Statement of Colin David Jensen

1. **Colin David Jensen**, Chief Executive Officer, Brisbane, in the State of Queensland, state as follows:

A. Since 9 August 2010 I have been the Chief Executive Officer of Brisbane City Council (Council). I was also appointed as the Local Disaster Co-ordinator (LDC) of the Brisbane Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG).

B. Attachment "CDJ-1" is a copy of a Requirement to Provide Information Notice dated 18 March 2011 (Notice) directed to me from the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (Commission) and received under cover of a letter from the Commission dated 21 March 2011 and received on 23 March 2011. This Statement is provided in response to the Notice.

C. On 11 March 2011, I instructed Clayton Utz (as solicitors for Council) to lodge a submission with the Commission (Initial Submission). Attachment "CDJ-2" is a copy of the Initial Submission (without its attachments which have already been provided to the Commission).

D. For the purposes of preparing this Statement I have, in my position as Chief Executive Officer, had access to the business records of Council and Council officers to obtain information to provide a response to the Notice. Unless otherwise stated, the matters set out in this Statement are based on my knowledge and the information derived from the above sources.

E. The LDMG was chaired by the Lord Mayor and its membership included Council officers and representatives from key external agencies. The State Government was generally represented by either the Deputy Premier or Treasurer. Public utility providers were also represented, such as Queensland Urban Utilities (QUU), Energex, and Origin Energy. Response agencies represented included the State Emergency Services (SES)/Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ), Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS), Queensland Police Service (QPS), Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) and Red Cross. In my capacity as the LDC, I coordinated disaster operations and to reported daily to the LDMG on progress. The LDMG set priorities and provided a forum for inter-agency coordination and cooperation. It was highly cohesive and quickly resolved issues. A list of the members of the LDMG appears as attachment 31 to the Initial Submission.

F. One of the functions of the LDMG is to share knowledge around the expected disaster event between members to enable their respective agencies the best opportunity to reduce damage and plan for a speedy reinstatement of the services for which they are responsible. Attachment
"CDJ -3" is a copy of Meeting Notes of the LDMG for meetings held during the period from 20 July 2010 to 22 January 2011 which report on the actions taken and information shared by each of the relevant member agencies during this period.

G. The LDC, as supported by Council, provides a co-ordination role to allow each of the member agencies to undertake their respective tasks before, during and after a disaster event.

1. **Local planning and preparation, including training, undertaken in advance of and/or in relation to the 2010/2011 flood events**

1.1 Council and the LDMG have responded to a number of large events over recent years and, as a result, have continued to improve their respective capacity and competency to respond to and manage disaster events. Examples include the Gap Storm Event of 2008, the Rocklea Creek flooding of 2009 and, more recently, heavy rain, high/king tides and some suburban creek flooding in October, December 2010 and January 2011.

1.2 Due to this recent hands-on experience, Council and the LDMG had a high state of preparedness and were well placed to deal with the Brisbane River flood of January 2011.

1.3 The Initial Submission deals with the above topic in some detail. I refer in particular to the following sections (page 12-14) of the Initial Submission:

(a) 5.7 - Community Awareness and Education. This section sets out how Council has invested heavily in community awareness campaigns since 2004;

(b) 5.8 - Disaster Response Planning. This section summarises the comprehensive disaster planning and management capabilities of Council and the LDMG;

(c) 5.9 - Disaster Management Training. This section outlines the significant and on-going training attended by Council officers both internally and externally;

(d) 5.10 - Disaster Management Exercises; and

(e) 5.11 - Continuous Improvement.

1.4 In addition to the information contained in the referenced sections of the Initial Submission, some particular matters of relevance are set out below.

1.5 On 17 August 2010 I was briefed by the Acting Disaster Operations Manager (**DOM**) on Council’s Disaster management arrangements and Council’s Concept of Operations.
Attachment "CDJ-4" is a copy of the "Disaster Management CEO Briefing" and Concept of Operations I received.

1.6 On 28 October 2010 I attended one of the periodic meetings of the LDMG where:

(a) a presentation was provided by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) outlining the weather outlook for the coming summer storm season. Attachment "CDJ-5" is a copy of the BoM presentation.

(b) A presentation from the QPS and the introduction to the Group of the new DDC. Attachment “CDJ-6” is a copy of the presentation.

(c) EMQ provided an update on training and exercises conducted with Council.

(d) Red Cross provided an update.

During the presentations there was general discussion about planning and preparedness for flooding and evacuation.

1.7 In December 2010 I inspected the newly refurbished Local Disaster Coordination Centre (LDCC). Council had invested approximately $250,000 undertaking this work to produce a state of the art coordination centre capable of managing a complex 24 hour/7 day a week response.

1.8 A Memorandum of Understanding between Council and Red Cross was signed on 22 December 2010 (MOU) for the purpose of clearly defining responsibilities for the management of evacuation centres. A copy of the MOU appears as attachment 35 to the Initial Submission.

1.9 During calendar year 2010 (and previous years), extensive training and disaster management exercises were undertaken by Council officers together with other agencies. A summary of disaster management training and a summary of disaster management exercises are attachments 26 and 27 respectively of the Initial Submission. My Executive Management Team (EMT) also undertook disaster communications training in the use of Council’s Motorola MTP850 digital radio. This back-up communications system is held by each member of the team as Council’s redundant communications system. A training session for Council’s EMT was held on 10 September 2010 as part of our preparation for the annual storm season and followed up by undertaking a regular teleconference using these radios.

Colin David Jensen

Witness
1.10 Council has various early warning messages available to the public and internal staff. These include: the Brisbane Metropolitan Transport Management Centre (BMTMC - a joint State/Council service) that monitors and manages the transport network; the Early Warning Alert System (that alerts internal staff and the public by text message and email); the Network Co-ordination Centre (NCC) that manages the Brisbane Transport bus network; Floodwise (that is an internal alert based on creek gauge telemetry); and the Creek Flooding Alert Service (publically available). As LDC, I receive these message alerts by either email or SMS or both. I am also updated by text message and telephone call by the BMTMC or NCC if there are transport network issues.

1.11 A nominated trained and experienced Council officer is always rostered on as the Disaster Management Duty Officer (DMDO). The DMDO constantly monitors current and emerging events and is empowered to act as appropriate including, for example, contacting me as LDC at any time, to, if necessary, activate a response.

2. Any measures implemented immediately prior to or during the 2010/2011 flood events that were designed to mitigate the effect of any flooding (for example, sandbagging, temporary levees), including an assessment of the performance of those measures

2.1 Immediately prior to the January 2011 flood event, Council took a number of steps to seek to mitigate the potential consequences of the impending flood. By way of example Council:

(a) moved ferries and City-Cats to safe-harbour;

(b) removed sensitive electrical equipment from Council buildings and infrastructure;

(c) removed critical traffic control equipment; and

(d) developed contingency plans to dismantle the "Riverwalk" if it was likely to become a maritime safety hazard (however this was ultimately not feasible and could not be achieved due to workplace health and safety reasons).

To assist the timely recovery, Council also pre-determined how these critical transport systems would likely be affected by the flood and pre-ordered repair parts.

2.2 Council also evacuated the Stones Corner, New Farm and Fairfield libraries. Approximately 16,800 books were saved at a value of $554,400. To date however, Council has been advised that 1,016 books on-loan were lost during the flood at a value of $31,364.

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Witness
2.3 The mitigation measures implemented by Council are set out in some detail at section 6.2 of the Initial Submission.

2.4 Due to the rainfall leading up to the flood event and the likelihood of creek flooding, Council began early preparations to make sandbags available to the public. For example, on 6 January 2011, 3,000 sandbags were provided to the public from Council’s depot at Balmoral in response to Council’s advice to prepare their properties for likely creek flooding.

2.5 In the lead up to the Brisbane River flood peak on Thursday 13 January 2011, Council filled and made available large quantities of sandbags from six Council depot and other locations. In total over 300,000 sandbags were filled and distributed.

3. Local participation, or otherwise, in Emergency Management Queensland’s (EMQ) 2010 Pre-Season Flood and Cyclone Workshop, including an assessment of the local assistance gained thereby

3.1 On 25 October 2010, Council’s Disaster Management Coordinator attended a Queensland Tropical Cyclone Consultative Committee Seminar in Gympie. This seminar was presented by the BoM and discussed the upcoming storm and cyclone season. Attachment "CDJ-7" is a copy of a flyer and the program for the seminar.

3.2 On 1 December 2010 Council’s Acting DOM and Disaster Management Coordinator attended a breakfast seminar in Brisbane hosted by the Institute of Public Administration of Australia. The seminar’s topic was Disaster Management Systems: Changes and Challenges. Attachment "CDJ-8" is a copy of an invoice for that seminar.

3.3 On 15 December 2010, members of Council’s Disaster Management Team and members of Council’s Flood Information Centre (FIC) attended an EMQ Flood Workshop at Wooloowin. This workshop was open to and attended by multiple agencies and local government representatives. Attachment "CDJ-9" is a copy of the flyer for that Workshop.

3.4 Each of the seminars referred to in this section were useful in maintaining and improving the professional network of the Council officers in attendance as well as keeping lines of communication open with other attendees. The seminars also provided good general background information as to the expected weather conditions across Queensland for the coming season.
4. **Local participation, or otherwise, in EMQ's 2010 Consultation Sessions concerning the proposed changes to the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (Qld), including an assessment of the local assistance gained thereby**

4.1 On 4 May 2010 members of Council’s Disaster Management Team attended a Disaster Management Review and Consultation Opportunity session at Slacks Creek. The session focused on the proposed changes to the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (Qld). This session was organised by the Local Government Association of Queensland. Attachment "CDJ-10" is a copy of an email invitation for this session.

4.2 On 19 July 2010 Members of Council’s Disaster Management team also attended an information session on the proposed changes to the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (Qld) at QPS Headquarters (Roma Street) facilitated by the District Disaster Coordinator (DDC). Attachment "CDJ-11" is a copy of an invitation to this session.

4.3 In addition, on 28 October 2010, the QPS also provided a briefing on the proposed changes to the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (Qld) to the LDMG. A copy of the slides for this presentation appears at Attachment "CDJ-6" to this Statement.

4.4 These sessions provided Council officers with an update and status report on the proposed amendments.

5. **Any measures taken to train and/or equip the local State Emergency Service (SES) including an assessment of the adequacy and timeliness thereof**

5.1 Council provides substantial support (including funding) to the Brisbane SES Group (SES Group).

5.2 By way of example:

(a) Council provides about $1.1 million dollars annually to accommodate, maintain and equip seven Brisbane SES depots across the City. This amount has significantly increased since 2004/2005;

(b) An addition Inflatable Rigid Boat (IRB) was purchased by Council in 2010; and

(c) Council assists with the purchase of plant and equipment by matching funds that are raised through donations by the SES Group and also recognises the commitment made by SES volunteers through an SES service recognition payment scheme. This
financial support is reflected in the 2010/2011 financial year where Council budgeted $150,000 towards fundraising support.

6. **The local actions undertaken in advance of and/or in respect of the 2010/2011 flood events in relation to resourcing, coordination and deployment of any personnel and equipment**

6.1 Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 (pages 14 - 35) of the Initial Submission describe the actions taken "in advance of and/or in respect of the 2010/2011 flood events in relation to resourcing, coordination and deployment of any personnel and equipment".

6.2 In addition to the information contained in the referenced sections of the Initial Submission, some particular matters of relevance are set out below.

6.3 Council has a dedicated Flood Information Centre (FIC) that is activated during a flooding event. In support of Council’s ability to quickly respond, Council has had a full time Disaster Management Group (DMG) which includes a Disaster Management Duty Officer (DMDO) and FIC Duty Officer for a number of years. The DMG is staffed and maintained to enable out of hours response coverage. Attachment "CDJ-12" is a copy of the DMDO Standard Operating Procedures.

6.4 By Council Resolution dated 8 February 2011, Council enhanced the DMG. The previous DMG was strengthened by an additional 11 staff, which include elements of the Corporate Strategy Office. Further its Executive Manager Disaster Response and Recovery (DRR) was elevated to be part of the Executive Management Team of the Chief Executive Officer. This step was in recognition that the recovery task will continue beyond the current financial year.

6.5 The DMDO monitored the lead up to the flood event and commenced providing regular situation reports on the morning of Saturday 8 January 2011.

6.6 I activated the LDCC following discussion with the Lord Mayor and the Lord Mayor’s Chief of Staff late afternoon on 9 January 2011 at ‘Level 3’ to manage the City’s immediate response to an emerging heavy rainfall threat that evening. This level means that there are events that require activation of the LDCC whereby the LDCC may be out on standby for possible escalation and activation to ‘Level 4’.

6.7 The LDCC remained at Level 3 on the morning of Monday, 10 January 2011 to monitor weather and environmental conditions.
At approximately 10:30 am on Monday, 10 January 2011, the Lord Mayor and I convened an Immediate Action Team (IAT) meeting in Brisbane Square. At this meeting it was decided to convene an LDMG meeting on Tuesday 11 January 2011 at 10:00 am.

On 11 January 2011 the LDCC activation was increased to ‘Level 4’ following discussion at LDMG meeting. ‘Level 4’ means that there are events that require a complex response through high level coordination, resources allocation and forward planning from a range of stakeholders, including some external to Council. Level 4 would see a full activation of the expanded LDCC functions and possible escalation to State, Federal and Non-Government Organisation agencies.

The anticipated flood-affected areas of the City were divided into sectors to enable efficient planning and response to the flood to occur. These sectors were created as aggregations of Statistical Local Areas to ensure maximum compatibility with all other administrative boundaries of Council and other agencies. Sector maps of the flood affected areas were produced to enable Council’s response to be coordinated in a consistent manner. These sectors were used by all LDMG representative agencies to plan co-ordinate and implement their response. The sectors continued to be used throughout the initial recover phase following the flood. The Sector Map is attachment 34 in the Initial Submission.

"Water Over Road" and "Road Closed" signs (including permanent versions that can be opened) were placed (or opened as the case may be) as required in known flooding sites within the various catchments of Brisbane in the weeks leading up to the flood. BMTMC were advised when roads were closed and re-opened to update their traffic reports.

Extensive community service announcements, social media posts and tweets (Facebook and Twitter respectively) were released by Council during the flood event.

I also convened a briefing session on the evening of Thursday 13 January 2011 where senior Council officers and I briefed the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on Council’s response concept of operations, sector maps and priorities in preparation for their deployment. The ADF had been allocated to Council in accordance with Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) procedures.
7. **The local actions undertaken in respect of the 2010/2011 flood events in relation to immediate management, response and recovery operations, including the coordination and deployment of personnel and equipment**

7.1 Section 6 of the Initial Submission which is from page 14 to page 36, titled "Response to the 2010/2011 Flood Events" includes detailed information on this topic. Some particular matters of relevance are set out below.

7.2 Council utilised its own assets and resources and worked in conjunction with emergency services including the QPS, the QFRS, the QAS, the EMQ, the SES, other government departments and agencies, other councils (particularly Logan City, Gold Coast City and Redland City), the ADF and not-for-profit agencies.

7.3 As the River peaked on 13 January 2011, a Council Ready Response Group was used in gathering intelligence on the receding water line and in making initial damage assessments. By 14 January 2011 water had started to recede and the Ready Response Group was joined by the QFRS Rapid Damage Assessment teams. These QFRS teams, with experience from other flood events, were deployed to assist with damage assessment.

7.4 On 14 January 2011, a major deployment was commenced to clear debris from major roads and transport corridors followed by secondary arterials. This included a significant effort by Council, the State Government and its emergency services, donated contractor manpower and equipment from business, resources from other councils and the ADF.

7.5 On the weekend of 15 and 16 January 2011, Council mounted a highly coordinated and extremely effective community volunteer call out to assist flood affected residents to clear mud and flood debris from their homes and damaged possessions. This call out resulted in 22,973 volunteers registering at Council’s four key volunteer marshalling areas. These volunteers assisted across the two days and were supported by a significant effort from Council employees and assets, ADF resources and civilian contractor employees and equipment.

7.6 Council acknowledges that there were many more unregistered volunteers who assisted with the clean up. Whilst it is not possible to accurately estimate the total number of volunteers, Council believes that as a result of its “Call to Action” there were as many as 50,000-60,000 volunteers across the weekend.

7.7 In the period through to 21 January 2011, Council coordinated the clearing of debris and rubbish to a ‘first pass’ level of every flood affected street in Brisbane. In addition, significant
progress was made in removing temporary waste dump sites to permanent land fill. On the weekend of 22 and 23 January 2011, a further co-ordinated volunteer effort was mounted, on a targeted basis, to clear and clean parks and recreational facilities. Between 14 January and 22 January 2011, it is estimated that 126,700 tonnes of waste were put into Council and commercial landfills. To date, in excess of 385,910 tonnes of waste has been put into Council and commercial landfills.

7.8 As a result of these coordinated efforts in a relatively short time, essential services were restored, major roads and arterials were cleared, public transport resumed, flooding debris and damaged household and business property were cleared from suburban streets and residents commenced returning home to clean up and assess damage to their property.

8. **Any local measures taken or requested to preserve vital infrastructure and to manage, maintain or reinstate the supply of essential services (water, food, power, transport, communications and/or sewerage) during the 2010/2011 flood events**

8.1 I refer to paragraph 2.1 of this Statement which is also relevant to this topic.

8.2 As referred to in paragraph F, the nature of LDMG operation is to have shared knowledge around the expected event to enable all asset owners and operators the best opportunity to reduce damage and plan for a speedy reinstatement of their services.

8.3 Examples of the inter-agency coordination achieved between members of the LDMG are as follows:

(a) with early warnings, Energex managed to remove much of its critical equipment prior to the flood to enable its swift reinstatement;

(b) Council provided assistance to public utility providers such as Energex. As power was cut to high-rise residential and commercial properties in the CBD, Council officers undertook foot patrols to provide a ‘presence’ in the street and to encourage residents to make an evacuation decision before they lost power or to obtain essential supplies; and

(c) during the immediate recovery, Council removed debris from around infrastructure owned by Queensland Urban Utilities to allow them access to fix their equipment on an urgent basis.

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Colin David Jensen
Witness
9. Any information received or obtained concerning weather and flood forecasts or warnings, and the steps taken to disseminate that information to the community before, during and immediately after the 2010/2011 flood events

9.1 Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 at pages 14 to 35 of the Initial Submission cover this topic in detail. Some particular matters of relevance are set out below.

9.2 Formally, once a day, the LDCC, BoM and the FIC briefed the LDMG, to provide an update on the latest weather and flood situation.

9.3 Council’s FIC was in frequent contact with BoM and sequwater to receive updates and warnings as they were produced. For example, sequwater, through its Flood Operations Centre (FOC), informed the FIC, of its current and planned releases of water from Wivenhoe and Somerset dams. This information was used by Council to predict the likely flooding consequences in its local government area.

9.4 Council used many different channels to communicate with flood affected residents and businesses. These channels included media, newsletters, fact sheets, posters and outdoor advertising.

9.5 As set out in the Initial Submission, numerous community service announcements, social media posts and tweets (Facebook and Twitter respectively) were released by Council before, during and after the flood event. The Lord Mayor also released numerous media releases providing early warning to the community. These are attachments 20, 21, 39, 40 and 41 to the Initial Submission.

10. In relation to [item 9], an indication of the source/s, accuracy and timeliness of that information for local purposes

10.1 Council was acutely aware of the need to provide accurate and timely information on preparation, response and recovery of the flood.

10.2 Council’s website was a valuable source of information for the local community. This is evidenced by an unprecedented volume of "hits" experienced. By way of example, under normal conditions, the Council website would receive a 5 minute average peak load of 3,000 - 5,000 hits. An unprecedented 5 minute average peak load of 53,162 hits was experienced on Wednesday 12 January 2011.

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Witness
10.3 On the morning of Monday, 10 January 2011, Council’s Information Services Branch was notified of issues with the Corporate website due to high demand. At this time the website was intermittent, with some users getting through, and some not. This degraded during the day, effectively rendering the website out of action by mid to late afternoon. The root cause of the outage was determined to be directly related to high demand for the online Floodwise Property Reports and Flood Flag Maps. The online Floodwise Property Reports and Flood Flag Maps provide residents with valuable information on the likelihood of river, creek and overland flow flooding for each property in Brisbane.

10.4 Staff worked on the website overnight and resolved earlier site loading issues. The site was available again from 5:00 am Tuesday 11 January 2011, but the significant load again caused response issues by early morning. Council decided to revert to a static website that went into production at approximately 1:00 pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 resulting in significant performance improvement. On Wednesday, 12 January 2011, a link was provided from the static site which enabled users to access the balance of Council’s corporate website.

10.5 I have no knowledge of the accuracy or otherwise of the weather and flood forecasts or warnings provided by external agencies, however at the time of receipt of that information I had no reason to doubt its accuracy.

11. **Any local measures undertaken to protect life and/or private/public property in connection with the 2010/2011 flood events (such as road/bridge closures, evacuation arrangements, etc), and the steps taken to disseminate information about those measures to the community before, during and immediately after the 2010/2011 flood events**

11.1 I refer to paragraphs 6 and 7 above and note sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the Initial Submission (which cover this topic in detail).

11.2 During any disaster event the LDMG’s priorities will always be to prevent serious injury and loss of life, minimise damage to property and infrastructure and maintain the provision of essential services.

11.3 Council’s Contact Centre receives information on road closures from a link on Council’s Corporate Website that takes officers to the www.131940.qld.gov.au website. Contact Centre officers either provide customers with this website/phone number or look it up on their behalf. If the Contact Centre is notified of a road closure that is not on the website the shift leader will send an email out informing the Contact Centre staff of this closure.
11.4 In the lead up to the river peak on 13 January 2011, Council filled and made available large quantities of sandbags from 6 depot locations spread throughout the City. Over 300,000 sandbags were distributed.

11.5 As the River peaked on 13 January 2011, a Council Ready Response Group was used in gathering intelligence on the receding water line and in making initial damage assessments. By 14 January 2011 water had started to recede and the Ready Response Group was joined by the QFRS Rapid Damage Assessment teams. These QFRS teams, with experience from other flood events, were deployed to assist with damage assessment.

11.6 On 14 January 2011, a major deployment was commenced to clear debris from major roads and transport corridors followed by secondary arterials. This included a significant effort by Council, the State Government and its emergency services, donated contractor manpower and equipment from business, resources from other councils and the ADF.

11.7 On the weekend of 15 and 16 January 2011, Council mounted a highly coordinated and extremely effective community volunteer call out to assist flood affected residents to clear mud and flood debris from their homes and damaged possessions. This call out resulted in 22,973 volunteers registering at Council’s four key volunteer marshalling areas. These volunteers assisted across the two days and were supported by a significant effort from Council employees and assets, ADF resources and civilian contractor employees and equipment.

11.8 In the period through to 21 January 2011, Council coordinated the clearing of debris and rubbish to a ‘first pass’ level of every flood affected street in Brisbane. In addition, significant progress was made in removing temporary waste dump sites to permanent land fill.

11.9 Council’s Early Warning Alert Service was used to warn of heavy rain and possible flash flooding prior to the flooding event. The Lord Mayor conducted numerous media interviews and provided extensive media releases warning of flooding. Community Service Announcements included information on health and safety.
12. The circumstances of any rescues or evacuations performed in the local area in connection with the 2010/2011 flood events, including an assessment of the adequacy and timeliness thereof

12.1 Council provided various early warnings leading up to both the 2010/2011 wet season and the River flood of January 2011 (as referred to in section 6.2(b) of the Initial Submission). These warnings provided the community with vital information in order to allow them to prepare for the flood and, if necessary, to evacuate prior to flooding of their property.

12.2 Section 6.2(e) of the Initial Submission outlines the evacuation co-ordinated by Council.

12.3 At the LDMG meeting on Wednesday 12 January 2011, the QFRS reported completing fourteen water rescues. At the LDMG meeting on Thursday 13 January 2011, the QFRS reported completing two water rescues and the SES reported completing 200 boat evacuations. The SES also reported that 32 SES flood boats and 23 Queensland Surf Life Saving boats (IRB) were being used.

13. The circumstances of the establishment, and subsequent operation and performance of any Evacuation Centre/s in the local area, including an assessment of any particular difficulties encountered

13.1 Section 6.2(e) of the Initial Submission outlines the evacuation co-ordinated by Council.

13.2 At 1:00 pm on Wednesday 12 January 2011, and in accordance with Council's Evacuation and Emergency Human Services Plan, two evacuation centres were opened by Council. The Emergency Human Services Plan appears as part of the Disaster Management Plan (attachment 23 to the Initial Submission).

13.3 Council coordinated the establishment of evacuation centres. In anticipation of a worst case scenario, commencing on Tuesday 11 January 2011 over 50 potential evacuation sites were progressively sourced to cater for up to 16,000 evacuees. On Tuesday, 11 January 2011, at approximately 1:00 pm, Council opened the first evacuation centre at the RNA Showgrounds. A second evacuation centre was opened at the Queensland Sport and Athletic Centre Mount Gravatt on Wednesday, 12 January 2011. The centres were resourced immediately by Council and Red Cross staff with a 24 hour staff roster in place. Both evacuation centres were managed by Red Cross with Council playing a coordination role in accordance with Council's Evacuation and Emergency Human Services Plan.
Community Service Announcements concerning Evacuation Centres were prepared and distributed including newsletters within the Evacuation Centres. Community Service Announcements included information about what to bring to Evacuation Centres such as bedding, medication and important documents.

A number of suburbs were fully isolated and it was necessary to accommodate affected residents at unofficial evacuation centres that were established in church halls and local primary schools by members of the community and community groups. On a number of occasions, the LDCC assisted in organising the resupply of these facilities by the ADF (including by land and air).

The circumstances of any flood-related human fatality within the region, including the measures taken to prevent and/or respond to any such fatality, during the 2010/2011 flood events

I am aware that a person was tragically killed in Durack during the flood event.

The circumstances of this death may be the subject of a coronial inquiry. I am unaware of any further details at this stage.

Any involvement had with State or Federal Agencies, including particularly the Queensland Police Service, in relation to the provision of emergency response measures, personnel, equipment, services or logistical support, together with an assessment of the adequacy and timeliness thereof, during the 2010/2011 flood events

In accordance with the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld), Council’s LDCC reported daily by situation report to the District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC). In addition, the District Disaster Coordinator (DDC) attended Council’s LDMG and provided an update on District issues. I am of the view that the DDCC and, in particular the DDC, provided excellent support to Council.

The LDCC formally lodged with the DDCC Requests for Assistance (RFA) on a number of occasions. These requests were registered in the LDCC event log and transmitted to the DDCC by the LDCC email account.

These RFA included requests for assistance from other local governments both within and outside of the Brisbane district and also from Federal Government resources such as the ADF (such as specialist aerial photography).

Colin David Jensen

Witness
15.4 The QPS provided liaison officers to the LDCC and officers to Council’s Evacuation Centres. These liaison officers provided policing advice and participated in the LDCC forward planning group.

15.5 Council received significant support from the ADF during the flood response phase. I convened a briefing session on Thursday, 13 January 2011 attended by senior council officers and key commanders and liaison officers from the ADF. The ADF were briefed on and provided copies of Council’s concept of operations and sector maps. The ADF Liaison Officers to the LDCC (one Lieutenant Colonel and for a short period an additional Major) provided excellent, flexible and responsive support to the flood response effort.

15.6 On Friday, 14 January 2011, the 2 Combat Engineer Regiment and 9 Royal Queensland Regiment were allocated to the north and south sides of the river respectively. They responded to LDMG priorities and their response was co-ordinated through the LDCC. The ADF worked very closely with the LDMG deployed assets and were provided additional support from major plant and equipment volunteered to LDMG. Additionally, the ADF allocated liaison officers to Council’s Regional Incident Management Teams (RIMT) South and West. The ADF initially deployed mid Friday 14 January 2011, and by Saturday 15 January, 350 soldiers were operating south of the Brisbane River and 450 soldiers were operating north of the Brisbane River.

16. The nature and timing of any communications within the disaster management hierarchy, including particularly communications had with the District Disaster Co-ordinator (DDC), the State Disaster Coordinator or the State Recovery Coordinator, and whether any direction/s were given by the DDC and the nature of any such direction/s

16.1 The Executive Officer to the DDC advised the LDCC at 10:45am on Monday 10 January 2011 that the DDCC had been activated. At 11:14am on Monday 10 January 2011, I was informed that the DDC intended lodging an application for a Declaration of a Disaster Situation.

16.2 The Declaration of a Disaster Situation was ultimately made on Tuesday 11 January 2011.

16.3 I had frequent conversations and telephone conversations with the DDC and met daily with him at the LDMG meetings. The interaction between the DDC and the LDMG was collaborative and highly professional.

16.4 Given this high level of co-operation there was no need for the DDC to issue any direction.

Colin David Jensen
Witness
17. **An assessment of the adequacy of equipment and communications systems in the local area during the 2010/2011 flood events**

17.1 The Initial Submission contains extensive discussion regarding communications between Council and the local community, particularly at sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 (see pages 14-35).

17.2 I also refer to paragraphs 10.1 and 10.3 of this Statement.

17.3 Council has well developed crisis communication procedures that are regularly reviewed and exercised. A Corporate Marketing and Communications Branch and Digital Marketing capability were embedded within the Incident Support Group (ISG) in the LDCC. This team managed the development, release and distribution of numerous community service announcements, media releases, Twitter tweets, Facebook posts, Community Newsletters, Fact Sheets/Flyers, Posters and Outdoor advertising.

17.4 Evacuation Centre newsletters were produced and distributed.

17.5 Council’s internal communications were managed through the use of business as usual systems. These systems included telephones, mobile telephones, PDAs, emails and the Motorola digital radio system. With exception to Council’s intermittent website issues (as mentioned at paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2) and a few minor mobile handset failures, these systems proved to be reliable.

17.6 I am not aware of any service disruptions or reports of equipment failures that limited or otherwise impacted upon Council’s flood response operations.

18. **An assessment of the adequacy of the community’s response in the local area during the 2010/2011 flood events**

18.1 I consider that Brisbane’s business and local communities, as individuals and as part of formal or informal groups, responded magnificently to the flood event. The community rallied and the response was extraordinary.

18.2 Council coordinated, through a specific Council team, 22,973 volunteers on the weekend of 15-16 January 2011. Council established four volunteer coordination centres at the Boondall Entertainment Centre, McGregor State High School, Doomben Race Course and Mt Coot-tha Botanic Gardens where volunteers were registered and allocated to sectors. Volunteers at these centres were then transported by Brisbane Transport buses to and from their allocated sectors. These volunteers were coordinated on the ground by officers from Council’s libraries.
18.3 I consider that this overwhelming community response and volunteering effort had not been experienced before and was a feature of this disaster response effort. I understand that there were many more unregistered volunteers who assisted with the clean-up. Whilst it is not possible to accurately estimate the total number of volunteers, Council believes that as a result of its ‘Call to Action’ there were as many as 50,000-60,000 volunteers across the weekend.

18.4 The community volunteered heavy equipment and plant which was coordinated by Council’s Major Infrastructure Project Office (MIPO). This support significantly enhanced Council’s ability to rapidly respond to the removal of debris from temporary debris sites to landfill.

18.5 Council established a team that was responsible for coordinating smaller working groups of volunteered plant and equipment. This volunteered plant and equipment was allocated to Regional Incident Management Teams and the ADF to assist with the removal of debris from streets in flood affected areas.

18.6 Council also established a ‘matching’ system where flood affected residents could register requests for assistance that were then ‘matched’ against individual offers of assistance. This system proved effective. Council has commenced to capture many of these lessons learnt into a comprehensive set of procedures that will assist in the management of volunteers during future events.

18.7 On Sunday, 6 March 2011 Council assisted "Clean-up Australia Day" by managing 216 of the clean-up sites of which 106 were provided with Council supervisors. Large quantities of plastics, bottles, cigarette butts, and tidal debris were removed from the City’s waterways and parks.

18.8 Council funds 10 full-time equivalent Creek Catchment Coordinators at a cost this financial year of $1.047m. It also supports Habitat Brisbane with 5 full-time equivalent positions at a cost of $1.029m. Habitat Brisbane has approximately 2,500 members.

18.9 Council is currently brokering support from a visiting US Navy submarine to assist the Queensland Maritime Museum with rebuilding of the facility and cleaning the Diamantina.
19. Any measures being proposed, planned or implemented to prepare for, mitigate or manage future flood events (such as the installation of automatic river gauges, culvert management, levee construction and the like)

19.1 An independent Flood Response Review Board chaired by Major General (Retd) Peter Arnison AC, CVO (the FRRB) has been commissioned by Council is currently reviewing Council's response to the flood event. The final report will be produced in May this year and provided to the Commission. The Terms of Reference for the FRRB have already been provided to the Commission as attachment 1 to the Initial Submission.

19.2 On 8 March 2011, the Council's Joint Flood Taskforce, chaired by Emeritus Professor Colin ApeIt delivered its report. A number of recommendations were made in the report. A copy of this report has been provided to the Commission and is also attached to the Initial Submission.

19.3 On 15 March 2011 Council adopted, by resolution, 'the actual January 2011 flood event, as observed during the event (4.46 AHD (Australian Height Datum) at the City Gauge, and at the highest observed level elsewhere), be used as the interim standard, on which Brisbane City Council bases its decisions concerning new residential development and redevelopment, with the essential condition that, wherever a higher level has been set as the current DFL (Defined Flood Level), the higher level must apply; and that this interim standard apply until the Commission of Inquiry and relevant comprehensive flood studies are completed'.

19.4 Council also resolved that, 'a request be made to the Minister for Local Government for a Temporary Local Planning Instrument (TLPI) to give effect to resolution (ii) and address other relevant citywide planning issues including but not limited to:

(a) the ability to approve houses over 8.5 metres (House Code and Residential Design – Small Lot Code)

(b) filling of land for reconfiguration of lots (Subdivision Code and Filling and Excavation Code)

(c) provisions relating to subdivision and development (Structure Planning Code and Subdivision and Development Guidelines)

(d) minimising potential impacts on neighbouring properties (Stormwater Management Code)

(e) other relevant factors.

Colin David Jensen

Witness
It is anticipated that Council will consider a resolution regarding the TLPI on Tuesday 29 March 2011, preparatory to forward to the Minister.

**Advice as to any special consideration that should be given the local area by reason of particular regional or geographic differences**

20.1 The economic impact of the flood event on the Brisbane regional economy has been estimated as approximately $3.91bn (including Ipswich). Damage to Council’s assets is currently calculated at $441 million. Whilst Brisbane is the largest local government in the country and accordingly has significant competency and resources available to it, recovery from such a substantial impact will require the support of all levels of government.

**Advice as to any feature of the disaster preparation and planning stages or the disaster response and recovery operations which presented particular difficulty or may require practical or legislative change to improve future disaster management in the local area**

21.1 During Council’s response phase to the flood event, over $60 million was spent by Council in the immediate clean up and getting back to business, such that on Monday 17 January 2011 Brisbane commenced its return to work.

21.2 In the 10 weeks since the flood, Council has significantly responded to the recovery of its infrastructure, services and provided community support (including through the establishment of the Lord Mayor’s Community Disaster Relief Appeal Fund and its payment of over $500,000 to date). Given this focus, I have not formed a considered view on the practical or legislative changes which may improve future disaster management.

21.3 Council’s FRRB will produce its report in May 2011 and that report will be delivered to the Commission. As a result of considering that report and other available information, there may be practical or legislative changes which may improve future disaster management. At this early stage I am unable to provide any comment on this topic.

I make this Statement conscientiously believing the same to be true to the best of my memory, knowledge and belief.

**Dated**

25 March 2011

Colin David Jensen

[Signature]

Witness