

**In the matter of the
Commissions Of Inquiry Act 1950**

Commission of Inquiry Order (No. 1) 2011

QUEENSLAND FLOODS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Witness Statement of Anthony Keith Trace

Local Disaster Coordinator

Ipswich City Council

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| AKT-1 | Copy of email to all members of the Ipswich LDMG, as well as to the ICC Councillors and relevant ICC officers that the level of activation be moved from "Alert" to "lean forward 1" | Friday, 7 January 2011 at 10:48am |
| AKT-2 | The minutes of the four Ipswich LDMG meetings held between February 2010 and October 2010 | |
| AKT-3 | The minutes of the Ipswich LDMG meetings held between 23 December 2010 and 28 December 2010 | 23-28 December 2010 |
| AKT-4 | The minutes for the Ipswich LDMG meetings held between 10 January 2011 and 28 January 2011 | 10 January 2011-28 January 2011 |
| AKT-5 | Sitreps 1-10 in relation to the December 2010 event | December 2010 |
| AKT-6 | Sitreps 1-31 in relation to the January flood event | January 2011 |
| VOLUME 2 | | |
| AKT-7 | Copies of the Ipswich DDMG minutes for meetings held 12 January, 13 January, 14 January, 18 January, 20 January 2011 and 27 January 2011 | January 2011 |
| AKT-8 | Copy of certificate presented to Mr Trace by EMQ upon completion of introduction course to the LDC role | 20 December 2010 |
| AKT-9 | Copies of the agenda for the meeting in Cairns on 30 November 2010 and copies of two UNISDR publications distributed at this meeting entitled "Making Cities Resilient my City is getting ready" and "Is your City ready" | 30 November 2010 |
| AKT-10 | Copy of a power point presentation which Mr Trace delivered as part of his presentation on 24 August 2010 | 24 August 2010 |
| AKT-11 | Memoranda to the Chief Operating Officer (Engineering Services) detailing ICC's applications for funding from the NDRP and the outcome of those applications | 2 August 2010 and 18 November 2010 |
| AKT-12 | Agenda for the LGAQ 2010 Disaster Management Conference | 2-4 June 2010 |
| AKT-13 | Copy of email dated received from Senior Sergeant Goodger, assistant EO to the Ipswich DDCC inviting Mr Trace to QPS information session, and detailing the agenda and areas to be addressed | 11 June 2010 |
| AKT-14 | Copies of media reporting in the local Ipswich media of the potential for a major flood event, and of steps to be taken by the community in preparation for such an event | 13 October 2010, 27 October 2010, 1 November 2010, 8 December 2010, 28 December 2010 |

| | | |
|---------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| | | and 6 January 2011 |
| AKT-15 | Memorandum to the Chief Operating Officer (Engineering Services) concerning the proposed changes to the Emergency Management Act, including a summary of the proposed policy and legislative changes to the disaster management arrangements | 12 May 2010 |
| AKT-16 | Email from Mr Wayne Bichel confirming action taken to ensure that the Council held sufficient stores of emergency equipment | 23 December 2010 |
| AKT-17 | Copies of emails Mr Trace to Council officers and Councillors | 28 December 2010 - 10 January 2011 |
| AKT-18 | Index of reports that ICC has a record of having received from BOM | 7 December 2010 - 21 January 2011 |
| AKT-19 | Copies of the BOM reports referred to in AKT-18 the aforesaid index | |
| AKT-20 | Index of Seqwater reports | 6 January 2011 - 20 January 2011 |
| AKT-21 | Copies of the Seqwater reports referred to in AKT-20 | |
| AKT-22 | Copies of the requests for assistance which were issued by the Ipswich LDMG to the Ipswich DDMG during the course of the flood event | |
| AKT-23 | Copy of the ICC Local Recovery Group Flood Recovery Plan | |
| AKT-24 | Copy of the debrief report produced by the Ipswich DDMG following the flood event | |

Witness Statement of Tony Trace

This written statement is provided in response to a requirement to provide written information to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry dated 29 March 2011 under Section 5 of the *Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950* (Qld).

I, **Anthony Keith Trace** of Ipswich City Council ("ICC"), [REDACTED] in the State of Queensland, state as follows:

Introduction and Qualifications

1. I hold a Bachelor of Business and Accounting from the Queensland University of Technology (1991). I have also completed post-graduate studies in obtaining an Applied Diploma in Finance and Investment with the Securities Institute of Australia (1999) and am currently studying for a Graduate Diploma in Business Excellence through SIA Global.
2. Since 2007 I have been employed by ICC as its Business Support Manager for Engineering Services. In that role, I have overall responsibility for the provision of business support to the Council's Engineering Services Department, that is, the "non-engineering" aspects of the department such as financial management and compliance, business planning and reporting, workforce planning, quality assurance and continuous improvement.
3. I commenced employment with ICC in October 2001 as a Business Support Officer for Ipswich Fleet Services. I have subsequently performed a number of roles:
 - (a) 2004-2006: Business Support Officer, Roads & Drainage Provider Unit;
 - (b) 2006: I was seconded to the Business Transformation Program and assisted in implementing ICC's enterprise resource planning solution (ERP);
 - (c) 2006-2007: Senior Business Advisor, Engineering Services.
4. In addition to my role as Business Support Manager, Engineering Services, since July 2009 I have had responsibilities in relation to ICC's Local Disaster Management.

5. In July 2009 I was appointed to the position of Executive Officer of the Ipswich Local Disaster Management Group (**Ipswich LDMG**). Prior to this, from November 2008, I had provided a support role to the then Executive Officer to the Ipswich LDMG.
6. Following amendments to the *Disaster Management Act 2003* (Qld) which came into effect on 1 November 2010, the role of Executive Officer for the Local Disaster Management Group was abolished. The 1 November 2010 amendments created a position of local disaster coordinator.
7. On 7 November 2010 I was appointed the Ipswich Local Disaster Coordinator (**LDC**) by the Chairperson of the Ipswich LDMG. I held the role of LDC during the December 2010/January 2011 flood event (**the flood event**) and continue to hold that position at the time of making this statement.
8. I had leave planned over Christmas 2010 but due to the developing adverse weather conditions I returned from Christmas leave early on Boxing Day, and was in attendance at my office from 26 December 2010 until after the passing of the flood event.

Background - Ipswich District Disaster Management Group and Ipswich LDMG

Ipswich LDMG

9. The Chair of the Ipswich LDMG is the Mayor, Councillor Paul Pisasale. The Deputy Chair of the Ipswich LDMG is Councillor Trevor Nardi. Mayor Pisasale and Councillor Nardi have occupied the positions of Chair and Deputy Chair since prior to my appointment as Executive Officer of the Ipswich LDMG in July 2009.
10. Throughout the duration of the flood event, Councillor Nardi acted as the Chair of the Ipswich LDMG. Mayor Pisasale was actively involved as the public face for the City of the Ipswich throughout the flood event, and was kept constantly updated on the developing flood situation and related matters by Councillor Nardi and myself.
11. The standing membership of the Ipswich LDMG, in addition to the Chair, Deputy Chair and LDC, comprises representatives of the following agencies:

- State Emergency Service (SES);
- Queensland Fire & Rescue Service (QFRS);
- Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS);
- Queensland Police Service (QPS);
- Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ);
- Queensland Health - Ipswich Hospital; and
- Ipswich City Council.

12. In addition, meetings of the LDMG typically include a number of observers/advisors on an "as required" basis. These observers/advisors comprise representatives from some or all of:

- Department of Communities;
- Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR);
- Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF);
- Telstra;
- Energex;
- Queensland Emergency Services Chem Unit;
- Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (DEEDI); and
- Queensland Urban Utilities.

13. Also, relevant officers of various ICC operational departments attend the Ipswich LDMG meetings on an "as required" basis.

14. There are two other LDCs for the Ipswich LDMC in addition to myself, being Mr Ross Drabble and Mr Tony Dileo. During the flood event, I alternated the LDC role with Mr Drabble, typically handing over to Mr Drabble at around 7:00pm with a hand over back to me at around 7:00am. However, Mr Drabble lives in Brisbane and for a short period took longer than usual to access Ipswich due to the floods. As a result I was actively involved as LDC beyond the times I have referred to. Mr Dileo was on leave at the time and was not involved during the flood event. For these reasons most of the LDC activity was undertaken by myself, with support from Mr Drabble.
15. The practice of the Ipswich LDMG is to meet quarterly and otherwise on an "as required" basis. Throughout 2010 the Ipswich LDMG met on:
- 2 February 2010;
 - 20 May 2010;
 - 3 August 2010; and
 - 26 October 2010.
16. In December 2010, Ipswich experienced some localised flooding consequent upon the heavy rainfall being received in the Bremer River and local creek catchments. As a consequence the Ipswich LDMG was convened and met on:
- Thursday, 23 December 2010;
 - Monday, 27 December 2010; and
 - Tuesday, 28 December 2010.
17. The various activation levels for the Ipswich LDMG are:
- Alert;

- Lean Forward Level 1
- Lean Forward Level 2
- Stand Up Level 1
- Stand Up Level 2
- Stand Down

The triggers for each of these activation levels are detailed at Schedule 4 to the ICC submission on Flood Preparedness (**the ICC Submission**) lodged with the Commission of Inquiry on Wednesday, 23 March 2011.

18. At its meeting on Thursday, 23 December 2010 the Ipswich LDMG was placed in a "Lean forward - level 1" position. By Tuesday, 28 December 2010 the relevant weather event had passed. However, as there was a forecast for further potential adverse weather, the Ipswich LDMG remained at "Alert" status.
19. To the extent that the December 2010 Ipswich LDMG meetings are relevant to the specific issues that the Commissioner has requested be addressed in this statement, those matters are addressed further below.
20. As a result of further substantial rainfall experienced over the New Year period and into early January 2011, on the morning of Friday, 7 January 2011 discussions were held with the Deputy Chair concerning the developing event and we agreed that the Ipswich LDMG level of activation be moved from "Alert" to "Lean forward 1" status. I emailed notice of this decision to all members of the Ipswich LDMG, as well as to the ICC Councillors and relevant ICC officers on 7 January 2011. My email noted that:

"Given the forecasted rainfall, the Deputy Chairperson has requested that the LDMG level of activation will be moved from "alert" to LEAN FORWARD ONE.

As such, member agencies are requested to review their level of readiness, including resourcing levels and availability.

LDMG members are notified that they should be prepared for the possibility of being required to attend full briefing meetings on Sunday or Monday, depending on how this weather system develops".

21. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-1** is a copy of my email at 10:48am on Friday, 7 January 2011 on this subject.
22. Also on Friday, 7 January 2011 a Flood Coordination Centre was established in the Hayden Centre, 37 South Street, Ipswich in preparation for what was, at that time, a potentially developing event.
23. At 8:30am on Monday, 10 January 2011 the first meeting of the Ipswich LDMG was held in relation to the extreme weather event then being experienced. At that meeting the LDMG status was upgraded from "Lean forward 1" to "Stand up". Between Monday, 10 January 2011 and Friday, 21 January 2011 the Ipswich LDMG met on 14 occasions. On Friday, 28 January 2011 the Ipswich LDMG status was formally downgraded to "Stand down" as the Ipswich City Local Recovery Group had been established and was scheduled to hold its first meeting on Monday, 31 January 2011.
24. Minutes of each LDMG meeting are produced by Ms Kerrie Tillick, the secretary to the Ipswich LDMG. These minutes contain a good record of the activities of the Ipswich LDMG, and of the decisions undertaken over the period to which they relate. Ordinarily the minutes are approved by the Chairperson. However, given the frenetic level of activity in the days following Monday, 10 January 2011 it is possible that not all of the Ipswich LDMG minutes for the period 10 January 2011 - 28 January 2011 were settled by the Deputy Chair. It is also possible that some of the minutes contain some minor inaccuracies. The minutes nevertheless represent a contemporaneous record of the activities of the Ipswich LDMG.

25. Attached to my statement are copies of the following Ipswich LDMG minutes:

AKT-2: The minutes for the four Ipswich LDMG meetings held between February 2010 and October 2010;

AKT-3: The minutes of the Ipswich LDMG meetings held between 23 December 2010 and 28 December 2010;

AKT-4: The minutes for the Ipswich LDMG meetings held between 10 January 2011 and 28 January 2011.

26. In addition to the record of events included in the Ipswich LDMG minutes, for the duration of an event Ipswich City Situation Reports (**Sitreps**) are produced by the LDC. I am generally the author of the Sitreps, although, during the January 2011 event, I was assisted in the preparation of these by other Council officers. The Sitreps are produced on a regular basis and are emailed by me to the Ipswich District Disaster Coordinator, the members of the Ipswich LDMG, other relevant agencies, ICC Councillors, the CEO, Department COO's and other relevant ICC Council officers. By this means all relevant and interested parties are kept updated with developments.

27. The Sitreps comprise a good record of the relevant events from my perspective as LDC. Between 23 December 2010 and 28 December 2010, 10 Sitreps were produced. Then between 11 January 2011 and 4 February 2011, 30 Sitreps were produced in relation to the flood event, with a final Sitrep (Sitrep 31) issued on 11 February 2011. Once again, due to the frenetic activity during the flood event it is likely that the Sitreps contain some inaccuracies in terms of detail, in that on occasions information in one Sitrep may have been inadvertently carried over into a succeeding Sitrep without being updated. The Sitreps nevertheless provide a good summary overview of the relevant event and of the actions taken.

28. Attached to my statement are copies of the following Sitreps:

AKT-5: Sitreps 1-10 in relation to the December 2010 event; and

AKT-6: Sitreps 1-31 in relation to the January flood event.

Ipswich District Disaster Management Group (Ipswich DDMG)

29. The Ipswich Disaster Management area comprises the Ipswich and Somerset local areas. Because the Somerset Regional Council is quite small in size (numerically), even though the Somerset regional area is quite large, comprising approximately 5,000 square kilometres compared to the Ipswich Council area of approximately 1,000 square kilometres, there is a significant commonality of membership between the Ipswich LDMG and the Ipswich DDMG.
30. The Chair of the Ipswich DDMG is Superintendant Garth Pitman of the QPS. Superintendant Pitman is also the District Disaster Coordinator (DDC). The Deputy Chairperson of the Ipswich DDMG is Inspector David Preston. The Chair and Deputy Chair are assisted by an Executive Officer (EO) (Senior Sergeant Robbie Goodger) and a number of assistant EOs.
31. Membership of the Ipswich DDMG comprises representatives of:
- Queensland Police Services;
 - Queensland Ambulance Services;
 - Emergency Management Queensland;
 - Ipswich City Council;
 - Somerset Regional Council.
32. The Ipswich DDMG is supported by advisors from a number of other agencies, primarily State government agencies and essential services providers. The practice of the Ipswich DDMG is to meet quarterly and otherwise on an "as required" basis. Through 2010 the Ipswich DDMG met on:
- 4 March 2010;
 - 3 June 2010;

- 2 September 2010;
 - 30 November 2010.
33. During the January 2011 flood event the District Disaster Coordination Centre was activated on Monday, 10 January 2011, primarily to coordinate the district response to flooding being experienced within the Somerset Regional Council area. The Ipswich DDMG first met on Wednesday, 12 January 2011, and then again on 13 January 2011, 14 January 2011, 18 January 2011, 20 January 2011 and 27 January 2011. Councillor Nardi and I attended these meetings on behalf of ICC. The meetings were held at the Yamanto Police Station approximately 10 minutes drive from the ICC Coordination Centre.
34. Attached at AKT-7 are copies of the Ipswich DDMG minutes for these meetings.

Request to provide information

35. By letter dated 29 March 2011 the Commissioner of the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry required that I provide a written statement under Section 5 of the *Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950* (Qld) detailing information in relation to 21 subject areas. This statement is provided in response to the Commissioner's request.
36. Further, by letter dated 29 March 2011, the Commission reiterated its desire to avoid duplication of information and that it does not require statements to repeat information that has already been provided to the Commission, and considers references in statements to such information sufficient where appropriate.
37. The ICC Submission contains detailed information in relation to ICC's preparation for and response to the flood event. In accordance with the Commission's request, I will not duplicate that information in my statement, but, where appropriate, my statement will cross reference relevant paragraphs of the ICC Submission.

Topic 1 - Local planning, preparation and training in advance of the flood event

Introduction

38. In response to this topic I will address the issue of local planning, preparation and training undertaken in advance of or in relation to the flood event from two perspectives:

(d) Firstly, my personal preparation and training in my capacity as LDC; and

(e) Secondly, preparation and planning undertaken by ICC.

Personal Preparation and Training

39. As noted in paragraphs 6 and 7, the role of LDC was introduced into the disaster management framework on 1 November 2010. I was appointed LDC on 7 November 2010. Prior to this I was the EO for the Ipswich LDMG.

LDC induction training - 20 December 2010

40. On 20 December 2010 I undertook an LDC induction training course. This course was conducted by EMQ in the Rosewood Room in the ICC Hayden Centre. The course was also attended by Councillor Nardi, Mr Drabble and Mr Dileo. At this course I was presented with the EMQ School of Emergency Management "SEM2016 Local Disaster Coordinator Induction" Participant Guide. The Guide is a bulky document and I have not exhibited a copy of the Guide to this statement. However, a copy can be made available to the Commission upon request.

41. This course was in the nature of an introduction course to the LDC role. On the completion of the training I sat an exam. Attached to my statement at ATK-8 is a copy of the certificate presented to me by EMQ upon my successful completion of this training.

The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS)

42. AIIMS is an incident management control system designed to enable the seamless integration of the activities and resources of multiple agencies when applied to the resolution of any emergency situation. The LDC induction course held on 20 December 2010 introduced the

AIIMS multiple agency incident management system but did not descend to the detail of how the system operated. I consider the development of these multiple agency management skills to be important to my carrying out my responsibilities as LDC and following my attendance at the 20 December 2010 Induction Course I requested the ICC Engineering Services training coordinator to identify a course that I can attend to undertake AIIMS training.

District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC) Training - 22 December 2010

43. On 22 December 2010 I attended a disaster management training session conducted by EMQ and the QPS at the Yamanto Police Station. This session was also attended by the Somerset Regional Council LDC, Mr Tony Jacobs, and focussed on disaster management issues at the Ipswich District level.
44. This session lasted half a day and covered some of the same ground as had been covered at the LDC induction session conducted two days earlier. It also included some exercises, using the AIIMS methodology and framework, and included an exercise involving the establishing of a mock crisis coordination centre, which was designed to demonstrate how such a centre would function.
45. This training involved the establishing of a coordination centre to deal with a mock traffic accident. It identified that a functioning coordination centre requires (1) planning personnel (2) operational personnel and (3) logistics personnel supporting the planning and operations personnel.
46. This training was prescient as a fortnight later I was required to establish the ICC flood Coordination Centre, and the training I had received through the mock exercise conducted on 22 December 2010 proved very helpful in that regard.
47. I was able to ensure that the ICC Coordination Centre for the flood event was structured to ensure that it included:

- (a) a planning arm, with personnel having a particular focus on issues such as hydrology reports, road networks and evacuation centres, and who were involved in converting the various pieces of information being received by the Coordination Centre from a range of information sources into action plans;
- (b) an operations arm, comprising relevant personnel from across the various Council departments and relevant agencies, who could give operational effect to the action plans; and
- (c) a logistics arm, comprising personnel who provided logistical support, in the nature of communications, supplies and other resources to the planning and operations arms.

48. At this DDCC training session there was also an introduction to the proposed EMQ Disaster Management Portal site. This site is still under development, but there was discussion as to how the site would operate. My understanding is that the DDMG, the DDC, the LDMG and the LDC will be able to log on to the portal site to access and extract relevant information and reports, as well as to input relevant data such as Sitreps, contacts lists and the such like.
49. The portal still has some considerable way to go in terms of its development. However, I consider it to be a valuable resource as I believe that an essential tool for future disaster management is a common, fully integrated, whole of State ICT (Information Communications and Technology) system. One particular issue experienced during the flood event, and addressed more fully in my comments below in response to Topic 15, is the difficulty I experienced in tracking the status of any response by the State Disaster Coordination Centre or by the DDCC to requests for support issued by the Ipswich LDMG through myself as LDC. A fully integrated ICT system should enable the status of such support requests to be readily tracked.
50. At present, disaster management across the State involves reliance on a number of different and largely incompatible ICT systems of varying levels of sophistication. Throughout the flood

event, the obtaining of reliable and timely information was an issue. I consider that reliable and timely knowledge and information management is critical, as it is from such knowledge and information that plans, actions, and priorities are identified at the LDMG level.

51. Another advantage of this DDCC training session was that, to the extent that I had not previously met them, it enabled me to meet and put faces to names of the relevant QPS personnel within the DDMG structure. At the conclusion of the DDCC training on 22 December 2010 arrangements were discussed for the scheduling of a follow-up training exercise to be held involving the Ipswich DDMG and the Ipswich LDMG and the associated Coordination Centres in late January 2011. However, due to the flood event this proposed exercise was replaced by an actual event.

UNISDR Making Cities Resilient Campaign - 30 November 2010

52. On 30 November 2010 I attended a United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) meeting held in Cairns. This meeting was on the subject of "Making Cities Resilient". Cairns is regarded as a role model City or "Champion" for community resilience to disaster events, and the purpose of my attending this meeting in my capacity as Ipswich LDC was to better understand the resilience program, and to develop my learning and skills around issues of community resilience with a view to examining how such learnings might be applied in the context of the City of Ipswich.
53. Annexed to my statement and marked AKT-9 are copies of the agenda for the meeting in Cairns on 30 November 2010 and copies of two UNISDR publications distributed at this meeting entitled "Making Cities Resilient my City is getting ready" and "Is your City ready".
54. This meeting was also attended by a representative from the Fraser Coast Regional Council. Following this meeting, I had the helpful experience of attending a meeting of the Cairns Local Disaster Management Group as an observer.

Community Resilience - Ipswich - 29 August 2010

55. My attendance at the UNISDR meeting in Cairns on 30 November 2010 arose from a particular interest that I have in the issue of community resilience to disaster events. The aim of community resilience is to strengthen communities, individuals, businesses and institutions to minimise the effects of disasters.
56. The key elements of disaster management are preparedness, response and recovery. There is, however, another important element, which is prevention. On 27 August 2010 I made a presentation to the ICC CEO and senior management team. The purpose of this presentation was to heighten awareness within the ICC management team of these key elements. This presentation was also used to promote discussion as to how, within the Council, we may be able to develop strategies to enhance awareness within the Ipswich community of the importance, in particular, of the elements of prevention and awareness, and of the concept of community resilience to disaster events.
57. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-10** is a copy of a power point presentation which I delivered as part of my presentation on 24 August 2010.

National Disaster Resilience Program

58. I also used this presentation to senior management on 24 August 2010 to increase awareness within the Council as to what was occurring in relation to the National Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP) and Community Resilience Applications (CRA's) which had been lodged with the NDRP by ICC.
59. The NDRP is a joint Federal Government and State Government Program which makes funding available in the form of grants for the purposes of disaster risk reduction and to enhance community resilience to natural disasters. The NDRP vision is to "reduce Queensland Communities vulnerability to natural hazards by supporting local governments and other

stakeholders to build community resilience". The funding arrangement is on a 1/3 contribution by each of the Federal Government, the State Government and the funding applicant.

60. In the first round of NDRP funding Ipswich was successful in receiving grants to:

- (a) increase the flood resilience of the Rosewood Township; and
- (b) increase the flood resilience of the Lower James Street area at Goodna.

61. The second round of grants was launched on 4 June 2010. For this round, ICC identified six initiatives for funding consideration and lodged CRA's for these initiatives. The initiatives, in order of priority were:

- (a) increasing the flood resilience of Greater Thagoona;
- (b) updating the Ipswich Natural Disaster Risk Management study and the Ipswich Disaster Management Plan;
- (c) development of the Brisbane River and Bremer River event modelling and action plans (an application made jointly with Brisbane City Council and Somerset Regional Council);
- (d) a pilot program for the calibration of critical crossings to the Alert/Floodwise monitoring system (a joint application with Brisbane City Council and Gold Coast City Council);
- (e) a feasibility pilot for event surveillance cameras; and
- (f) the floodway upgrade at Grey's Plains Road, Mount Mort.

62. At the meeting on 24 August 2010 I outlined these initiatives to senior management. The purpose of prioritising the applications is to attempt to secure NDRP funding for the highest priority areas, with Council funding then being utilised to pursue other lower priority disaster management initiatives. As it transpired I was notified in November 2010 that each of the six

ICC CRA's had been successful. However, the funding agreements for these initiatives were not received until January 2011, at around the time of the flood event. As a result none of these initiatives had been commenced prior to the flood event. They will each be progressed during the course of 2011.

63. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-11** are copies of my memoranda to the Chief Operating Officer (Engineering Services) dated 2 August 2010 and 18 November 2010 respectively detailing ICC's applications for funding from the NDRP and the outcome of those applications.

Annual Local Government Disaster Management Conference - 2-4 June 2010

64. As a further element of my training I attended the 2009 and 2010 annual Local Government Disaster Management conferences conducted by the Local Government Association of Queensland. These conferences were held over three days.
65. The 2009 conference was held in Emerald and was also attended by Councillor Nardi and Ms Brooke de Jong, a Council Officer in the Economic and Community Development department who has a particular interest in disaster management.
66. The 2010 conference was held in Home Hill on 2-4 June 2010 and was also attended by Councillor Nardi and Ms Kerry Anderson, a Council Officer in the Health, Parks and Recreation department who also has a particular interest in disaster management.
67. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-12** is a copy of the agenda for the LGAQ 2010 Disaster Management Conference.

Disaster Management Joint Information Session - Queensland Police Service - 19 July 2010

68. On 19 July 2010 Councillor Nardi and I attended a disaster management information session held at the QPS Headquarters, Roma Street, Brisbane. The purpose of this session was to outline to the Ipswich DDMG and to the Ipswich LDMG the proposed changes to the Disaster

Management Act. This session followed an earlier briefing in relation to the proposed amendments to the Act conducted by EMQ on 4 May 2010. I have included further details in relation to the EMQ information session in my response to Topic 4 below. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-13** is a copy of an email dated 11 June 2010 that I received from Senior Sergeant Goodger, an assistant EO to the Ipswich DDMG inviting me to this QPS information session, and detailing the agenda and areas to be addressed.

Conclusion in relation to personal preparation, including training

69. As is illustrated by the foregoing, throughout the course of 2010, and in particular during the six months period from June 2010 to December 2010 I undertook considerable formal training in preparation for carrying out my roles and responsibilities as Ipswich LDC. Because of my particular interest in disaster management, I supplemented this formal training with additional reading, as well as my preparation for and attendance at Ipswich DDMG and Ipswich LDMG meetings throughout the course of 2010.

Preparation and planning undertaken by Ipswich City Council

70. In this section of my statement I detail some of the local planning and preparation, including training, undertaken by ICC in advance of or in relation to the flood event.

"1974 Scenario" for the ICC Riverview Depot

71. The Riverview depot is located at 4 Kenneth Street, Riverview, near to the junction of the Bremer and Brisbane Rivers. It is ICC's primary public works and storage depot. It contains the ICC fleet workshop, the Council's main store and is the location where the Engineering Services department operations arm is based, comprising the field workers and related Engineering Services fleet and equipment. The location of the Riverview depot was flooded during the 1974 flood.

72. In preparation for the 2010/2011 summer storm season, a mock exercise was carried out in relation to how the Riverview depot would respond to a repeat of the 1974 flood event if the depot was inundated and unable to be accessed for seven days.
73. This exercise was undertaken over two days on 15 November 2010 and 13 December 2010. The questions asked as part of this exercise included:
- (a) what are the issues we might face;
 - (b) what are the solutions to these issues;
 - (c) where does the plant and equipment go in a flood situation, where do the people go, and how do we continue to operate if we are unable to access the depot.
74. This was an effective exercise. Arising from this exercise included plans as to:
- (a) where plant and equipment from the depot would be taken in the case of a flood event;
 - (b) identifying which Council officers and employees were available to be called in if required on an urgent basis over the 2010-2011 summer holiday period;
 - (c) ensuring that all relevant skill sets were covered by available Council employees during the summer holiday period; and
 - (d) the production of a contact list for the available officers and employees.
75. As it transpired the Riverview depot was inundated during the flood event and the plans developed during the mock exercise were successfully implemented. Although the depot sustained substantial damage and some plant was lost, primarily due to the suddenness of the flood event, employees were called in urgently to assist with the relocation of plant and equipment, and the fleet and much of the equipment was relocated to flood proof areas as planned. To the extent that it was possible to do so, the functions of the depot continued to be performed from temporary facilities whilst the depot was unavailable.

76. One of the learnings to emerge from this mock exercise was the need to develop and document business continuity plans for important Council assets and infrastructure. It is also necessary that these plans can be readily accessed and implemented in the case of any future disaster event. This learning is further detailed at paragraph 13.37 of the ICC Submission.

Other Ipswich City Council preparations

77. Other planning and preparation undertaken by ICC in the months preceding the flood event included:

- (a) at the Ipswich LDMG meeting held on 26 October 2010 the EMQ representative provided an overview of BOM predictions for the summer season, including 6 cyclones predicted for the East Coast of Queensland, 75% higher than average rain fall, and potential weather conditions paralleling those of 1974. As a result of these predictions the Ipswich LDMG requested that:
 - (i) all LDMG members review their specific roles and responsibilities under the Ipswich Local Disaster Management plan and advise any amendments or updates to these responsibilities to the secretary to the Ipswich LDMG by 8 November 2010. Each of the Ipswich LDMG members responded to confirm awareness of their respective roles and responsibilities;
 - (ii) the SES representative was requested to liaise with the Ipswich Show Society as to the potential use of the Ipswich Showgrounds as an evacuation centre in the case of an emergency. The SES representative, Mr van den Ende consequently met with the Ipswich Show Society President, together with one of the ICC Councillors, Ms Cheryl Bromage, who is also a member of the Ipswich Show Society, and confirmed the availability of the Showgrounds as an evacuation centre if required;

- (b) updated contact lists were prepared for all Ipswich DDMG and Ipswich LDMG members.
- (c) a review was undertaken of the "Link" to the EMQ website from the ICC website to ensure that this link was functioning properly and also to ensure that the emergency management forms located on the EMQ website were up to date, and that the information in relation to the household emergency event preparation check lists, household evacuation kits and the such like, published on the EMQ website, were current;
- (d) during September and October 2010 a maintenance check was undertaken of the Enviromon "Alert" system to ensure that all ICC gauges located in Ipswich area catchments were operative and functioning properly. Any non-functioning gauges were repaired. At the time of the flood event all of the "Alert" gauges throughout the Ipswich area were functioning properly, with the exception of only one remote gauge located at Ripley in the top end of the Bundamba Creek catchment, although this was not material as there are a number of downstream gauges along that catchment which were all functioning;
- (e) the ICC Enterprise Business Solutions Branch (EBSB) and Health Parks and Recreation department (HP & R) had proposed undertaking maintenance work on ICC's facilities over the quiet Christmas/New Year period, which would have resulted in several ICT applications being unavailable including email, internet, PD Online and all enterprise applications (for example, Council mapper), as well as the Enviromon monitoring system being off-line whilst the maintenance was carried out. Given the adverse weather forecasts for this period, arrangements were made with EBSB and HP & R to defer this work until the Easter 2011 holiday period;
- (f) following the creation of Queensland Urban Utilities (QUU) with responsibility for the provision of Ipswich's drinking water supply and sewerage services from 1 July

2010, a representative from QUU was appointed as an observer on the Ipswich LDMG to report to the LDMG as required on water and sewerage related issues, and was included on the contact list for the Ipswich LDMG;

- (g) a continuation of an ongoing awareness campaign by the ICC and by the SES to enhance disaster management awareness within the Ipswich Community. These awareness activities included:
 - (i) the presence of a disaster management information stand attended by SES officers at most ICC community events;
 - (ii) visitations by the Ipswich SES Coordinator to Ipswich Schools and community groups promoting the key messages of awareness and preparation for potential disaster events;
 - (iii) regular media reporting in the local Ipswich media of the potential for a major flood event, and of steps to be taken by the community in preparation for such an event. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-14** are copies of reports published in the local Ipswich newspapers, The Ipswich Advertiser and the Queensland Times on 13 October 2010, 27 October 2010, 1 November 2010, 8 December 2010, 28 December 2010 and 6 January 2011; and
 - (iv) promotion by the Ipswich SES Coordinator of ICC's Emergency Management website page as a source of further disaster management information;
- (h) steps undertaken in conjunction with the Ipswich SES to increase the availability of sandbags.

Topic 2 - Immediate pre-flood event - Mitigation measures

Introduction

78. ICC and the Ipswich LDMG implemented a number of measures immediately prior to the flood event designed to mitigate the effect of any flooding and also in preparation for ICC's emergency response to the flood event.

Mitigation Measures

79. During the period from around October 2010 and continuing over the 2010 Christmas-New Year period, ICC's drainage maintenance crews were focussed on maintenance activities in low lying areas. This involved work in connection with the maintenance of the storm water systems and gross pollutant traps to ensure that these were clear of debris and obstructions, and functioning effectively.
80. In the period from around October 2010 ICC was also engaged in close monitoring of the Marburg and Rosewood Detention Basins to ensure that there were no obstructions in the pipe work. The Detention Basins were the subject of regular inspections in accordance with the management plans for the basins, to the point that ICC engineers inspecting the Rosewood Detention Basin on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 became flood bound for a period of time as a result of the Rosewood township becoming isolated due to localised flooding in the area.
81. From around 23 December 2010 the Ipswich SES distributed approximately 11,000 sandbags to local residents from the four SES depots. The availability of sandbags was broadcast over local Ipswich radio and notified through the local media, as well as through the local ICC call centre. However, whilst the sandbags were of value to residents in low lying areas such as Thagoona, Rosewood and Marburg, which were subjected to overland flooding, and also of value in shoring up homes and business premises which were only subjected to minor inundation, they were of little assistance in the case of significant riverine flooding.

82. No temporary levees were established within the ICC area and such a step would be impractical.

ICC preparation for the emergency response

83. The ICC Coordination Centre was established on 7 January 2011, and steps taken to ensure that the centre was fully operational, equipped and that all critical systems were pre-tested. These included testing the auxiliary backup power, the communications systems, ensuring Coordination Centre specific computers had been allocated, as well as dedicated Coordination Centre phone lines with separate direct telephone numbers, the allocation of a dedicated LDC mobile phone to be passed between LDC's on changeovers, and other logistical support. With effect from 7 January 2011 the Rosewood Room was fitted out as an Operational Emergency Management Centre.
84. From the time of the 23-28 December flood event, the ICC call centre had resources in place to enable it to operate on a 24/7 basis as and when required. The ICC call centre moved to 24/7 mode from the morning of Tuesday, 11 January 2011 for the duration of the flood event.
85. An assessment had been made by ICC as to the availability of critical staff over the Christmas/New Year period. Key managerial staff were allocated to the Coordination Centre with responsibility for covering the areas of evacuation centres, community welfare, road networks and drainage assets, hydraulics, hydrological mapping, communications and call centre operations. Operations staff available to assist with necessary field operations, particularly for functions like road closures and ICC asset and infrastructure protection were also identified.
86. Contact lists of key managerial and operations staff were prepared, together with contact details for relevant support agencies, and copies of the contact lists were made available online and within the Coordination Centre.

Topic 3 - Emergency Management Queensland workshop

87. ICC was represented at the EMQ 2010 pre-season flood and cyclone workshop held at Kedron on Wednesday, 15 December 2010. This workshop was promoted as the SEQ Climate and Preparedness workshop. The ICC representatives were myself, Councillor Nardi, Mr Daryl Hickey and Mr Rasitha Perera. Mr Hickey and Mr Perera work within the ICC Asset Spatial and Hydrology sections of the Engineering Services department, with a particular focus on hydrological issues. Inspector Preston and Senior Sergeant Goodger from the DDMG also attended.

88. To my recollection the workshop involved the following presentations and activities:

- a presentation by BOM on the outlook for the summer season;
- a presentation by Seqwater in relation to the Wivenhoe Dam Release Management plan;
- presentations by the Brisbane City Council, Gold Coast City Council and Moreton Regional Council on some initiatives within those local authorities in relation to flood mapping and models; and
- a workshop exercise around regional alliances and collaboration in relation to local authorities managing and supporting each other in a crisis event.

89. The workshop was attended by representatives by a number of local authorities. My brief overview of the presentations follows.

BOM presentation

90. The BOM presentation was consistent with information which had been provided by BOM at an earlier EMQ/BOM pre-season outlook meeting held at Beenleigh on 13 October 2010. The EMQ/BOM pre-season workshop is an annual event at which BOM provides a weather outlook for the summer season. BOM reported that higher than expected rainfall was anticipated over the Christmas/New Year holiday period and through the summer months. It also predicted that up to approximately six cyclones might impact the Queensland coast, in particular the North

Queensland coastal areas over this period. I do not recall that there was anything raised in the BOM presentation on 15 December 2010 which gave rise to additional awareness or alarm in respect of the ICC area. The presentation was, as I say, consistent with the earlier EMQ/BOM season outlook briefing provided on 13 October 2010.

Seqwater presentation

91. This presentation involved an explanation by Seqwater on the Wivenhoe Dam Release Management Plan, and what this plan potentially means for the communities on the Brisbane River downstream of the dam. It was set within the framework of the application of the Release Management Plan in the case of a hypothetical event similar to the 1974 flood event.
92. The Seqwater representative, Mr Terry Malone (Principal Hydrologist) explained that the Release Management Plan takes into account a number of factors including levels within the Brisbane River, in flows into the Brisbane River (for example, from the Bremer River), the dam level, in flows into the dam, actual rainfall and predicted rainfall, and balances the impact of these factors so as to minimise the downstream impact.
93. It was explained that if South East Queensland experiences another "1974 type event" Seqwater will minimise the impact of the event as much as possible, but there may still be a point at which releases from the dam would have to be increased to ensure dam integrity, and there was discussion as to the potential downstream impact this might have.
94. A question was asked of the presenter that the questioner had understood that "the purpose of the Wivenhoe Dam was to prevent future flooding in Brisbane". The Seqwater representative responded, to the effect, that the "dam can mitigate the impact of flooding, and it achieves this by managing the flood event through dam releases, so that the flood peak is substantially reduced but the flood event may extend over a longer period of time".

95. The focus of the presentation was on the potential impact of releases on the Brisbane River and on the downstream suburbs adjoining the river. There was no suggestion in the Seqwater presentation that Bremer River levels could be impacted by Wivenhoe Dam releases.

Brisbane, Gold Coast and Moreton presentations

96. These presentations concerned, firstly, the Gold Coast City Council's initiative for the predictive modelling of flood events within the Gold Coast Region. This is presently an unproven application. ICC relies on BOM to undertake this modelling and to report to the Ipswich LDMG.
97. The Moreton Regional Council presentation concerned the use by Moreton of catchment studies to drive land use planning and works initiatives.
98. The Brisbane City Council presentation focussed on the continued development of its "floodwise" application, which is used during events to assist with management of operational Alerts for key infrastructure.

Workshop Exercise

99. This was an exercise involving a scenario whereby south east Queensland (as distinct from a particular area within south east Queensland) was impacted by a crisis event, and the workshop focussed on Councils' level of preparedness for such an event and how different local authorities might collaborate and provide support to each other in such an event. This was the first occasion that I had been involved in a discussion around scenario planning for such a multi regional event.

Assessment of the assistance gained by Ipswich City Council

100. (a) I did not learn anything new in relation to the BOM predictions for the coming summer season. This presentation did however confirm my existing understanding of the predictions for the season ahead;

- (b) (i) The Seqwater presentation was, to my mind, presented on the basis that it was the management of the actual Wivenhoe releases that constituted the relevant event. Whilst it was discussed that the release plan took into account inflows into the Brisbane River below Wivenhoe, the plan as presented did not seem to have contemplated an event of the magnitude that actually occurred, in particular the impact of the substantial inflows that occurred from Lockyer Creek and the potential impact of the dam releases on the Bremer River;
- (ii) the presentation focussed on the management of dam releases to mitigate and reduce the impact of a flood in the lower reaches of the Brisbane River. This plan appears to have been effective for the event experienced over the period 23-28 December 2010.
- (c) (i) I found the workshop discussion around regional emergency management planning and cooperation particularly helpful. I consider this to be relevant in two respects. Firstly, if there was to be a major event impacting all of south east Queensland, how would the response to such an event be managed and resourced?
- (ii) Secondly, if a very major event was experienced in one location (for example, a tsunami or major bush fire) what was the plan to manage such an event, and how might that location be supported by other local areas and how would that support be coordinated?
- (iii) In my experience, current emergency management planning is focussed largely at the local level and this workshop raised, to my mind, important considerations of multi-agency and multi-locality support and collaboration. It also raised, in my mind, the utility of the DDMG/LDMG structure for local authorities such as Somerset Regional Council, which only has a relatively small number of officers and staff available to assist in a disaster event, and whether there may be an

improved structure and processes for supporting the requirements of areas such as Somerset in a crisis event.

Conclusion

101. I left this workshop with the thought that we may be facing an interesting wet season, but based on all that I had seen and heard I considered that Ipswich was reasonably well placed to manage a major event should this arise. I was already "on alert" as to the possible impact of the predicted rainfall on the Ipswich area, but nothing that I heard in this presentation gave rise to my having a heightened sense of alert.
102. I had no expectation, arising from anything that was said at this workshop, that releases from the Wivenhoe Dam could impact adversely on the Bremer River and on areas of Ipswich adjacent to the Bremer River. However, I was mindful that the dam release plan might not prevent flooding in the lower reaches of the Brisbane River and therefore suburbs of Ipswich such as Goodna, that are on the Brisbane River, might be impacted. However, the dam release strategy would have the effect of managing that impact by reducing the height in the Brisbane River, although the "trade off" was that the impact might extend over a longer period.
103. I left the workshop with a level of concern as to how well south east Queensland was prepared in terms of resourcing and logistics if we were to experience a major event impacting all of south east Queensland, and with a desire to progress on a more regular basis the discussions initiated at the workshop around the issue of regional collaboration, including targeted scenarios and outcomes.

Topic 4 - EMQ 2010 consultation sessions

EMQ session - 4 May 2010

104. ICC participated in the EMQ 2010 consultation sessions concerning the proposed changes to the *Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld)* (the Act). I attended this session, held at Beenleigh on 4

May 2010. I was the only ICC representative. Representatives from other local authorities were also present.

105. I did not consider this to be a consultation session, rather the purpose of the session was to present a "heads up" on the proposed changes to the Act. These were presented as a "fait accompli". ICC did not participate in the development of the proposed changes and, so far as I am aware, was not involved in consultation as to the proposed changes.
106. As a result of the proposed amendments there were to be changes in various responsibilities and roles. At the time of this session the amendments to the legislation were expected to be introduced to the Parliament in June 2010 and the legislation passed in September 2010.
107. Attendees at this session were informed that the State and EMQ would be scheduling subsequent training sessions to assist local authorities in giving effect to the operational changes which would arise consequent upon the amendments to the Act. In the case of Ipswich, this subsequent session took place on 20 December 2010, and has been addressed in my response to Topic 1 above. However, no such guidance was provided at the session on 4 May 2010.

Assessment of the assistance gained by Ipswich City Council

108. This was an information session concerning the proposed amendments to the Act, not a consultation session, and as such I gained limited assistance from attending the session. Following this session I prepared a memorandum to the Chief Operating Officer (Engineering Services) concerning the proposed changes to the Act, and included with this memorandum a summary of the proposed policy and legislative changes to the disaster management arrangements. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-15** is a copy of my memorandum dated 12 May 2010 and enclosed summary.
109. This memorandum was considered by the Council at its meeting on 24 May 2010 and the recommendations contained in it were approved by the Council.

110. Once the changes to the Act were effected, I was aware that there would need to be a review of and changes to disaster management operations more generally as a consequence of the changes to the Act.
111. One aspect of the proposed changes that struck me as slightly incongruent was that such significant amendments were scheduled to take effect in September 2010 (as matters transpired they took effect on 1 November 2010), just prior to the imminent storm season. I expected such changes would be introduced at the end of the summer storm season so as to allow time for training and familiarisation in relation to the impact of the changes over a period of some months before the onset of the next storm season.

Topic 5 - Local State Emergency Service

Training and support for local SES

112. ICC is very active in its support of the local SES, and has provided this support over many years. The local SES Coordinator is a member of the Ipswich LDMG, and ICC sees the local SES as an integral part of the "front line" in the City's response to an emergency event.
113. Within Ipswich, the SES is capable of providing an immediate volunteer response to an emergency event. For example, in a major storm event the SES can provide an immediate response through the provision of sandbags, and in assisting in dealing with fallen trees, the impact of localised flooding issues and the such like. Without this SES support, ICC would have to employ or procure additional resources to deal with such matters.
114. The ICC support of the SES is manifested in the following ways:
- (a) ICC is one of the few local authorities to fund a full time SES Coordinator, whose role is to liaise with the Council and with the Ipswich LDMG and to ensure sufficient SES volunteers are maintained so as to enable the local SES function to operate effectively. The Ipswich SES has approximately 200 volunteers within its ranks;

(b) ICC has provided and maintains four depots and related facilities (shed and amenities) at Ipswich, Goodna, Marburg and Rosewood for SES operations. ICC is currently investigating the upgrading of the Goodna depot;

(c) Ipswich has provided a fleet and other equipment to the local SES comprising:

- a 21 seater bus;
- 4 x troop carriers;
- 4 x 8 tonne trucks;
- 1 x Holden Rodeo ute;
- 1 x Nissan Nivara ute;
- 8 x mobile generators;
- 5 x special tarping trailers;
- 2 x welfare trailers;
- 1 x emergency operations caravan;
- 1 x coldroom;
- 4 x flood boats (including 2 provided by EMQ);
- 1 x water trailer - 1,200 litres;
- 2 x special water trailers with pumps and hoses - 1,500 litres.

115. ICC also allocates the local SES in the order of \$40,000 per annum on a recurring basis for their "portable and attractive assets" comprising items such as equipment and ropes.

116. ICC does not provide training to the local SES. Whilst ICC supports the local SES operations, training is undertaken pursuant to a separate framework within the EMQ/SES relationship.

Assessment of the adequacy and timeliness of SES measures

117. I consider the local SES to be well supported and equipped. Although not directly involved in their training I consider the local SES to be well trained.

118. Because of the extent of the 2011 flood event, SES resources, as with the resources of all agencies, were very stretched. However, the SES provided invaluable assistance to ICC and to the Ipswich LDMG throughout the flood event.
119. Three areas relevant to SES operations which I have identified for further consideration arising out of the experience of the flood event are:
- (a) firstly, the benefit of having in place a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) between EMQ and ICC as to responsibility for coordinating and directing SES operations during a disaster event, as this "boundary" became somewhat blurred during the flood event;
 - (b) secondly, as between the State and the local authority, formalising the funding and support arrangements for the local SES so as to ensure that the SES remains sufficiently resourced and supported; and
 - (c) thirdly, (and related to item (b) above) assessing whether the optimal model for SES operations and arrangements is a State based model or a local government model. This is of particular relevance where, as a result of a disaster event, SES support is required across a broad geographic area, covering many local authority areas, and in relation to which multiple events there are competing priorities for SES support.

Topic 6 - Ipswich City Council actions in advance of the flood event

120. Information as to local actions taken by ICC in advance of or in respect of the flood event in relation to resourcing, coordination and deployment of any personnel and equipment has been provided in:
- (a) my response above to Topic 2 under the heading "ICC preparation for the emergency response";
- and in the following sections of the ICC Submission:

- (b) paragraph 8.12 in relation to establishing the Coordination Centre;
- (c) paragraphs 9.24-9.32 in relation to road closures;
- (d) paragraphs 9.48-9.55 in relation to protection of ICC assets and infrastructure; and
- (e) paragraphs 10.9-10.25 in relation to the establishment of evacuation centres.

121. I refer the Commission to these paragraphs but do not repeat the information contained in them in this statement. In relation to this topic I make the following additional comments:

- (a) at the Ipswich LDMG on 28 December 2010, although the LDMG reverted to the "Alert" status, all agencies represented on the Ipswich LDMG were requested to ensure that resources were available on short notice for the remainder of the Christmas/New Year period and ready to respond in the event of an elevation in status;
- (b) arrangements were made for road signage which had been deployed for the 23-28 December 2010 event to remain "in the field" following the downgrading of that event for immediate redeployment if required, rather than returning this signage to the storage depot;
- (c) prior to Christmas 2010 I spoke with the ICC Procurement Officer, Mr Wayne Bichel, to ensure that the Council held sufficient stores of emergency equipment in the nature of sandbags, signage, barrier mesh and the such like as may be required in the case of a flood event. By email dated 23 December 2010 Mr Bichel informed me that this request had been actioned. Attached to my statement and marked "AKT-16" is a copy of Mr Bichel's email;
- (d) arrangements were made with Mr Hickey (who had planned to be on annual leave through January 2011, but as a result of the flood event cancelled his proposed leave), Mr Teece and Mr Perera, ICC officers in the Engineering Services

department with particular responsibility for monitoring the flood "Alerts" information being received in the Enviromon system as well as the information being received from BOM and Seqwater, to be on call over the summer holiday period. In addition, Mr Teece and Mr Perera were issued with two BlackBerrys (designated "Flood Alert 1" and "Flood Alert 2") to ensure that all members of the ICC hydraulics team (Mr Hickey as the ICC Asset and Spatial team leader already had a Council issued BlackBerry) were able to access and monitor information as it was received;

- (e) arrangements were also made for the key members of the Asset and Spatial team, Mr Ashley Dobbie and Mr Peter Dowdle to be on call over the summer holiday period. Together with Mr Hickey, these were the ICC officers responsible for converting the flood information being received and interpreted by the hydrologists into "on the ground" impact mapping, so as to identify the areas of potential inundation. Based on this spatial mapping, notifications could then be issued to affected residences and businesses, as well as in relation to potential road closures;
- (f) I have previously referred to my email of 7 January 2011 (AKT-1) requesting all agencies to review their levels of readiness and resourcing;
- (g) at 11:00am on each of Tuesday, 4 January 2011 and Thursday, 6, January 2011 I attended the Ipswich DDMG office at Yamanto to participate in State Disaster Group briefings, which briefings also provided updates on the current BOM warnings and on the current and prospective flood affected areas; and
- (h) from 28 December 2010 through to 10 January 2011 I kept all Ipswich LDMG members informed by email with regular current weather system, catchment summary and dam release updates. My email of 7 January 2011 (AKT-1) is an example of such updates. These emails were also sent by me to the ICC Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the ICC Departmental Chief

Operating Officers and key ICC operations staff, for example the engineering officers responsible for road closures, the officers responsible for establishing evacuation centres and the officers responsible for media, the call centre and operations. By these emails all relevant Council officers were kept aware of the developing situation, which enabled them to be in a state of preparedness. These emails were also copied to all ICC Councillors so that the Councillors remained informed. Attached to my statement and marked ATK-17 is a copy of the emails that I issued between 28 December 2010 and 10 January 2011. Following the reconvening of the Ipswich LDMG on 10 January 2011 to deal with the flood event, I replaced these regular email updates with the Sitreps that I commenced issuing with effect from 11 January 2011 (copies of these Sitreps are attached at ATK-6).

ICC business as usual

122. Whilst issues relevant to the flood event were being monitored and managed by the ICC officers engaged with the Ipswich LDMG and through the Coordination Centre, so far as possible ICC's operations had to otherwise continue on a business as usual basis. This occurred under the direction and supervision of the CEO, Mr Wulff. Throughout the event it was my responsibility to keep the CEO and senior Council officers updated, which I did through the regular issuing of Sitreps and through direct discussions.

Topic 7 - Ipswich City Council actions in response to the flood event

123. The local actions undertaken in relation to the immediate management and response to the flood event have been addressed in my response to Topic 6 and are not repeated here.
124. In terms of the actions undertaken in relation to recovery operations, these actions are comprehensively addressed in section 11.0 of the ICC Submission and are also not repeated in this statement. Section 11.0 of the ICC Submission addressed the roles and actions of both the short term ICC Recovery Task Force and the longer term Flood Recovery Working Group.

125. The Recovery Task Force was established by the Ipswich LDMG at its meeting at 8:00am on Wednesday, 12 January 2011. The task force operated from level 4 of the Hayden Centre. Mr Craig Maudsley, ICC's Chief Operating Officer Health Parks and Recreation was appointed Local Recovery Coordinator. The Recovery Task Force disbanded with effect from 31 January 2011 and was replaced with the Flood Recovery Working Group, which was established under the Ipswich City Local Recovery Plan.

Topic 8 - Vital infrastructure and essential services

ICC Submission

126. The ICC Submission addresses the following matters:

- (a) at paragraph 4.9: the essential services of water, communications and power;
- (b) at paragraphs 9.38 - 9.60: measures taken in relation to Council infrastructure; and
- (c) at paragraphs 9.61 - 9.68: some particular matters relating to the provision of power;

during the flood event.

127. I will not repeat the information set out in the ICC Submission in this statement, but refer the Commission to those paragraphs of the ICC Submission. However, in relation to the matters addressed at paragraphs 9.61 - 9.68 of the ICC Submission, I do wish to emphasis three matters:

- (a) firstly, due to the magnitude of the flood event, Energex resources were under extreme pressure, were working very hard, and were faced with a range of competing priorities which I have no doubt contributed to the difficulties identified in the ICC Submission;
- (b) secondly, that at the ICC Engineering Services operations level and at the Ipswich LDMG level I have an effective and productive working relationship with the Energex representative to the Ipswich LDMG; and

- (c) thirdly, I consider the key issues arising out of flood event to be those identified at paragraphs 9.62 (forward planning so as to ensure, insofar as it is reasonably practicable, that in a future flood event power can be maintained to those parts of the City that are not flood effected) and 9.68 (developing a clear understanding of the division of the roles, responsibilities and authorities as between the LDMG, the LDC and the relevant power utility) of the ICC Submission.

ICC Flood Coordination Centre

128. As has been previously addressed in this statement, prior to the flood event steps were taken to ensure that the Hayden Centre was adequately prepared to accommodate the flood Coordination Centre throughout the duration of the flood event. I do not repeat those comments.
129. Had the flood event in Ipswich reached a height of 24 metres (the flood peaked at 19.4 metres but at one stage on the evening of Tuesday, 11 January 2011, whilst very unlikely, a peak of 24 metres was not totally beyond the range of possibilities) the Hayden Centre would have been flood impacted and the Coordination Centre comprised. As a result, in conjunction with the Deputy Chair of the Ipswich LDMG, I had identified a contingency plan to relocate the Coordination Centre to the premises of the Ipswich DDMG at Yamanto Police Station, or to the Thorn Street, Ipswich SES depot. However, in the event, this was not required.
130. A learning for ICC from the flood event is to develop a business continuity plan for disaster management in a crisis event, and in particular to ensure that the Council has a viable continuity plan (including a back-up plan) for the maintenance of critical systems and infrastructure such as the Coordination Centre, the Enviromon monitoring system, telecommunications, power and computer systems during a crisis event.

Telecommunications

131. The Telstra exchange is located at the corner of East and Limestone Streets. Telstra has a representative who sits as an observer on the Ipswich LDMG. Following the Ipswich LDMG

meeting on the afternoon of Tuesday, 11 January 2011 I directed Coordination Centre staff to contact the Telstra representative to advise of the possibility of flooding, and to ensure that Telstra had safeguards in place to protect its essential infrastructure.

132. In preparation for the flood event Telstra took steps to sandbags its premises, as there was a concern of the possible overheating to essential equipment located on the first floor of the building. This floor is located below the projected flood levels and also below the 1974 flood level.
133. I also spoke with EMQ to access some satellite phones to be used by the Ipswich LDMG and by myself as LDC should telecommunications become unavailable. These satellite phones were procured and EMQ now has a store of satellite phones available for use if required in a future event. ICC is now considering the installation of satellite capabilities as a redundancy back-up for its ICT system during an emergency event.
134. The Telstra representative attended Ipswich DDMG meetings as an observer and kept the DDMG and myself as LDC updated throughout the flood event. In addition, Coordination Centre staff were in regular contact with Telstra. However, as it transpired, there were no issues with the maintenance of telecommunications services during the flood event. As a result of its experiences during the flood event, Telstra is investigating the relocation of essential equipment (air-conditioners and fuel reserves) to the third floor of the exchange. This floor is located above all previous flood heights.

Water and Sewerage

135. The essential services of water and sewerage are addressed at paragraph 4.9(a) of the ICC Submission. There were no major issues. Due to the nature of sewerage pump stations, these tend to be located in low lying areas and are susceptible to flooding. As the flood waters receded, primary treatment of sewerage resumed at the pump stations. However, due to the flooding of the Goodna and the Bundamba waste water treatment plants, it was some considerable time before secondary treatment of sewerage could be undertaken at these plants.

136. As a result there was the potential for increased adverse environmental risks in relation to the issue of untreated sewerage. This risk was closely monitored by Council Environment and Health officers following the flood event.
137. The treatment of sewerage would have been a more significant issue had the flood waters remained for a longer period of time, as the primary treatment of sewerage could not resume whilst the pump stations remained flooded.
138. The QUU representative attended the Ipswich LDMG meetings as an observer and kept the Ipswich LDMG updated throughout the flood event. I anticipate that as a result of its experience gained from the flood event, QUU will investigate plans for the enhanced protection of its pump stations and treatment plants in a future flood event.

Power

139. The following observations are an amplification of the matters addressed in the ICC Submission. Firstly, Energex took steps to cut off consumer access to the power grid as a safeguard against potential inundation and possible injury to the community. Although Energex was represented at the Ipswich LDMG meetings, ICC did not know in advance which parts of the City were being cut off, or when they were being cut off. As a result the Ipswich LDMG and the ICC had no means of alerting the community in advance of power cut-offs occurring. Energex sought to manage the provision of such information to the community through its own communications resources. The cutting off of power with limited (or in some cases no) advance warning resulted in significant community frustration.
140. Secondly, power was cut off to areas that were not inundated, including areas that were never at risk of inundation. An example addressed in the ICC Submission concerns the Polar Ice Works. The ice production facility was not inundated, but power to the facility was cut off as a precaution, due to inundation of adjoining areas. On Thursday, 13 January 2011 I asked Energex, through its representative, to restore power to this facility so that ice could be produced for the use of residents whose homes were without power. However, power was not

restored to the ice works until the early hours of Monday, 17 January 2011. The cutting off of power to areas that were not inundated, and were never at risk of inundation was also the cause of significant community frustration.

141. Conversely, when resources were available, Energex was able to respond in a timely manner. One example of this concerned the restoration of power to the Riverview Gardens Nursing Home once it was determined that the Home had not been affected by the flood. This enabled the residents to be returned to the Home, and allowed ICC to progress the closure of the Ripley evacuation centre.
142. In the context of forward planning for the management of any future flood event I consider it is important that Energex has plans in place which enable it to assess where the flood impact will occur, and mechanisms within its infrastructure which enable it to isolate the "at risk" areas from those areas that are not "at risk", so as to ensure that the supply of power is maintained to those areas which fall outside of the "at risk" zone.
143. The loss of power during a disaster event has a range of significant implications. Some of these are addressed at paragraph 9.67 of the ICC Submission, and are not repeated in this statement.

Food/Fuel

144. Ipswich did not experience any major issues with the provision of food or fuel during and after the flood event. Prior to the flood event there were some instances of "panic" buying by consumers, and during the event the Coles Supermarket within the Ipswich CBD was inundated.
145. However, in terms of resupplying supermarkets and fuel stations, the only impediment was access to those locations as a result of road closures. During the recovery process the ICC Procurement Manager worked closely with major suppliers to ensure restoration of the supply of food and fuel to the City as quickly as possible. This restoration of supply proceeded smoothly, and Ipswich did not experience a food or fuel crisis.
146. The only real issues with food supply were:

- (a) in connection with the supply of food to the ICC evacuation centres, particularly on the evening of Tuesday, 11 January 2011. This issue is addressed at paragraphs 10.41 - 10.42 of the ICC Submission; and
- (b) in connection with supply to the organic evacuation centres which were established at the Karalee State School and the Leichhardt Avon Community Hall following the isolation of those communities. Whilst those areas remained isolated food drops were carried out by SES boats and by four-wheel drive access.

Rail Transport

147. The Brisbane-Ipswich-Rosewood rail line closed on Tuesday, 11 January 2011. Some flood damage was sustained to rail infrastructure, particularly around the Goodna Railway Station. Following the flood waters receding on Thursday, 13 January 2011 the Brisbane-Darra rail line reopened, with bus transfers beyond Darra. On Sunday, 16 January 2011 a single rail line reopened and on Tuesday, 18 January 2011 the Brisbane-Ipswich-Rosewood line was fully reopened.

Roads

148. The Ipswich area sustained a considerable number of road closures as a result of inundation. This issue is addressed more fully in my comments below in response to Topic 11.

Bridges

149. The Ipswich City area is serviced by three major bridges:
- (a) the David Trumpy (or "Town") Bridge: this bridge crosses the Bremer River and links the City of Ipswich to North Ipswich. The David Trumpy Bridge was not flooded but the approaches to the bridge on the town side were flooded, with the result that the bridge was closed for approximately 24 hours. With some inconvenience to motorists, the David Trumpy Bridge is able to be by-passed;

- (b) the One Mile Bridge: this bridge crosses the Bremer River and links the City of Ipswich to the communities of Leichhardt, Walloon, Rosewood and beyond. It also provides access to the "secondary entrance", via the Three Mile Bridge, to the Amberley Air Force Base, the "primary entrance" being from the Warrego Highway. The One Mile Bridge and the Three Mile Bridge were inundated with the result that the bridges were closed for approximately 24 hours. The One Mile Bridge can be by-passed so long as the David Trumpy Bridge is open, but when both bridges are closed there are significant restrictions on access from Ipswich to the townships of Walloon and beyond; and
- (c) the Bundamba School Bridge: this bridge crosses Bundamba Creek at the Bundamba State School on the main Brisbane-Ipswich Road. The bridge and its approaches were inundated with the result that it was closed for approximately 24 hours. The Bundamba School Bridge can be by-passed.

Conclusion - Essential Services

150. With the exception of the maintenance and reinstatement of the supply of power, during the flood event the City of Ipswich did not experience any major issues in relation to the preservation of vital infrastructure or in relation to the management, maintenance or reinstatement of the supply of essential services.

Topic 9 - Weather forecasts and flood warnings and public dissemination of that information

Sources of information concerning weather and flood forecasts

151. The sources of information to ICC and the Ipswich LDMG concerning weather and flood forecasts and warnings are:
- (a) the BOM website;
 - (b) the official BOM weather and flood warnings;

- (c) Seqwater reports and updates (these reports are also received by BOM);
 - (d) information recorded in the ICC Enviromon system from ICC Alert gauges (this information is also received by BOM); and
 - (e) local "field" intelligence communicated to ICC. This information is usually received through telephone calls from ICC staff, other Ipswich LDMG agencies and the community to the Coordination Centre and generally concerns overland flooding giving rise to road closures. Another source of "field" intelligence are the ICC survey staff deployed to visually monitor critical gauges, who also serve to verify Alert readings.
152. Although reliance is placed by ICC on all of these sources of information, the Council relies on the information provided by BOM and Seqwater as the authoritative sources of information regarding a developing flood event, dam releases and the likely impact of the event within the Council area.
153. The BOM weather and flood warnings include information as to the predicted Brémer River and Brisbane River heights. It is these river height predictions that underpin Ipswich LDMG decision making in relation to warnings to the community, evacuation plans, evacuation centres and road closures.
154. Paragraphs 8.4-8.6 of the ICC Submission address these weather and flood forecast information sources. Paragraphs 8.7-8.12 then describe the development of the flood event and paragraphs 9.1-9.9 address the notice ICC received as to the scale of the flood event. Schedule 5 to the ICC Submission is a comprehensive table which summarises the information received by the Ipswich LDMG from Monday, 10 January 2011 through to the Bremer River flood peak, which occurred at 1:00pm on Wednesday, 12 January 2011. Except where it is appropriate to do for purposes of context I do not repeat in this statement the information contained in those paragraphs of the ICC Submission.

BOM reports

155. Attached to my statement is a folder containing the following material:

ATK-18: an index of all reports that ICC has a record of having received from BOM between 7 December 2010 and 21 January 2011;

ATK-19: copies of the reports contained in the aforesaid index.

Seqwater reports

156. Attached to my statement is a further folder containing the following material:

ATK-20: an index which identifies:

- (a) by those items which are not highlighted in the index, reports that ICC has a record of having received from Seqwater which are identified by Seqwater in appendix E to its report dated 2 March 2011 entitled "Report on the operation of Somerset Dam and Wivenhoe Dam" as situation reports 1-34 issued by Seqwater between 6 January 2011 and 19 January 2011;
- (b) by those items highlighted in blue in the index, reports that ICC has a record of having received from Seqwater which are not identified by Seqwater in appendix E; and
- (c) by those items highlighted in yellow in the index, situation reports identified in appendix E that are said to have been issued by Seqwater but that ICC is presently unable to identify as having been received by ICC;

ATK-21: copies of the reports received by ICC by Seqwater, being the reports that fall within categories (a) and (b) above.

Predicted levels of the Bremer River at the Ipswich gauge

157. At 12:36am on Monday, 10 January 2011 BOM advised a level of 4.1 metres rising at the Ipswich gauge and predicted further rises in the next 24 hours with at least minor flood levels expected in the Bremer River at Ipswich during Monday night and continuing into Tuesday.
158. At 6:30am on Monday, 10 January 2011 Seqwater issued a situation report (14) advising that the objective for dam operations was to minimise the impact of urban flooding in areas downstream of the dam and, at that stage, releases would be kept below 3,500m³/s and the combined flows in the lower Brisbane River will be limited to 4,000m³/s if possible. Seqwater advised that currently the estimated peak flow in the lower Brisbane River would be the highest since Wivenhoe Dam was completed in 1984 but still well below the 1974 levels. Seqwater advised that heavy rainfall continued throughout south east Queensland and the situation could deteriorate rapidly over the next 24 hours.
159. At 7:00am on Monday, 10 January 2011 Mr Hickey from ICC spoke with BOM by telephone, which predicted a "moderate" flood height for the Bremer River at Ipswich of approximately 8.2-8.3 metres, to be achieved by Tuesday afternoon. Following his conversation with BOM, Mr Hickey spoke with Mr Teece and myself, and we reviewed the potential impacts on Ipswich of this prediction. A flood peak of 8.3 metres might impact a small number of properties. It would not justify setting up an evacuation centre.
160. At 8:28am on Monday, 10 January 2011 BOM predicted a peak of at least 9.5 metres (moderate) at Ipswich during the early hours of Tuesday. In terms of its impact, a peak of 9.5 metres was not materially different to the earlier predicted peak of 8.3 metres.
161. At 10:00am on Monday, 10 January 2011 I telephoned the Seqwater flood desk and was informed by the duty engineer that the position had not changed from Seqwater's earlier advice with regard to dam releases.

162. At 12:16pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 Seqwater issued a situation report (15). The "impacts downstream of Wivenhoe Dam" and the "outlook" in this report were identical to the Seqwater situation report (14) issued at 6:30am that day.
163. At 4:17pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 BOM issued a report that the Bremer River at Ipswich was expected to reach about 12.7 metres on Tuesday afternoon and that higher levels were possible. A predicted flood peak of 12.7 metres had the potential to cause some minor flooding to approximately 80 properties. It did not justify the establishment of an evacuation centre.
164. At 6:13pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 BOM issued an update which included a prediction for the Bremer River at Ipswich in the same terms as its 4:17pm report.
165. At 6:43pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 Seqwater issued a situation report (16) that the flash flooding experienced in the upper areas of Lockyer Creek had been examined and was not expected to significantly increase Brisbane River flows above the current projection of 4,000m³/s at Moggill. Seqwater advised that water levels in the lower Brisbane River would be impacted by the combined flows of Lockyer Creek, Bremer River, local run off and releases from Wivenhoe Dam, that heavy rainfall continued throughout south east Queensland and the situation could deteriorate rapidly over the next 24 hours.
166. At 9:44pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 BOM issued a report which contained the same prediction of approximately 12.7 metres for the Bremer River peak at Ipswich.
167. At around 11:00pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 I telephoned the Seqwater flood desk and was informed by the duty engineer that the position had not changed from Seqwater's earlier advice with regard to dam releases.
168. At 11:56pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 Seqwater issued a situation report (17) which was in essentially the same terms as situation report (16) except that Seqwater advised that consideration would be given to modifying the releases from Wivenhoe Dam to try to moderate the peak flows emanating from Lockyer Creek.

169. At 12:07am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 BOM issued an update which did not change its predicted peak of 12.7 metres for the Bremer River at Ipswich.
170. At 4:07am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 BOM issued a further report which again did not alter its predicted peak of 12.7 metres for the Bremer River at Ipswich.
171. At 6:12am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 Seqwater issued a situation report (18) advising that releases from the dam had been held at a rate of 2,750m³/s since 7:30pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 but that if further rainfall occurred dam releases may need to be increased and this may result in river flows in the lower Brisbane River approaching or exceeding 5,000 m³/s. Seqwater also advised that as a result of rainfall in the past 12 hours in the catchment above the dam, the option of modifying the releases from Wivenhoe Dam to try to moderate the peak flows emanating from Lockyer Creek was not possible. Therefore instead of decreasing releases to accommodate the Lockyer Creek flows, the strategy will endeavour to maintain the current releases until Lockyer Creek peaks.
172. At 8:00am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011, notwithstanding that the highest and most recent prediction from BOM for the Bremer River peak at Ipswich was 12.7 metres, the Ipswich LDMG observed that the predicted peak recorded on the BOM website for the Bremer River was 14.7 metres. In light of this website prediction the Ipswich LDMG converted its status to "Stand up level 1". A predicted Bremer River flood peak at Ipswich of 14.7 metres had the potential to impact 200-300 homes. Based on the Council's mapping information, a 14.7 metre flood peak would not result in evacuation centres having to be established, but the revised figure was concerning.
173. At 9:29am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 BOM issued a report predicting the Bremer River at Ipswich was expected to reach about 16 metres during Wednesday and that higher levels were expected. I was surprised by the sudden increased prediction from 12.7 metres to 14.7 metres to 16 metres. The predicted flood peak of 16 metres constituted a major event and resulted in the

Ipswich LDMG initiating a range of urgent activities. These activities are detailed in the ICC Submission.

174. As no further prediction had issued from BOM, I telephoned BOM shortly prior to the Ipswich LDMG meeting held at 2:00pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 and was informed that the predicted flood peak for the Bremer River at Ipswich remained at 16 metres.
175. However, shortly afterwards, at around 3:00pm, the BOM website predicted a flood peak for the Bremer River at Ipswich of 18-19 metres. At 3:13pm I telephoned BOM to confirm the revised prediction appearing on the BOM website, and was informed that the predicted peak for the Bremer River at Ipswich was 22 metres and that higher levels were possible if rain continued.
176. At 3:24pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 BOM issued a revised prediction, confirming what I had been told in the telephone conversation at 3:13pm, that the Bremer River at Ipswich was expected to reach about 22 metres during Wednesday and that higher levels were possible as rainfalls continued.
177. At 8:06pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 BOM issued a report predicting that the Bremer River at Ipswich was expected to reach around 21.5 metres during Wednesday.
178. This prediction was repeated in a report issued by BOM at 12:19am on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 and in a further report issued by BOM at 4:03am on Wednesday, 12 January 2011.
179. In reports issued by BOM at 7:34am, 7:57am and 11:57am on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 the Bremer River peak was revised to 20.5 metres.
180. The Bremer River at Ipswich peaked at 19.4 metres at 1:00pm on Wednesday, 12 January 2011 and remained at that peak for approximately 4 hours.
181. Although Seqwater continued to issue situation reports from the afternoon of Tuesday, 11 January 2011 those reports were, in effect, superseded by the BOM predicted peak of 22 metres. Ipswich LDMG mapping indicated that a flood peak of 18-19 metres could potentially impact

over 6,500 properties and that a peak of 22 metres would be significantly more catastrophic than that.

Impact of the predicted flood peak and steps taken to disseminate information to the community

182. The predicted flood peak of 12.7 metres for the Bremer River at Ipswich remained constant from around 4:00pm on Monday, 10 January 2011 through to around 8:00am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011. Then, over the course of the next 7 ½ hours, the prediction increased from 12.7 metres to 22.0 metres.
183. The increase in the predicted flood peak from 12.7 metres to 16.0 metres between 8:00am and 9:30am on the morning of Tuesday, 11 January 2011 made it impractical for the ICC to use its call centre, or to undertake personal visits and door knocking to alert residents to the flood event threat. The sudden increase in the number of homes and businesses potentially impacted made telephone calls or personal visitations impossible.
184. Instead, a decision was taken by myself and the Deputy Chair, Councillor Nardi, to issue a warning to residents through the State's Emergency Alert System. Councillor Nardi and the EMQ representative on the Ipswich LDMG, Mr Mark Kelly, drafted a message. However, the drafting of the message had to be revised because of the changes in predicted flood peaks, as these changes then resulted in an increase in the impact area to which the message had to be issued.
185. The message was approved by Councillor Nardi and then passed to the Ipswich DDMG and subsequently to EMQ for approval, before it was finally issued at 3:24pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011. A copy of this message appears at annexure 6 to the ICC Submission.
186. I am concerned that it took too long for the message to issue. This was in part due to the impact of the changing information as to the flood peak, in part because of the time taken to convert the flood information into lists of potentially impacted streets, and also in part due to the series of approval and logistical processes required to be undertaken to enable the Emergency Alert to

issue. The nature of an Emergency Alert is that it should issue quickly, and a learning from the flood event is that the procedures regarding the use of the State's Emergency Alert System should be reviewed to facilitate the more timely issuing of emergency messages, including the development of a suite of pre-drafted messages and impact maps based on a range of pre-modelled events.

187. In addition to using the Emergency Alert system, the primary and most effective means of conveying warnings to the community were through:

- (a) the regular broadcasting of the updated BOM information over the radio;
- (b) the very effective communication of the flood warnings, in particular by the Ipswich Mayor, Councillor Pisasale, through extensive radio interviews and also some television interviews;
- (c) similar communication through radio and television by Councillor Nardi; and
- (d) the regular broadcasting of the updated BOM information in television news broadcasts and updates, although it should be noted in this regard that the television reports were:
 - (i) quite "Brisbane centric", with the result that conveying the local "Ipswich message" was somewhat difficult; and
 - (ii) to many residents, reporting the predicted flood peak of the Bremer River at the Ipswich gauge was, in any event, a relatively meaningless reference unless the reference was placed in some other relevant context.

Topic 10 - The accuracy and timeliness of weather forecasts and flood warnings

188. The following comments concern the accuracy and timeliness of the information concerning the flood forecasts and warnings, and the effectiveness of the warnings for local purposes.

189. Firstly, the information contained in the dam release situation reports issued by Seqwater was quite uninformative and lacking in detail, insofar as any impact on the residents of Ipswich was concerned, and were of little relevance for local purposes. The information primarily relied on for local purposes was the BOM updates.
190. Secondly, with regard to the BOM updates, as has been noted, the nature of the information changed very significantly in a short period of time. To respond effectively to the flood threat the Ipswich LDMG needed to be notified of the prediction that the flood peak might increase to 22 metres as soon as possible. This would have enabled the ICC Hydrologists and Asset and Spatial team to carry out their mapping as to potential impacts at an early stage. This would have resulted in more effective warnings being issued, more time for residents to prepare their homes and protect belongings, more time to prepare evacuation centres, more time to attend to road closures, more time for businesses to implement business continuity arrangements, more time for ICC to protect its potentially affected assets and infrastructure and the such like.
191. It may be that, having regard to all of the variables with which it was dealing, the information provided by BOM was as accurate and as timely as was possible. However, I was concerned, in particular, at the lengthy delay, during what was really the peak of the crisis, between BOM issuing its report of a predicted peak of 16.0 metres for the Bremer River at Ipswich at 9:29am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 and then not issuing another official warning until 3:24pm that afternoon. It was this delay which prompted my telephone calls to BOM at 1:56pm and at 3:13pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 to obtain updated predictions.
192. Whatever the explanation for the rapid escalation in predicted flood peaks from 8:00am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011, it would have been helpful to the Ipswich LDMG and for the City of Ipswich to have received additional warning and additional planning time. The increase from 12.7 metres to 22.0 metres over a short period of time had significant adverse implications for Ipswich.

193. As I have outlined in this statement, ICC and the Ipswich LDMG were well prepared for the pending flood event. It was the sudden "ramping up" of the predicted peak which was the issue, as it was only when the predicted peak extended beyond 12.7 metres that most of the required actions and response had to be initiated. As a result the Ipswich LDMG, the Council, relevant agencies and the community had to scramble to deal with the situation. My belief is that everyone concerned responded extremely effectively, but it would have been much better for everyone concerned if the response could have been effected in a more orderly fashion.
194. Thirdly, an issue for the Ipswich LDMG was its ability to interpret the BOM information. The Ipswich LDMG Hydrologists are aware of the impact of a Brisbane River flood event on the lower reaches of the Bremer River. Accordingly, the two relevant BOM predictions for Ipswich LDMG purposes are the predicted Brisbane River peak at the Moggill gauge, and the predicted Bremer River peak at the Ipswich (David Trumpy Bridge) gauge.
195. For flood modelling and impact analysis purposes during the flood event, the ICC Hydrologists used pre-existing flood impact maps for events of various magnitude at the two gauges to plot the theoretical impact of the BOM predictions. The first of these maps plots the predicted footprint of the Bremer River flood peak at the Ipswich gauge as a purely Bremer River event. The second map overlays the first, and plots the predicted footprint of the Brisbane River flood peak at the Moggill gauge. The impact of the Moggill peak on the Bremer River (and its tributaries) is more pronounced in the lower reaches of the Bremer River, downstream from the David Trumpy Bridge. In other words, the ICC Hydrologists take the two BOM predictions for the Ipswich and Moggill gauges and overlay the predicted Brisbane River impact on the predicted Bremer River impact to obtain a predicted event impact, adopting the David Trumpy Bridge as an arbitrary cut off point for the influence on the Bremer River of the Brisbane River event.
196. As I understand it, BOM, in providing its projected flood peaks, undertakes comprehensive modelling based on numerous factors, and the predicted peak of the Bremer River at the Ipswich gauge already includes, as part of the BOM modelling, a predicted impact of the Brisbane River

flood event on the Ipswich gauge. However, modelling the theoretical impact of the BOM predictions is not a precise science. By treating the peak at the Ipswich gauge as a purely Bremer River event, and then overlaying this with the theoretical footprint of the Moggill flood peak to model the overall regional impact of the event, the ICC Hydrologists are therefore adopting a conservative (worst case) approach to the potential impact.

197. Finally, in terms of the effectiveness of the warning forecasts for local purposes, I repeat the learning mentioned earlier in this statement, and also identified at paragraphs 13.18-13.26 of the ICC Submission, that warnings by reference to flood peaks at particular gauges are meaningless to the majority of the community.
198. Information of the kind issued by Seqwater that Wivenhoe Dam releases will keep flows in the lower Brisbane River below 3,500m³/s, 4,000m³/s or 5,000m³/s is even less meaningful to Ipswich residents.
199. For these warnings to be effective there either needs to be change in the nature of the information disseminated, or the information needs to be converted through some process so that what is provided to the community is information that the community can readily understand and respond to. In this regard ICC is presently investigating being a "pilot" region for possible implementation of the coastal evacuation framework into a riverine environment.

Topic 11 - Measure to protect life and private/public property

200. Local measures undertaken to protect life and public property in connection with the flood event (such as road/bridge closures, evacuation arrangements etc) are detailed in the ICC Submission and I do not repeat those matters in this statement:
 - (e) paragraphs 9.24-9.32 of the ICC Submission addresses the issue of road closures and reopenings;
 - (f) paragraphs 9.38-9.60 address the protection of Council's assets and infrastructure;and

(g) section 10.0 addresses the issue of evacuation centres.

201. The Ipswich LDMG Sitreps that were produced and issued throughout the duration of the flood event (AKT-6) include current lists of road closures. As I have explained in this statement, these Sitreps were widely circulated, including to the ICC call centre and to the ICC Media Manager, Mr Alan Roebuck. Mr Roebuck then issues the road closure information to the media and to the RACQ.
202. Dissemination to the community during the flood event of information as to road closures and evacuations centres was primarily effected through:
- (a) the media, particularly ABC radio and the local Ipswich radio station, River 94.9FM;
 - (b) the ICC call centre, which operated 24/7 during the flood event and was kept fully updated with all relevant information; and
 - (c) posting the information on the ICC website (although, as noted at paragraph 9.9(e) of the ICC Submission, the ICC website was down between 11:00am and 1:30pm on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 as a result of the high number of hits it was experiencing).

Topic 12 - Rescues and evacuations

Voluntary Self-Evacuations

203. In total approximately 2,000 Ipswich residences were evacuated during the flood event, as well as number of aged care facilities and businesses. The vast majority of evacuations effected in the Ipswich area were voluntary self-evacuations.

Assisted Evacuations

204. There were also some assisted evacuations conducted by the QPS or by the SES. These evacuations were conducted on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 and Wednesday, 12 January 2011,

primarily in the townships of Rosewood and Marburg (on 11 January 2011) and in the suburbs of Karalee, Bundamba, North Booval and Goodna. I am not aware of the overall number of assisted evacuations, but do not believe the number was substantial.

205. I am not aware of any particular issues or incidents in relation to assisted evacuations other than in a number of instances, particularly in the Goodna area, some residents initially declined QPS or SES requests to evacuate, only to then be the subject of an assisted evacuation some hours later.

Rescues

206. I am not aware of any rescues being effected in the Ipswich area.

Karalee Medical evacuation

207. I am aware however of an issue which arose concerning a request for the urgent evacuation of four people from the Karalee Evacuation Centre on medical grounds.
208. During the course of the flood event, an "organic" evacuation centre was established by the QPS at Karalee State School, as the Karalee community had become isolated by the flood event.
209. On Wednesday, 12 January 2011 a QPS officer at the Karalee Evacuation Centre contacted the Ipswich Coordination Centre advising that there were four people at the Karalee Evacuation Centre who required urgent medical evacuation for medical attention.
210. Despite concentrated efforts through the QPS and QAS to secure helicopter assistance to effect this evacuation, the Coordination Centre was unable to secure a helicopter to effect the evacuation. I understand the issue was only resolved some considerable hours later when a helicopter attended at the Karalee Evacuation Centre to provide supplies and a Police Officer stationed at the centre coerced the helicopter pilot to evacuate the patients.
211. An issue for future consideration which arises more generally from this incident concerns the arrangements and processes for the procurement and deployment of helicopter support in the

case of a crisis event or medical emergency. Particularly in the case of Ipswich, which has the Amberley Air Force base located within its local authority area, and a representative of the Australian Air Force (RAAF Amberley) sitting as an advisor to the Ipswich DDMG, the issue which arises is the circumstances in which the Amberley Base Commander could consider a request from the Ipswich DDMG for the provision of helicopter support.

212. As part of the Ipswich DDMG debrief following the flood event, the EMQ representative on the Ipswich DDMG indicated that for short term (less than 24 hours) urgent deployment requests such assistance, if available, could be deployed by RAAF Amberley in direct response to a request for assistance from the Ipswich DDMG. However, requests for more sustained or longer term assistance would have to be processed through the usual disaster management request for assistance approval processes.
213. This is an issue which will be further considered by the Ipswich DDMG and by the Ipswich LDMG, as the provision of such support would be very relevant to future management planning for the carrying out of rescues and evacuations in a crisis situation.
214. In the case of the flood event, with the exception of the Karalee incident described above, I consider the processes for the carrying out of assisted evacuations to have been adequate and timely. As noted, I am not aware of any rescues having been effected in the Ipswich area.

Topic 13 - The establishment, operation and performance of evacuation centres

Overview

215. The position with regards the circumstances of the establishment and subsequent operation and performance of evacuation centres within the Ipswich local area, including an assessment of any particular difficulties encountered, is addressed in detail in section 10.0 of the ICC Submission (paragraphs 10.1 - 10.75) and also at paragraphs 13.45 - 13.46 of the ICC Submission. I refer the Commission to the matters detailed in the ICC Submission and do not repeat the information set out in the Submission in this statement.

Additional observations regarding evacuation centres

216. By way of a supplement to the matters addressed in the ICC Submission I only wish to make the following points.
217. The Ipswich LDMG had been on stand-by to proceed with the establishment of evacuation centres, if required, for a considerable period of time. The prospect of evacuation centres was very much a front of mind issue. However, evacuation centres are resource intensive, requiring the coordination of a large number of support agencies (comprising both professional support and voluntary support) and the decision to establish an evacuation centre is not one which should be made lightly, or prematurely.
218. As previously described in this statement, following the Ipswich LDMG meeting on 26 October 2010, steps had been taken to secure the availability of the Ipswich Showground as an evacuation centre if required.
219. In addition, Ms Brooke de Jong, who as the ICC Home Assist Program Coordinator would be directly involved in establishing evacuation centres, had attended the Ipswich LDMG meetings on 23 December 2010, 27 December 2010 and 28 December 2010 as an observer. Ms de Jong had also been sent my email of 7 January 2011 (attachment AKT-1) advising of the change of status of the Ipswich LDMG from "Alert" to "Lean Forward One" and requesting all agencies to review their level of readiness.
220. Ms de Jong had also been in attendance at the two Ipswich LDMG meetings held on Monday, 10 January 2011 and at the 8:00am meeting of the Ipswich LDMG on Tuesday, 11 January 2011. Ms de Jong was ready to assist with the establishment of evacuation centres if and when required.
221. However, the issue that was the cause of the initial "teething" difficulties with establishing the evacuation centres was the extreme urgency with which the requirement to establish them arose, consequent upon the projected flood peak in Ipswich moving from 12.7 metres at the

commencement of the Ipswich LDMG meeting at 8:00am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 to 16.0 metres at 9:30am that day and then to a prediction of at least 22.0 metres by 3:24pm that afternoon. At a projected peak of 12.7 metres, minor flooding would be sustained to approximately 80 properties. This level of flooding did not justify the application of the resources involved in the opening of an evacuation centre. However, the 9-10 metre increase in the projected flood peak over a seven hour period on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 dramatically altered the situation and resulted in the evacuation centres having to be established and resourced very urgently.

222. Notwithstanding this urgency and the initial "teething" difficulties detailed in the ICC Submission, the centres, on the whole, functioned very successfully. For any future event the key issue is to obtain more timely projections of the likely flood peak, as effective decision making in relation to evacuation centres is dependent on this information.

223. My only additional comments in connection with evacuation centres are that:

- (a) the Ipswich LDMG plan had been to use the Ipswich Showgrounds as the central location at which evacuees were received, with a view to then bussing evacuees to other evacuation centres, as appropriate. By this means, for example, the aged and infirm evacuees could be concentrated at the Ripley Community Evacuation Centre, while families could be transported to one of the Grammar Schools. However, as the event unfolded, the proposal that the Ipswich Showgrounds be utilised as the central reception point did not work as efficiently as had been hoped for. Part of the difficulty was that the media published the location of all evacuation centres, with the result that evacuees turned up at all of the centres. In the case of planning for a future event, further consideration should be given to this issue, as I consider there to be considerable benefits which arise from the reception and processing of evacuees through a central reception point;

- (b) an evacuation centre was also established by the SES and QPS at the Rosewood State High School on Tuesday, 11 January 2011. This evacuation centre is not referred to in the ICC Submission. ICC was initially unable to support this evacuation centre as the Rosewood district had become isolated by the flood event; and
- (c) a critical period for resourcing evacuation centres is the initial 12/24 hour period of the event. To better manage this initial phase in any future event:
 - (i) ICC is seeking to establish a MOU with the Red Cross as to the respective roles and responsibilities of ICC and the Red Cross in relation to evacuation centre management;
 - (ii) the Red Cross is taking steps to increase its local volunteer base and to provide enhanced skills training to that volunteer base so that local Red Cross personnel are available to provide immediate "on the ground" assistance and support in the initial 12/24 hours of a crisis event; and
 - (iii) Council is liaising with the State Government Procurement Agency to increase ICC's local logistics capability during emergency events. The purpose is to ensure that ICC has the capability to readily source essential supplies (for example bed, linen, food, water etc) as quickly and efficiently as possible in an emergency event.

Topic 14 - The circumstances of any flood related human fatality

- 224. There was one flood related human fatality in the ICC local government area. This fatality occurred at Campbells Gully on the Karrabin-Rosewood Road on Wednesday, 12 January 2011.
- 225. I am not familiar with the circumstances of this incident and am unaware of any eye witness to the incident. The incident is under investigation by "Task Force Galaxy" in preparation for a coronial investigation.

226. This incident is addressed at section 12.0 of the ICC Submission. If as a result of the coronial investigation there are any measures identified to prevent or better respond to such an incident, these measures will be taken into consideration and addressed by ICC.

Topic 15 - The involvement of State and Federal agencies during the flood event

Federal Agencies

227. The only Federal agency with whom I had dealings during the flood event was the Department of Defence (RAAF Amberley). As is noted at paragraph 11.13 of the ICC Submission, the Australian Defence Force provided extraordinary support to the Ipswich community, particularly in connection with the recovery and clean-up effort.

State Agencies

228. The timeliness of support by various State agencies was largely a factor of the level of resources the agencies had available. Because of the extensive nature of the flood event throughout southern Queensland, the resources of most State agencies were extremely stretched. Despite this, overall the response of State agencies throughout the flood event was excellent, particularly in the context of the magnitude of the event and the resources available. The "people on the ground" from all agencies made a wonderful contribution. Notable emergency response measures included:

- (a) **Queensland Police Service** - the QPS provided significant support in establishing and managing the Karalee evacuation centre, effecting evacuations (notably in the Karalee, Goodna and North Booval areas), as a source of information to the community and as a source of support and advice to me during the course of the flood event. QPS was also very effective in initially coordinating the ADF recovery activities in the Karalee and Barellan Point localities;

- (b) **Queensland Fire and Rescue Service** - QFRS worked tirelessly throughout the flood event and their rapid impact assessment immediately following the event provided an invaluable initial picture of the impact of the event on the community;
- (c) **Emergency Management Queensland** - the EMQ representatives provided invaluable advice and support to me during the response phase and EMQ provided experienced staff to assist in the recovery phase. Within the EMQ framework, SES undertook 1,400 jobs locally, including effecting assisted evacuations, particularly in Rosewood, Goodna, Karalee and North Booval;
- (d) **Queensland Ambulance Service** - QAS assisted with the transfer of aged evacuees to alternative nursing home facilities and to the Ripley evacuation centre, and provided ongoing support at evacuation centres for the duration of the event;
- (e) **Queensland Health** - the Ipswich Public Health Officer worked tirelessly throughout the event and Queensland Health provided significant support to the evacuation centres and to the community more generally. The only issue experienced was the incident described at paragraph 10.70 of the ICC Submission;
- (f) **Department of Communities** - DCS provided excellent support in both the immediate response phase, and in the recovery phase following the flood event. This support was especially appreciated as it was provided notwithstanding DCS had been made homeless in Ipswich by the flood event and its resources were very thinly stretched across the State.

Assessment of the adequacy and timeliness of emergency response services

229. I have already observed that the major factors impacting on the adequacy and timeliness of the response of State agencies were the extent of the flood event being experienced and the limited resources available. In the case of agencies such as QPS and EMQ, the availability of resources

was also impacted by the terrible events experienced in the Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba on Monday, 10 January 2011.

230. However, in relation to broader systemic issues impacting on the adequacy and timeliness of support, I make the following three comments.
231. Firstly, I consider the effectiveness of the response to a crisis event would be enhanced by a representative of the relevant State agencies being present in the Coordination Centre for the duration of the event. This did not occur during the flood event. Representatives of the various agencies attended at the Hayden Centre for the purpose of Ipswich LDMG meetings, but following the meeting, many then left the Centre to attend to their own issues. This impacted adversely on communications, with consequential delays, as it resulted in communication with relevant agencies having to generally be conducted by telephone.
232. Had representatives of all agencies been permanently available in the Coordination Centre, to be consulted on a "face to face" basis, this would, to my mind, have significantly enhanced the adequacy and timeliness of the response to the flood event. I appreciate however that with limited resources, this may be a goal which is simply not logistically achievable.
233. Secondly, there is a material difference in the geographic areas of responsibility for the various agencies, and their areas of responsibility do not mirror the area for which ICC and the Ipswich LDMG are responsible. For example, the area of responsibility of the local branch of DCS extends as far as Roma and St George. Because of this disharmony in areas of geographic responsibility, there are inevitable competing priorities for agency resources.
234. Thirdly, delays were experienced in the Ipswich LDMG receiving a response to requests for assistance (RFA). The process is that RFAs are issued by myself to the DDC who refers the request to the State. This is a somewhat cumbersome process. An RFA is not issued unless support is needed. However, once a RFA issued, I had considerable difficulty in obtaining information as to who would respond to the RFA and when the response would occur.

235. The practical reality, in the case of Ipswich, is that if the Ipswich LDMG cannot resource a requirement locally, it is highly probable that the Ipswich DDMG, which oversees the Ipswich and Somerset areas, will also be unlikely to have the capability to resource the request, and the request will then be referred to the State.
236. As a means of more effectively addressing this issue:
- (a) I have previously detailed in this statement the benefits which I consider could be gained from the implementation of a fully integrated Statewide common ICT system in "tracking" the current status of RFA's;
 - (b) within Ipswich, our procurement officer is looking to develop a process whereby, at a local authority level, we can directly access the State's procurement processes and contracts so as to support local requirements in a crisis event, thereby side-stepping the Ipswich DDMG in terms of satisfying resource requirements. I have discussed this proposal with the Ipswich District Disaster Coordinator who is not uncomfortable with this initiative, as he recognises the limitations on the ability of the Ipswich DDMG to assist the Ipswich LDMG with its resource requirements during the course of a crisis event. I consider that having in place protocols which would enable local government to directly access the State's procurement processes to assist in meeting resource requirements during a crisis event would be a significant step in enhancing the adequacy and timeliness of such support.
237. Because of these logistical difficulties, the Ipswich LDMG limited its requests for assistance during the flood event, and sought to satisfy as many requirements as possible by accessing local resources.
238. Attached to my statement and marked **ATK-22** are copies of the requests for assistance which were issued by the Ipswich LDMG to the Ipswich DDMG during the course of the flood event.

Topic 16 - Communications within the disaster management hierarchy

239. I am unaware of any directions given by the DDC during the flood event.
240. As LDC, I had no dealings with the State Disaster Coordinator during the course of the flood event. I am aware, however, that Councillor Nardi, as acting Chair of the Ipswich LDMG, and the Ipswich DDC participated in daily conference calls with the State Disaster Coordinator during the course of the flood event. I understand these conference calls to have been in the nature of briefing sessions, in which updates were provided by the Ipswich DDMG and by the Ipswich LDMG.
241. I also had no direct dealings with the State Recovery Coordinator. I did however receive a request from EMQ to provide EMQ with a copy of the Ipswich Local Recovery Plan for forwarding to the State Recovery Coordinator. I provided an initial draft of the recovery plan to EMQ in response to this request. Attached to my statement and marked **AKT-23** is a copy of the current draft ICC Local Recovery Plan.
242. I have previously addressed in Topic 15 some aspects of coordination between the Ipswich DDMG and the Ipswich LDMG, particularly in the context of requests for assistance during an emergency event. I do not repeat those comments in this section of my statement.
243. On 2 March 2011 I participated in a formal debrief of the flood event conducted by the Ipswich DDMG. Annexed to my statement and marked **AKT-24** is a copy of the report produced by the Ipswich DDMG following this debrief.

Topic 17 - The adequacy of equipment and communication systems

244. This statement and the ICC Submission (particularly at paragraphs 8.12, 9.6 and 9.9) have largely addressed the adequacy of equipment and communications systems in the local Ipswich area during the flood event.

245. In the overall circumstances, I assess the adequacy of the equipment and communication systems to have been very good. Ipswich was well prepared for the event, with the Coordination Centre having been established, tested, resourced and fully operational from Friday, 7 January 2011.
246. The ICC call centre operated on a 24/7 basis from the morning of Tuesday, 11 January 2011 for the duration of the flood event.
247. The ICC catchment Alert gauges functioned effectively throughout the duration of the flood event, sending information to the Enviromon system which also operated effectively for the duration of the event.
248. A significant issue in terms of communications support for Ipswich was that the ICC call centre was able to step in to support EMQ when the 132500 SES contact number went down for some hours on Monday, 10 January 2011. EMQ arranged with the telecommunications service provider for calls to this number to be diverted to the ICC call centre. Call centre operators were able to take the details of calls and email these to EMQ so that the SES contact number was able to operate effectively until this problem was rectified.
249. To my mind there were only three negative issues in terms of the adequacy of equipment and communications systems during the flood event:
- (a) as has been previously mentioned, at approximately at 11:00am on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 the ICC website went off line for approximately 2 ½ hours as a result of the high number of hits it was experiencing;
 - (b) there was a software problem with the mapping component of PD Online which made it difficult to bring up maps from links on the ICC website. This issue had been identified by ICC before the flood event, and was rectified on about Thursday, 13 January 2011; and

- (c) as a result of the flooding of the Riverview Depot, some road signage was unavailable to Council during the event.

Topic 18 - The adequacy of the Community response

250. The response by the Ipswich community during the flood event was inspirational. Community behaviours which had a particular impact on me include:

- (a) the extraordinary contribution by volunteers across a range of areas. Volunteer support was particularly significant in:
 - (i) supporting the operation of evacuation centres, being both the ICC evacuation centres and the organic centres;
 - (ii) assisting neighbours with evacuations. Particularly noticeable was the feature that community members who had experienced the 1974 flood event were door knocking neighbours and encouraging them to take steps to evacuate and safe guard their belongings, and assisting their neighbours to do so; and
 - (iii) assisting with the clean-up of the City following the passing of the flood peak.
- (b) the generosity of community members in providing food, clothing, and taking evacuees, in some instances total strangers, into their homes. A feature of the evacuation centres was car load after car load of food, clothing and other necessities being dropped by community members at the evacuation centres;
- (c) supporting, in particular, the isolated organic evacuation centres established in local churches and community centres and assisting fellow community members to be comfortable in that environment.

251. ICC maintained a record of flood related assistance offers received by the Council. As at 1 February 2011 these included:

- 73 donations;
- 1129 registered volunteer offers direct to ICC by telephone;
- 310 registered volunteer offers direct to ICC via website;
- 1104 registered volunteer offers via Volunteer Queensland;
- 81 fee for service approaches;
- 177 various service offers via LGAQ;
- in excess of 30 various offers of services to the Ipswich LDMG via the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

252. The community spirit demonstrated by the Ipswich community in response to the flood event was overwhelming and inspiring.

253. There were certain small elements of the community who did not prepare for the event in the way that the majority of the community prepared, perhaps because they did not appreciate the significance of the event they were facing. An example of this is addressed in the ICC Submission, concerning residents of aged care facilities and nursing homes being left at evacuation centres without proper medication and other medical necessities. The ICC Submission also includes reference to the failure of some community members disregarding road closure signage.

254. However, these examples in no way undermine what was, in totality, the overwhelming goodwill, neighbourly support and encouragement demonstrated by the Ipswich community in its response to the flood event.

Topic 19 - Proposed mitigation measures for future flood events - to be addressed in a supplementary statement.

Topic 20 - Special geographic considerations relevant to Ipswich - to be addressed in a supplementary statement.

Topic 21 - Areas of particular difficulty or which may require practical or legislative change to improve future disaster management in Ipswich - to be addressed in an supplementary statement.

Dated this *6th* day of April 2011


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Anthony Keith Trace