFLATING THE BOAT AND MAKING PREPS TO ENTER WATER

312B [IWB] NOTIFIED OF SOC RYE REQ ALL 6 AUX TO REMAIN ON STN

312A [IWB] ADV RESP CREW ON ARRIVAL DONE LEV 2 SWIFT WATER EQUIP, AND BE THE IN WATER SAFETY TEAM FOR SWIFT WATER TEAM 1

317V [IWB] WITH 2 LEVEL TWO ON BOARD RESP. REQ IF COPIED LAST FROM 312A, ACK LAST

312A [IWB] FROM SW TECH CRIGHTON STH OF FLOOD WATER 1 MOTHER 1 DEFACTO AND 1 CHILD MISSING INFORM SOC

26/12/2010 21:50:29

ANA [IANA] QAS Advised. MIKE ADVISED OF LAST

26/12/2010 21:51:20

ANP [IANP] QPS Advised. NO ANSWER FROM COMMS TO VERIFY MISSING PAX

26/12/2010 21:52:02

ANDMO [IANDMO] DMO Notified. UPDATED ON INC - REQ A BANK SEARCH ONCE RESCUED 1 PERSON ACC FOR

26/12/2010 21:52:26

WB 317V [IWB] VIA PHONE - REQ DIRECTIONS. REQ BEST ACCESS ACCORDING TO LAST WB - MISSING FAMILY

26/12/2010 21:54:43

ANP [IANP] QPS Advised. TONY ADVISED THEY WERE UNAWARE OF MISSING OCCS - TECH RESCUE NUMBER GIVEN TO QPS COMMS

26/12/2010 21:55:06

WB 312A [IWB] REQ 317V GO TO SOUTHERN SIDE AND LIASE WITH 313A AND ADV - MESSAGE BROKEN - UNABLE TO CONFIRM ON RADIO

26/12/2010 21:56:43

WB 312A [IWB] AFFIRMATIVE TO LAST MESSAGE

26/12/2010 21:56:48

WB 317V [IWB] ACK LAST

26/12/2010 21:59:29

WB 312A [IWB] ADV 317V WHEN THEY ARRIVE K8 STH SIDE TO REPORT SECTOR COMMANDER CRIGHTON FOR TASKING

26/12/2010 21:59:42

WB 317V [IWB] ACK LAST

26/12/2010 22:01:29

WB 2 FF STANDING BY AT STN 13

26/12/2010 22:06:34

WB 312A [IWB] 4 PAX RECOVERED CONFIRMED ALL PAX ACCOUNTED FOR 317V STILL TO PROCEED TO STH END AND LIASE WITH SECT CONTROLLER

26/12/2010 22:06:49

WB 317V [IWB] COPIED LAST

26/12/2010 22:07:33

ANA [IANA] QAS Advised. MIKE ADVISED OF LAST

26/12/2010 22:08:09

ANDMO [IANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE UPDATED ON INC - DOES NOT WANT STUFF TO HANG AROUND UNNECESSARILY

26/12/2010 22:08:32

ANP [IANP] QPS Advised. TONY ADVISED OF LAST

26/12/2010 22:09:52

WB 312A [IWB] ETA 317V TO STHERN SECTOR

26/12/2010 22:10:33

WB 317V [IWB] APPROX 20MINS

26/12/2010 22:10:48

WB 312A [IWB] COPIED LAST - FURTHER CARRYING OUR SEC SEARCH SW T 1 ENTRYING FROM NORTH SIDE

26/12/2010 22:16:25

WB 312A [IWB] ADV TRC THAT THEIR CREW ON SITE ARE SAFE AND THE UTE IS ABOUT TO BE SWEEP OF THE CAUSEWAY

26/12/2010 22:17:24

AN [IAN] Authority Notified KAREN FROM TRC - NOTIFIED OF INC

26/12/2010 22:31:17

ANDMO [IANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSP RYE PHONEED TO SEE WHERE CREWS WERE AT

26/12/2010 22:33:37

WB 317V [IWB] CHECKING RADIO CH IN PITSWORTH. ADV UHF CH IN PITSWORTH. FOR 312A ADV TURNING INTO OAKLEY PITSWORTH RD
312A [IWB] ADV TO CONTACT COMMS VIA LANDLINE. ADV 317V WHEN THEY GET TO SEC STH TO TAKE UP WITH SW TECH CRIGTHON WATER SHOULD NOT EXCEED HEIGHT FOR VEH TO CROSS THROUGH SAFELY. TO DO A SLOW SEARCH TO NORTH TO SCH FOR ANY OTHER VEH IN WATER

312A [IWB] SEC SEARCH HAVE BEEN COMPLETE REVISED IAP I REQUIRE 317V TO BE USED AS WORK PLATFORM TO TRAVERSE ROADWAY TO ENSURE NO OTHER VEH HAVE BEEN SWEEP OFF THE FLOODWAY 312A [IWB] RECOVERED A TOTAL OF 4 CAS FROM 3 VEH

317V [IK8] Vehicle At Scene - Checking with QFRS Officer in Charge.

[ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSR RYE ADVISED DIRECT ORDERS THAT ALL APPLIANCES ARE TO BE BACK IN AREAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

[ICM] DIRECT ORDERS FROM SOC RYE - ALL APPLIANCES TO RETURN ASAP

312A [IWB] ROGER INFORM SOC ALL APPLIANCES WILL BE RELEASED WHEN WE HAVE FINISHED IN WATER OPERATIONS

312A [IWB] INFORM SOC IF HE WISHES HE CAN ATTEND. FCO INQ AFTER DELAY FOR INC. HOPING FOR 15MIN

[ANDMO] DMO Notified. ADV APPROX 15MIN DELAY AT THIS STAGE

313A [IWB] REQ TO STANDDOWN FROM INC AS THEY ARE NOT REQ AND THE CREEK ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEM IS RISING

312A [IWB] INQ IF 313A TO REMAIN AT INC. THAT IS AFFIRM ALL UNITS AT THIS STAGE ARE ON INC TILL THE STOP IS PUT IN WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN AS YET

[ICM] FCO ADV REQ TO STANDDOWN CAME FROM 313A AS CREEK IS RISING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEM ON OAKEY PITSWORTH RD

312A [IWB] WILL GET THEM TO STAY UNTIL 317V FORDS THIS SIDE GET 317V THEN TO TURN AROUND THEN ESCORT THEM OUT

313A [IWB] ACK LAST

312A [IWB] 317V IS TRAVERSING WATER CARRYING OUT FINAL SEARCH

312A [IST] OAKEY PITSWORTH INC STOP 313A IS BEING RELEASED ALL OTHER VEHS MAKING UP

313A [IWE] RETURNING TO STN ON DELAYED RESPONSE DUE TO WATER ACROSS ROAD K4


[ANDMO] DMO Notified. A/INSR RYE UPDATED ON INC

312B [IOI] DID NOT RESPOND

# Senior Officer ON - CALL July 2010 to December 2011

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|               | 28-03        |                 |
|               | Area Director 5* | C.S.*           |
|               |               |                 |

* Note: Area Director 1* is different from Area Director 1.
1. PURPOSE

(a) To outline the requirements for the activation of aircraft, including QFRS Contract, Call When Needed and Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network aircraft for fire suppression and/or reconnaissance.

2. APPLICATION

(a) Applies to all fire officers who require the assistance of aircraft for fire suppression and/or reconnaissance.

3. DIRECTIVE

(a) Aircraft are available for operational support and must be managed in accordance with this Directive.

3.1 Activation

(a) All requests for aircraft support are to be made through the relevant Firecom dispatching resources to the fire or the relevant Regional Fire Coordination Centre, if established.

(b) Request for aircraft support may be made by the Incident Controller. The requesting person must state:

- Type of support required (e.g., water bombing, reconnaissance/observation, transport);
- Incident Control Point/Incident Controller name;
- Grid reference of UBD or specified map latitude and longitude (if available) or specific location;
- Fire ground channel to be used; and
- Location of water source if known and applicable.

(c) Firecom will obtain authorisation for deployment of aerial resources from the relevant Senior Rural Officer or Senior Urban Officer and will notify the relevant Assistant Commissioner and the State Air Operations Coordinator (SAOC) immediately the authorisation has been given.

(d) Aircraft operations extending beyond two (2) hours must be authorised by the relevant Assistant Commissioner (or the regional authorised delegate, e.g., Regional Manager Rural Operations).

(e) QFRS personnel are only permitted to travel in aircraft operated by operators who are pre-qualified by the QFRS Air Operations Unit. This does not apply to personnel travelling on aircraft operating as regular commercial passenger services.
(f) Firecom will contact the State Air Operations Coordinator via any of the following means in priority order, ensuring that the coordinates of the fire are given in latitude and longitude in degrees minutes and decimal of minutes.

- Phone: [redacted]
- Pager: [redacted]
- Fax: [redacted]
- Email: [redacted]

(g) The requesting centre must ensure sufficient detail is provided for aircraft to respond to the incident and communicate with the Incident Controller or other authorised person.

(h) Where required, the State Air Operations Coordinator will identify suitable resources in accordance with the notified requirements and will provide the deployment details to the requesting centre.

(i) Where Incident Control Centres are established, details must include the Communications Plan and the nominated air base, if applicable.

(j) Appendix 1 presents the flowchart for activating QFRS contract aircraft (including Call When Needed aircraft on active standby and Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network aircraft) and Appendix 2 presents the flowchart for activating Call When Needed aircraft on ad hoc hire.

3.2 QFRS Contract Aircraft

(a) Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters with a variety of roles) may be contracted and placed on activate standby for exclusive use to support QFRS operations during the fire season or in response to any other forecasted significant fire weather event.

(b) Aircraft may be based in a number of areas around the state, and can be relocated in response to potential or actual threats.

(c) Regions may seek the support of any aircraft via Firecom who will contact the State Air Operations Coordinator who will coordinate deployment and tasking.

(d) Contract aircraft are available to assist other agencies.

(e) Contract aircraft will require significant logistical support that will be coordinated by the State Air Operations Coordinator with the Regional Fire Coordination Centre or the Incident Management Team (refer Incident Directive 1.14).

(f) Contract aircraft are fitted with QFRS radios and are required to maintain communications with a Firecom Centre at all times except when allocated to an incident and under the tasking of the Incident Management Team (refer Incident Directive 1.9).

(g) Regions are required to establish Flight Following Watch procedures initially via Firecom for any supporting aircraft. These arrangements must be discussed with the State Air Operations Coordinator.
3.3 QFRS Call When Needed (CWN) Aircraft

(a) Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters with a variety of roles) may be called to respond as a result of an activation request by an Incident Controller and may take some time to be available to respond. These aircraft would be on an *ad hoc* contract arrangement.

(b) Aircraft are accessed as per 3.1 above.

3.4 Queensland Emergency Helicopter Network (QEHN)

(a) There are six (6) providers of emergency helicopter services within the network, including four (4) community helicopter providers:

- EMQ Helicopter Rescue (Brisbane, Townsville and Cairns). State Government owned and operated.
- Australian Helicopters Pty Ltd (Torres Strait and Northern Peninsula). Fully funded under contract with EMQ, DES.
- Careflight Queensland (Gold Coast and Toowoomba).
- Sunshine Coast Helicopter Rescue, also known as Energex Community Rescue (Sunshine Coast and Bundaberg).
- Capricorn Helicopter Rescue Service (Rockhampton)
- Central Queensland Helicopter Rescue Service (Mackay)

(b) Firecom personnel must be aware of the primary response for aircraft (on Government contract) in the region.

4. QFRS RELEVANCY

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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner

REFERENCES
The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides

Version: 3.0 Page 3 of 5 INCDIR 1.3
Appendix 1: Activation of QFRS Contracted Aircraft
(including CWN Aircraft on Active Standby and QEHN Aircraft)

INCIDENT CONTROLLER (CONTROL POINT)
Incident Controller requests air support
via Firecom stating type of support
required:
- Water Bombing
- Reconnaissance/Observation
- Transport

Information to include:
- Incident Control Point (CP) location
  including Grid reference of UBD or
  specified map/altitude and longitude or
  specific location
- Fireground channel to be used
  (UHF/VHF)
- Location of known water sources

Yes
Regional Firecom
(Is an RFCC Activated?)

No

RFCC
- Sets and approves time limit.
- Phones or pages State Air Operations
  Coordinator on 3109 0129, or pager 77791
  request from Incident Controller.
- Completes INCFORM 21 and emails to -
  or faxes to
- Activates AAS / AOB as per regional register
- Responds aircraft as per regional arrangements.

State Air Operations Coordinator
- Liaise with RFCC.
- Ensures Air Attack Supervisor (AAS)
  responded for bombing or Air Observer
  (AOB) for observation work.
- Completes tasking component of INCFORM
  21 and return email or fax to RFCC.
- Completes documentation and tracks aircraft
  usage.

RFCC
- Confirms to Firecom that aircraft sourced
  and responding.

State Air Operations Coordinator
- Liaises with Regional Firecom.
- Ensures Air Attack Supervisor (AAS)
  responded for bombing or Air Observer
  (AOB) for observation work
- Confirms to Firecom that aircraft sourced
  and responding.
- Completes documentation and tracks
  usage of aircraft.
- Monitors competing priorities.

INCIDENT CONTROLLER
- Tasks aircraft on arrival.
- Monitors time usage.
- Seeks approval for extension time.
Appendix 2: Activation of Call When Needed (CWN) Aircraft on Ad Hoc Hire

**INCIDENT CONTROLLER (CONTROL POINT)**

- Incident Controller requests air support via Firecom stating type of support required:
  - Water Bombing
  - Reconnaissance/Observation
  - Transport

  Information to include:
  - Incident Control Point (CP) location including Grid reference of UBD or specified map/latitude and longitude or specific location
  - Fireground channel to be used (UHF/VHF)
  - Location of known water sources.

---

**Regional Firecom (Is an RFCC Activated?)**

**Yes**

- RFCC
  - Sets and approves time limit.
  - Completes INCFORM 21 and email to
    - State Air Operations Coordinator
    - Source and dispatches aircraft.
    - Advises RFCC.
    - Completes tasking component of INCFORM 21 and return email or fax to RFCC.
  - Completes documentation and tracks aircraft usage.

- State Air Operations Coordinator
  - Source and dispatches aircraft.
  - Advises State Firecom.
  - Completes tasking component of INCFORM 21 and return email or fax to State Firecom.
  - Completes documentation and tracks usage of aircraft.

**No**

- Firecom contacts Senior Officer (Urban/Rural) as per regional arrangements for authorisation.
- Authorising Officer gives approval for maximum of two hours operation.
- Completes INCFORM 21 and email to
  - INCIDENT CONTROLLER
  - Tasks aircraft on arrival.
  - Monitors time usage.
  - Seeks approval for extension time.

**RFCC**

- Confirms to Firecom that aircraft sourced and responding.
1. PURPOSE

(a) To outline the requirements for initial support of aircraft by Regions and Districts.

2. APPLICATION

(a) Applies to all QFRS personnel.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

(a) Aircraft will require logistical support from regions and districts. Support may be required during fire detection flights or during the initial phase of fire, before the arrival of specialist support personnel. QFRS stations/brigades, in close proximity to local airports, may be requested to provide support that may include:

- Provision of foam and water.
- Assistance with refuelling.
- Airfield support.
- Accommodation and transport.

4. DIRECTIVE

(a) The appropriate Senior Officer of the Region/District is to be advised by the State Air Operations Coordinator to coordinate logistical support when QFRS tasked aircraft are operating in the vicinity of the Region/District.

4.1 Fuel

(a) The Region/District will obtain information (in Region Operational Plans) on availability of Avgas or Jet A1 fuel at the airport or within the district and will ensure that suppliers are notified of the requirement and trained personnel available to assist with refuelling.

4.2 Local Airport Use

(a) All operations at the local airport shall be conducted in a safe manner and any local airport operational requirements shall be adhered to.

(b) Regions/Districts should become familiar with the Airport Emergency Plan and any other operational procedures of the local airport.

(c) The airport manager or supervisor will be advised that water-bombing support activities are to be conducted at the local airport.
4.3 Suppressant (Foam/Water) Supply Requirements

(a) The aircraft pilot shall determine the quantity of water or water foam mix that is to be loaded into the aircraft. Crews loading suppressant should work under the pilot's direction at all times.

(b) QFRS or Council water tanker(s) may be required to provide water supply (est. 2000-3000 litres per load) if the main water supply is not available.

(c) Contract aircraft are required to carry CAMLOK to 64mm QRT Adapter. The connection to these aircraft will be a 2-inch CAMLOK or a 64mm QRT Adapter. Local agricultural aircraft may have different fittings.

(d) Should foam be needed, then a 0.5% concentration of BFFF foam will be required. For a 2000-litre load of water, 10 litres of foam shall be added to the filling hose before water is pumped into the aircraft.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with the District Inspector for additional information.

REFERENCES
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides
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Confidential Information for internal use only

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<p>| Name:           | Douglas, Paula Jane       | Driver?:        | Yes                         |
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| Name: | Wensley, John Colin |
| Payroll: | 002166 |
| Position/Rank: | OIC / SO3 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Crighton, Mark Phillip |
| Payroll: | 019159 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / FF-1 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Sullivan, Chris |
| Payroll: | 017105 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / FF-1 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Robinson, Peter (Robbo) Christopher |
| Payroll: | 002537 |
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| Name: | Kahler, Rodney Graham |
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| Shift: | AUX |
| Name: | Lissimore, John Charles Thomas |
| Payroll: | 025039 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / AUX-FF2 |
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| Shift: | AUX |
| Name: | Lissimore, John Charles Thomas |
| Payroll: | 025039 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / AUX-FF2 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | AUX |

| Name: | Wensley, John Colin |
| Payroll: | 002166 |
| Position/Rank: | OIC / SO3 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Crighton, Mark Phillip |
| Payroll: | 019159 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / FF-1 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Sullivan, Chris |
| Payroll: | 017105 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / FF-1 |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
| Name: | Robinson, Peter (Robbo) Christopher |
| Payroll: | 002537 |
| Position/Rank: | FF / S-FF |
| Crewed: | Yes |
| Shift: | B10 |
Name: Beil, Jamie Scott  Driver?  No  BA Worn?  No
Payroll: 011414  Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:54:59
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-L  Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:00:07
Crewed: Yes  Total Time: 5 minutes 8 seconds
Shift: AUX

Name: Rule, Michael John  Driver?  Yes  BA Worn?  No
Payroll: 014231  Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:54:59
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF2  Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:00:07
Crewed: Yes  Total Time: 5 minutes 8 seconds
Shift: AUX

Name: French, Peter William  Driver?  No  BA Worn?  No
Payroll: 024861  Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:54:59
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-FF1  Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:00:07
Crewed: Yes  Total Time: 5 minutes 8 seconds
Shift: AUX

Name: Huggins, Jason Alan  Driver?  No  BA Worn?  No
Payroll: 009480  Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:54:59
Position/Rank: OIC / AUX-C  Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:00:07
Crewed: Yes  Total Time: 5 minutes 8 seconds
Shift: AUX

Name: Maxwell, Douglas  Driver?  No  BA Worn?  No
Payroll: 021341  Dispatch Time: 10/01/2011 17:54:59
Position/Rank: FF / AUX-L  Att. End Time: 10/01/2011 18:00:07
Crewed: Yes  Total Time: 5 minutes 8 seconds
Shift: AUX

Other Attendance

Other Agencies Notified?  Yes
Notified by Firecom?  Yes
Last updated by: jburrows
Last updated date: 1/12/11 8:17 AM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notification</th>
<th>By Firecom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A56 Electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A57 Gas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A58 Water</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A59 Police</td>
<td>TOOWOOMBA</td>
<td>Notified &amp; did not attend</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A60 Ambulance</td>
<td>QAS</td>
<td>Notified &amp; did not attend</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A61 SES</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>A62 Other Fire Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>A63 DERM</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>A64 Voluntary Rescue</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A65 Charities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>A66 Gov Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Notified</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>N/A Fire Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>Not Notified</td>
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### Event 1 of 1

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<tr>
<th>Exposure Number:</th>
<th>0</th>
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<tr>
<td>Firecom Problem Type:</td>
<td>RESCUE WATER ALL TYPES</td>
<td>Mob. Property Involved:</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Type:</td>
<td>363-Swift water rescue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions Taken:</td>
<td>210-Rescue, provide assistance, remove from harm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Block A

| Major Event | 363 | Swift water rescue |
| Most Serious Event | 71 | 000 - The reporting person dials 000 or mobile on 112 |
| A9 Method of Notification | 31 | Traveller, passer-by, neighbour |
| A10 Agency/Person Raising Alarm | MCCORMACK, CHRISTOPHER |
| Callers Name | QLD 4350 |
| Address | TOOWOOMBA |
| A12 Local Government Authority | ANDREW PHIEDKE |
| A14 Occupant's Name | Road complex |
| A19 Complex Type Code | Street, road, way (public) |
| A20 Fixed Property Use Code | Local Government |
| A21 Type of Owner | Private |
| A22 Type of Occupant | 10/01/2011 |
| A6 Date of Call | 17:38:29 |
| A8 Time of Call | 2011-01-10 00:00:00.0 |
| A25 Stop Date | 17:59:54 |
| A26 Stop Time | 10/01/2011 |
| A27 Duties Completed Date | 18:13:09 |
| A28 Duties Completed Time | 10/01/2011 |
| End Date | 06:13:09 |
| End Time | Total Incident Time | 0 Days, 0 Hrs, 34 Min, 40 Sec |
| Latitude | -27.546438 |
| Longitude | 151.852524 |
| UBD Grid Reference | NA |
| iZone Classification | No |
| In urban levy area? | ARIA Remote ness |
| A39 Number of CABAs Worn at the Incident | 0 |
| A29 Peak num. personnel at scene | 2 |
| A35 Mutual Aid | No mutual aid |
| A36 Weather Conditions | Rain |
| A37 Delayed Arrival | 92 - Due to distance travelled |
| A42 Problem Encountered | 08 | No problems encountered |
Casualties 0  No injuries or fatalities
Rescues  No rescues
Evacuations None

Event Comments
OWNER OF HONDA MOTORBIKE HAD ATTEMPTED TO CROSS A FLOODED CAUSEWAY THAT WAS 1.5M DEEP AND STALLED. A TRUCK DRIVER THEN DROVE IN AND EFFECTED A RESCUE.
**RECOMMEND THAT RIDER BE FULLY CHARGED FOR ALL QFRS RESOURCES THAT RESPONDED**

HIS ADDRESS IS [REDACTED]

ESCAD Wordback
<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:38:31</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Agency QAS Incident #: 02224195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:44:06</td>
<td>TO</td>
<td>312A [ITO] Vehicle Responding. SWIFT TECHS TO THIS LOCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:47:39</td>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>317C AT STN 12 ADVISED NO LEVEL 2 TECHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:51:02</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>[NIR] Unit Assigned to Incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:52:50</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td>317C [I0I] UNIT 312B RESPONDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:53:37</td>
<td></td>
<td>GOWR41 IS LISTENING CAN RESP FOR TRAFFIC CONTROL IF NEEDED - FCOM ADVISED WILL ADVISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:55:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Page] Dispatch page sent to Unit:313A, Sent From: BNEVCPRSTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:55:19</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>[ICM] 314A CAPT MASON ADV NOT ABLE TO RESPOND - OKEY CUT OFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 17:59:54</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>312A [IST] No further assistance required from responding units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:00:01</td>
<td>K40</td>
<td>312B [IK40] Vehicle Not Required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:00:08</td>
<td>K40</td>
<td>313A [IK40] Vehicle Not Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:00:46</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td>312A [IWB] QPS REQ TO SCENE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:01:37</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>[IANP] QPS Advised,PHONE RANG OUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:03:09</td>
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<td>QAS REQUESTED IF QAS STILL REQ AT SCENE</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:03:46</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td>312A [IWB] NEG HAVE SPOKEN TO VICTIM NO WATER INDUSED - REQ QPS TO GIVE HIM A TICKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:04:02</td>
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<td>QAS STEVE ADVISED NOT REQ</td>
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<td>10/01/2011 18:04:08</td>
<td></td>
<td>QAS STEVE ADVISED NOT REQ</td>
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</tbody>
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Printed by jburrows 5/2/11 11:44 PM Page 5 of 6
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:06:02</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>[IANP] QPS Advised. THEY CAN'T ATTEND - REQUESTED REGO FOR QPS - JOB 1881</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:08:21</td>
<td>AN</td>
<td>[IAN] Authority Notified TRG ADV</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:07:43</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td>312A [WB] ADVISE ERGON CREEK HIGH VOL AND LOW VOL ABOUT TO BE KNOCKED OVER BY WATER - WESTBROOK BRIDGE</td>
</tr>
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<td>10/01/2011 18:09:46</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011 18:11:13</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>[IANP] QPS Advised. PHONE RANG OUT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regional Functional Plan
2009 – 2010

South Western Region

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Wildfire Operational Plan
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<td>Overview</td>
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<td>PRE-DETERMINED INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRES (ICC)</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
<td>Geographical areas managed by pre-determined ICC's</td>
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<td>11.1.1</td>
<td>Toowoomba ICC</td>
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<td>11.1.2</td>
<td>Warwick ICC</td>
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<td>11.1.3</td>
<td>Stanthorpe ICC</td>
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<td>Millmerran ICC</td>
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<td>11.1.5</td>
<td>Crownsnest ICC</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>11.1.6</td>
<td>Tara ICC</td>
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<td>REGIONAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTRE (ROCC)</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td>Purpose of ROCC</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
<td>Location of ROCC</td>
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<td>ROCC Team</td>
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<td>Reporting &amp; Communications Structures</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
<td>REGIONAL TEAMS</td>
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<td>15.0</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION PLANS</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
<td>Toowoomba</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
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<td>15.2</td>
<td>Warwick</td>
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<td>15.3</td>
<td>Stanthorpe</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>Millmerran</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Dalby</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>Tara</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>Crownsnest</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio channel and station Identifier</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Map of Radio repeaters</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1.0 INTRODUCTION

In order to ensure a coordinated response to wildfires, it is essential that all staff within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) South West Region (permanent, auxiliary and volunteers) operate according to policies, procedures and practices as prescribed in the:

- QFRS Operations Doctrine Manual
- Region iZone Plan 2009-2010

1.1 Scope

This plan will operate from 1 August 2009 to 30 July 2010 and applies to all permanent, auxiliary and volunteer Officers and Fire fighters in South Western Region.

This plan is restricted to managing wildfire operations and excludes:

(a) Training associated with fighting wildfires
(b) Community education.

This plan will be implemented in the areas identified in the plan, it must be noted that with such a large Region there will areas where the plan is not applicable.

1.2 Associated Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doc Ref</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional iZone Plan 2009-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operations Doctrine Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>State Operations Coordination Centre Operational Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Regional Fire Coordination Centre Activation Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Commissioners Priorities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2.0 OBJECTIVES

To ensure the required infrastructure for the Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC) and pre-determined Incident Control Centres (ICC’s) are in a constant state of readiness, thereby minimising the risk to fire officers and the community.

This plan has been developed to provide a holistic approach to wildfire operations that includes:

- Wildfire preparedness (infrastructure & resources)
- Proactive strategies (including pre-emptive activities to manage response to wildfires along with weight of initial attack process and activities in place). It is now QFRS policy where possible to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires while they are still in a containable situation. This approach is to remove the threat of wildfires escalating to a point beyond human control in conditions that are severe or are predicted to deteriorate.
- Coordinated wildfire response (permanent, auxiliary and volunteer staff)
- Coordinated wildfire operations at the:
  - Fire ground;
  - Operations Point;
  - Incident Control Centres; and
  - Coordination Centres (Regional and State).

Regional Outcomes

- The ROCC and ICC’s operating according to pre-determined stages, including the required:
  - Staffing
  - Infrastructure

- Meeting the requirements as described in the Operations Doctrine Manual.

Measures

- ROCC infrastructure in place and operational all year round
- Pre-determined ICC infrastructure in place and operational all year round
- Implementation of all aspects of this Wildfire Operational Plan in accordance with the criteria described in the wildfire alert levels.
3.0 LINKAGE TO STRATEGIC PLANS

This Wildfire Operational Plan contributes towards the requirements to achieve:

- Whole-of-Government Priorities
- Department of Emergency Services Corporate Plan 2008-2012
- QFRS Strategic Plan 2004-2008

QFRS Strategic Plan 2008-2012

- **QFRS Goal 2 – Emergency Response**
  To provide effective and efficient operational service delivery

  o Strategies:

    Strategy 2.1 Use appropriate resources and a flexible approach to service delivery that matches community needs
    Strategy 2.2 Provide integrated service delivery that is responsive to the diversity of Queensland communities
    Strategy 2.3 Provide operational best practice equipment, communications and technology to support service delivery

4.0 LINKAGE TO SIOPP- AREA REFERENCE MANUAL

- To complement activities undertaken at station, brigade and regional level under Functional Management the following business rules support this plan.

**Operations Management**

A1

A 1.8 Participate in Regional Planning-Operations Management
A 1.9 Ensure operational readiness

**Operations Management**

A2

A 2.1 Monitor and report seasonal conditions for Bureau of Meteorology
A 2.2 Manage education programs for Bushfire prepared communities.
A 2.3 Identify, Develop and maintain Local Area Plans of risks in your patch
A 2.6 Apply Operations Doctrine to manage response
A 2.7 Implement Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early
## 5.0 WILDFIRE OPERATIONAL PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>Wildfire Operational Plan</th>
<th>Preparedness and Response</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Description:</strong></td>
<td>This Plan provides for:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wildfire preparedness (infrastructure &amp; resources)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Proactive strategies (including pre-emptive activities to manage response to wildfires)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordinated wildfire response (permanent, auxiliary and volunteer staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordinated wildfire operations at the:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Fire ground;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Incident Control / Operational Point;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Incident Control Centres; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Coordination Centres (Regional and State).</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcomes:**
- The ROCC and ICC’s operating according to pre-determined stages, including the required:
  - Staffing
  - Infrastructure
- Meeting the requirements as described in the Operations Doctrine Manual.

**Measures:**
- ROCC infrastructure in place and operational
- Pre-determined ICC infrastructure in place and operational
- Implementation of all aspects of this Wildfire Operational Plan in accordance with the criteria described in the wildfire alert levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity and Measure</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Due Date</th>
<th>Action Officer</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCC infrastructure in accordance with operational requirements to coordinate information and activities between ICC’s and State Operations Coordination Centre</td>
<td>Toowoomba ROCC</td>
<td>1 August 2009</td>
<td>Manager Regional Training</td>
<td>Completed and tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-determined ICC infrastructure (as per ICC standards) in place and operational</td>
<td>6 pre-determined ICC's</td>
<td>1 August 2009</td>
<td>Area Directors Urban and Rural</td>
<td>Mobile ICC Kits completed and allocated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildfire Operational Plan managed in accordance with stated requirements (see Management of Plan) &amp; associated alert levels (see Wildfire Alert Levels)</td>
<td>On-Going</td>
<td>Area Directors Urban and Rural</td>
<td>Utilise information from Mobilisation Plan and ROCC Activation Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5.1 Management of Plan

This Wildfire Operations Plan is for the 2009/2010 financial year. The "fire season" is expected to last from August to December however, the actual duration will depend upon prevailing weather conditions. The Area Directors Urban and Rural will provide advice to the Regional Assistant Commissioner on the progression and severity of the fire season.

Refer to the flow chart below and Section 7.5 (Wildfire Alert Level's Activation Table) for guidance on implementing this plan.

During the fire season, weekly planning meeting will be conducted at the ROCC for the purpose of updating information and group decisions on recommended alert levels.
5.2 Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Title</th>
<th>Position/Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tom Dawson</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner Regional Office Toowoomba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Directors</td>
<td>All Functional Managers &amp; Area Directors Urban and Rural, South Western Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Stations</td>
<td>Anzac Avenue, Kitchener Street and Warwick Fire Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Fire Brigades</td>
<td>All Rural, Village and Izone brigades and Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Waltisbuhl</td>
<td>Regional Manager Rural Operations Regional Office Toowoomba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurie Bill</td>
<td>Manager Strategic Development, Regional Office Toowoomba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCC Co-ordinator</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator Regional Fire Coordination Centre, Anzac Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firecom Manager</td>
<td>Firecom, Toowoomba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Control</td>
<td>Toowoomba, Crows Nest, Stanthorpe, Warwick, Tara and Millmerran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Operations</td>
<td>State Operations Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Rural</td>
<td>Rural Operations Central Office Kedron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Coordinator</td>
<td>State Operations Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Organisational Performance Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.0 INCIDENT CLASSIFICATIONS

There are three levels of incident classifications related to wildfires. These are:

- **Level 1**
  - Small to medium fires that will be contained by the initial attack resources. These are expected to be solely QFRS resources.
  - Typically, these fires can be controlled within 12 hours.
  - These will be managed by mobile control or an Incident Control Centre using local resources.

NB. A wildfire may exceed this time scale and still remain a Level 1 incident if located in inaccessible terrain and not threatening or damaging assets.

Weather characteristics associated with level 1 are:

(a) Temperatures around 30°C  
(b) Humidity less than 30%  
(c) Dew point less than 15°C  
(d) Wind 20km/h or more NNW to SSW  
(e) Drought Index over 80
Level 2
- Fires that are medium to large may require extended attack and likely to involve multiple agencies.
- Assets that are at risk possibly including those assets with environmental cultural and heritage significance.
- Typically, these fires can be controlled within 12 to 24 hours.
- An Incident Control Centre should be implemented using local and regional resources.

Weather characteristics associated with level 2 are:

(a) Temperatures in the mid 30°C's
(b) Humidity is less than 20%
(c) Dew point in single figures or in the minus
(d) Wind 25 to 35km/h NW to SW
(e) Drought Index is over 100

Level 3
- Large and complex fires that may take several days to control and suppress.
- Likely to occur at times of very high or extreme fire weather conditions, with a significant fire risk and potentially uncertain fire behaviour.
- Significant assets at risk with potentially high suppression costs. May also apply when significant environmental, cultural or heritage assets are at risk.
- This type of incident is where the State Incident Management Team (SIMT) could be deployed [supported by local and regional resources].

Weather characteristics associated with level 3 are:

(a) Temperatures are usually in the mid to high 30°C's
(b) Humidity is less than 10%
(c) Dew point is below -5°C
(d) Wind is often above 30km/h and is land based WNW
(e) Drought Index is over 120

In these conditions all fuel becomes available. Usually, only defensive strategies should be employed. Back-burning or burning out areas should not occur, as containment would almost be impossible. Suppression is expected to be very difficult to achieve.
7.0 WILDFIRE ALERT LEVELS

Wildfire Alert Levels are based on the Fire Danger Ratings (FDR) from the Macarthur Forest Fire Danger Meter Mark 5. The ranging from Low to Extreme FDR's are the primary basis for developing and determining a level of pre-emptive response to wildfire management in the Region.

All current and forecasted weather are taken into account when determining the FDR as well as current fire activity.

RMRO, ADRO's and MSD will monitor the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) weather forecast and local Drought Indexes.

The MSD and RMRO will liaise daily during the fire season to determine the alert level the Region should activate.

Operating in conjunction with the Wildfire Alert Levels are pre-emptive regional activities in accordance with the table below.

Southwest Region WAL covers the whole Region. All resources will be at the same alert and preparedness level to meet the highest risk that the Region has to manage.

Part 1 - WILDFIRE ALERT LEVELS

There is an indirect correlation between the Fire Danger Rating Index (FDRI) and the Wildfire Alert Level (WAL). This allows Regions to apply local knowledge to local conditions, with available resources in determining the appropriate WAL and therefore activation.

The decision process for determining the WAL is a combination of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Danger Rating Index</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>Wildfire Alert Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The QFRS will use the Fire Danger Rating Graphic (FDRG) which includes</td>
<td>• Fire activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The FDRI;</td>
<td>• Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Temperature;</td>
<td>• Fire history (in the local area)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relative Humidity;</td>
<td>• Seasonal developments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wind speed;</td>
<td>• Local knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wind direction;</td>
<td>• Potential community risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forest fuel drought factor; and</td>
<td>• Grassland curing and loading data.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Regional Manager, Rural Operations (RMRO) to consult with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) before endorsing the WAL for the whole Region.
## Wildfire Alert Level Activation Table for a Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALERT LEVEL</th>
<th>Weight of Initial Attack *</th>
<th>Rural Region Reporting **</th>
<th>Resources Prepared</th>
<th>Community Warnings ***</th>
<th>Fire Permits +</th>
<th>ICC</th>
<th>ROCC</th>
<th>SOCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Notify and activate relevant staff and agencies</td>
<td>Maximise initial response</td>
<td>RMRO Liaise with Region AC</td>
<td>Optimum resources staged where appropriate</td>
<td>Issue Community Warnings</td>
<td>Implement Fire Ban</td>
<td>Standby</td>
<td>Activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Notify relevant staff and agencies</td>
<td>Increase initial response</td>
<td>RMRO Liaise with Region AC</td>
<td>Additional resources verified</td>
<td>Contact key stakeholders Consider Issuing General Community Advice &amp; Warnings</td>
<td>Consider Local Fire Permits Restrictions</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Alert/Standby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Notify relevant staff</td>
<td>Normal response</td>
<td>Liaise Through RMRO</td>
<td>Additional resources identified</td>
<td>Provide general Community Safety information and advice</td>
<td>Ensure Adequate Fire Permit Conditions</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Watching brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NORMAL BUSINESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These are the minimum activity requirements. Regions may increase these activity categories (columns) based on local conditions (but may not increase or decrease the Alert Levels 1 to 4)

* **Weight of initial attack:** Regions should consider additional appliances and air attack based on the risk and available resources.

** Rural reporting to the Region AC at WAL 3 and 4 because Level 2 or 3 incident(s) are expected to occur or have occurred.

*** **Community Advice and Warnings:** Community advice and warnings should escalate with increasing WAL as described in the Regional Wildfire Readiness Plan

+ **Permit Restrictions and Fire Bans:** RMRO or designate to solely handle attaining Fire Ban approvals along with implementation of Fire Permit variations and instructions in a Region.
7.1 Wildfire Alert - Level 1

Characteristics of Level 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Danger Rating Index</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Wildfire Alert Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperatures &lt;30°C</td>
<td>• Fire activity</td>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humidity &gt; 40%</td>
<td>• Fuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dew Point &gt; 20°C</td>
<td>• Fire history (in the local area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind &lt;15 km/h</td>
<td>• Seasonal developments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought Index &lt; 80</td>
<td>• Local Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential community risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alert Level 1 is normal conditions and fire activity is normal for that time of year or conditions are such that there is no adverse threat of fire. Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team consult regularly to establish future forecasts.

7.2 Wildfire Alert - Level 2

Characteristics of Level 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Danger Rating Index</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Wildfire Alert Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperatures around 30°C</td>
<td>• Fire activity</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humidity less than 30%</td>
<td>• Fuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dew Point less than 15°C</td>
<td>• Fire history (in the local area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind 20 km/h</td>
<td>• Seasonal developments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought Index over 80</td>
<td>• Local Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential community risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team with consideration given to the number of active fires in the Region.

7.3 Wildfire Alert - Level 3

Characteristics of Level 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Danger Rating Index</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Wildfire Alert Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperatures in the mid 30°C</td>
<td>• Fire activity</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humidity less than 20%</td>
<td>• Fuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dew Point in single figures or in the minus</td>
<td>• Fire history (in the local area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind 25 - 35km/h</td>
<td>• Seasonal developments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought Index over 120</td>
<td>• Local Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential community risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team and consideration given to complexity and number of fires burning in the Region.
7.4 Wildfire Alert - Level 4

Characteristics of Level 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Danger Rating Index</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>Wildfire Alert Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperatures in the mid 30s C</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fire activity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humidity less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dew Point less than -5oC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fire history (in the local area)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind is often 30km/h</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seasonal developments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought Index over 120</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential community risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is a guide and the appropriate Wildfire Alert Level should be determined based on the fire danger index, a combination of the variables and discussion between the Rural and Urban Regional Fire Management Team. This is the highest level of alert and consideration will include Fire-fighter safety and communities at risk.
7.5 COMMON ACTIVATION DEFINITIONS

To accommodate the wide variance of emergency situations and events the ICC, ROCC and SOCC common activation levels will be:

- Watching Brief
- Alert
- Standby
- Activation

Watching Brief
The Watching Brief involves monitoring the warnings about a potential incident that may require activation of all or part of a ROCC.

During the Watching Brief the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:

- Watch the developing situation/s during normal business hours and under normal operating conditions and,
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ROCC during normal business hours in Alert
- Keep the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: The Watching Brief does not require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC

Alert
Alert involves ensuring the ICC, ROCC or SOCC is ready to be activated.

During Alert the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:

- Check, prepare and verify the ICC and ROCC can be activated (check that phone lines and faxes will work, emails will work, etc)
- ICC kits are checked for accessibility and completeness
- Watch the developing situation/s during all hours (either on site or off site) and,
- Identify ICC or ROCC staff who can attend the centre within 1 hour
- If not done so in your plans a coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ROCC during all hours in Standby
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ICC during normal business hours in Standby
- Keeps the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: Alert does require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC during normal business hours only
Alert does not require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC
Standby
Standby involves the initial opening the ICC, ROCC or SOCC so it is ready to be fully activated within 60 minutes.

During Standby the nominated representative will ensure the following is carried out:
- Open the ICC or ROCC (make sure that phone lines and faxes are working, emails are working, etc)
- Watch the developing situation/s during all hours and,
- Identify ICC or ROCC staff who can attend the centre within 1 hour
- A coordinator/monitor is appointed to be available to remain in the ICC during all hours in Activation
- Keeps the AC and RMRO or SOCC Management Group informed of unfolding events.

Note: Standby does require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC or SOCC during all hours

Standby does require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC during normal business hours only

Activation
Activation involves expanding the operations and staffing of the ICC or ROCC to meet the current and projected situation.

Note: Activation does require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ROCC during all hours of its operation

Activation does require a coordinator/monitor to remain in the ICC during all hours of its operation.

Scale Down
Scale Down will be advised when the ICC or ROCC is to begin demobilisation. The scale down of the ICC or ROCC may be staged by functional area at the discretion of the coordinator. Debriefing of the operational activities of the ICC, ROCC and SOCC will follow the final stand down.

Approval Process for Activation Levels
The approval process to move into a Watching Brief and then between activations is dependant on the situation. If it is a Wildfire, then:
- The RMRO*, for the Region consults with the AC before deciding on the WAL for the whole Region
- For the SOCC, it involves the approval by one of the following Senior Managers, Deputy Commissioner, QFRS, QAS or Deputy Executive Director, EMQ. The Deputy Commissioners or Deputy Executive Director will delegate a person to activate the SOCC.
7.6 Wildfire Activation Process

Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations

Issue FDRG Daily

Decide WAL/s

Advise appropriate bodies

Issue Community Advice & Warnings

Update FDRG

- Usually <1600 Hrs via email/DESPortal.
- One day forecast and 4th day out.
- Spreadsheet:
  - Temperature;
  - Relative Humidity;
  - FDRIs;
  - Wind speed;
  - Wind direction;

Refer WAL Activation Table (Attachment A):
- Consider the FDRG along with other factors to determine WAL; and
- Shires within a Region can be at different WALs.
- Assistant Commissioner and MSD.
- Regional Manager, Rural Operations (RMRO).
  - Area Directors (both Urban and Rural Operations).
  - FireCom.
  - ROCC.
  - Stations, Brigades and Fire Wardens.
  - Manager, Planning and Research, Rural Operations
  - SOCC.
  - Local Government Authorities.

- WAL 2 – Provide general bushfire safety advice & messages
- WAL 3 – Contact key stakeholders and media
  Issue general information and preparation advice.
  ADRO - Consider fire permit restrictions
- WAL 4 - Issue local and area specific community
7.7 Fire Behaviour

Fire behaviour is influenced by a number of factors:

- Fuel – type, arrangement and quantity.
- Topography, Slope and Aspect – flat, undulating, hilly, north and west, south and east.
- Weather conditions – temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, atmospheric stability and diurnal effects.
- Drought factor and seasonal effects, such as prolonged drought and soil moisture profile.
- Fuel moisture content

Strategies employed will depend on consideration of these factors during the course of the incident.

All of the inputs are variable throughout the day and therefore must be continually monitored during an incident. A sudden drop in humidity can rapidly change the Fire Danger Index and rating and give erratic fire behaviour. Changes in temperature have little or no effect on fire behaviour.

The key elements in the weather to monitor are sudden drops in Relative Humidity and an increase in wind strength. These 2 factors will have an effect on fire behaviour.

The Dew Point should also be observed when planning for night time burning out operations.
7.8 Weight of Initial Attack

Under certain conditions small incidents or incidents of low community impact may develop into devastating fires. Therefore it is critical in times of high fire danger to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires whilst in a containable situation.

It is now QFRS policy where possible to assign additional resources with available aircraft support to rapidly suppress wildfires whilst in a containable situation. This approach is to remove the threat of wildfires escalating to a point beyond human control in conditions that are severe or are predicted to deteriorate.

The policy of the QFRS response during times of high fire danger (eg Wildfire Alert level 3 and 4) is to attack bushfires:

- Hard,
- Heavy, and
- Fast

Air Operations are recommended to be called in as an initial response along with a heavier number of appliances to all bushfires to quickly extinguish the fire before it has a chance to escalate. This policy would involve FireCom automatically calling in an extra appliance or two to an initial bushfire incident and air support if available. Activation of Aircraft must be in accordance with Operations Doctrine (Aircraft operations activation INCDIR 1.1)

As with all incident response, the use of RECEO, PACT and LCES will continuously identify hazards, assess the risk, prioritise objectives and apply tactics to control and resolve the incident.

From the initial response, the Incident Management System (IMS) should expand to maintain control and coordination of resources, identifying and achieving objectives.

The rapid suppression of wildfire incidents may have immediate benefits but there must be the realisation that as fires are suppressed quickly before spreading, the unaffected areas will show an increase in fuel loading. Therefore any strategy of swift and overwhelming action must be supported by land management techniques to reduce the cumulative effect of unburnt fuel loads across a region.
# Wildfire Alert Level's Activation Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Level 1 activities</th>
<th>Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigades</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Normal Business         | • All equipment checked and appliances in a complete state of readiness  
                         | • Consider ceasing hazard reduction burning  
                         | • Contact with Fire Wardens to discuss local conditions  
                         | • Brigade area familiarisation and awareness of local area conditions  
                         | • Assessment of water points (dams, creeks, pools etc)  
                         | • Update risk assessment of known hazards  
                         | • Ensure adequate supply of PPE and drinking water in store  
                         | • Conduct Brigade area inspections and patrols  
                         | • Develop availability lists  
                         | • Develop team roster  
                         | • Be prepared to back up urban crews  
                         | • Be aware, two Brigade response now active  
                         | • Recommendation of 2 Brigade response to all wildfires  
                         | • Strike Teams on Standby  
                         | • All members be prepared and advise First Officer of unavailability  
                         | • Fire-fighters to keep hydrated  
                         | • Where possible, have a crew on standby  
                         | • Strike Team Activated where required  
| **Stations**            |                                                            |                                                                  |                                                               |
| Normal Business         | • All wildfire equipment checked and appliances in a complete state of readiness  
                         | • All staff to keep hydrated  
                         | • Ensure adequate supply of PPE and drinking water in store and on appliance  
                         | • Desist from issuing new permits and cancel all existing permits  
                         | • Where possible, take early lunch break  
                         | • Strike Team on Standby/Activation  
                         | • Re-schedule all non-essential activities  
                         | • All crews to keep hydrated  
| **Group Officers**      |                                                            |                                                                  |                                                               |
| Normal Business         | • Contact with brigades and develop Strike Team format  
                         | • Review of Regional Plan at Group Meetings  
                         | • Activate Strike Teams at Stage 1 or 2, as directed  
                         | • Keep daily contact with Area Director Rural Operations  
                         | • Group command vehicle to respond to incidents  
                         | • Daily contact with Duty Officer or Inspector  
                         | • Strike Teams activated at Stage 2  

Page 20 of 61
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Area Office</th>
<th>Alert level 1 activities</th>
<th>Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normal Business</td>
<td>Monitor Drought Index throughout Area</td>
<td>Ensure appropriate staff proceed to RCOC if required.</td>
<td>Area Director Rural Operations HC as per plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake weekly curing rate assessment</td>
<td>Re-schedule all non-essential activities</td>
<td>Re-schedule all non-essential activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake weekly contact with other Agencies</td>
<td>Frequent monitoring throughout the day of BOM site</td>
<td>Operational staff to be stationed throughout Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor weather patterns</td>
<td>Contact with fire wardens re: Permit cancellation or local restrictions</td>
<td>Administration staff to assist with recording of resource movements across Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Area Office       | Normal Business           | Ensure all ICC’s in zone are resourced                       | Ensure ICC’s in zone are fully operational at Stage 1 alert | Ensure nominated ICC’s in zone are operational in accordance with Stage 1 or Stage 2 activation |
|                   |                          | Ensure adequate supply of PPE, drinking water and Class “A” foam concentrate in store at Area Office | Consider re-scheduling all non-essential duties            | Re-schedule all non-essential duties                        |

| Regional Office   | Normal Business           | Advise all non-operational staff                            | Consider re-scheduling all Regional training               | Re-schedule all Regional training                            |
|                   |                          |                                                             | Community Safety and Regional Training staff on standby (but to continue functional roles) | Re-schedule Community Safety activities and building inspections |
|                   |                          |                                                             | Notify EMQ Area Director of fire weather                   | Ensure ROCC is staffed and replacement roster completed      |

<p>| Manager Regional Training | Normal Business | Ensure ROCC is in a state of readiness and activated at Stage 1 | ROCC is activated at Stage 1 or Stage 2 and replacement roster completed if required | Activate ROCC at Stage 3                                      |
|                          |                 | Notify Duty Officer at State Operations Coordination Centre   | Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC’s         | Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC’s           |
|                          |                 |                                                             | Notify Workshops/technicians                               |                                                             |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Manager Rural Operations</th>
<th>Alert Level 1 activities</th>
<th>Alert Level 2 Activities (in addition to Level 1 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 3 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
<th>Alert Level 4 Activities (in addition to Levels 2 &amp; 3 activities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normal Business</td>
<td>Normal Duties and monitoring weather and any active fires</td>
<td>Discuss weather forecasts a.m. and p.m. with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO.</td>
<td>Participate in Teleconferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaise with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO's of adjoining Regions</td>
<td>Contact ROCC as required</td>
<td>Implement fire bans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure Regional Air Ops plans are in place</td>
<td>Monitor any active fires</td>
<td>Re-schedule all non-essential tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-ordinate Air ops roster</td>
<td>Advise DDMG's and LDMG's</td>
<td>Ensure a roster for Air Attack supervisors is in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Audit all level 2 and 3 IMT’s</td>
<td>Review community warning alerts and adjust accordingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaise with State Air Desk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure remote air base is in readiness for activation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager Strategic Development</td>
<td>Normal Business</td>
<td>Normal Duties and monitoring weather and any active fires</td>
<td>In consultation with AC ensure ROCC is activated and that Ministerial documentation is readied.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaise with Assistant Commissioner</td>
<td>Mobilise to incident with Minister if required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss weather forecasts a.m. and p.m. with SWR Management, DRO and RMRO relative to forthcoming fire conditions</td>
<td>Consider 24-hour operation to support active ICC’s and ROCC</td>
<td>Monitor any active fires and prepare Ministerial documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in Teleconferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Commissioner</td>
<td>Normal Business</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advise QAS, EMQ &amp; QPS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilise to incident with Minister if required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advise Media Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firecom - Weight of Response</td>
<td>Normal Business</td>
<td>FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident</td>
<td>FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances &amp; air support as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident</td>
<td>FireCom operators understand when and how to send extra appliances &amp; air support as part of an initial response to a bushfire incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td>Fire Spotter Recon as required</td>
<td>Daily Recon Morning &amp; Evening</td>
<td>Daily Recon Morning &amp; Evening</td>
<td>Daily Recon Morning &amp; Evening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Attach as required</td>
<td>Air Attach as required</td>
<td>Air Attach as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.0 ACTIVATION DESCRIPTORS

To assist with the implementation of this Plan, the following descriptors provide guidance to fire officers.

9.1 Strike Teams

The following are considered the minimum numbers available. The Regional Coordinator in the Regional Fire Coordination Centre will assemble additional Strike Teams as required to manage the number and scale of wildfire incidents.

9.1.1 Rural Strike Teams

- Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
  Assembly point – Fire Station

- Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
  Assembly point – Fire Station
  Strike Team (5 medium attacks + 1 light attack)
  Assembly point –

9.1.2 Urban Strike Teams

Strike Teams are assembled at these identified areas within South West Region:
Area One Strike Team will be assembled at Kitchener Street Fire Station and deployed as required.

Area Two Strike Teams are assembled at Warwick Fire Station and deployed as required.

Area Three Strike Teams will be assembled at Dalby Fire Station and deployed as required.

Note when strike teams are deployed within the Region strike team members can expect to work 10 – 12 hour shifts and all team members should be prepared for 72 hour deployment. Once the appliances have been deployed to an Incident, change over
Staff may be transported by bus to the Incident.

Stage 1 Activation

- Urban Strike Teams - Team Leader and crews notified by Regional Coordinator and placed on standby
- Rural Strike Teams - Team Leader and crews notified by Area Director Rural Operations and placed on standby/alert

Stage 2 Activation

- Strike Teams mobilised as required and placed on standby at designated locations.
- For Rural Strike Teams, it will be in accordance with 9.1.1, above.
For Urban Strike Teams, it will be at Anzac Ave, Goondiwindi, Dalby or Warwick Fire Stations. This will be determined by the Assistant Commissioner and the Regional Coordinator depending upon the destination of the Strike Team.

9.2 Incident Control Centres

South Western Region has 6 Incident Control Centres (ICC's) capable of managing Level 3 wildfire incidents. These are located at Highfields, Crows Nest, Warwick, Stanthorpe, Millmerran and Tara (Refer Sections 10.0 and 11.0). Supporting these Centres are numerous Incident Control Centres capable of managing Level 2 wildfire incidents. Level 1 wildfire incidents will be managed from mobile resources.

There are two stages of activation for the 6 pre-determined ICC's, being Stage 1 and Stage 2. Activation is by the Team Leaders, after advice received from the Regional Coordinator and Area Director Rural Operations (based on weather conditions and fire activity).

Stage 1 Activation
Team Leaders ensure that their ICC's are fully resourced with equipment and staff identified to assume functional roles in an Incident Management Team. Refer to the Table in Section 7.5 for instances when this occurs.

Stage 2 Activation
The pre-determined ICC's are operational with staff and volunteers. This level of response can be for going fires or as a pre-emptive action due to Wildfire Alert Levels 2 or 3 being determined as required to be activated. Each of these levels of activation may be at either high or low levels. Refer to the Table in Section 7.5.

9.2.1 Activation of pre-determined Incident Control Centres
A pre-determined ICC will be activated:
- When two or more Incident Control Centres (fixed or mobile) are operating in a zone covered by a pre-determined ICC.
- When an incident escalates to Level 2 or Level 3.
- At the direction of the Assistant Commissioner, Area Directors or the Regional Fire Coordination Centre.

9.3 Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC)

9.3.1 Activation of ROCC
There are three stages of activation for Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC), being Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3. Activation is by the Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations and is in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria.
Stage 1

The Regional Coordinator, Planning Officer and RMRO are liaising and monitoring weather conditions and wildfire activity in the Region. This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.5. This does not necessarily require the ROCC room to be opened.

Stage 2

The ROCC is activated with 4 staff assigned to monitor and support incidents or in preparation of fire outbreaks due to predicted fire weather. The staff should consist of:

- Manager Regional Training
- Manager Strategic Development
- Planning Officer
- Admin Officer

This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.5.

Stage 3

The ROCC is fully operational with a minimum of 4 staff, all with specified roles. Refer Section 12.5 for details on the management of the ROCC.

This will be in accordance with the Wildfire Alert Level criteria. Refer to Table in Section 7.6.

Regional Manager Rural Operations to have All Air Observers in Southwest Region on standby
10.0 REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

To provide the appropriate levels of command, control and coordination of wildfires, the following infrastructure has been developed:

- Pre-determined Incident Control Centres (ICC's), located at:
  - Highfields Fire Station
  - Crows Nest (Council Office)
  - Warwick Fire Station
  - Stanthorpe Fire Station
  - Millmerran (Council Office)
  - Tara (Council Office)
- Regional Operations Coordination Centre, located at Regional Training Anzac Avenue

10.1 Overview

The following is an overview of the regional infrastructure.
11.0 PRE-DETERMINED INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRES

It is expected that wildfire activity will commence at the lower, or Level 1, stage of incident progression. Statistics indicate that approximately 96% of wildfires will not progress beyond this level of activity.

However, depending upon the weather conditions, fuel load and curing rate, approximately 3% will progress to Level 2 stage. In this stage, the appropriate Incident Control Centre should be activated to manage the incident.

Further, approximately 1% of wildfires will progress to the Level 3 stage. In the event of this occurring, the Incident Control Centre will either be discontinued or revert to a Divisional Command and control will be transferred to one of the pre-determined ICC's capable of managing a Level 2/3 incident.

11.1 Geographical areas managed by pre-determined ICC's

When one of the 6 ICC's is established, it will manage all wildfire activity in the local authority's area in which it is located. Responsibility for managing wildfires in specific geographical areas is the relevant Command Area Director and/or Area Director Rural Operations. Coordination of urban and rural resources will be used to protect life, property and the environment, regardless of whether the wildfire is in an urban or rural area.

11.1.1 Toowoomba ICC (Highfields Station)

The Toowoomba ICC will manage Level 2 and 3 wildfires throughout Area One Toowoomba, including the localities of:
- Toowoomba Area
- The Area identified as the Escarpment Area
- Crows Nest area
- Cambooya area
- Rosalie area

Team Leader
- Area Director, Area 1Toowoomba

Staging
- Highfields Fire Station.
## South Western Region Wildfire Operational Plan 2009-2010

### Highfields ICC IMT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fireground to ICC</th>
<th>VHF repeater</th>
<th>UHF SES (portable repeater)</th>
<th>ICC Contact Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69 67 71</td>
<td>Talk around and 1/3</td>
<td>11, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Controller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Fax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Email: iccsouthwesttoow@emergency.qld.gov.au
User name: iccsouthwesttoow
Password: iccsouthwesttoow

### QFRS Rural Brigades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Fire Ground VHF</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabarlah</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peachy Gromesville</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagners Flat</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowrie Little Plain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambooya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anduramba</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooyar Town</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooyar District</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southbrook Linthorpe</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pittsworth</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irongate Rossvale</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowrie Mountain &amp; Wagners Flat</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peranga</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampton</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravensbourne</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pinelands</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gomaren</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haden &amp; District</td>
<td>18 see above</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maclagen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Binga</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emu Creek</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### QFRS Urban Brigades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Urban Brigades</th>
<th>Fire ground UHF</th>
<th>Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitchener Street Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td>82 (46 &amp; 61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anzac Avenue Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td>82 (46 &amp; 61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsworth Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakey Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Radio Channel</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QPWS</td>
<td>Ch 111 vhf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toowoomba Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Forestry</td>
<td>(100 ch/1000ch)</td>
<td>VHF 85/123 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pechey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarraman</td>
<td>VHF 86/125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (SES Ch's 11&amp;12) Repeaters</td>
<td>UHF 194/195</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toowoomba</td>
<td>UHF 2(5,1,3) 202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsworth</td>
<td>UHF 5 (1,3) 205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest</td>
<td>UHF 4 (5) 204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambooya</td>
<td>UHF 1(2,3) 201</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosalie</td>
<td>UHF 5 (2,4) 205</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest Council service centre</td>
<td>VHF 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambooya Council service centre</td>
<td>VHF 93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Ch 34 (Repeater)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPS Comms Toowoomba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UHF repeaters – Mt Kynock 46
- Picnic Point 61
- Bald Hill 60

VHF repeaters – Anduramba (Local Repeater 71)
- Picnic Point (Local Repeater 69)
- Pittsworth (local Repeater 67)
- Perseverance (Local Repeater 35)

### 11.1.2 Warwick ICC (Warwick Training Room and Area Office)

Warwick ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout Warwick Shire, including the localities of:
- Allora;
- Clifton;
- Killarney;
- Inglewood (minimal Fire ground use Forestry VHF 115)
- Warwick.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warwick ICC IMT</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF SES (portable)</th>
<th>ICC Contact Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fireground to ICC</td>
<td>66,61,67,65</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>11, 12</td>
<td>Sat Phone (CUG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incident Controller
Operations
Planning
Logistics
ICC Fax

NB Last 4 digits of phone number is code for displyan line activation
Team Leader

- Area Director, Warwick and nominated Station Officer, plus Regional Support.

Staging
- Can be facilitated at Warwick Fire Station or local Council facility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Urban Brigades</th>
<th>VHF (local repeater)</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF</th>
<th>Channel 83 - Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allora</td>
<td>66 / 61</td>
<td>1/3/5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42, 44</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42, 44 talk around</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>66 / 61</td>
<td>1/3/5</td>
<td>82,83</td>
<td>46, 61 and 42, 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Killarney</td>
<td>66 / 65</td>
<td>1/3/5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42, 44</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>42, 44 talk around</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54 talk around</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42, 43, 44</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42, 43, 44 talk around</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UHF Repeater sites: Bacons Hill (42), Passchendale (43) Bony Mountain (44), Bracker Forest (54)
VHF Repeater site: Braeside Ch 66, Pittsworth 67, Karara 61, Killarney 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Firecom</th>
<th>UHF CB</th>
<th>Fireground VHF</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massie</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>John Davis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tom Willet</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Len Chandler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allora</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7, 20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Don Burge</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Len Chandler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freestone &amp; District</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5, 7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Alan Payne</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rod Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leslie</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>Tim Johnson</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>E Benz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratten Bony Mountain</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jeff Clegg</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H Mob</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mark Paroz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karara Leyburn</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9, 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Michael Welsh</td>
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<td>Leyburn Town</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Stephen Evans</td>
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<td>Robert Blackett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greymare</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Don Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Radio Ch</td>
<td>Contacts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Glen</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Mal Marshall, John Saunders, Peter Keogh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wildash</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>John Meyer, Peter Keogh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swan &amp; Emu Creek</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Graham Hoffman, Robert Bradford</td>
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<tr>
<td>Killarney District</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Bruce Gustafson, Rod Peterson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalveen</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Jim Mitchell, Nigel Shattler</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gladfield Maryvale</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Mal Stacey</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Warwick Group/Support</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Alan Payne, Mal Stacey, Michael Welsh</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Agencies</th>
<th>Radio Ch</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Passchendale</td>
<td>VHF 75/111</td>
<td>Howard Ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>VHF 79/115</td>
<td>Mark Wren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPWS</td>
<td>VHF 118,119,120</td>
<td>Martin Ambrose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES Warwick</td>
<td>SES UHF 1, 11, 12 Firecom UHF 94=SES 11 95=SES 12 201=SES 1</td>
<td>John Newby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Downs Council Warwick Council service centre</td>
<td>VHF 92 (QRFS INC CH. 98/92)</td>
<td>Peter See- Dir. Eng. Services, Ben Weeks- Tech. Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### South Western Region Wildfire Operational Plan 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Centre</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th></th>
<th>VHF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clifton Council service centre</td>
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<td>John keen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goondiwindi Regional Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ron Gurney (2IC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood service centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ian Badham – Branch Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Crisp – Dist Engineer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QAS Warwick</td>
<td>VHF 52</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geoff Dunning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Warwick</td>
<td>UHF 90 (190)</td>
<td></td>
<td>District Inspector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**11.1.3 Stanthorpe ICC (Stanthorpe Fire Station)**

The Stanthorpe ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout the Stanthorpe Shire, including the localities of:

- Stanthorpe;
- Happy Valley;
- Sugarloaf;
- Wallangara; and
- Ballendean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stanthorpe ICC IMT</th>
<th>VHF (Mt Dillon and Chrsties Target, local repeaters)</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF SES (portable repeater)</th>
<th>ICC Contact Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fireground to ICC</td>
<td>58, 59, 63</td>
<td>Talk around and 1/3</td>
<td>11, 12</td>
<td>Sat Phone (CUG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Controller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Fax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Email: [email protected]
User name: [username]
Password: [password]

UHF Repeaters: Mt McKenzie (40), Mt Marley (41), Passchendadel (43)
VHF Repeaters: Christie’s Target 58, Mt Dillon 59, Amiens 63
Team Leader
- Area Director Warwick and nominated Station Officer plus Regional Support.

Staging Area
At the rear car park of Stanthorpe Fire Station and Council depot or shopping centre car park if required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Fireground VHF</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Granite Belt</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Michael Caitlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drumsleed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Gordon Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applethorpe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Scott Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadwater-Amiens</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Howard Sweet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallow</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Edward Boyce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarloaf</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Peter Neville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorndale Glen Applin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>David (Ian) Townsend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severnlea West</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tony Scuderi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenlyon</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>William (John) Pratt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severnlea East and Mt Tully</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Michael Boucher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eukey</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Robert Pugno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballandean</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Allan Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyberba</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Greg Saxby</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Urban Brigades</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF</th>
<th>Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stanthorpe</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>41, 43</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallangarra</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Agencies</th>
<th>Radio Ch</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Passchendale</td>
<td>VHF111</td>
<td>Howard Ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPWS Girraween</td>
<td>VHF 111, 113</td>
<td>John Cowburn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UHF 12</td>
<td>Jolene McLellan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES Stanthorpe</td>
<td>UHF 10 (210)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 11.1.4 Millmerran ICC

Millmerran ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout the Shire of Millmerran in the localities of:

- Scrubby Creek
- Burnt Brigalow
- Captains Mountain
- Yandilla
- Forest Pines
- East Millmerran
- North Millmerran
- Bringalilly & Weir River
- Leyburn Town
- Pampas
- South Millmerran

#### Team Leader
Area Director Goondiwindi and Auxiliary Captain and Rural Operations Toowoomba Area Office.

#### Staging Area
Millmerran Fire Station

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Fireground VHF</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scrubby Creek</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dennis Dwyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burnt Brigalow</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>David Anderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains Mountain</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Paul Antonio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yandilla</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Marcus Salomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Pines</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>David Downing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Millmerran</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lindsay Simmons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Millmerran</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Keith Lindenmayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringalilly</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>John (Graham) Chandler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weir River</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Peter Markham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyburn Town</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Stephen Evans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampas</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Michael Hegarty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Millmerran</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Philip Thornton</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1/3</td>
<td>62</td>
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### Other Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Radio Ch (100/1000)</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources &amp; Minerals DPI</td>
<td>80/118</td>
<td>Wayne Kapernick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Creek (Repeater)</td>
<td>80/118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82/115 – 119 (RTA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karara (Repeater)</td>
<td>76/112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78/110 – 113 (RTA)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>UHF 90 (190)</td>
<td>SA Ryan</td>
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<tr>
<td>QPWS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin Ambrose</td>
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### Millmerran Service Centre Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseer</td>
<td>WL Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES Local Controller</td>
<td>WL Johnson</td>
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</tbody>
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### QAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millmerran Hospital</td>
<td>Ian Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management Officer</td>
<td>P Le Griffon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Cox</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millmerran &amp; Dist Community Support Services</td>
<td>G D Fogarty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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UHF repeaters: Mt Domville 62
VHF repeaters: Captains Mtn 57
Email: [redacted]
User name: [redacted]
Password: [redacted]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MillmerranICC IMT</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF SES (portable repeater)</th>
<th>ICC Contact Numbers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fireground to ICC</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Talk around and 1/3</td>
<td>11, 12</td>
<td>Sat Phone (CUG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Controller</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>ICC Fax</td>
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<td>Spare No's</td>
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<td>Line 4</td>
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**NB. LAST 4 DIGITS OF PHONE NUMBER ARE DISPLAN CODE NUMBERS TO ACTIVATE PHONE**

AIRSTRIPS \ WATER SUPPLIES \ STAGING AREAS \ SAFEHAVENS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>GPS COORDINATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millmerran Airport</td>
<td>Airstrip</td>
<td>Cecil Plains Road</td>
<td>S27.86362</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.27574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAA Phil Communss</td>
<td>Airstrip &amp; Staging Area</td>
<td>Moffat Road Rural No. 10125</td>
<td>S27.98541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.09818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeater Site</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blackwell Road Rural No. 113</td>
<td>S27.92934</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>E151.18318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply 1</td>
<td>Dam Heliattack</td>
<td>Blackwell Road Rural No. 113</td>
<td>S27.98652</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.09335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply 2</td>
<td>Dam Heliattack</td>
<td>Blackwell Road Rural No. 113</td>
<td>S27.98768</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.08023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Supply 3 Harry Disiers</td>
<td>Dam Heliattack Alternate supply</td>
<td>Kimberley Fields Drive, Lot 33</td>
<td>S27.97187</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safehaven</td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.03027</td>
</tr>
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<td>E151.02925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply 4 Mr Dawson</td>
<td>Dam Heliattack</td>
<td>Lot 16 Rd No. 257, Rosella Avenue, Forest Pines</td>
<td>S27.97692</td>
</tr>
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<td>E150.95700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply 5</td>
<td>Bore &amp; tanks</td>
<td>Poola Macca Drive, Scrubby Creek</td>
<td>S27.98496</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.06721</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Supply 6</td>
<td>Bore &amp; tanks</td>
<td>Cnr Thyme Rd &amp; Basil Dr, Forest Pines</td>
<td>S27.96258</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.01520</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scrubby Creek Community Hall</td>
<td>Staging Area</td>
<td>Cnr Primrose Dr &amp; Camellia Crt, Scrubby Creek</td>
<td>S27.97834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E151.05662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Pines Rural Brigade</td>
<td>Staging Area</td>
<td>Cnr Gore Hwy &amp; Rosella Av, Forest Pines</td>
<td>S27.97970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E150.98116</td>
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</table>
11.1.5 CROWSNEST ICC

Crowsnest ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout the localities of Crowsnest, parts of Rosalie in the localities of:

- Northern part of Toowoomba escarpment
- Hampton
- Ravensborne
- Cooyar
- Mt Binga
- Emu Creek

Team Leader
Area Director Rural Operations supported by the Crowsnest Rural Fire Brigade Group Officer

Staging Area
Crowsnest Showgrounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Fire Ground VHF</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabarlah</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peachy Groomesville</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagners Flat</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anduramba</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooyar Town</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooyar District</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irongate Rossvale</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowerl Mountain &amp; Wagners Flat</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peranga</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampton</td>
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<td>Ravensbourne</td>
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<td>Pinelands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gomaren</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Haden &amp; District</td>
<td>18 see above</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maclagen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mount Binga</td>
<td>20</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Urban Brigades</th>
<th>Fire ground UHF</th>
<th>Voting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td>Ch 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td>Ch 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highfields Station</td>
<td>CH 1/3</td>
<td>V82</td>
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</table>

Crowsnest Rural Fire Brigade  Timber Road Crowsnest Ph 4698 1133
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Agencies</th>
<th>Radio Ch (100/1000)</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Pechey</td>
<td>Ch123 vhf</td>
<td>Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIC mob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>David Adam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greg Stuckey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowsnest Council</td>
<td>VHF 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>UHF 204</td>
<td>Les King</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UHF repeaters: Picnic Point Ch 61, Mt Kynock Ch 46, Bald Hill Ch 60, Perserverance Ch 26
VHF repeaters: Mt Perserverance Ch 35, Anduranba Ch 71, Picnic Point Ch 69

Crowsnest Incident Control Centre
Toowoomba Council Building
Crowsnest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crowsnest ICC IMT</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>UHF SES (portable repeater)</th>
<th>ICC Contact Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fireground to ICC</td>
<td>Ch35/71</td>
<td>Talk around and 1/3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Controller</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>ICC Fax</td>
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<td>Data lines Ops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data line IC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Council chambers layout

The training room  Operations and Planning
The Chambers      Logistics
The meeting Room   Incident Controller

Building entry key
IT/Comms assistance

Email: [redacted]

Page 39 of 61
11.1.6 TARA ICC
Tara ICC will manage Level 2/3 wildfires throughout most parts of the Dalby Regional Council.
A backup location to set up an ICC is at the Council Chambers in Tara. Contacts for the use of this building.

Doug Bogoure
Office: 
Mob: 
Home: 

Team Leader
- Area Director Dalby, and Area Director Rural Operations Toowoomba and support staff

Staging Area
- Tara Showgrounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Fireground VHF</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bennett’s School Road</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wimbah South</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weranga Goramba</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolmoh</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogan Condamine</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condamine</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QFRS Urban Brigades</th>
<th>Fireground UHF</th>
<th>Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tara</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
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Other Agencies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Radio Ch (100/1000)</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPI Inglewood</td>
<td>77/115</td>
<td>Mark Wren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Merinda</td>
<td>78/116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Karara</td>
<td>76/112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Western Creek</td>
<td>80/118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Kumbarilla</td>
<td>81/119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Bunya Mountains</td>
<td>83/120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Talk Around (RTA)</td>
<td>78/110 – 113 (RTA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82/115 – 119 (RTA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84/120 – 121 (RTA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| SES                          | 87/122-127 RTA      |         |
| Tara Shire Council           |                     |         |
| Police                       | UHF 90 (190)        |         |

UHF Repeaters: Nil in area closest Mt Kiangarow 50
Bennett RFB Tara shed Chinchilla 51
Miles 52
Dalby 48 (NIS)

VHF Repeaters: Bennett RFB Shed Tara 27, Bunya Mtns 73

Email:
12.0 REGIONAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTRE

The Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC) forms an integral part of wildfire management in South Western Region. The ROCC can assist Incident Controllers to meet incident management resourcing issues, and to assist regional requirements to report the current status of all incidents to the State Operational Coordination Centre (SOCC). These functions directly assist in managing demands placed on individual Incident Controllers by the complexity of the incidents being managed.

12.1 Purpose of Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC)
The purpose of the ROCC is to:

- Provide strategic direction and operational support to IMT’s operating within South West Region; and
- Receive and supply relevant information from/to the SOCC) and Assistant Commissioner (see flowchart in Section 12.6 and refer to Operations Doctrine).

12.2 Location of ROCC and resources
The Regional Operations Coordination Centre is located at:
Regional Training
201 Anzac Avenue

This location also provides access to computers linked to Firecom Brisbane, Firecom Southeast, Firecom North coast and Firecom South West to enable the ROCC team to monitor all available resources.

Also available are desktop computers, scanner, maps of South West Region, Regional LSOPS, VHF and UHF radio capability all forms manual and electronic and stationery.
12.3 ROCC Team

Manager Strategic Development

Assistant Commissioner

Regional Manager Rural Operations

Planning Coordinator

Air Observer

ROCC Coordinator

Media Liaison

Administration Support
12.4 Staffing of ROCC

The following teams will be used when Stage 3 activation of the ROCC occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Team 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Coordinator</td>
<td>Manager Strategic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Community Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Agency Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Coordinator*</td>
<td>Planning Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Admin Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Data Entry</td>
<td>Regional Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Liaison Coordinator</td>
<td>Area Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toowoomba- Area 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCC Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FireCom Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Coordinator</td>
<td>Regional Admin support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT/Comms Support</td>
<td>Manager Regional Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies/Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Manager Rural Operations (RMRO) to audit and mentor IMT’s and report to the Regional Co-ordinator at the ROCC on future requirements of resourcing for incidents and operational effectiveness.
12.5 Roles & Responsibilities of ROCC Team Members

Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC. NOTE – the Optimum, Standard and Basic examples provided in Operational Guide #3 to allow for different resources available in each Region and to allow the ROCC to grow and contract depending on the level of incidents occurring.

12.5.1 Regional Coordinator

The Regional Coordinator reports directly to the Assistant Commissioner QFRS.

The functional duties of the Regional Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC.

12.5.2 Regional Planning Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Planning Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the RFCC

- Administrative Support (reports to Planning Coordinator)

  The functional duties of the Administrative Support include the following tasks:
  Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC.

12.5.3 Regional Operations/Liaison Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Operations/Liaison Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the RFCC

12.5.4 Regional Logistics Coordinator

The functional duties of the Regional Logistics Coordinator include the following tasks:
Refer to the Operational Guide #3 for details on the management structure and roles of the ROCC

NOTE – these are the suggested minimum positions in the ROCC as shown in the basic example in Operational Guide #3. Please feel free to add more positions as may be required for your Region but only as per those outlined in Operational Guide #3.

12.5.5 Communications Officer

12.5.6 Data Support Officer

12.5.7 Agency Liaison Officer

12.5.8 Finance Officer
12.6 Reporting & Communications Structures

State Operations Coordination Centre
Kedron Park

Assistant Commissioner
South Western Region

Regional Operations Coordination Centre

Firecom
(Communication is triangular between RFCC, Firecom & ICC’s)

Regional Incident Management Team No. 1
Divisions
Sectors
Strike Teams/Task Forces

Regional Incident Management Team No. 2
Divisions
Sectors
Strike Teams/Task Forces

Regional Incident Management Team No. 3
Divisions
Sectors
Strike Teams/Task Forces
12.7 De-Commissioning of ROCC
(a) The Assistant Commissioner is to be advised that ROCC is closing down
(b) Make an entry on the general log that ROCC is being deactivated
(c) Make up Room and return all equipment to storage areas.
(d) Print out required data from the electronic white board. Print and put with hard copy of general log attached.
(e) Hard copy documentation sent to RHQ for archiving and future reference
(f) Clean off any unnecessary details from white board and table top
(g) Return all keys to Regional Training
(h) Clean up room and return condiments to storage cupboard.
(i) Restock regional PPE supplies as required

12.8 Preparedness and Maintenance of ROCC
In order to ensure the ROCC is in an operational mode at all times, it is essential that the ROCC is checked on a regular basis and the process of checking is recorded. This will be completed once every three months (or more often in times of adverse weather conditions).

The Manager Regional Training, in conjunction with the Planning Officer will manage theses duties

The purpose of this preparedness and maintenance procedure is to:

(a) Test the functionality of all equipment; and
(b) Provide a competency maintenance program for all personnel who may be deployed to the ROCC
(c) To periodically test the procedures in this document, including those that are outlined in the Regional Operations Coordination Centre Activation Plan.

These directives ensure the Assistant Commissioner’s priorities of maintaining an efficient and effective operational response capacity is in place and managed.
13 Regional Teams

13.1 Incident Management

The following positions have been identified as pre-planned Incident Management Teams

**Team 1**

Area Director Rural Operations Toowoomba  
Manager Community Safety  
Area Director Dalby  
Area Training and Support Officer Rural Operations Toowoomba  
Area Director Warwick  
Admin Officer  
Local Rural Fire Brigade rep  
Other agencies as required

**Team 2**

Area Director Rural Operations Roma  
Area Director Goondiwindi  
Regional Training Officer  
Izone Officer  
Area Director Roma  
Admin Officer  
Local Rural Fire Brigade rep  
Other agencies reps as required

**Support Staff to Team 1 and 2**

Manager Regional Training  
Area Director Charleville  
Brigade Training and Support Officer Rural Operations Toowoomba x 2  
Safety assessment Officer x 2  
Regional Training officers x 2  
Building assessment officer x 2
14 Air Operations.

14.1
The Southwest Region Air operations is managed and co-ordinated by the Regional Manager Rural Operations (RMRO).

All requests for air operations must follow the correct procedure - Incident Directive 1.3

The RMRO will take pre-emptive actions during the fire season and dispatch an air observer to provide quick detection of any wildfires. In these cases the air observer will communicate directly with Firecom in the absents of an IMT operating. The air observer will also advise Firecom Southwest of the aircrafts flight plans.

In the event that an ICC is established and functioning, the aircraft will communicate with the incident controller for tasking.

14.2
The team of air observers in Southwest Region is as follows:

Warren Buckley      SO Toowoomba
Scott Frame        Senior Fire Fighter Toowoomba
Mark Haddow        Senior fire fighter Toowoomba
Col Neal           ATSO Roma
Dave Downing       First Officer Forest Pines Rural Fire Brigade
Peter Crisp        Volunteer fire fighter
John Boucher       Volunteer fire fighter

Air Attack supervisors

Warren Buckley
Col Neal

14.3
Equipment.

A cache of equipment has been developed to support the establishment of an airbase. Currently this is in a trailer located at the ROCC.

An aircraft radio pack is located in the Roma Area office.

An Air Observer cache is located in the cabinet in the Regional Training Kitchen. Access is via the external door using the keypad. Each observer has a key for the cabinet.
15. Communication Plans

The following are radio communication plans assigned to each of the designated Incident Control Centers

Toowoomba (Highfields)
Warwick
Stanthorpe
Millmerran
Tara
Crowsnest
Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Highfields ICC

- FIRECOM
  - UHF 61/46
    - STAGING AREA
      - VHF 10
        - UHF 9
    - ICC
      - VHF 69/35
        - 67/71
      - COMMAND CHANNEL
        - SECTOR COMMANDER
          - VHF11
            - UHF 3
          - APPLIANCES
        - SECTOR COMMANDER
          - VHF 12
            - UHF 5
          - APPLIANCES
        - SECTOR COMMANDER
          - VHF 13
            - UHF 7
          - APPLIANCES
        - SECTOR COMMANDER
          - VHF 14
          - APPLIANCES

Command Channels:
- VHF 69 Picnic Point Repeater
- VHF 35 Perseverance Repeater
- VHF 67 Mt Parker, Pittsworth
- VHF 71 Anduramba

Alternative Command Channels:
- Forestry VHF 114 Pechey
- Forestry VHF 123 Pechey

Alternative Fireground Channels:
- VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
- VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
- Portable UHF Fireground repeater
- channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
- 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
- repeater channels are utilised)

Rosalie, Crowsnest and Pittsworth
- Group Rural Fire Brigades.
- Cambooya Rural Fire Brigade

Toowoomba (stations 11 and 12,
- Highfields, Pittsworth and Oakey
- Urban stations

Page 51 of 61
Command Channels
VHF 66 Braeside Repeater
VHF 61 Karara Repeater
VHF 65 Killarney Repeater

Alternative Command Channels
Forestry VHF 113 Cunningham Range
Forestry VHF 112 Karara
Forestry VHF 117 Karara

Alternative Fireground Channels
VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
Portable UHF Fireground repeater
channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised)

Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if not used for command.

Warwick Group Rural Fire Brigades
Warwick, Allora, Clifton, Killarney and Inglewood Urban stations
Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Stanthorpe ICC

Command Channels
VHF 63 Amiens Repeater
VHF 58 Christie's Target Repeater
VHF 59 Mt Dillon Repeater

Alternative Command Channels
Forestry VHF 111 Passchendaele
QPWS VHF 110 Christie's Target

Alternative Fireground Channels
VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
Portable UHF Fireground repeater channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised)

Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if
not used for command.

Stanthorpe Group Rural Fire
Brigades

Stanthorpe, Warwick and
Wallangarra Urban stations
**Command Channels**

VHF 57 Captains Mountain Repeater
VHF 67 Pittsworth

**Alternative Command Channels**

Forestry VHF 118 Western Creek

**Alternative Fireground Channels**

VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22

Portable UHF Fireground repeater channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised)

Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if not used for command.

---

**Millmerran Rural Residential Rural Fire Brigades.**

Millmerran and Pittsworth urban brigades
Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Dalby ICC

**Command Channels**

VHF 55 Kumbarilla Repeater (NIS)
VHF 73 Bunya Mountains (NIS)
For VHF 120 Bunya Mountains
For VHF 119 Kumbarilla

**Alternative Command Channels**
As above

**Alternative Fireground Channels**

VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
Portable UHF Fireground repeater channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised)

Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if not used for command.

Wilkie Creek, The Ridge, Bell Centre, Kalmkillenbun, Warra and Tara Blocks Rural Fire Brigades.

Dalby, Jandowae, Chinchilla and Cecil Plains urban brigades
Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – (Wieambilla South ICC)
TARA

Command Channels
VHF 27 Bennett Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
Kumbarilla Forestry VHF 119
Western Creek Forestry VHF 118
Alternative Fireground Channels
VHF 11, VHF 12, VHF 13, VHF 14
VHF 15, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
Portable UHF Fireground repeater channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels 1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these repeater channels are utilised)
Alternative Command Channels can be used for Fireground communications if not used for command.

Tara Rural Fire Brigades
Weranga Goranba Bennett,
Wieambilla South, Tohnah, Kogan and Tara and Chinchilla Urban Stations
Local Wildfire Fireground Communications Plan
South Western Region – Crowsnest ICC

FIRECOM

UHF 60

STAGING AREA

VHF 10
UHF 9

ICC

COMMAND CHANNEL

VHF 71/35

SEGMENT COMMANDER

VHF 11
UHF 3

APPLIANCES

SEGMENT COMMANDER

VHF 12
UHF 5

APPLIANCES

SEGMENT COMMANDER

VHF 13
UHF 7

APPLIANCES

SEGMENT COMMANDER

VHF 14

APPLIANCES

Command Channels
VHF 71 Anduramba Repeater
VHF 35 Perseverance Repeater
Alternative Command Channels
Forestry VHF 114 Pechey
Forestry VHF 123 Pechey
Alternative Fireground Channels
VHF 15, VHF 16, VHF 17, VHF 18
VHF 19, VHF 20, VHF 21, VHF 22
Portable UHF Fireground repeater
channels 2, 4, 6 or 8 (simplex channels
1, 3, 5 or 7 cannot be used if these
repeater channels are utilised)
Alternative Command Channels can be
used for Fireground communications if
not used for command.

Rosalie and Crowsnest Group Rural
Fire Brigades.
Toowoomba (stations 11 and 12),
Highfields, Crowsnest and
Goombungee Urban stations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area / Stations</th>
<th>UHF</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Repeat Location</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1 Toowoomba</td>
<td>Veto</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchener st</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>69 Picnic Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anzac Av</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>69 Picnic Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsworth</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67 Pittsworth</td>
<td>114&amp;123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakey</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67 Pittsworth</td>
<td>Pechey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67 Pittsworth</td>
<td>114&amp;123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crows Nest</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71 Anduramba</td>
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<td>Highfields</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>69 Picnic Point</td>
<td>114&amp;123</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mt Glorious</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66 Braeside</td>
<td>113 C'ham Range</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65 Killarney</td>
<td>112&amp;117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
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<td>61 Karara</td>
<td>Karara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67 Pittsworth</td>
<td>113 C'ham Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allora</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>113 C'ham Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killarney</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66 Braeside</td>
<td>113 C'ham Range</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanthorpe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59 Mt Dillon</td>
<td>111 P'daele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanthorpe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63 Ameins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallangarra</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58 Christies Target</td>
<td>110 Ct target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>115 Inglewood</td>
</tr>
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## South West Region radio channels and Station Identifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area / Stations</th>
<th>UHF</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Repeat Location</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 3 Dalby</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cecil Plains</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Bunya Mt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalby</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Bunya Mt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kumbarilla (NIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tara</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48/61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Bennetts Rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jandowae</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>120 Bunya Mt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinchilla</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48/51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Bennetts Rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51/52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>121 Barakula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meandarra</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Area 4 Goondiwindi</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54/62</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Captains Mt (NIS)</td>
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<td>St George</td>
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<td>Bollon</td>
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</table>
### South West Region radio channels and Station Identifiers

<table>
<thead>
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<th>UHF</th>
<th>VHF</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
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John Burrows

From: John Burrows
To: Tom Dawson; Remco Speekenbrink; Iain MacKenzie
Cc: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart
Subject: RE: dumb luck
Attachments:

Tom,

Regarding this issue I wish to refer you to a series of meetings and agreements with the Local Branch of the United Firefighters

In addressing our manning concerns you stated that before further staffing increases can occur you need to explore the current required our cooperation to allow for the best chance of success in making them a reliable resource. The local branch in good fa nearly two years ago!

The second part of the equation was that if it was not successful then you’re part of the agreement was that you would corrspr for a further Manned Fire fighting Appliance/Station.

Can you please inform this Branch if you now intend to keep your end of the agreement?.

In light of all this, the local branch executive has been talking with the UFU State officials and requires answers on the followi

1. Is the safety of QFRS crews paramount?
2. Are the Toowoomba Aux’s a viable 3rd Pump response crew?
3. With 14 Aux’s on staff at Toowoomba and a response of only 4 to incidents where is the value for money for the Service?
4. Why has the State Response standard to “Special Risks” of 3 Pumps on initial turnout been diluted to 2 pumps without cor
5. Is it acceptable that a Fire-fighter who fell 4m and was injured at a incident should have to re-enter to rescue his fellow fli
6. Is it acceptable that the BAST crew is made up of Aux’s who took 20mins to arrive “Code 8”?
7. How can 2 Pumps in Toowoomba [population 150,000] be classified as acceptable risk management by QFRS?
8. Why was a Aux used as a casual fire-fighter? This is in breach of QFRS’ own Standing Orders/Policy.
9. Why was a un-qualified Aux fire-fighter placed on 3113 as the driver, and with an S/O tasked with responding to any other
10. Isn’t point 9 a change of work practice and a breach of duty of care? Why hasn’t there been consultation at a local level c
11. With the size and growing risks within Toowoomba [population 150000] why haven’t operational staffing levels increased?

John Burrows
UFU Toowoomba Branch President
On behalf of Remco Spreekenbrink
Branch Secretary

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Dawson
Sent: Sun 9/20/2009 9:43 PM
To: Remco Speekenbrink; Iain MacKenzie
Cc: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart; John Burrows
Subject: RE: dumb luck

https://bnefes01/exchange/jburrows/Deleted%20Items/1A29503BF6F91164691674BB974C32C651110... 02/05/2011
Remco

I will review your questions that you have raised and will provide my reply in due course. However the normal SHE report and a debrief will occur regarding this incident. The debrief will allow for not only operational tactics to be considered but also allow us to review the early hours of Saturday morning did not indicate any staff level issues or ESCAD problems. But as indicated I will review all of them in detail.

On your other issues regarding the current and future manning levels of Toowoomba I am glad continue our discussions at our next meeting.

Regards

Tom Dawson
AC-SWR

From: Remco Speekenbrink
Sent: Saturday, 19 September 2009 22:43
To: Tom Dawson
Carbon Copy: Henry Lawrence; Mark Walker (QFRS); John Oliver; Glen Englart; John Burrows
Subject: dumb luck

Tom

Again we have escaped, only through pure dumb luck, with the serious deficiencies in our safe permanent staffing levels. As you there have been sufficient crew for mast teams for safety support for the primary response crews.

Tom, in my email about a month ago I raised our members concerns for their safety due to the unsafe permanent staffing levels do a safety audit through the State UFU OH&S rep on our crewing levels the rate payers and risks of Toowoomba.

But wait there's more, ESCAD also managed to go down during this incident.
As discussed at our last meeting, Auxillaries are not to crew specials, but again an Auxiliary was crewing a special with an officer. Auxiliary FF was expected to drive if another incident was to occur in our area (with a crew of 2). An Auxiliary was then told to take up the spot of the injured FF for the rest of the shift, 3hrs (casual labour) instead of calling the trucks.

In 1956 the Toowoomba fire station was built with 5 engine bays, in 1974 Anzac Ave was built with 2 engine bays. In 2009 Too high risk buildings have increased, heavy vehicle & dangerous goods has increased.

Toowoomba has not had an operational permanent staff increase since 1974, but staffing levels of non-operational administrativ

Remco Speekenbrink
Toowoomba Branch Secretary
Incident Management System (IMS)

**Level 2 Incident**
- Control is transferred to ICC (Incident Xxxx Control)
- Focorum to ICC (Focorum boundaries)
- FOC becomes Operations Point (original IC becomes OPSO)
- Reseeding from Staging Area

**Level 3 Incident**
- SOCC
- DECC
- SECTOR
- SECTOR
- SECTOR
- SECTOR
- SECTOR
- SECTOR

Flowchart diagram showing the relationship between different areas and sectors.
1. **PURPOSE**

(a) To outline requirements for the escalation of an incident from Level One through to Level Three.

2. **APPLICATION**

(a) Applies to all fire officers and volunteers.

3. **ESCALATION OF AN INCIDENT**

3.1 **General**

(a) From the initial response of local resources, escalation of the incident may require a scaling up of the Incident Management System. This may be the result of the intensifying complexity, increased application of resources and a predicted protracted incident - or a combination of all factors.

(b) At all stages of the escalation of the management structure, communications and control measures must maintain their effectiveness and have a seamless operational continuity for all personnel.

(c) During a classified Level 2 or Level 3 incident all regional resources (urban and rural) will come under the direct control of the regional Assistant Commissioner.

3.2 **Level One Incident**

(a) At a Level One incident the Officer-in-charge takes control and informs the relevant Fire Communication Centre of the nominated Incident Control Point and provides the appropriate Situation Reports.

(b) Where a higher ranked Officer arrives and assesses the incident to be within the scope of the existing level of control, the higher ranked Officer need only advise the Incident Controller of their arrival and that they will not be taking control. When this occurs, the higher ranked Officer may, at their discretion, be delegated another role, leave the scene or remain to observe.

(c) If the assessment determines the existing level of control is not adequate for the incident, the higher ranked Officer, after appropriate briefing (SMEACS format) with the current Incident Controller, shall immediately assume the role of Incident Controller.

(d) Immediately after the higher ranked Officer assumes control, the relevant Fire Communication Centre and personnel at the incident shall be notified of the new Incident Controller and the location of the Incident Control Point.
(e) As an incident escalates and more sectors (geographical or functional) are required, the ability to appropriately manage the incident from a Level One Incident Control Point may not be possible.

(f) The Incident Controller will request the establishment of an Incident Control Centre and will maintain control until advised of the establishment of the Incident Control Centre.

(g) The Incident Control Centre maybe predetermined in regional response plans or may be suitably located near the incident (e.g. refinery, Emergency Operations Room).

- Sectorisation Occurs
- Incident escalates
- Requires more sectors - geographical or functional
- Request for an Incident Control Centre be established
- Maintain control until Incident Control Centre is established
3.3 Level Two Incident

(a) An incident shall be reclassified as a Level Two (2) Incident by a Senior Urban Officer or Senior Rural Operations Officer.

(b) Where the Senior Urban Officer or Senior Rural Operations Officer determines the incident should be reclassified, the Incident Controller must be consulted.

(c) Once advised that the Incident Control Centre is established the Incident Controller will generally become the Operations Officer and continue to tactically command the incident from an Operations Point.

(d) If it is operationally necessary to locate the Operations Officer in the Incident Control Centre then a single Division Commander can be appointed.

(e) In many urban cases a dedicated ‘control’ vehicle may be substituted for an Incident Control Centre.

(f) All relevant incident information including resource summary, personnel accountability, and incident option analysis is to be made available at the new Incident Control Point or the Incident Control Centre.

(g) When an Incident Control Centre is established then a Staging Area should be established.

(h) The transfer of control is communicated at the incident to all personnel and a Situation Report is sent to the relevant Fire Communication Centre, confirming new appointments of roles, new Incident Control Point or Incident Control Centre location, geographic area being managed and any update on the incident status.

LEVEL 2 INCIDENTS

- Control is transferred to Incident Control Centre (Incident Name Control)
- Firecom to Incident Control Centre (Identify boundaries)
- Incident Control Point becomes Operations Point
- Resourcing from Staging Area
3.4 Level Three Incident

(a) An incident shall only be reclassified as a Level (3) three incident by the Assistant Commissioner. This is necessary, as the suspension of regional non-essential duties may need to be considered.

(b) If there is a continuing escalation of the incident, i.e. the establishment of Divisions, preparation for the transfer from a Level Two Incident Control Point or Level Two Incident Control Centre to a Level Three Incident Control Centre, will begin.

(c) A Division Point(s) will replace the Operation Point Division Commander(s) will be appointed and the Operations Officer previously working from an Operation Point will work within the Incident Control Centre.

(d) The Incident Control Centre must be fully operational before transfer from the Level Two Incident Control Point occurs. If a Level Two Incident Control Centre is functioning the only change is in staffing.

(e) The Incident Control Centre may be predetermined in regional response plans or may be identified for suitability in relation to the incident location.

(f) The transfer of control is communicated at the incident to all personnel and a Situation Report is sent to the relevant Fire Communication Centre, confirming new appointments of roles, new Division Command Points location, geographic area being managed and any update on the incident status.

(g) The Regional Operations Coordination Centre and the State Operations Coordination Centre will be established at the appropriate levels relevant to the requirements of the incident.

LEVEL 3 INCIDENTS

- SOCC
- RFCC
- FIRECOM
- INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE
- STAGING AREA
- WEST DIVISION
  - SECTOR A
  - SECTOR B
  - SECTOR C
- EAST DIVISION
  - SECTOR N
  - SECTOR O
  - SECTOR P
4. QFRS RELEVANCY

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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1999
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides

Lee A Johnson
AFSM MiFireE
Commissioner

Version: 3.0
Page 5 of 5
IMS 2.3
Transcript: Wayne Waitisbuhl

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## Curricula: Wayne Waltisbuhl

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## Transcript: Paul Storrs

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<td>F-PUATE40012B</td>
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</table>
Just a couple of observations out of the Vic Black Saturday Fires and a couple of sobering comments that I have found:

"Conformity to rules was the enemy of judgment, common sense and moral responsibility"

"There was a failure by media to distinguish between the fire-fighter on the frontline, who were rightly lauded, and the competence of those who were controlling the fight".

However in conversation with some QFRS managers there is a belief that this would not happen in Queensland, what's your thoughts, and have we prepared ourselves to ensure this doesn't happen?
# Learning History

## Thomas Dawson

**Person No:** 000905  
**Organisation Unit:** QFRS South Western Region

### Certifications

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<tr>
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<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>FNA481 Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation</td>
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<td>FNA482 Advanced Resuscitation Techniques</td>
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<td>ZSKR400 Senior Officer Core Skills Block 4</td>
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### Curricula

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<td>1.25 High Angle Rescue 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.04 Incident Control System - Agency Specific</td>
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<td>HLTCP201A Perform CPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLTF201A Provide Basic Emergency Life Support</td>
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<td>HLTF301B Apply First Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUASAR001A Participate in a Rescue Operation</td>
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<td>QFST01 INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING</td>
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<td>QFST02 Training Preparation</td>
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<td>QFST03 Instruction Techniques</td>
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<td>QFST04 ROLE OF THE MENTOR</td>
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<td>QFSWTR Certificate IV in Workplace Training</td>
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### Courses

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<td>CSYC010 Operations Management System Essentials</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT10 Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT11 Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT2 Provide Leadership in the Workplace</td>
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## Learning History

### Thomas Dawson

**Person No:** 000905  
**Region:** QFRS South Western Region  
**Organisation Unit:** QFRS South Western Region

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<td>FMI_UNIT8 Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT9 Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes</td>
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<td>FPEMC03 Advanced Resuscitation</td>
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<td>FPEMC03R Advanced Resuscitation Recertification</td>
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<td>FPEMC06R Senior First Aid Recertification</td>
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<td>FPEMC09R Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Recertification</td>
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<td>FUNIT124 Urban Search &amp; Rescue (USAR) - Category 1</td>
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<td>FUNIT228 BA Refresher</td>
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<td>FUNIT489 Leadership Within a CLM Structure</td>
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<td>FUNIT493 Senior Officers Command &amp; Control Residential</td>
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<td>FUNIT529 Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early</td>
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<td>FUNIT551 Greater Alarm Response System - GARS Awareness</td>
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<td>HLTLFA301B-1 Apply First Aid - activity</td>
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<td>PERCO15 Diversity in the workplace</td>
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<td>PERCO20 Solving people problems</td>
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<td>PERCO25 Leading teams</td>
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<td>PUASAR001A-1 Participate in a Rescue Operation-assessment</td>
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<td>SHLC015 Alcohol and other drugs awareness for Supervisors</td>
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<td>ZSKC100 IC500AS Guide for First Senior Officer at an Incident</td>
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<td>ZSKC101 IC501AS Hierarchy of Command and Control</td>
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<td>ZSKC102 IC502AS Role of Divisional Commander</td>
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<td>ZSKC103 IC503AS Snr Officers Core Skills GARS</td>
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<td>ZSKC104 IC504AS Duties of the Incident Controller</td>
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<td>ZSKC105 IC505AS Duties of the Planning Officer</td>
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<td>ZSKC106 IC506AS Role of the Operations Officer</td>
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<td>ZSKC107 IC507AS Role of the Logistics Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSKC108 MS501AS Command, Leadership and Management Core Skills</td>
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# Learning History

## Thomas Dawson

**Person No:** 000905  
**Includes Profiles:** 000905 26 QFRS

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<td>ZSKC201 02 HM611AS Introduction to chemical fires and managing safety</td>
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<td>ZSKC202 03 HM612AS Applying the measurements</td>
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<td>ZSKC203 04 HM613AS Risk assessment and planning</td>
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<td>ZSKC204 05 HM614AS Chemical detection capability</td>
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<td>ZSKC205 HM500AS Managing a decontamination area</td>
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<td>ZSKC206 HM615AS Health Surveillance</td>
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<td>ZSKC207 HM616AS Recovery Arrangements for Major Hazmat Incident</td>
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<td>ZSKC208 HM617AS Guidelines for Transport Emergency Response Plan</td>
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<td>ZSKC209 HM502AS Clandestine drug lab incidents</td>
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<td>ZSKC210 HM503AS Actions at while powder incidents</td>
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<td>ZSKC211 HM506AS Corrosive Material Incidents</td>
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<td>ZSKC212 HM507AS Radioactive materials incidents</td>
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Printed: 02/05/2011 9:25:04PM  
Page 3 of 3
### Transcript: Edward Lacko

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<td>Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development</td>
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<td>F-FUNIT529</td>
<td>Prepare, Stay and Defend or Go Early</td>
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## Curricula: Edward Lacko

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Transcript: Paul Evans

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Completion Date after: 01/02/2011
Completion Date before: 01/04/2011
Curricula: Steven McCherney

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Transcript: Steven McInerney

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Completion Date before: 01/04/2011

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## Curricula: Bruce Smith

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<td>F-FUNIT551</td>
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# Learning History

**Lindsay Hackett**

**Region:** QFRS South Western Region  
**Organisation Unit:** QFRS South Western Region

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<td>FNA011 Introduction to Incident Control Systems - 16hrs</td>
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<td>FNA036 Incident Control Systems - Awareness Program - 4 Hours</td>
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<td>FNA039 Building Fire Safety - Level III</td>
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<td>FNA089 JEST - Chemical Biological Radiation Workshop - 8 Hour</td>
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<td>HLTFA301B Apply First Aid</td>
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<td>PUAEQ001A Prepare, Maintain and Test Response Equipment</td>
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<td>PUAFIR201A Prevent Injury</td>
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<td>PUAFIR204A Respond to Wildfire</td>
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<td>PUACHS001B Follow Defined Occupational Health and Safety Policies and Procedures</td>
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# Learning History

**Lindsay Hackett**

Region: QFRS South Western Region  
Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

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<td>PUAP0E002A Operate Communications Systems and Equipment</td>
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<td>PUAP0E003A Navigate in Urban and Rural Environments</td>
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<td>PUAP0E005A Manage A Multi-Team Response</td>
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<td>PUAP0E006A Control Multi-Agency Emergency Situations</td>
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<td>PUAP0E007A Command Agency Personnel Within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response</td>
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<td>PUAP0E008A Coordinate Resources within a Multi-Agency Emergency Response</td>
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<td>PUAP0L008A Administer Legislation to Ensure Compliance</td>
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<td>PUAP0L026A Conduct Interviews</td>
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<td>PUATEA001A Work in a Team</td>
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<td>QFST02 Training Preparation</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT1 Manage Personal Work Priorities and Professional Development</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT10 Facilitate And Capitalise On Change And Innovation</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT11 Contribute To The Development Of A Workplace Learning Environment</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT3 Establish and Manage Effective Workplace Relationships</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT5 Manage Operations To Achieve Planned Outcomes</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT6 Manage Workplace Information</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT7 Manage Quality Customer Service</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT8 Develop And Maintain A Safe Workplace And Environment</td>
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<td>FMI_UNIT9 Implement And Monitor Continuous Improvement Systems And Processes</td>
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# Learning History

**Lindsay Hackett**

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<td>UNIT005 Electrical De-energising - Low Voltage Extraction</td>
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<td>UNIT050 Incident Control Systems Introduction - 16 hrs</td>
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<td>UNIT122 Building Fire Safety - Level 3</td>
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<td>UNIT314 Air Attack Guidelines for Fireline Personnel</td>
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<td>UNIT367 Vector UK HIMO 1A</td>
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<td>UNIT493 Senior Officers Command &amp; Control Residential</td>
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# Learning History

**Lindsay Hackett**

Person No: 001163

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## Courses

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<td>PUAPOL029A-1</td>
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<td>PUASAR001A-1</td>
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<td>SPDC110</td>
<td>Introduction to Privacy</td>
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<td>X_FHRC30</td>
<td>Human Resources Courses: Anti Discrimination Training</td>
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<td>X_FMAP04</td>
<td>Risk Map Monitor: Risk Mapping</td>
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<td>X_FPOTRO1</td>
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<td>X_FPRES01</td>
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<td>IC502AS Role of Divisional Commander</td>
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<td>IC503AS Snr Officers Core Skills GARS</td>
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### Learning History

**Lindsay Hackett**

Region: QFRS South Western Region  
Organisation Unit: QFRS South Western Region

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The Department of Emergency Services
Workplace Health and Safety Policy

Our commitment
To provide all our staff, volunteers and contractors, a workplace that is free from harm and encourages a culture that has safety as an absolute priority.

We believe:
- Safety is a core value
- Leadership is the key driver of a safety culture
- Safety is everyone's responsibility
- Workplace safety standards are achievable
- Working safely is a condition of employment for everyone
- Everyone's involvement in health and safety is essential
- Safety training and participation is voluntary

We act on our beliefs by:
- Communicating and consulting with stakeholders
- Creating and delivering safety policies and procedures
- Fostering a culture of safety through leadership
- Buying products with health and safety considerations
- Conducting regular audits, reviews and other reports
- Providing worksite health and safety information
- Reporting injuries, incidents and near misses
- Ensuring our codes of conduct are followed

We internally monitor our performance through:
- Regular internal audits against legislative requirements
- Business performance indicators
- Combined strategic objectives
- Reporting on the ongoing performance
- Undertaking continuous safety evaluation process

We verify our performance by:
- Regular audits, reviews and other reports
- Conducting internal audits

Achievement of the World Health Organization's

ZERO harm

Jim McGowan  Director-General
Lee Johnson AFSM MIFES Commissioner Queensland Fire and Rescue Service
David Melville APM FAIM Commissioner Queensland Ambulance Service
Frank Pagano AFSM Executive Director Emergency Management Queensland
Gary Taylor Executive Director Business Support Services
Gary Mahon Executive Director Strategic Policy and Executive Services

Issue Date 20th October 2008
Review Date 20th October 2010

all injuries are preventable
ZEROharm

On this Page: ZEROharm | Associated Topics

Version: 1.0
Valid From: 29-08-2007
Valid To: 29-08-2009
Contact: Workplace Health and Safety / Human Resources

ZEROharm

The health and safety of all employees, volunteers and contractors is a DES core value. The recently developed DES Workplace Health and Safety Strategy 2007-2010 establishes the department's intention to vigorously pursue and integrate a best practice management approach to WH&S for employees, contractors and volunteers which systematically eliminates or mitigates workplace hazards and risks and has "ZEROharm-- all injuries are preventable" as its ultimate goal.

The WH&S Strategy establishes the department's intention to vigorously pursue and integrate a best practice management approach to WH&S for staff, contractors and volunteers which systematically eliminates or reduces workplace hazards and risks.

The alignment is demonstrated by the four strategic objectives documented in DES Workplace Health and Safety Strategy 2007-2010. The objectives are:

- To eliminate workplace hazards and injuries;
- To build WH&S leadership and workplace capability;
- To drive a ZEROharm WH&S performance culture across DES and;
- To establish effective WH&S governance.

For further information on ZEROharm refer to the WH&S Management Policies and Procedures.

Associated Topics

WHS Management System Policy Statement

For Information contact: Workplace Health and Safety / Human Resources
Last Updated: 23-12-2008 14:39:06
1. PURPOSE
(a) To outline the activation protocols for a Regional Operations Coordination Centre (ROCC).

2. APPLICATION
(a) Applies to fire officers involved in the activation and operation of the ROCC.

3. GENERAL
(a) The ROCC is essential to maintain a strategic overview of the emergency response capability and resources utilised and available across the Region and also the availability of resources from intrastate and interstate deployments.

(b) When the ROCC is activated to assist with intrastate and interstate deployments, it will ensure that appropriate mobilisation, accountability, well-being maintenance and demobilisation of all resources is efficient and effective.

(c) When required, the QFRS will provide a QFRS Liaison Officer to any other agency involved in managing the incident and specifically the District Disaster Management Group (if activated).

(d) The functional standards for a ROCC are detailed in Incident Management System 2.7.2.

4. DIRECTIVE
4.1 Activation
(a) The activation of the ROCC and the level of activation will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner after an assessment of the incident or emergent situation. For wildfire incidents, the Assistant Commissioner will consult with the Regional Manager Rural Operations in determining the level of activation and taking into consideration the Wildfire Alert Level for identified areas.

(b) When the Assistant Commissioner activates the ROCC it is their responsibility to appoint an appropriately qualified officer as the Regional Coordinator as required. Note: for minor incidents and activations, the ROCC Manager may be appropriate to perform this role (refer Incident Management System 2.7.2).

(c) Upon activation of the ROCC, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will notify the State Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC) and the regional Fire Communications Centre of the activation.
4.2 Stages of Activation

(a) The activation levels of the ROCC include the following:
   - Watching brief
   - Alert
   - Standby
   - Activation

(b) **Watching Brief** - involves monitoring the warnings about a potential incident that may require activation of all or part of the ROCC. During the watching brief, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) monitors the developing situation/s during normal business hours and under normal operating conditions, and regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events. The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC during the watching brief.

(c) **Alert** - involves ensuring the ROCC is ready to be activated. During alert, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
   - Check, prepare and verify the ROCC can be activated, e.g., check phone lines, faxes, and emails.
   - Continues to monitor the developing situation/s during, either on site or off site.
   - Regularly informs the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events.
   - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is not required to remain in the ROCC.

(d) **Standby** - involves the preparation of the ROCC to enable full activation within one (1) hour. During standby, the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) will ensure the following is carried out:
   - Monitor the developing situation/s during all hours.
   - Identify staff who can attend the ROCC within one (1) hour.
   - Regularly inform the relevant Assistant Commissioner and Regional Manager Rural Operations of unfolding events.
   - The Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) is required to be in the ROCC during all hours.

(e) **Activation** - involves expanding the functional roles and staffing of the ROCC to meet the current and projected situation.

4.3 Stand Down (Partial and Full)

(a) The full or partial stand down of the ROCC will be determined by the relevant Assistant Commissioner on advice from the Regional Coordinator (or ROCC Manager) considering the size and scale of the operations.

(b) Stand down of the ROCC may be staged by functional area at the discretion of the ROCC Coordinator (or ROCC Manager).

(c) Debriefing of the ROCC operational activities will follow the full stand down of the ROCC.
4.4 Relationship with Incident Control Centres and SOCC

(a) The ROCC is responsible for effective and efficient management of information from all Incident Control Centres and Incident Control Points across the region.

(b) The ROCC does not make decisions that are directly involved with operations at an incident however the ROCC may:

- make decisions concerning resource availability which may affect operations at an incident; and
- monitor ICC activities and provide guidance and assistance to the ICC in meeting operational standards.

(c) The ROCC is responsible for communicating relevant incident information to the SOCC by following the reporting protocols and timing requirements (e.g. summary of all Incident Control Centres/Point to the SOCC, etc).

(d) A ROCC will generally not communicate with another ROCC, however it is the responsibility of the SOCC to coordinate support and information between ROCCs as necessary.

4.5 Reporting Requirements

(a) The first report from the ROCC to the SOCC must be generated within the first two hours using the Regional Incident Summary (INCFORM 16). An Incident Action Plan or a Situation Report (INCFORM 15) received by the ROCC may also be attached.

(b) After the first report, ongoing Regional Incident Summary Reports are required to the SOCC:

- Every four hours; or
- More frequently if a major change has occurred or a notifiable event such as significant injuries, fatalities, service vehicle accidents, significant structural loss, and/or stock loss.

(c) The Regional Incident Summary Report need to indicate if the region requires additional resources, for example 4 to 48 hours in advance.

5. QFRS RELEVANCY

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<tr>
<th>INCDIR 7.2</th>
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<td>May Apply*</td>
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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

REFERENCES
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System
Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
QFRS Training Material
QFRS Operational Guides

Lee A Johnson AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner

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Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

State Operations Directorate

Operational Guide

Incident Debriefing

Guide 7
## QFRS Operational Guides

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Operational Guides have been developed to provide staff with further information and clarification on operational systems and processes. They are designed to “bridge” the information gap between training documentation and the QFRS Operations Doctrine.

Further Operational Guides will be developed as they are required.

For further information contact the State Operations Directorate.

## Key Points

- Incident Debriefing involves:
  - debriefing,
  - reporting, and
  - analysing collected information to identify any lesson to be learned and shared.

- ‘Lessons Learned’ can be applied from the local level to the entire organisation.

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Enquiries should be addressed to The Commissioner QFRS, GPO Box 1425 Brisbane 4001

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QUEENSLAND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE

Relevancy Matrix

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* This document may apply to some Rural brigades. Check with your Senior Officer for additional information.

Prepared by: Bruce Budge
Contributors: Kevin Walsh, John Harrison
Authorised by: John Cawcutt
Executive Manager State Operations Directorate

FOREWORD

Every incident together with its relevant response has the potential to improve QFRS operations and assist in ensuring the safety of all Queenslanders. We can learn from the collective experiences of Queensland firefighters so that the best approach for emergency response is identified. This learning will also provide, in the environment of continuous improvement, a safer workplace and work practices for all personnel.

For nearly all operational personnel there have been moments of reflection in where we ask ourselves after attending incidents “Could I have done better?” This simple question is the first step to the process of continuous improvement for the entire organisation. If there is the recognition that there may have been a better way of doing what we do, then it must be captured and made available across the organisation.

No review of operational performance is the forum to lay blame or to criticise individuals; rather it is to review the organisation’s performance to enable actions to be taken to improve deficiencies and to recognise areas of strength. The process must be exploratory so that the reason and thought process behind actions taken can be extracted. The debriefing officer should probe and ascertain exactly why individuals and groups pursued a particular course of action.

It must be recognised that when an incident response is effective and innovation for a "better way" has occurred that it must be captured and shared across the organisation for the benefit of all.

From this point, a total package of information is developed for application across aspects of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service - from training to operational response and on to community safety and education. This information will be made available externally (in response to requests or specific need) for other agencies or groups in a state, national or international sphere.

This Operational Guide has been developed to provide all QFRS staff with a reliable and consistent method for debriefing of incident response and training. Debriefing and incident analysis will continue to be a valuable tool for the QFRS and other emergency services for refining and improving their operational response procedures and incident management systems.

Iain S MacKenzie AFSM
Deputy Commissioner
PURPOSE

The QFRS has embraced a knowledge management philosophy to ensure that firefighters and support personnel across the state are encouraged to share information and pass on the legacy of their experiences.

A 'Centre for Lessons Learned' process is being developed to capture both negative and positive experiences of personnel at emergency situations. This process begins with personnel being aware of their immediate environment, their actions and the resultant outcomes. This situational awareness is crucial when recalling the "cause and effect" scenario that will be used in the operational debrief.

This guide has been developed to give personnel a greater understanding of the process of knowledge management and learning from operational response.

For incident analysis to be effective, various tools for review such as forms and report formats are to completed appropriately as per the suggested examples provided in this guide.

Future developments include a lessons learned package for specific incidents, inclusion of "lessons learned" into firefighter competency maintenance training and a web-based, experience capturing database for QFRS personnel.

This guide involves other knowledge management approaches from within the organisation to improve understanding, learning and service delivery.
ESTABLISHING KNOWLEDGE

Incident analysis enables the firefighters involved in an incident to identify information about what happened, why it happened, what went well, what needs improvement and what lessons can be learned and shared from the experience.

The process begins before the first firefighter arrives at the incident. It starts with having knowledge about what are the incidents most likely to occur within a firefighter's area of responsibility.

It involves persons involved in pre-incident activities as well as those directly involved in operational response. It also involves any persons that can facilitate the process and those with expert knowledge relevant to the type of incident.

QFRS Incident Analysis System

LEARN

Post Incident Recovery
(Including Operational Analysis)

Risk Modification

Readiness

Response

Recovery

APPLY

Pre-incident Planning
(Local Action Plan development, exercises, testing of communication plans)

Fire Investigation and Research Unit

Operational Equipment, Engineering, Research & Development Unit
(Review current and identify new equipment)

School of Fire and Rescue Service Training
(Review Training material)

Rural Operations Planning and Research
(Review Rural Training material and equipment)

State Operations Directorate
(Review Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Strategies, Improvement or all relevant documents)

Research, Information & Analysis

Community Safety
(Review Public Education and Building Safety Inspection programs)

Improved Incident Response
(Training, equipment, relationships, systems, procedures and/or knowledge)
WHY DEBRIEF AN INCIDENT

An Incident Debrief is an overall assessment of the effectiveness of any incident planning and the operational response and recovery. The review encompasses debriefing, incident investigation and cause determination, environmental, community and organisational incident impact, near-miss reporting and inter-agency collaborations where applicable.

The review material and findings will (where relevant) be used for any enhancement of firefighter safety, equipment, operational response, and community service and may include any of the following:

- safety issues (near misses, reporting of injuries)
- human impacts (stress, fatigue and attitude)
- communications (mobilisation, incident ground, between various centres and external)
- command (roles and responsibilities)
- objectives
- tactics and strategies
- coordination of QFRS and external agencies response and actions
- performance and use of equipment
- procedural adherence issues
- pre-incident planning
- organizational issues (cultural problems)
- influences of the environment
- technical performance and tactics used
- innovations
- lessons learned
- chronological report of events

Debriefs are conducted to ensure consistency in the process of gathering information and then presenting it for review to identify any potential improvement in service delivery. Consistency in debriefs can be achieved through the use of the SMEACS format - as in briefings.

As identified in the Operations Doctrine, there are numerous types of incidents requiring varying levels of response and varying levels of escalation.

This is reflected in the manner in which the debrief is conducted - ranging from an informal debrief to a formal debrief and investigation. The first consideration is the location and the timeframe in which the debrief is conducted.
WHERE TO DEBRIEF

The options available to the Officer-in-Charge include:

- Informally on-site with crews and other agencies involved in the response;
- Informally at the home station with available crews and other agencies; or
- Formally at a time and a location in which all personnel involved and specific personnel who can offer additional input can attend without interruption (consider alternate response strategies).

Each situation has its strengths and weaknesses in achieving a successful improvement from any identified lesson in relation to the response to the incident.

Debriefing during the course of a long duration incident such as a campaign wildfire would be best managed by an informal on-site debrief at a suitable time such as crew changeovers. The information captured is compared against the broader incident objectives within the incident action plan for that operational period.

This has an immediate impact as it will be used to review the incident action plan for all subsequent operational periods.

On-site

On-site debriefs are conducted informally with the immediate crew members involved in the incident. These are typically for incidents of a short duration where local resources were used. On-site debriefs can be done at the conclusion of the response, after a significant event during an incident or at the demobilisation of personnel during an incident - at a time that does not compromise operational activities. On-site debriefs are best suited for a tactical, task or personal evaluation of operations.

Most information will come from personal observations and experiences. The Officer-in-Charge may use *Incident Debriefing Worksheet (INCWS 11)* or a simple 'mud map' to examine the incident particulars.

Consideration must be shown when conducting on-site debriefs in that respect must be shown to members of the public or persons involved who may be nearby.

At Station

These debriefs are conducted at station after the incident where the format can still be informal. Where possible, such debriefs should involve all attending crews and members of other involved agencies. Some of the techniques suggested in this guide could be used to ensure that relevant information that can be passed on is captured.

It is expected that this will be the most common format. It may require the Officer-in-Charge or Incident Controller to complete an Operations Doctrine *INCFORM 09* which will be passed on to the immediate supervisor.
The debriefing officer can use a whiteboard or data projector to present information to personnel. The information being displayed may be a building or street layout or a map of the area involved together with a written sequential explanation of the incidents events or tactical benchmarks.

A Specific Location

For a formal brief, there is time available to gather information, complete the Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident, collect information from other agencies (if possible request personnel from other agencies to attend and present information) and reports from other areas such as Community Safety and the Fire Investigation and Research Unit.

This debrief may not require the presence of all operational response crews as the focus is more on the strategic considerations. Operational crews and their Officer-in-Charge may submit INCFORM 09 relevant to their involvement to the Debrief Officer.

The debrief will be best facilitated by a venue where information technology such as computers and data projectors are used to present the information to the attendees.

The quality of an Incident Debrief depends on the willingness of participants to be open; this is unlikely to happen if they fear they are going to be unfairly assessed or blamed.
DEBRIEF TYPE

Debriefing occurs at different stages of an incident and may require a special approach to how the debriefing process is managed and its objective. The type of debrief will be influenced by the complexity, duration and the impact of the incident on the organisation and the community.

Hot / Shift

A hot / shift debrief can be conducted with personnel at the conclusion of a shift or work period or during a shift immediately after a significant event or a near miss situation. This information from this type of debrief may be used to improve or adjust the Incident Action Plan, providing an opportunity to review work undertaken throughout the shift, to identify any issues. The result can then be addressed and reported to the appropriate supervisors and personnel participating in the subsequent shift.

Post-Incident (Formalised)

A post-incident debrief is conducted after the incident with the purpose of assessing the conduct or results of an operation. At a Level 1 incident, this debrief will usually occur immediately after the incident. In Level 2 and 3 incidents, the debrief may be conducted some weeks or months after the event. A post-incident debrief may be conducted at the crew, agency or inter-agency level.

Tour / Campaign

A tour or campaign debrief is conducted when crews have operated at a location away from their home base (e.g. region, interstate and overseas). The purpose is to determine if there were any issues associated with mobilisation and logistical arrangements regarding the tour (e.g. transportation) and to capture information and learn organisationally from the experience.

Agency-specific

An agency-specific debrief is conducted at an organisational level after a major event or at the end of a fire season or event. This type of debrief provides an opportunity for an organisation to identify any emerging trends and can be part of an ongoing organisational improvement process. A campaign debrief can also involve an interagency or community component if required.

Inter-agency

Individual agencies do not respond alone to the majority of incidents; debriefs provide opportunities to improve joint operations. These debriefs normally occur at the higher or strategic levels of most interagency operations but can occur at any of the three incident levels relevant to the involvement of the agencies. Care must be taken to respect the intent and responsibilities of other agencies, organisations and individual persons that were involved. They are excellent forums to learn more from other agencies and to develop relationships across the agencies involved.
Critical Incident Stress

Critical incident stress de briefs (CISD) are conducted by personnel with specialist training and expertise in this particular type of de brief.

This Operational Guide does not provide you with the expertise to undertake a CISD. The QFRS Operations Doctrine details the criteria for responding FireCare in the aftermath of a critical incident (QFRS Operations Doctrine INCDIR 13.1 FireCare Activation) and further information can be obtained from FireCare.
FACILITATING DEBRIEFS

The value of using independent facilitators is the provision of a comprehensive process and one that is conducted in an open and honest forum.

The following facilitators are appropriate for the different incident levels as listed below:

- **Level 1 incident**: the Incident Controller should be the facilitator.
- **Level 2 incident**: the facilitator may be a Senior Officer from a different area or region.
- **Level 3 incident**: the facilitator may be appointed by the Assistant Commissioner or above.

For level 2 and level 3 incident, the appointed facilitators should be persons not closely involved in the incident; they can remain objective and neutral but must have a detailed knowledge of operational procedures, guidelines and the organisation as a whole.

During a review into the QFRS response to major incidents, research was conducted into various debriefs and reports. These debriefs and reports from various agencies and sections varied greatly in their structure, detail and depth of discussion.

Other issues identified included:

- questions raised over how “critically reflective” some people were as facilitators of debriefs; and
- the accuracy of information contained in reports generated from the debrief back to their respective areas to be addressed.

Whilst it is an improbable proposition to suggest that every debrief should be conducted by an independent person, some organisations are now appointing facilitators for major and significant incidents. The main functions of the independent facilitator are to:

- help the team to learn by creating an environment leading to answers, insight and the consideration of contentious issues;
- ensure every person present has the opportunity to contribute; and
- assist in creating the right environment, ensuring there is a "no blame" mentality present.

Any debrief should be carried out in a manner that can be described as being “critically reflective” yet not critical.
PRESENTING DEBRIEF INFORMATION

When presenting debrief information at a station, a standard approach should be adopted to ensure consistency across the organisation. The presentation of information should follow these guidelines in order to analyse the incident, actions of personnel and the degree in which objectives were achieved:

1. information on pre-incident planning;
2. notification and response details;
3. chronological details of events within the incident;
4. details of approach, initial actions, information gathering and the development of the Incident Action Plan (IAP);
5. the decision-making process used and the tactical information involved;
6. layout of incident (hand-drawn map, site layout, building plans, topographical map);
7. comments and observations from other agencies (when available); and
8. post-incident recovery details.

The debrief techniques in this guide will assist the debriefing officer to get the most out of the experiences, both negative and positive, of the personnel involved.
The format below is a suggested layout that can be adjusted to suit each individual incident. The layout is to be used after an incident as a prompt to assist in the presentation of consistent information.

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<th>Post Incident Analysis Report Required</th>
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<td>Incident Times</td>
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<td>Significant Events</td>
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<td>Situation</td>
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<td>Mission</td>
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<td>Administration</td>
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<td>Command/Comms</td>
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<td>Safeguards</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>QFRS RESOURCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Controller</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA Entry Officer</td>
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<td>Safety Advisor</td>
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<td>QFRS Officer</td>
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<td>Plan Officer</td>
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<td>Logs Officer</td>
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<td>AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE</td>
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<td>CALL / ON-SITE</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
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<td>Elect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LESSONS LEARNED</td>
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<td>ACTION REQUIRED</td>
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<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
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</table>

This worksheet can be accessed through the Desportal - QFRS Knowledge - Operations Doctrine - Incident Worksheets - INCWS 11 Incident Debriefing.

Debriefing worksheets may be used in conjunction with the incident worksheets (e.g. High-rise, Wildfire) to assist in presenting the Incident Debrief. This worksheet can be printed in a large poster size or alternatively used electronically with a data projector.
INFORMATION SOURCES

A range of documents can be used to present information. Their use can ensure a comprehensive operational debrief leading to an overall improvement in QFRS service delivery.

1. INCFORM 09
2. IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident
3. Aust. Incident Recording System (AIRS) Report
4. First Attending Officer's Report
5. Near-miss Reports
6. Workplace Health and Safety Report
7. Coroners Report
8. Media Articles (Print, Photos and Audio-Visual)
9. Community Safety Report
10. Equipment Fault and Performance Reports
11. Fire Investigation Reports
12. Wodback transcripts
13. Entries into official notebooks
15. All unit logs
16. Community Safety Reports
17. All relevant maps
18. Information from external sources (other state, national or international agencies or organisations)

Information is gathered from these sources and compared against current QFRS Doctrine, operational plans, practices, policies and procedures to ensure personnel operate in the safest, most effective and efficient emergency service possible.
CONDUCTING A DEBRIEF

When debriefs are to be conducted, the intent of the brief, the objectives of the
facilitator and rules of behaviour for the group must be communicated to the
personnel involved.

The considerable information presented by the facilitator, should flesh out larger
amounts of information, experience, opinions and lessons drawn out from the group.
It is this process that validates the effectiveness of the response, identifying
meaningful recommendations and lessons learned.

While the following process is a guide only, it can be adapted to suit the specific
requirements of the situation:

1. Set a time, date and location for the brief relevant to the incident and the type
   of brief required.

2. Identify the persons required to attend relevant to the incident type and
   sufficient time for specific persons to schedule attendance.

3. Prepare the brief location relevant to type of brief, incident, personnel and
   facilities required such as whiteboards, data projects and personal requirements
   such as travel time to the location, catering, toilets or accommodation if needed.

4. Greet personnel and record their attendance in the minutes of the meeting if
   this applicable for the type of brief. In opening the brief, take the
   opportunity to state the rules of behaviour for the group.

5. Use maps, Incident Forms and building plans to describe incident actions and
   developments, ensuring that all personnel can see and hear the information
   being presented. As information is presented, check with personnel that it is
   valid information.

6. Depending on the situation, the brief may involve
   - open discussion as the information is presented
   - invitation to the group to randomly give information or opinions
   - structured order of responses for specific personnel/roles
   - open discussion after the information is presented.

7. By involving all personnel encourage an environment of succinct, calm and
   respectful dialogue that promotes a sense of value. A calm and respectful
   facilitator will encourage calm and respectful group participation.

8. Use the brief techniques suggested in this guide to capture information,
   ensuring that it is recorded for further analysis and validation in the QFRS
   reporting process.

9. When required, follow-up on critical issues with feedback to the individual or
   group involved.

10. At the end of the brief, summarise the process and openly thank everybody
    for their attendance and involvement.
DEBRIEFING TECHNIQUES

Certain techniques can help a facilitator to ensure the effective capture of information from personnel.

Listed below in italics are some suggested communication strategies that the person conducting the debrief can use to facilitate the process.

Setting the Atmosphere

“This is a critique not criticism. It’s an open, honest and professional discussion. It is about helping others faced with similar situations in the future.”

Restating a Point

This is used to summarise a point, made by a participant that may have not been clear to everyone. “So you’re saying you think the backburn should have started higher up the ridge, and that would have prevented……”

Handling the Upward Delegation of Blame

Participants will often blame the “system” for being broken, and that causes failures at their level. “OK, I agree, but that’s out of our hands. We still have to live with the fact that this issue places us in increased risk. So what can we work on at our level to improve?”

Bringing Out the Opinion of the “Quiet Ones”

Some people just don’t process through discussion, but they usually are listening closely and when asked have good insights. Wait until a little later in the debrief and then ask them by name open-ended questions. “Well Ken, you were up on the road. What was your perspective on this?”

Interrupting a Dominant Member of the Group

Some people just naturally like to talk. There is also a tendency for a leader to give all the answers. Interrupt them tacitly with a comment like: “I'm concerned we're going too deep into this issue without getting any additional input. Let's hear from….”

Pursuing an Issue to its Root Cause

The Japanese have a saying, ‘Always ask “why” five times’. It’s a good technique to make sure that you’re really getting to the root cause of an issue. “So…the torches weren’t ready because they didn’t get fuelled. And we’ve heard they didn’t have fuel because the fuel cans were on the other rig. What caused that to happen?”
Using “Negative Polling” to Ask Questions

This is an effective way to get quick agreement/consensus. It is faster than making sure everyone agrees. “Is anyone opposed to moving on to question #3 now?” or “Does anyone disagree that that was the plan, yet this is what really happened?”

Avoiding Win/Lose Decisions

Look for a win-win situation with the group. “Does it have to be one way or the other? Could we agree to both?”

Building Up or Eliminating Ideas

This technique merges complementary pieces from different ideas or highlights agreement on pieces of an idea when the total idea is not agreed upon. “So is there anything you could add to that suggestion to make it work for you?” or “What could we delete from the idea to make it work better?”

Asking Open-Ended Questions

This allows for a variety of possible responses while inviting involvement and participation. “Why do you think that happened?” or “What could we do differently next time?”

Backcasting

Relate events to subsequent results using hindsight in supportive manner to highlight alternative courses of action.

When the Group is in Denial

One or more people think (let’s use “communications”) went fine and are not discussing the issues. In this order:

- Act somewhat surprised. “Really? Interesting. Are there any other thoughts on how communications went today?”
- Spur discussion with one of your own observations: “OK, I saw a couple messages that didn't get passed to the crews holding the road. What was the plan there?”
- Press a bit firmer: “OK, what I'm hearing is that you would do this exactly the same way again?”

Emotion and Memory

The emotional aspect of an experience is a key point if you want to discuss human performance factors, and it is important for effective adult learning. Most people will not “technically” remember a specific situation that they were confused about. The event is then remembered within the context of that emotion.
Terms like: "frustrated", "confused", "unsure", "apprehensive", and "pissed off" can indicate the emotional manifestation of a command breakdown. As time goes by, the emotional aspect of the event fades and the event itself can be lost or reduced to its technical aspect only.

Finally, do one of two things. If the issue is minor, let it pass. If the issue is important, then you may have to make the point blank observation yourself: "OK. You're saying communications went fine. I saw two specific instances where we had a near-miss and that information did not get to either Mike or Susan. You're telling me that is not a problem? What would have happened if we didn't get that Helitack drop?"

Techniques prepared by: Mark Smitty/Mission-Centred Solutions and Mike DeGrosky/ The Guidance Group, December 2003

REMEMBER, WHEN IN A DEBRIEF.

"Decisions made in real time are never perfect so don't second guess an operation from an armchair."

The Bourne Ultimatum 2007
REPORTING

For reporting of minor and major incidents a standard process is to be followed:

Minor Incident

At a minor incident the Incident Controller:

1. conducts debrief on-site or at station using QFRS Debriefing Format;
2. includes observations, an assessment of the Incident Action Plan and feedback from personnel including other agencies (if available);
3. completes INCFORM 09 as per Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident;
4. submits the INCFORM 09 to Area Office, then to the Regional Office and on to the State Operations Directorate; and
5. review the current Local Action Plan (or develop a new Local Action Plan if required);

Major Incident

At a major incident the Incident Controller:

1. debriefs (Hot, Shift or Tour) are conducted at shift changeovers and when personnel are demobilised (Strike Teams, Inter-region and Inter-state);
2. includes observations, an assessment of the Incident Action Plan and feedback from personnel including other agencies;
3. requests frontline supervisors (Strike-team and Task-force Leaders, Sector or Division Commanders) to complete and submit INCFORM 09;
4. review the current Local Action Plan (or develop a new Local Action Plan if required);
5. complete, dependant on the incident size, complexity, duration, operation performance and impact on the community, an Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report; and
6. submits the IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report to the regional office which then passes the report onto the State Operations Directorate.

The facilitator for the formal debrief should be a Senior Officer neutral to the incident. Senior Officers from a neighbouring area or region should conduct Level 2 incidents whilst facilitators for level 3 incidents should be appointed by the Assistant Commissioner or above, (Post-incident or Campaign) for the total incident response at a station or a specific location.

Information from the debrief and finalised reports is made available to the relevant research and improvement areas of the QFRS.
WRITTEN REPORTS

Within the QFRS Operations Doctrine are three processes for writing reports detailing information that may be used to improve operational performance.

1. Operations Doctrine Feedback Form (General Section of the Operations Doctrine)
2. Post-Incident Analysis INCFORM 09
3. Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident

Operations Doctrine Feedback Form

The form is used to give comment on existing documents within the Operations Doctrine based on the experiences, research or opinion of the person submitting the form.

Post-Incident Analysis Incident Form 09*

The minor incident Operational Analysis will occur at every incident:

• where there has been an incident-related fatality or serious injury;
• where an incident results in substantial property loss;
• where there are unusual circumstances that may provide learnings for others; or
• as request by an Inspector or higher ranked Officer.

The Post-incident Analysis Report (INCFORM 09) is the template used for the Minor Incident Report, which is to be forwarded to the relevant Senior Officer, who will then forward a copy to the State Operations Directorate via QFRS Knowledge for review.

*PURPOSE:

This form is used at incidents to capture information relevant to any operational review for the particular type of incident. It can be used if required by Division or Sector Commanders to support the Operational Analysis Report (IMS 2.10) for Level Two -Three incidents.

PREPARATION:

The report is completed by the Incident Controller for Level One Incidents after the completion of the incident response. If requested by the Incident Controller, this form would be completed by Unit Leaders, Division or Sector Commanders on the completion of their duties for that operational period.

MANAGEMENT:

The report is submitted to the Senior Officer responsible for the location in which the incident occurred. If completed by Division or Sector Commanders at request of the Incident Controller it is to be included in the Operational Analysis Report (IMS 2.10) for Level Two -Three Incidents. The form will be sent from the Senior Officer's office to the State Operations Directorate via QFRS Knowledge for review.

*QFRS Operational Guide Two
Provided below is a completed *Incident Form 09* as an example to assist with the process of collecting information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POST-INCIDENT ANALYSIS MINOR REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: Wildfire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRS REPORT No.: 503778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARED BY: Terry Hunn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE: 03/11/05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Call Details**
Attach Fileion Word Back end AIRS Report.

- Multiple triple 0 calls from residents in the Sandy Creek area.

**Previous Incident History**
Attach or refer to previous Post-Incident Analysis Reports.

- Fire in same area in 2004 with similar resources

**Pre-Incident Planning**
- Izone LAP

**Size-up / Risk Assessment**
Describe initial observations and information gathered on-site.

- Fire burning in inaccessible areas but predicted wind change will bring fire close to properties

**Incident Action Plan**
Describe IAP, and attach (if available).

- IAP attached for first operational period indicating water bombing for inaccessible areas with fire breaks and back burning to support this action

**Strategies and Tactics**
e.g., operational needs, weight of initial attack, water supply, scene security, initial attack, exposure protection, law enforcement, ehrpress, ventilation

- Two helicopters working northern flank (greatest risk to properties on this flank) and four rural brigades supported by council earthmovers to establish fire breaks and conduct back burn

**Was the Incident unique in any way?**
- no

**Lessons Identified**
LAP needed to be updated to indicate new subdivision

**Innovations with procedures, resources and equipment used?**

- Two portable water dams used to increase attack rate.

**Supply any information to support INCFORM 09**

- [ ] DEBRIEF MATERIAL (e.g. INCWS 11 summary)
- [ ] MEDIA (e.g. digital, video)
- [ ] Other Information

**FORWARD TO AREA DIRECTOR**

- NAME: Terry Hunn
- DATE: 03/11/05

**EMAIL TO:**

- [ ] Area Director
IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident Report

1. A major incident Operational Analysis will occur:
   • at Level 2 incidents where there is significant impact
   • at every Level 3 Incident, or
   • as required by the Assistant Commissioner.

2. Incident Management Team members and individual commanders can submit a INCFORM 09 for activities carried out during their shift period in their area of responsibility; this can be used as information in the major incident report.

3. The Operational Analysis and data collection process should endeavor to address each subject heading and sub points listed, but should not be restricted to the items listed.

4. The report is to be structured in accordance with the sections detailed in the Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Operational Analysis Post-Incident and covered under the main headings listed below.
   • Summary
   • Scope
   • Incident Description
   • Pre-Incident Planning
   • Response
   • Recovery and Rehabilitation
   • Coordination
   • Other Issues
   • Recommendation / Action Plans
   • Signature / Approval

QFRS Commissioner’s Request

To facilitate the process of improving performance in delivering service to the community of Queensland, the QFRS will seek to learn from its experiences. The task of completing post incident reports lies with Incident Controller; however, if an incident occurs and a report is not submitted, the Commissioner of the QFRS will request the relevant Region or Business Unit to provide information for incident analysis. In accordance with Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 Post-incident Analysis, a request can be made and will be forwarded to the specified Assistant Commissioner as per the following template.
Request for Post Incident Analysis Report

Assistant Commissioner

Region
(Address)
(Date)

Dear >>>>>>,

The completion of a 'Post Incident Analysis Report' is a key strategy in the "lessons learned" process for improving QFRS operational performance. Post incident reports provide important information for the review of command and control arrangements, training, legislation, safety issues and operational procedures.

Operations Doctrine IMS 2.10 details the incidents where a report should be submitted to the State Operations Directorate. These incidents include:

- Where there has been a fatality or serious injury;
- Substantial property loss;
- Unusual circumstances that may provide learnings for others; and
- On request of the Inspector or Superintendent

An incident has occurred in your region that may provide important learnings that can be shared with all QFRS operational personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region/District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firecall Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can you please arrange for the Incident Controller for the above incident to complete a Post Incident Analysis Report (INCFORM 09) and submit it to QFRS Knowledge Management; at their earliest convenience.

Regards

LEE A JOHNSON AFSM MIFireE
Commissioner
REPORT IMPLEMENTATION

The Operational Analysis (Major or Minor) will generally be undertaken by the Incident Controller or by person/s as designated by the Assistant Commissioner. On completion, it will be forwarded through the chain of command to QFRS State Operations Directorate via QFRS Knowledge for review.

The QFRS State Operations Directorate will determine whether the matter relates only to the region and can be addressed regionally or is a State matter. If determined that it is a State matter, it will be referred to the appropriate department for inclusion or adjustment to:

- QFRS training material
- Operations Doctrine and other QFRS documentation
- Fleet, equipment and other resources
- Community Education and Safety

If the issue has a multi-agency impact, then it may be referred to the Deputy Commissioner or relevant regional planning and coordination team to conduct a review and implement recommendations for improvement as necessary.

*If the experience of a single firefighter at one incident can be used to improve the safety of all firefighters then this experience must be recorded and passed on to where those changes can be made for the benefit of all.*
LESSONS LEARNED

Firefighters respond to a wide range of operations and while there are broad commonalities that exist, every incident presents many variables. These variables cannot be addressed by set procedures and must be approached initially on a generic level. By understanding the generic approach, firefighters can combine existing knowledge with the incident specific information to resolve the incident.

This combination leads to an innovative approach resulting in a positive lesson learned for the organisation. Where the activities at any level (strategic, tactical or task focused) highlight a critical error in the incident response, a negative aspect which can be corrected by the organisation is thereby revealed.

Lessons learned, both positive and negative, are the result of experiences. They can be of value to the organisation only if personnel are empowered to present them in an honest and factual account of the incident.

Any experience which is recounted in an environment where there is fear of punitive actions, personnel bias or unsubstantiated claims will not assist in the process of continuous improvement.

To identify the lessons from an incident, firefighters must first maintain situational awareness during the incident and then actively participate in the debriefing process. By doing this, observations are packaged together with pre-incident planning, information from the incident and interaction from external agencies and other involved persons.

Near-Miss

All incidents that occur within the DES or through DES sponsored activities where work-related fatality, injury, illness, dangerous occurrence, near miss, environmental incident, or property damage has resulted are to be reported.

A near-miss is an event observed during the incident; it involves an action or a series of preceding actions that were identified as having the potential to cause injury or death.

Near-miss reporting is to be undertaken in accordance with DES Incident Reporting & Investigation Policy (OH/C15.0) and should be included in debrief material to source the actions that lead to the near-miss. It can highlight the effect on operations if the event identified as a near-miss were to be actualised.

An operational near-miss can result in objectives being compromised such as when hose lines are placed ineffectively allowing fire spread or an incomplete backburn with the potential to allow the spread of a bushfire.

Innovation

Firefighters are practical people who are quick to realise when there is an easier and more effective way of achieving a task. These improvements must be captured, evaluated and introduced into the organisation's response profile.
VALIDATION

Four simple questions can be used to identify whether lessons can be learnt from the response:

1. What was supposed to happen?
2. What actually happened?
3. Why were there differences?
4. What did we learn?

From these questions, especially if there are considerable differences between what was supposed to happen and what actually happened, the lessons learned can be highlighted.

It is then that the organisation can consider its response options in possible improvements using the following categories:

Sustain

The response measures that the organisation has in place and have been validated by the recent experience are suitable for any future response. This directly links to relevant documents incorporating all policy, procedure and training material to support issue management (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Review

The response measures were inadequate or challenged in their ability to manage and effectively resolve the incident but only require nominal improvement, learning from the recent experience. This directly links to relevant documents with feedback from analysis to improve documentation during annual review process (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Develop

Personnel encountered a situation where organisational capacity was non-existent and the response was by an ad-hoc approach with the organisation learning to prevent a reoccurrence of not being prepared. Specific gap in knowledge identified and analysis of issue conducted to develop policy, procedure, training material and the implementation of the information across QFRS (may require Standing Order or Safety Bulletin).

Pass On

Information and response indicate that the issue is not the responsibility of this organisation but documentation has to be completed to inform other DES Divisions and/or other Government Department of identified impact.
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

From this information and research on best operational practice, the QFRS will ensure increased safety for all personnel and continuous improvement in service delivery.

Effective learning draws upon the principle that the less time that elapses between discussing a lesson and applying it at work, the more effective the application and the overall improvement.

The State Operations Directorate maintains information within the Operations Doctrine and Field Incident Guide within the established annual review process. When information is identified as being vital for safety and operational effectiveness, Safety Bulletins and Standing Orders provide the temporary communications until the information is captured in the next review process.

In the practical environment of emergency response we must experience the lesson before teaching it to others so that the benefit to all is built on the cost of few.

Safety Bulletins

A Safety Bulletin is used to communicate critical/urgent information swiftly and to alert QFRS personnel to operational safety hazards, near misses, and innovations generated from the fireground and is outside the annual document review period.

In a generic sense, Safety Bulletins communicate the actions required to eliminate or manage the risk - then improve performance delivery by identifying a better practice and sharing the knowledge.

They may be revoked only by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or moved to an appropriate permanent location during annual review such as the Operations Doctrine.

Safety Bulletins can be initiated by Region, Area, or Headquarter Business Unit, after the Assistant Commissioner's approval, and then forwarded to the State Operations Directorate for issue.

Standing Orders

Standing Orders are a multi-purpose document used to communicate only critical/urgent information, new/changed policy, instruction or information relevant to QFRS operational and/or business functions;

Standing Orders enable the Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner to communicate to the relevant personnel, information that is not currently covered within policy, doctrine, business rules, templates etc. Standing Orders are used outside the annual review period or as a reminder of information needed to control a specific situation.