[redacted]

From: Rob Drury [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, 16 January 2011 6:43 PM
To: Duty Seq
Subject: Fw: Cabinet in co nfidence - Ministerial brief outline

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From: Peter Borrows
To: Rob Drury
Cc: John Tibaldi; Paul Bird; Jim Pruss; Peter Borrows
Sent: Sun Jan 16 18:06:18 2011
Subject: Fw: Cabinet in co nfidence - Ministerial brief outline

Have a look.

I'll call in a while. You'll have to get input from John T I think.

From: Kathy Reilly [redacted]
To: Reilly Bob <Bob.Reilly [redacted]; Peter Borrows; john.bradley [redacted]
<peter.allen@ [redacted]
Sent: Sun Jan 16 17:59:36 2011
Subject: Re: Cabinet in co nfidence - Ministerial brief outline

Hi Peter

Peter Allen will provide you with some technical commentary, so I will concentrate on the wider issues. In the interests of time, I have not checked my comments with Peter Allen so he and your staff can feel to correct me if I have got my facts wrong.

Dam failure versus fuse plug activation

In the current event, the critical issue we were trying to avoid was activation of the fuse plugs, with the first one being activated at (I recall) 75.6 metres--not sure what this was in terms of percentage of capacity. As well as the adverse impacts of such activation cited in the text, the practical effect would also have been to increase, I understand, flood heights by about 0.5 metres in Brisbane. So, we had to avoid this outcome. (Also what the 0.5 metres been worth in terms of avoided property damage?)

Personally, I would emphasise more the arguments around what we had to do to avoid this outcome.

Reducing the peak flood in brisbane--last paragarph p.3

This is an important point. However the argument would be strengthened if you more comprehensively explained the reasoning behind the statement. For example, are we saying that because seqwater reduced the flow from 6,000 cumecs to 2,500 cumecs, then this was the outcome, and that the only reason we could do that was because we were still 0.5 metres or so below fuse plug activation (and thus had a buffer if there was an unexpected surge in inflows?)

Also what is the 1 metre worth in terms of reduced property damage?

Section 2.4

Playing the devil's advocate for a moment with respect to the table on p.7, could someone convincingly argue that if the starting level had been 50% of FSL, you would have had the ability to reduce the releases from Wivenhoe below 2,500 cumecs at the height of the flood event, and thus further reduce the peak height in Brisbane /Ipswich?

Seqwater report (p.13)

The specific additional issues that I suggest we include are:

- whether it is worth investigating increasing the flood capacity of Wivenhoe--I know a fair bit of work has been done on this issue
- whether the Brisbane River crossings which act, under some situations as a constraint on the releases from Wivenhoe, should be replaced by bridges. For example if the smallest could pass , for example, 2,500 cumecs, then this could enable higher releases under some circumstances.
- Whether the policy of draining the flood compartment within 7 days should be modified.

I also suggest the review be undertaken by an independent expert and that an expert panel be formed to provide review of the report and identification of any additional issues requiring investigation--this is important if you are picking up possibel improvement by otehr agencies.

Minor points.

- throughout the text can we be clear what we mean by the term "failure"--to the Minister I suspect this means the dam will collapse and I do not think this is what meant in some cases.
- the spillway upgrade in 2035 is not intended to improve flood mitgation capacity, I understand (p.2)
- the first few paragraphs in section 2.1 refer to the sceanrio where Wivenhoe did not exist--could this be made clearer in the text?
- Finally, could we make the point that Wivenhoe/Somerset does not control Lockyer/Bremer and that the flood flow at the river peak was compromised of x % from these sources. In the last few days, I have explained to many people around Milton/Auchenflower (where there was significant flooding) this point and they are always surprised. There appears to be a strong view in the community that Wivenhoe was supposed to stop any repetition of the 1974 flood and therefore it "failed" in this task given what has happened.

Regards

Bob

----- Original Message -----

From: Reilly Bob
To: [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 4:33 PM
Subject: Fw: Cabinet in co nfidence - Ministerial brief outline

----- Original Message -----
From: Peter Borrows [redacted]
To: Reilly Bob; Rob Drury [redacted] Duty Seq [redacted]; Bradley John; Dennien Barry @ [redacted] spiller daniel @ [redacted]
Cc: Lyons Michael @ [redacted] Mike Foster [redacted] Elaina Smouha [redacted]
Allen Peter
Sent: Sun Jan 16 16:28:29 2011
Subject: Cabinet in co nfidence - Ministerial brief outline

Please see attached draft with attachment.

In relation to the draft contents outline sent yesterday, the following is a cross reference FYI.

The attached Ministerial Briefing Note addresses the questions contained in the Ministerial Information Request as follows:

1) Design of Dam – Storages/Spillway upgrade

Refer Section 1

2) "The Flood Event" – Q&A

a. Chronology - High level time step of events and significant decision making/changes – more detailed time step information for Tuesday afternoon (i.e. what was the BOM forecast at the time, narrow peak etc.)

Refer Section 2.5

b. How does Wivenhoe Dam work as a flood mitigator?

Refer Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 3.1

c. What are the factors being balanced when making decisions about the amount of dam releases? To what extent does information from the Bureau of Meteorology/rain gauges influence decisions? How reliable is this information?

Refer Sections 3.1 and 3.2

d. Statistics on how much did Wivenhoe Dam knock off the flood peak.

Refer Section 2.1

e. What would have happened if Wivenhoe Dam had not been built and we only had Somerset Dam? What damage would have been caused compared to what has currently been experienced (damage statistics)?

Refer Sections 2.1 and 2.2

f. If we have undertaken pre-emptive dam releases to bring Wivenhoe Dam's full supply level down to lower than what we had maintained (i.e. 60%), what would have been the river height for the period that this flood event occurred?

Refer Section 2.4

g. If pre-emptive dam releases would not have made a difference, why? (i.e. why did we not release earlier?)

Refer Section 2.4

h. Why was Wivenhoe Dam only allowed to rise up to 191% and not 230%?

Refer Section 2.2

i. What is the fuse plug and why did it need to be maintained?

Refer Section 2.3

j. What damage or town isolation occurred during the Wivenhoe Dam releases that occurred since October 2010?

Refer Section 2.4

k. Did Seqwater have time to reduce the dam level between the 5 events? If so, would it have made a difference to this flood event?

Refer Section 2.4

3) The Flood Mitigation Manual

Refer Section 3.1

a. Describe the decision making framework - Four strategies

Refer Section 3.2

b. How is the Manual designed to work?

Refer Section 3.2

c. History of Flood Mitigation Manual updates and peer review – who was on the panels, studies that fed into previous versions of the Manual and who was involved in these studies?

Refer Section 3.1

4) Regulatory context - Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 (Information provider: Peter Allen - DERM)

Refer Section 4

Regards, Peter.

Peter Borrows

Chief Executive Officer

Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority trading as Seqwater

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From: Elaina Smouha [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, 15 January 2011 5:03 PM

To: Mike Foster; peter.allen[redacted] bob.reilly[redacted] Peter Borrows; Rob Drury; Duty Seq
Cc:[redacted]
michael.lyons[redacted] Elaina Smouha
Subject: Cabinet in confidence - Ministerial brief outline

Dear All

To assist, attached is a Ministerial brief outline as per our recent teleconference, for Monday's Emergency Cabinet meeting. It also records those who will be providing information for the Background and Flood Mitigation Manual report process.

As discussed, the brief needs to be provided to Minister Robertson tomorrow (Sunday, 16 January 2011).

Regards

Elaina

Elaina Smouha

Director, Governance and Regulatory Compliance

SEQ Water Grid Manager

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3 sheets of A4 paper = 1 litre of water

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