

Contents

Preface	6
Introduction	20
1 Summary of weather and flood events.....	24
1.1 Summary of weather leading to 2010/2011 flood events.....	24
1.2 Summary of 2010/2011 flood events	25
1.2.1 General note on terminology for flood levels.....	25
1.2.2 December 2010.....	25
1.2.3 January 2011.....	26
2 Dams	32
2.1 Relevant agencies and legislation.....	32
2.1.1 Department of Environment and Resource Management.....	32
2.1.2 Queensland Water Commission	33
2.1.3 SEQ Water Grid Manager.....	33
2.1.4 Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority trading as Seqwater.....	34
2.1.5 SunWater Limited.....	34
2.1.6 Relationships between DERM and the water agencies.....	34
2.1.7 Local councils	35
2.2 Dam history, functions and capacities.....	36
2.2.1 Referable dams	36
2.2.2 Flood mitigation manuals.....	36
2.2.3 Flood mitigation and water supply	37
2.2.4 Full supply level	37
2.2.5 Resource operations plans and licences	37
2.2.6 Types of dams.....	38
2.2.7 Somerset Dam.....	38
2.2.8 Wivenhoe Dam.....	39
2.2.9 Fuse plugs	39
2.2.10 North Pine Dam	40
2.2.11 Regional dams.....	40
2.3 Flood preparedness of Seqwater	41
2.3.1 Arrangements for flood operations	41
2.3.2 Annual Wivenhoe and North Pine manual review.....	41
2.3.3 Tools at the flood operations centre	42
2.3.4 Seqwater's flood preparedness activities.....	43
2.4 Temporary alteration of full supply level	44
2.4.1 Fixing and altering the 'full supply level' of dams	44
2.4.2 Drought and proposals to raise full supply level.....	44
2.4.3 Community concern	45
2.4.4 October 2010 process	46
2.4.5 February 2011 process.....	48
2.4.6 Relevant and responsible decision-maker.....	50
2.4.7 Proposed temporary reduction of Wivenhoe Dam in 2011/2012	51
2.5 Manual of operational procedures for flood mitigation at Wivenhoe Dam and Somerset Dam	52
2.5.1 Structure of the Wivenhoe manual	52
2.5.2 Choice of strategy/forecast rainfall	55
2.5.3 Use of forecasts – January 2011	55
2.5.4 Interpretation and compliance	56
2.5.5 Training.....	57

2.5.6 Registration of flood engineers	58
2.5.7 Interim review of the Wivenhoe manual.....	58
2.5.8 Longer term review of the Wivenhoe manual.....	59
2.6 Decision-making and conditions at the flood operations centre	62
2.6.1 Weather forecasts.....	62
2.6.2 Rainfall gauges	63
2.6.3 Stream gauges	63
2.6.4 The real time flood model	63
2.6.5 'With forecast' and 'without forecast' model runs.....	64
2.6.6 Estimating flows from the Lockyer and Bremer	64
2.6.7 Estimating flow at Moggill	65
2.6.8 Working conditions at the flood operations centre	65
2.6.9 Records of decision-making.....	66
2.6.10 Communications	67
2.7 Chronology of the operation of Wivenhoe and Somerset dams in January 2011	70
2.7.1 The beginning: the bridges	71
2.7.2 Transition to strategy W3	72
2.7.3 Rise and fall	72
2.7.4 Heavy rain and the threat of urban flooding.....	73
2.7.5 Water continues to flow in	75
2.7.6 Holding Moggill to 4000 m ³ /s	76
2.7.7 Another downpour.....	78
2.7.8 Increasing releases in W4.....	80
2.7.9 The days after: the drawdown.....	81
2.8 General comments on the operation of Wivenhoe Dam	81
2.8.1 The interpretation of strategy W3.....	81
2.8.2 An earlier move to W4?.....	82
2.8.3 Gate openings in W4	82
2.8.4 Reaction to Brisbane City Council advice regarding threshold of damaging flows in Brisbane.....	83
2.9 Effects of dam releases.....	83
2.9.1 Dam releases and the flow at Moggill	83
2.9.2 Modelling of the impact of dam releases on flooding.....	86
2.9.3 Effect of releases on riverbanks	87
2.10 Operation of North Pine Dam.....	88
2.10.1 Managing flood events	88
2.10.2 Wet season flood events.....	88
2.10.3 Safety concerns.....	90
2.10.4 Personal safety of the dam operator	91
2.10.5 Interim review of the North Pine manual	91
2.10.6 Longer term review of the North Pine manual	92
2.10.7 North Pine River crossings	93
2.10.8 Isolation of some Whiteside residents	94
3 Disaster frameworks, preparation and planning.....	112
3.1 Disaster management framework	112
3.1.1 National disaster management framework.....	112
3.1.2 Queensland disaster management arrangements.....	112
3.1.3 Disaster agencies in Queensland	114
3.1.4 Disaster framework in the 2010/2011 floods	115
3.2 Preparation and planning.....	115
3.2.1 Local government preparation	115
3.2.2 State level planning	116

3.2.3 Risk management.....	116
3.2.4 Activation level terminology	117
3.3 Disaster management plans.....	117
3.3.1 Local disaster management plans.....	118
3.3.2 Oversight of disaster management plans.....	119
3.3.3 Disaster management guidelines	119
3.4 Disaster management training	120
3.4.1 Exercise ‘Orko’	120
3.4.2 Adequacy of training.....	120
3.5 Community education and driving in floodwaters.....	121
3.5.1 Community education	121
3.5.2 Driving in floodwaters.....	123
4 Forecasts, warnings and information	128
4.1 Flood warning systems.....	128
4.1.1 Warnings.....	129
4.1.2 Information about flood levels.....	135
4.1.3 Flood mapping and flood modelling	136
4.1.4 Warnings about dam spillway outflow.....	137
4.1.5 Information about road conditions.....	140
4.2 Warnings and forecasts: Bureau of Meteorology and councils.....	143
4.2.1 How the Bureau provides information	143
4.2.2 The Bureau’s warnings	143
4.2.3 Severe weather warnings.....	143
4.2.4 Flood warnings.....	144
4.2.5 Weather conditions likely to cause flash flooding.....	144
4.2.6 Bureau communications with councils during 2010/2011 floods	145
4.2.7 Bureau communication with Ipswich City Council on 11 January 2011	145
4.2.8 Warnings for Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba	146
4.2.9 Helidon gauge spike	150
4.2.10 Amateur weather watchers.....	152
4.2.11 Warnings for Fernvale	152
5 Emergency response.....	160
5.1 Local government response	160
5.1.1 Council-to-council assistance	162
5.1.2 Locality-based disaster management.....	163
5.2 Communication between local, district and state groups.....	165
5.2.1 Communication with local groups	165
5.2.2 Participation in teleconferences	166
5.3 Rescue	167
5.3.1 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.....	167
5.3.2 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service preparedness for and response to the events of 10 January 2011.....	172
5.3.3 Helicopter training for swift water technicians	174
5.3.4 Equipment for swift water rescue	174
5.3.5 Communications	177
5.3.6 The role of the rural fire brigade in responding to disasters other than fire.....	178
5.3.7 State Emergency Service.....	179
5.3.8 Emergency Helicopter Network	181
5.4 Emergency calls	183
5.4.1 Background.....	183
5.4.2 Emergency calls in the Toowoomba region on 10 January 2011	185
5.4.3 Emergency calls made by Ms Donna Rice and her son Jordan Rice	186

5.5 Evacuation	188
5.5.1 Evacuation plans	188
5.5.2 Informing the community about evacuation centres.....	190
5.5.3 Official evacuation centres.....	191
5.5.4 Makeshift evacuation centres.....	192
5.5.5 Indemnity insurance for makeshift evacuation centres.....	193
5.5.6 Australian Red Cross involvement in evacuations	194
5.5.7 Registration of evacuees.....	195
5.5.8 Assisted evacuations	195
5.5.9 Arrangements for animals.....	197
5.6 Boundaries.....	198
5.7 Re-supply	202
5.7.1 Re-supply delays.....	202
5.7.2 Re-supply of isolated communities and individuals	202
5.7.3 Fodder drops.....	202
5.8 Local road maintenance	203
5.9 Co-ordination of cross-border emergency responses	203
6 Essential services	218
6.1 Essential services in the disaster management framework	218
6.1.1 Power	218
6.1.2 Water	219
6.1.3 Telecommunications	221
6.2 Communications and assistance between essential services providers	222
6.3 Rocklea Markets	223
7 Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba	228
7.1 The December/January floods in the Toowoomba region	228
7.1.1 The region	228
7.1.2 Toowoomba Regional Council disaster preparation and planning.....	229
7.1.3 December 2010/early January 2011 floods	229
7.1.4 Flooding in Toowoomba on 10 January 2011	230
7.1.5 Toowoomba Regional Council and other agencies' response to events	230
7.1.6 Oakey	230
7.1.7 Cooby Dam	231
7.2 The December/January floods in the Lockyer Valley region.....	232
7.2.1 The region	232
7.2.2 Lockyer Valley Regional Council preparation and planning	233
7.2.3 December 2010/early January 2011 floods.....	235
7.2.4 Lockyer Valley disaster response – agency response	237
7.2.5 Lockyer Valley Regional Council response	238
7.3 Other issues raised by communities in the Lockyer Valley	243
7.3.1 The effect of debris	243
7.3.2 The Grantham railway line	243
7.3.3 The Grantham quarry	243
7.3.4 Mobile phone reception in and around Murphys Creek, Spring Bluff and Postman's Ridge ...	244
7.3.5 Grantham residents' exclusion from their properties	244
Appendices.....	250
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference.....	251
Appendix 2: Leave to appear	255
Appendix 3: Glossary.....	257