

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Prepared by: Legal Services Unit

Prepared by: Legal Services Unit

Date: 9 May 2011

Name of Witness: Thomas Craig Dawson

Address of Witness: QFRS Regional Headquarters Toowoomba

Occupation: Assistant Commissioner, QFRS

Position: Assistant Commissioner, QFRS, South Western Region

Telephone: (Work) (Mobile)

I, **Thomas Craig Dawson**, Assistant Commissioner, South Western Region, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS), Department of Community Safety state:

1. I have been employed by the QFRS for 30 years.
2. I carry out my role as Assistant Commissioner, South Western Region, from the Regional Headquarters located at Margaret Street, Toowoomba.
3. This statement responds to matters raised by Station Officer Burrows in transcripts, some of which were only provided to me some days ago. It should be noted that I have had significant involvement in the managerial resolution processes and bringing disciplinary proceedings against Station Officer Burrows.

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4. My statement also responds to some extent to matters raised by various officers in the submission provided to the Commission of Inquiry by the United Firefighters Union of Australia.
5. The matters addressed in this statement relate primarily to the South Western Region.

Operational Plans and Local Action Plans

6. Each local QFRS command is required to have in place an Operational Plan for each financial year. Toowoomba Command currently has a 2010/2011 Operational Plan in place. The Operation Plan sets out the planning, preparedness, response and recovery operation plans for each local fire station. It plans this through community education, building fire safety requirements (building fire safety inspections) support for commercial training and other services as required. It also sets out staff competence acquisitions and staff skill maintenance and knowledge management, asset management, financial resource manage, HR management, risk management and SIOPP administration. Attached and marked **TCD-1** is a copy of the Toowoomba Command Operational Plan for 2010/2011.
7. The Operation Plan also includes the requirements for the co-ordination for station meetings, the person responsible for conducting those meeting and the frequency of those meetings.
8. As part of the Operational Plan QFRS local commands are responsible for developing Local Action Plans (LAPs) as required to assist with the co-ordination of local risk identification and updates as required in the areas of developing I-Zone LAPs and Local Specific Operation Plans (LSOPs). Each command Inspector, supported by their Station Officers is responsible for developing the LAPs and LSOPs.
9. There was no flood LSOP in place prior to the 2010/2011 flood events as it was not identified as a significant risk prior to these events.

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10. As a result of lessons learned from 10 January 2011, a new LSOP in relation to flooding in Toowoomba city has been designed and drafted by Inspector Lacko in consultation with the Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator and other technical rescue practitioners, Inspector Toowoomba Command and the Chief Superintendent. I hope to review and endorse the new plan soon. Similar plans are also being prepared for all South Western Region towns that were impacted by the 2010/2011 flood events. A copy of that plan once finalised can be provided to the Commission of Inquiry.

Communications between Senior Management and Operational staff

11. Contrary to Station Officer Burrows' allegations, there has been no breakdown of communications between QFRS senior management and operational staff. Regular meetings are conducted including shift meetings, Captain and Lieutenant meetings, and Senior Officer meetings with operational staff. There are minutes taken of these meetings which are stored on the Regional website and all command offices keep copies of these minutes.

12. QFRS Policy, Procedures and Guidelines were in place for Operational crews to respond initially to all emergency calls. Prior to the 2010/2011 flood events, additional operational procedures were in place and included:

- (a) procedures specific to Technical Rescue events; and
- (b) additional Technical Rescue equipment was obtained through Cannon Hill for Technical Rescue events and put in locations where they would be required.

These procedures are referred to in the Planning and Preparation Activities document which has previously been provided to the Commission of Inquiry (see SOQ 001.001.0153-0156).

13. As I recall our regional work load regarding flood activities right across the region continued well into February 2011. We were still responding teams to St George, Goondiwindi, Dirranbandi, and the recovery phase involvement was still steady within the South Western

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Region. Also we deployed staff to North Queensland for Cyclone Yasi as well as staff to New Zealand to Christchurch. The debriefs were conducted as soon as possible. But certainly not within the 48 hour period as it was simply not possible under the circumstances at the time.

14. I was not present for all of the debriefing on 4 February 2011 (not 12 February 2011 as alleged by SO Burrows). I understand that all of the discussions at that debriefing were captured on tape. It has been my experience when in meetings with Station Officer Burrows that if you do not control Station Officer Burrows he will dominate discussions, prolong conversations unnecessarily, push his own agenda, and put off others who need to contribute. I am sure that senior management trying to conduct this debrief would have had to address Station Officer Burrows' conduct. In light of the extreme events that occurred on 10 January 2011, it was extremely important that all officers were given the opportunity to have their say and express their points of view at this debriefing.

QFRS forewarning of 2010/2011 flood events

15. While QFRS was aware of heightened severe weather risks as a result of earlier BOM briefings, QFRS had no forewarning of the scale of the threat of the 2010/2011 flood events that actually eventuated. Nevertheless, QFRS prepared and responded as the incident escalated within QFRS capability at that time.
16. QFRS had standard weather forecast ability through DCS website access, that is, the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) information which is also available to operational crews.
17. Due to the dynamics of this incident, road closures constantly changed however road closures were available on local government websites for the majority of the 2010/2011 events. Accuracy of road closures cannot be relied on always due to the incident dynamics and local knowledge was accessed as much as possible.

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18. South Western Region Senior Management do at times make decisions in locations removed from events, due to the regions geographical size, however they do not leave strategic decisions to operational staff. Of course, decisions are always made on advice or, from wordback/situation reports provided by operational staff on the ground.

Swiftwater Rescue (SWR) Qualifications

19. I have no formal knowledge of QFRS not recognising Station Officer Burrows' international qualifications with respect to Swiftwater Rescue (SWR).

20. It is my understanding that to obtain a SWR qualification you must first hold vertical rescue qualifications. I understand that Mr Burrows does not currently hold vertical rescue qualifications.

Strategic Support from on call Seniors

21. The role of the on call Senior Officer is to ensure that adequate resources are called to any specific incident. This is achieved through consultation with the officer in charge of the particular incident to determine what resources are required. If necessary the on call Senior Officer will attend the incident personally. Once on site, the Officer will determine the level of command required and ensure that that level of command is implemented. The Officer will then ensure that the incident is managed to a safe closure. The on call Senior Officer is informed of an incident by FireCom.

22. The on call Senior Officer position only operates out of normal hours and on weekends. On 10 January 2011, as the events occurred during normal working hours, there were several Senior Officers present within Toowoomba who were available and were deployed to various locations during the events.

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23. On 10 January 2011, I placed 2 Senior Officers in the FireComs centre in order to ensure that QFRS resources were prioritized effectively and that operational points established by operational crews remained supported throughout this event.

24. All Senior Officers in the Urban Stream of QFRS have progressed through the ranks from recruit firefighter to Station Officer to Senior Officer. This is the case for all Senior Officers in the South Western Region. This includes the Assistant Commissioner.

Swift Water Rescue (SWR) Training for Senior Officers

25. Across the State it is generally the case that Senior Officers are not trained in SWR. The only Senior Officer trained in SWR to my knowledge was Inspector De Vries who was, until November 2010, SWR's Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator. Inspector DeVries who was appointed in 2009 decided to stand down from his technical rescue duties in order to focus on his new role as Warwick Command Inspector. Operational Seniors are required to have a board knowledge and understanding of all of the QFRS's operational capabilities so that they can effectively coordinate and manage large incidents and events. The level of technical skill and knowledge of the senior officer does not have to be a fully qualified practitioner. This has been a very successful approach not only in Australia but in many parts of the world.

Herries Street Communications Centre

26. The Herries Street Communication Centre in Toowoomba is a joint facility used by QAS and QFRS. The communication centre main room is an open plan design with breakout out facilities off to the side. The QFRS operate 2 consoles with 2 staff rostered 24/7 in the north eastern corner of this room. The area is recognised as a limited workspace.

27. A significant increase in 000 emergency calls was received to the South Western Region Fire Communications Centre (FireCom) during the 10 January 2011 flood events. Senior

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management had rostered an additional staff member to FireCom to assist in the expected increase in workload. This is standard procedure for storm events however, this storm was unprecedented. Importantly, any 000 calls that cannot be answered by South Western Region FireCom are diverted/presented to the Brisbane Fire Communications Centre. Any calls received by Brisbane FireCom, can be entered into the state Emergency Services Computer Aided Dispatch (ESCAD) system allowing South Western Region FireCom to dispatch appropriately.

28. Both QAS and QFRS management continue to discuss workspace areas in this centre. The Division of Workplace Health and Safety have in the past provided advice on how to best manage this work area. For example, during operator training 4 staff can function for a short duration well. During large incidents it is not uncommon for a senior officer to be position in FireCom to assist in the operational management of the incident or ensuring that adequate resources are deployed across the region so as to sustain operation response. This approach was taken and employed on 10 January 2011. It is correct to say that the area would have been busy space wise, but it was manageable.

29. During the official debrief for all FireCom Operators it was noted that there were concerns about the actual space available for QFRS staff and that is why I keep QFRS staff levels to the requirement for normal business (no visitors unless authorised by the manager). However, during pending or actual large events I have no choice but to use what space QFRS does have in the centre to the best effect.

30. I have listened to many hours of the Firecom tapes and radio messages from 10 January 2011 (not all) and I did not hear any arguing in the back ground just a lot of very busy staff both QFRS and QAS (it is a shared centre). I also attended the Firecom debrief which involved all SWR Firecom staff who worked the entire SWR weather event of 2010/2011 and I cannot recall any such comments or incident that have been indicated.

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31. South Western Region does not have a Firecom supervisor. It has a Regional Manager of Communications and the manager was present in the Firecom from just after 1300 hours of 10 January 2011.

Administrative Staff levels

32. South Western Region has an administration structure on the same model as every other Region in the State. South Western Region currently has 6 commands across the Region and there is 1 Administration Officer attached to each command. There are 4 functional commands however there are only 2 Administration Officers working in these areas. Within Regional Headquarters there are staff responsible for WH&S, HR, Finance, Regional Operations (operational Chief Superintendent), Regional Development (operational Superintendent), Manager of Regional Communications, and The Office of the Assistant Commissioner. All of those staff are supported by 2 Administration Officers. This means that South Western Regions approved administration staffing level is 10, as approved by the Commissioner of the QFRS.

QFRS Resources in Toowoomba

33. The QFRS monitors population and industrial trends as well as operational response capacity in Toowoomba as well as right across the state of Queensland. In determining the most appropriate number of firefighters allocated to the specific location, QFRS considers a number of factors including population, incident call rate data, hazardous risk and availability of neighboring operational resources. Currently the Toowoomba Command has 14 Station Officers, 34 Permanent Firefighters and 72 Auxiliary Firefighters.

34. The \$2.4 million Kitchener Street replacement fire station commenced on 23 September 2010. That station operates 24/7 and is permanently staffed by 4 Firefighters and 2 Station Officers on each shift. This new station is directly supported by Anzac Avenue Station which is permanently staffed by 3 Firefighters and one Station Officer on each shift and

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again, that station operates 24/7. Both of these permanently staffed stations, in conjunction with a network of Auxiliary staffed stations (Crows Nest, Goombungee, Highfields, Oakey, and Pittsworth), provide service delivery to the city of Toowoomba and surrounding areas.

35. The number of incidents within the urban levy boundary in Toowoomba Command has remained consistent over the last 10 years. The Toowoomba Area operational response capability has been improving as a direct result of more effective fire appliances, additional equipment, increased focus on training and skill maintenance, implementation of a number of community education initiatives, building fire safety improvements and increased fire communication capability. The total number of incidents within the urban levy boundary in Toowoomba Command for 07/08 was 1745, for 08/09 was 1804, for 09/10 was 1776 and for 10/11 up to the end of February was 1189.
36. The average response times to structural fires from Toowoomba's Kitchener St Station and Anzac Avenue Station are well below the target response time of 14 minutes.
37. The QFRS will continue to monitor the primary response figures for the Toowoomba Fire Stations and is committed to providing a safer Queensland and to a Zero Harm environment for its staff of men and women.
38. The entire South Western Region operational response capacity is overseen and managed by the Command Inspectors under the leadership of the Chief Superintendent who, with his Inspectors, form a critical part of the South Western Region on call senior officer network.
39. There is also the further ability of the on call seniors to respond the necessary resources from other locations so as to directly support the operational requirements of any incident occurring in South Western Region. This highlights the importance of sustaining sound working relationships between the Station Officers, Captains and Senior Officers.

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Staffing levels on 10 January 2011

40. On 10 January 2011, 56 QFRS staff and 1 Federal Police Rescue officer responded to the flood events. They included:

- (a) Toowoomba Command permanent staff -10;
- (b) Community Safety staff -1;
- (c) Auxiliary staff -18;
- (d) Operational call back staff -11;
- (e) Firecom - 4;
- (f) Seniors Officers - 5;
- (g) BA Hazmat - 2;
- (h) Rural support - 3;
- (i) Federal Police Rescue - 1; and
- (j) Brisbane Region Technical Rescue staff awaiting deployment – 2.

41. On 10 January 2011, due to the consultation between the Technical Rescue Coordinator and South Western Region Management, two (2) specialist personnel were rostered on shift, however a number of Firefighters self responded and once on station "reported in" as to their attendance. On that day, the South Western Region also called back five (5) additional SWR Technicians.

42. The additional South West Region staff, including swift water rescuers, that were being requested were currently being rested as they were utilised in the Grantham incident the night before (fatigue management). However all available swift water rescue staff returned to duty as the event of 10 January unfolded, and many as call backs.

43. The primary function of the ROCC is to support the activities of incident management teams and the regional requirements as per IMS 2.7.1 *Control and Coordination Centres (ICC)*

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Functional) Standards and IMS 2.7.2 Control and Coordination Centres (ROCC Functional) Standards and does not make operational decisions. Furthermore these procedures do not discriminate between urban and rural personnel. In addition, at all times, urban personal were rostered to the ROCC.

44. QFRS encourage all Auxiliaries to attend as many incidents as possible. According to their work agreement they must attend at least 75% of all incidents in that year.

45. Mr McInerney was on annual leave for the entire 2010/2011 flood events and therefore could not have denied any resources into South Eastern Region. In any event, operational response has no boundaries and the necessary resources will always be sent. However, an unnecessary double up of resources is to be avoided at the risk of reducing available resources in other locations.

Senior Officers on leave during flood events

46. During the 2010/2011 flood events, the Senior Officers in the South Western Region who were on leave were as follows:

- (a) Inspector McInerney who was replaced by A/Inspector Rye Toowoomba Command 11/10/2010 – 24/1/2011;
- (b) Inspector John Wilcox who was replaced by A/Inspector Mc Garth Roma Command 27/12/2010- 31/1/2011; and
- (c) Inspector Lacko who was replaced by A/Inspector Goodman Manager Business Operations 20/12/2010-24/1/2011.

47. It should also be noted that Inspector Lacko was recalled to duty on 11 January 2011 and was assigned to Firecom to assist with operations at Oakey and the recovery phase in Toowoomba. On 13 January 2011, Inspector Lacko was assigned to the role of QFRS SWR Liaison Officer in the QPS MIR located in Police Headquarters in Toowoomba. Acting

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Inspector Goodman remained in the position of A/Manager Operational Business, and supported activities in the ROCC.

48. I returned from Annual Leave on the 20 December 2010 and therefore all other senior officers acting up in other positions returned to their normal positions.

49. QFRS allows for a senior officer to take 5 days leave (1 week) and does not need to be replaced. All other periods longer than 5 days must be replaced. This is and was the practice leading up to and during the 2010/2011 flood events.

Direction given during flood events

50. Contrary to Station Officer Burrows' allegations, there was no lack of direction from Senior Management about overall coordination of and deployment of personnel and equipment as there was a fully active and operating Regional Operation Coordination Centre (ROCC) facilitating rescue deployment prior to, during and post flood activity. The ROCC liaised with strategically located Incident Control Centres (ICC) and Operational Points (OP) to support their operations.

51. Contrary to Station Officer Burrows' allegations, South Western Region management "was at all times" in direct consultation with the SWR Technical Rescue Coordinator. His advice was sought in relation to the staffing with the appropriate skill level.

52. Every officer should be fully aware of the QFRS Operational Doctrine and its supportive documents and the QFRS command structure. There was no lack of direction or understanding on what was required. Staff undertook their duties in an extremely dangerous and hostile environment. What was achieved by all involved on 10 January 2011 was outstanding and is indication of the application of the Operational Doctrine and policies and procedures by all involved.

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53. As a result of outstanding performance and commitment demonstrated by officers in the South Western Region during the 2010/2011 flood events, it is my intention to recommend to the Commissioner that all such staff be formally recognised appropriately. However, the extraordinary efforts by some staff will be recognised through a higher award system.
54. On 10 January 2011 for the peak of this event, Acting Inspector Rye was located in the Firecom and supported the Chief Superintendent and Firecom operators. To my knowledge, the only code Red Red Red (this is code for firefighter in difficulties – send assistance) was the one instigated by Station Officer Burrows regarding the rescue involving swift water rescuer Peter McCarron.
55. At the official SWR Technical Rescue Team debrief conducted by Inspector McInerney, Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator Station Officer Stewart Lange produced a document containing recommendations for consideration. This document of recommendations was endorsed by the Chief Superintendent and myself. Stewart Lange attended the QFRS State Special Operations debrief in Brisbane and tabled the SWR document. The Commissioner of the QFRS has recently established a full review into all aspects of Technical Rescue with a special focus on swift water rescue. Feedback on SWR's particular recommendations is still pending.
56. Contrary to his present allegations, Station Officer Burrows clearly indicates in his transcript of interview that staff were in fact accessing the weather information on the station computers via the BOM site. This is what they are required to do. Firecom and the ROCC and established ICC would have all been accessing the very same information. It is standard operational procedure for staff during wild fire season to monitor local conditions and view the information being provided on the BOM site. There is generally no need to pass this information on unless we know that they are experiencing an IT problem. Again senior management were aware that local crews were monitoring the BOM site and had the same information as everyone else had. All understood that Toowoomba was receiving severe weather warnings on 10 January 2011.

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57. On 10 January 2011 the ROCC was performing its Regional role. ICCs in Dalby and Roma and their respective fixed Operational Points were working well. As events unfolded in Toowoomba and as the Regional Fire Commander I decided to adopt the approach that flexible and mobile Operational Points would need to be established as required and dictated by the event as it unfolded would be the best approach to handle rescues and further QFRS assistance within Toowoomba. Such activity was being coordinated and monitored by the Chief Superintendent and Acting Inspector for the Toowoomba Command located in Firecom where all of the 000 calls and radio communications were coming into.

58. In the Firecom the Chief Superintendent could hear the work load and assist with operational decisions regarding prioritising resources and deployments based on availability and access to locations. If the Chief Superintendent needed to deploy the Acting Inspector he could. Senior Officers were also deployed from Community Safety, Regional Training and released from the ROCC as the event developed. I am of the opinion this approach was our best offence and defence for such an event as that which Toowoomba experienced. As the Regional Fire Commander for the 2010/2011 flood events, I had pre-emptively arranged for additional staff to be brought in at Firecom and have neighbouring auxiliary stations stand up (Oakey and Pittsworth). However, I had no comprehension of what actually hit Toowoomba until the event unfolded. I believe that the above plan gave us our best starting point. By the time I understood what was unfolding the option of establishing an ICC in Toowoomba was not possible and not suitable. However an ICC was established at Highfields fire station on 11 January to support the QFRS resources sent to Oakey to assist with the pending flooding and for the recovery phase of Toowoomba.

59. I considered it was not suitable to establish an ICC because the preferred site for an ICC would have been Highfields Station. The crews from this station were already fully committed to the event as well as I could not confirm road access to the station. Once committed to the strategies of flexible and mobile operation points, the immediate need was to support activities developed by the operational points and monitor the progression of the

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extreme weather event. As the event proceeded and the extreme flood waters reduced and fell to within the capacity of the Toowoomba drainage system, QFRS resources were able to regroup and consolidate their efforts. With water levels rapidly dropping, many self-evacuations, community aided rescues and community assists occurred. QFRS continued to work effectively from the use of Operational Points at various locations throughout Toowoomba. As water levels reduced further, the focus of the QFRS resources shifted to assisting the QPS and local government in searching affected areas and assisting the community as much as possible.

Communications between DDMG and LDMG

60. Information and communications between the DDMGs and LDMGs that were functioning during the 2010/2011 flood events within the South Western Region was effectively flowing between all agencies involved. The Dalby, Roma and Warwick DDMGs and LDMGs were all very active prior to 10 January 2011. Regarding the QFRS such information was targeted to the ROCC and ICCs. The respective ICCs passed the necessary information on to any Operational Points that they may have had in place.

61. Until the 10 January 2011 flood events had occurred, the Toowoomba Command was in normal operational business mode. It should be noted that although activities were moving towards a severe weather event on 10 January 2011, it was also important that normal operational responsibility was also to be sustained. Information coming from the Toowoomba Regional Council LDMG prior to 10 January 2011 was focussed on local level flooding occurring to the west of Toowoomba and outside of the Toowoomba stations urban boundaries and some localised flash flooding that occurred the week before in Toowoomba. But any information like road closures due to flooding was being passed on to local stations or was readily available on the Department of Transport and Main Roads website.

62. I am also aware that A/Inspector Rye and an administration officer from Rural Operations, June Flohr, were assigned to attend the Toowoomba DDMG and LDMG. To the best of my

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knowledge they did so prior to 10 January and Superintendent Waltisbuhl of the Rural Operations did so after 10 January, and all necessary information was passed onto the ICC that was established on 11 January at Highfields that supported the Toowoomba Regional Council in the post 10 January response requirements to Oakey and the subsequent recovery phase for both Toowoomba and Oakey. Also assistance requests from the Gatton ICC through the ROCC were implemented through the Highfields ICC.

63. Station Officer Burrows' normal role is as a team leader at shift and station level. However, I am mindful that a number of station officers within the Toowoomba command did not have a good understanding of the new arrangements in place as required under the amendments to the State *Disaster Management Act*, which commenced in November 2010. That being said, there were no adverse consequences to their operational responses. Although this was and is concerning and is in the process of being addressed, it was important that the senior management team did, in fact, have a sound understanding of the changes to this Act and that the operational staff implemented their normal policies and procedures when required to do so and this they did very well.

Swiftwater Rescue and other Equipment

64. South Western Region has a cache of equipment. I am aware that three days before Christmas equipment was acquired including PFDs, throwbags and a floatation device. These items were picked up by A/Inspector Wally Rye. Additional equipment was also moved from Warwick to Toowoomba.

65. Technical rescue staffing levels are set and established by Special Operations at Cannon Hill. For the South Western Region the current staffing levels currently sit at 13 officers. Of the 13 Technical Rescue Officers 13 are qualified in confined space, 12 are qualified in vertical rescue, 13 are qualified in trench rescue, 10 are qualified in urban search and rescue, and 9 are qualified in swift water rescue. All 13 officers are level 2 qualified in the respective

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disciplines. These staffing levels are set out in the 2010/2011 South Western Region Functional Plan for Technical Rescue.

66. After my return from annual leave on the 20 December 2010, and after the rescue event at Dalby on that very same day, I caused a meeting to be held to review that event as well as to revisit our current swift water rescue capability. At this meeting were the Chief Superintendent Mr Hackett and the Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator Station Officer Lange. As a result of this meeting it was agreed that South Western Region would increase its SWR equipment capacity. It was agreed that the Technical Rescue appliance at Kitchener St Station would carry a full complement of SWR equipment and that as many as possible Yankee units would be made up as SWR units (2 such vehicles was achieved). The Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator would be placed off shift and would be provided with a response capable vehicle and would report to the Chief Superintendent directly.

67. I am aware that Inspectors Rye and De vries and Station Officers from the Toowoomba Command assisted this project and, to their credit, achieved the required results by 24 December 2010. My direction was clear that there were no financial restrictions and Special Operations at Cannon Hill had given us their support. I knew that between the State cache and a cache of equipment that existed within the Warwick Command my objectives would be supported.

68. A/Inspector Wally Rye travelled to Brisbane and Warwick to gather the necessary equipment so as to fully establish the Lima appliance and 2 Yankee vehicles to support regional needs. A/Inspector Wally Rye, Chief Superintendent Lindsay Hackett and Station Officer Stewart Lange meet and organised and established these vehicles to ensure that the South Western Region technical rescue capacity was in readiness for the flood events of 2010/2011.

69. With regards to the swift water rescue incident at Dalby on 20 December 2010, the Chief Superintendent, Regional Coordinator for Technical Rescue and Cameron Ashmore's supervisor A/Inspector Goodman all had a responsibility to have discussions with Cameron

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Ashmore regarding his involvement in this incident. The outcome of this incident caused me to commence a full review of the South Western Region's swift water rescue approach just prior to the pending flood events.

70. Debriefs after the 2010/2011 flood events indicated that there were no waterproof jackets available for portable radios. This problem has been addressed by Chief Superintendent recently purchasing a quantity as recommended by Regional Technical Rescue Coordinator, Station Officer, Lange. Each appliance is issued with a minimum of 3 standard portable radios. South Western Region is undertaking a trial of the protective water proof pouches for portable radios.

71. South Western Region received a significant number of swift water rescues on the day of 10 January 2011. The QFRS is currently performing a review of Technical Rescue. South Western Region, as is the case for all regions, will have direct input into this review.

72. I make this statement of my own free will believing its contents to be true and correct.

Justices Act 1886

I acknowledge by virtue of Section 110A(6C)(c)(i)(ii) of the Justices Act 1886 that:

- (1) This written statement by me dated 9 May 2011 and contained in the pages numbered 1 to 18 is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and
- (2) I make it knowing that, if it were admitted as evidence, I may be liable to prosecution for stating anything that I know is false.

... [Redacted] Signature

Signed at Brisbane this 9th day of May 2011

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