In the matter of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950
Commissions of Inquiry Order (No.1) 2011
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry

WITNESS STATEMENT TO QUEENSLAND FLOODS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
BY WARREN DAY, GOLD COAST CITY LOCAL DISASTER COORDINATOR AND
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[Note that a list of abbreviations used in my statement is attached to the end of this
statement.]

1. I, Warren Day, Gold Coast City Local Disaster Coordinator and Director
   Engineering Services, Gold Coast City Council, in the State of Queensland,
   say as follows in response to a request from the Queensland Floods
   Commission of Inquiry (Refer to Annexure 2), following the Gold Coast City
   Council submission to the Inquiry (Refer to Annexure 1).

Regarding Support From Gold Coast City To Disaster-Affected Communities

2. As the Gold Coast City Local Disaster Coordinator I received, approved and
   provided on behalf of Council substantial support to communities impacted by
   the recent South East Queensland flood disaster.
3. A summary list of the support was provided through regular reports to the councillors of GCCC. The most recent report summarising Council resources deployed is provided for the Inquiry in Annexure 3.

4. While the support provided by GCCC was extensive, in accordance with the request from the Commission of Inquiry my statement focuses on four particular resource deployments. Issues relating to these deployments are explored in further detail later in my statement.

5. These four GCCC resource deployments are:
   A  The provision of 1000 temporary beds in support of evacuation actions in Emerald
   B  The provision of Incident Management Team staff (IMT) to Somerset Regional Council (SRC)
   C  The provision of Call Centre staff to Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC)
   D  The provision of environmental health officers to Hinchinbrook Shire Council (HSC) and competing requests.

6. The following is my understanding of the processes leading to the deployment of these resources.

**Provision of 1000 temporary beds in support of Emerald**

7. On 30 December 2010, Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) participated in the State-wide teleconference, which was conducted by the State Disaster Coordination Group (SDCG).

8. Council was represented in this teleconference by Mr Peter McNamee, Executive Coordinator Disaster Management (ECDM), and Mr Dean Gutteridge, who was acting in my capacity as Gold Coast City Local Disaster Coordinator (LDC) at the time that these resources were deployed.

9. During the teleconference advice was received that there was a shortage of bedding for evacuation centres in Emerald.

10. As part of our own preparedness for disaster events within the Gold Coast area, GCCC holds a cache of 1500 temporary beds and bedding.

11. Given that the Gold Coast was fortunate in that it was not extensively impacted by the storm and flood events, the ECDM contacted the Gold Coast District Disaster Coordinator (GC DDC) during the teleconference to advise that GCCC had 1000 beds in its cache that it could contribute to assist with the Emerald evacuation centres and that I had approved this offer to be made.

12. The offer was made by phone during the teleconference to Supt Paul Ziebarth, Gold Coast District Disaster Coordinator (GC DDC) via Sgt Peter Hellinga, Gold Coast Operations Support Officer (GC OPSO) and with a follow-up email which was sent at 1144 hrs. The email trail of Annexure 4 shows the offer of the beds.
13. The process of making the offer was consistent with the approved Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements, as documented within the training manuals maintained by Emergency Management Queensland. That is, the offer was submitted through the GC DDC for consideration by the State.

14. The GC DDC advised that he would inform the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC) of our offer of assistance and that Council should also advise SDCC of the offer, given the perceived urgency of need. GCCC emailed the SDCC at 1152 hrs of this offer. SDCC acknowledged the offer at 1411 hrs and advised the Rockhampton DDC at 1442 hrs. Annexure 4 also shows the email trail for these advices.

15. At 1615 hrs, SDCC advised Council by email that they wished to accept Council’s offer and acquire the temporary beds and bedding and that they would be shipped by air from Coolangatta Airport the same day by Independent Aviation which operated from the airport. To assist with preparing transport arrangements Council was requested to provide information on dimensions and weight of the cargo. SDCC confirmed the receipt of cargo information at 1857 hrs and confirmed that the bedding was to be delivered to the airport by 2200 hrs and was bound for Emerald. Annexure 5 details these communications.

16. However, as the time was outside normal business hours, Council experienced difficulty in accessing its normal transport providers and requested assistance from SDCC in sourcing suitable contractors. However, SDCC advised that they were also unable to assist and requested Council to keep trying. GCCC ECDM utilised Council’s emergency procurement procedures to engage a transport contractor from Minden, who arrived at Council’s Southport Depot at approximately 2100 hrs, ready for loading of the beds and bedding for transport to the Gold Coast Airport. (At 2319 hrs, the ECDM emailed Council’s Purchasing unit to advise of the emergency procurement to ensure that the contractor could be paid in a timely manner. Annexure 6 is a record of this advice to Council’s Purchasing Unit).

17. While the truck was being loaded, SDCC advised the ECDM that the truck was to be diverted that evening from Coolangatta Airport to Brisbane Airport as the air contractor was unable to carry the beds as planned. The Council-engaged contractor agreed to change the conditions of his service and that he would deliver the beds to Brisbane Airport as requested.

18. At approximately 2230 hrs, the ECDM received a further phone call from SDCC advising that the beds would now leave early the next day (31 December 2010) and requested the transport contractor deliver the beds by the start of business. Again, the contractor agreed with the change.

19. On 31 December 2010 the contractor advised the ECDM that the beds had been delivered to the Brisbane Airport.

20. Upon delivery at the Brisbane Airport, GCCC transferred responsibility for the beds to the State Government. Once the beds became the responsibility of the State, GCCC did not have visibility over how beds were deployed. However, it is my understanding that the beds arrived at the Rockhampton Airport and were to be deployed to Emerald and other areas of need, as determined by the Rockhampton DDC.

21. The beds were returned to Council on 7 February 2011. Mr David Keegan, Department of Public Works, managed the process of return.
22. The partnership demonstrated between GCCC and the State provides an example of how the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements can be utilised to provide support to disaster-affected communities.

Provision of Incident Management Team Staff in support of Somerset Regional Council

23. At 0710 hrs on 12 January 2011, Somerset Regional Council initiated a request for assistance (RFA) for Incident Management Team (IMT) staff to assist with disaster coordination in the local government area. As shown in Annexure 8, the RFA was seeking these staff by start of business the following morning (13 January 2011).

24. As shown in Annexure 9, this request was submitted to the Ipswich DDC by the EMQ Area Director on behalf of the Somerset LDMG at 1753 hrs. The Ipswich DDC subsequently submitted the RFA to the SDCC at 1846 hrs. At 2101 hrs SDCC Logistics referred the request for assistance to the Gold Coast DDC, which was subsequently passed on to Council via the ECDM at 2112 hrs.

25. On receipt of the RFA, the ECDM sought my approval to meet the request, for which approval was granted.

26. The ECDM commenced Council’s process of identifying suitable IMT staff for deployment. As shown in Annexure 10, I was notified at 2254 hrs by the ECDM that suitable IMT staff from within GCCC had been identified and were available for deployment to Somerset Regional Council the following morning.

27. On 13 January 2011 Council despatched four IMT staff at approx 0830 hrs to Somerset Regional Council following their completion of Workplace Health and Safety briefings and collection of equipment and provisions to support the deployment. Due to difficulties experienced with road conditions, the GCCC team arrived at Somerset Regional Council (SRC) later that afternoon and reported to the SRC LDC.

28. The role of the GCCC team was initially to assist Somerset Regional Council with disaster coordination duties, especially planning functions. However, following their arrival on site Ms Naomi Toy (the GCCC Team Leader leading the deployment) reported to ECDM that additional GCCC staff would be required.

29. On the evening of 13 January 2011, I approved an increase in the GCCC contingent to seven staff to work on site at SRC for a period of 7 days (until 21 January 2011) to assist SRC with disaster coordination functions and to assist their council to develop a local IMT capacity. This training involved GCCC staff instructing and mentoring SRC staff on how to perform IMT functions of planning, operations and logistics in a local disaster coordination centre.

30. During the period of deployment a total of 14 GCCC staff were deployed to SRC.

31. On 21 January 2011, the ECDM and I visited SRC to meet with the SRC LDC and to review the performance of the GCCC staff deployed to assist. I was proud of the actions undertaken by our IMT staff.
32. Whilst meeting with the SRC LDC, he expressed his gratitude to Council for releasing our staff to assist their council with both coordination and training in disaster management. During the course of the conversation the SRC LDC explained that it was difficult to find sufficient numbers of staff within his council to undertake disaster coordination functions and that it is difficult to access suitable training.

33. The GCCC deployment ended at 1200 hrs on 21 January 2011.

34. As can be seen in Annexure 11, at 1330 hrs on 21 January 2011, Somerset Regional Council made a subsequent RFA through the Ipswich DDC for two GCCC IMT staff to return to their local area on 24 January to review and check on the progress being made by SRC in performing disaster coordination functions. This request was received by the GCCC ECDM and myself, from the Local Government Association of Queensland Inc (LGAQ) at 1718 hrs, as shown in Annexure 12.

35. Initially it was unclear to me why this RFA was received from the LGAQ rather than through the Gold Coast DDC, as per the State’s Disaster Management Arrangements. To ensure that the DDC was aware of the request, I requested that the ECDM advise the DDC and confirm that it was being considered as part of the State’s disaster management. The ECDM subsequently advised me that the DDC noted and supported the RFA, and I approved the deployment of additional resources to meet the RFA.

36. At 1850 hrs, the ECDM advised LGAQ that GCCC was able to meet the request and that officers would be deployed at the start of business on 24 January 2011. A copy of this advice was sent to the SDCC to ensure that the SDCC was aware of the actions. Annexure 13 shows this advice.

37. On 24 January 2011 two GCCC Officers were despatched to SRC. The ECDM reported to me that the deployed GCCC staff were able to confirm that the SRC staff were performing well in their new disaster management functions.

38. Following Council’s involvement with Somerset Regional Council, I recommend a review of the Disaster Management Act 2003 to determine whether smaller councils should receive support from Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) or other unaffected councils in a structured manner.

**Provision of Call Centre Staff in support of Lockyer Valley Regional Council**

39. On 21 January 2011, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC) LDC submitted a RFA for local government resources through their DDC. As shown in Annexure 14, the RFA provided a list of resources that were needed.

40. Again the RFA was received directly from LGAQ, as shown in the email trail of Annexure 14, which appeared not to be consistent with the approved Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements, as documented in:

A. *Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2010)*, Section 8.3 and Annexure A, which identifies the Department of Public Works as being responsible for the coordination of the logistics framework.

B. *Queensland's Disaster Management Arrangements – Participant Guide (2009)*, which identifies the SDCC as responsible for the coordination of resources (p86).
C  **SEM2016 Local Disaster Coordinator Induction (2010) – Part 1**, which describes Queensland’s disaster management system and the role of disaster coordination centres at all levels to coordinate information, resources and services necessary for disaster operations (p14).

41. The email was received at 1353 hrs on 22 January 2011.

42. As LDC, I requested the ECDM to advise LGAQ that Council had submitted an offer of assistance through the DDC, that this offer was still valid, and to clarify the role of LGAQ in sending the RFA to Council. I further requested the ECDM to advise the GC DDC that the RFA had been received and to confirm with the DDC that this was within the State’s arrangements. The ECDM reported that the DDC confirmed this was the case.

43. Following a review of the RFA by myself and the ECDM and consultation with Council managers, it was identified that GCCC could provide experienced call centre staff to support LVRC, as illustrated in the email trail of Annexure 15. These actions were undertaken on 24 January 2011.

44. On 25 January 2011, two experienced customer contact officers were deployed from GCCC to LVRC. However, as can be seen in statutory declarations made by these officers in Annexure 16, they were advised on arrival at LVRC that the request was nearly a week old. Following advice of this by the GCCC staff, the ECDM reported to me that he made contact with LVRC, in which this was confirmed. The ECDM reported to me that the original need for customer contact staff was determined by LVRC in the period 19-20 January 2011. During the course of the conversation, LVRC advised that, since the deployed GCCC staff were also trained members of the GCCC IMT, they would be useful in the local disaster coordination centre.

45. As a result, I received a request from the ECDM for the deployed Council staff to stay at LVRC to assist with disaster coordination, which I approved.

46. This confusion around the currency of the RFA was communicated to LGAQ at 1448 hrs on 25 January 2011, as shown in Annexure 17. This annexure also documents the reply by LGAQ in which one of their officers notes that there were processing delays around the LVRC RFAs, and states that “Unfortunately your staff were caught in the (understandable) processing lag at LVRC that has occurred over the past few days.”

47. From our involvement with LVRC, it appears that there is a need for further investigation of the process by which the State Disaster Coordination Centre handles RFAs so that the process can be streamlined and made more effective across the State.

Provision of environmental health officers to Hinchinbrook Shire Council (HSC) and competing requests

48. On 9 February 2011, the ECDM informed me that at approx 1700 hrs he had received a telephone call from Hinchinbrook Shire Council (HSC) regarding progress by GCCC in supplying environmental health officers in response to a RFA that HSC submitted on 2 February 2011. The ECDM advised me that, to the best of his knowledge no RFA had been received for these resources, and as a result he stated he would contact the DDC to check this.
49. At 1123 hrs on 10 February 2011, the GC OPSO advised by email that a RFA for environmental health resources had been generated by HSC but it was being managed by the Townsville LDMG and no further requests had been received. Refer to Annexure 19 for details of the email trail documenting this line of inquiry.

50. Following investigations by the Townsville DDC, HSC resubmitted their initial RFA for additional environmental health resources (from GCCC) at 1118 hrs on 10 February 2011. Refer to Annexure 18 for a copy of this RFA.

51. Upon receipt of the RFA (Annexure 18), I approved that the RFA be allocated to Council’s Community Services Directorate. The RFA was received by the Directorate on 11 February 2011, with further advice that the GCCC staff would be required as from 14 February 2011. Refer to Annexure 20 for the email trail outlining these arrangements.

52. I was advised that the GCCC staff departed for HSC on 13 February 2011, ready to commence work on 14 February 2011.

53. Meanwhile, after GCCC staff had been notified of deployments, I received advice from the ECDM that he had received a telephone call from LGAQ enquiring whether GCCC was able to assist LVRC with the supply of environmental health officers. He further advised that he had made contact with Council’s A/Executive Coordinator Environmental Health Services & Policy, to confirm the availability of these resources. However, with the deployment to HSC, advice was received that GCCC would be unable to assist LVRC at this time. Refer to Annexure 21 for an email trail showing this.

54. Again, it appears that the RFA from HSC was delivered through the documented Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements, while the RFA from LVRC was being actioned by LGAQ.

55. This raises the following issues with processing requests for assistance:

A. There is a risk that RFAs involving multiple agencies may only be partially completed, as appeared to be the case of the HSC RFA for GCCC. GCCC didn’t receive the intended RFA until this was followed up by HSC one week later. If this is the case, this risk might be treated by ensuring that RFAs which are destined for multiple agencies are “broken up” into a number of RFAs, with one for each agency that is expected to support the action.

B. The utilisation of LGAQ within the SDCC requires review to ensure seamless operation during a disaster event.

56. Given the importance of having a strategic approach to the deployment of resources across the State during times of disaster, I recommend that the Inquiry further investigate the RFA process and the issues raised above.

Regarding Activation Of Disaster Management Arrangements In Areas Not Impacted Directly By Disasters

57. On 26 December 2010, I approved the activation of the Gold Coast City Local Disaster Management Group in preparation for a series of storms that were threatening the City.

58. Over the period 26 December 2010 – 13 January 2011, the LDMG activation status moved through various activation levels — Alert, Standby and Activate — in response to the changing risk profile.
59. By 13 January 2011, although disaster threats had passed the Gold Coast, I maintained the Gold Coast City LDMG at STAGE 1 – ALERT, to ensure that all agencies were aware that requests for assistance from disaster-affected communities were likely to be received by the Gold Coast and to ensure coordination of these requests in/out of the City. This was explained in SITREP 3 which was distributed to LDMG members at 0618 hrs on 13 January 2011. Refer to Annexure 3 for a copy of this SITREP.

60. Further, in conjunction with LDMG activation, I maintained the activation of the Gold Coast City Disaster Coordination Centre (DCC) to ensure that requests for assistance received through the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements were received, tracked and fulfilled in a timely manner.

61. During this activation of the DCC, the Centre was staffed by Council’s full-time Disaster Management Unit (DMU) staff and when needed, additional staff from other Council work units that are trained to work in the DCC on an as-needed basis. Note that Council maintains a register with a targeted number of 70 trained staff to support the DMU, which is explained later.

62. During the Queensland Flood event, the majority of requests for assistance received were for Council resources as illustrated previously. The Disaster Coordination Centre ensured that these requests were received and allocated to appropriate sections within GCCC and processed in a timely manner in accordance with the CEO-approved process for deploying resources to disaster-affected communities. This process is outlined in Annexure 23. An example of how this process was implemented and coordinated by the Gold Coast Disaster Coordination Centre is provided in Annexure 24. As illustrated in Annexure 3, regular reports summarising the resources requested and provided to disaster-affected communities were provided to the GCCC councillors.

63. The Disaster Coordination Centre was responsible for collating and compiling lists of available resources, and submitting these on my behalf to the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements via the DDC. An example of how this process was implemented is given in Annexure 25 which details a request to Council managers to identify resources that could assist areas in need which were then submitted to the DDC.

64. In addition to managing requests for assistance and offers of assistance, the Disaster Coordination Centre managed many enquiries from Gold Coast residents and visitors about the event per se, the risks to the Gold Coast and how they could assist disaster-affected communities.

65. To assist with managing public inquiries during disasters, Council operates a Disaster Hotline (1800 606 000) and a 15 seat call centre to provide information to the Gold Coast public and to distribute requests for assistance to the appropriate disaster management response agencies. The Hotline and call centre is a critical component of our City’s disaster management arrangements.

66. During the flood event, I approved the activation of the Hotline and the call centre for 14 days, until Monday 24 January 2011. During the initial phases of the event, the Hotline and Call Centre operated for extended periods and transitioned back to normal business hours on 21 January 2011. Refer to SITREP 10 in Annexure 26 for details of this.
67. During the event, the Hotline and call centre received in excess of 1000 calls from the public for information and to offer assistance to disaster-affected communities. Public feedback during these calls was generally positive.

68. As a result of the success of the Hotline and Call Centre, GCCC has resolved to support a motion raised by Cr Ted Shepherd to enhance the use and promotion of the hotline. Refer to Annexure 27 for the detail of the general business item raised by Councillor Shepherd.

69. It is my view that Council’s activation of its disaster management arrangements during the recent event made a positive contribution to the support that my Council could give to disaster-affected communities.

70. However, it should be noted that current guidelines and training doctrine (eg, Introduction to Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements course) appear silent on activating disaster management arrangements for events that occur outside of local boundaries.

71. I believe that this is an issue that should be investigated further to provide better direction in future events.

Regarding resources provided by Gold Coast City Council for Disaster Management

72. In accordance with Section 4A of the Disaster Management Act 2003, GCCC has the primary responsibility for disaster management within the Gold Coast community.

73. To meet this obligation, Council provides substantial resources:

A A Disaster Management Unit, which is located in my Directorate. The Unit is staffed by 5 full-time staff: an Executive Coordinator, a Planning Officer, an Education Officer, a Systems Officer and an Administration Officer.

B A dedicated Disaster Coordination Centre which incorporates:

i A meeting room for the LDMG

ii A coordination room for an Incident Management Team to operationalise decisions of the LDMG

iii A liaison room in which key disaster management agencies can operate during events

iv A redundant communications room for emergency radio contact to emergency services

v A public communications room for staff and media to prepare warning messages and information for distribution to the community

vi The Disaster Hotline and 15 seat Call Centre to deal directly with public enquiries

vii Standby power and a standalone computer network

viii Other facilities to ensure the Centre is able to operate 24/7 for an extended period if necessary.
C To ensure that the Gold Coast DDC has an effective base in which to operate, Council has expanded its Gold Coast City Disaster Coordination Centre to include a District Disaster Coordination Centre. This will ensure best possible communication and coordination between the LDMG and the DDMG.

D Approximately 70 support staff from across Council assist with DCC operations on an as-needed basis. These staff complete a structured program of training and exercising to ensure their competence to operate within the Centre. Details of how these staff are recruited and organised is provided in Annexure 28. Note that their wage costs are paid by the DMU when they are activated for training, exercises and operations.

E A Disaster Management Plan that is consistent with the State’s Strategic Policy Framework and Guidelines.

F A budget of approx $1.71M this financial year to support the above. Annexure 29 provides some detail of the budget allocation.

74. In addition, Council maintains a disaster response capability that potentially incorporates all Council directorates.

75. Council ran an exercise in 2008 which specifically addressed the required level of staffing for the DCC. The post-exercise analysis showed that at least 42 staff were needed to operate the Centre 24/7 for an extended period during times of disaster. GCCC has scaled this figure up to 70, to provide sufficient redundancy.

76. It should be noted that for many years GCCC has had a strong commitment to enhancing the safety of the Gold Coast community and building our local capacity to manage disasters.

77. To effectively meet the obligations of Section 4A of the Act, local government requires substantial resources.

Regarding the provision of disaster management training

78. There is a need for effective disaster management training in Queensland.

79. Whilst the State provides introductory level awareness courses in the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements, this training does not in itself build the capacity of disaster managers to work effectively within disaster coordination centres.

80. Council has augmented State training to ensure that its DMU staff, IMT support staff, myself and my deputy LDCs, member agencies of the LDMG and other disaster response agencies within the City are prepared for disaster events.

81. Council’s DMU has a Disaster Management Training Framework (Annexure 31) and a curriculum for disaster coordination (Annexure 32) for implementation within the Gold Coast.
82. The GCCC disaster management training program is freely available to all disaster management response agencies of the City, within the SEQ Region and elsewhere. These training opportunities are communicated via a Disaster Management Training Calendar to all agencies via the LDMG and DDMG contact lists. Annexure 33 provides an example of the calendar. Note that training positions are allocated on a priority basis with internal needs given top priority.

83. Whilst the Gold Coast Disaster Management Training Program fulfils a need for training, this approach also assists in building interoperability between agencies as they meet together and complete a common curriculum. Annexure 34 is a copy of the Disaster Management Training report, which includes details of numbers of participants in the Gold Coast program and the their agencies.

84. Annexure 35 outlines correspondence I have sent to EMQ regarding the further development of State training for executive officers and the reply received, whilst Annexure 36 provides minutes of Council’s Disaster Management Executive Committee meetings, in which training issues were discussed.

85. To assist EMQ build a State curriculum, Council provided EMQ with a complete set of GCCC training materials, immediately following the 2010 LGAQ Disaster Management Conference at Home Hill.

86. Council regularly receives requests from other agencies (including other local governments) for copies of the Gold Coast curriculum for local adaptation and implementation. Annexure 37 provides examples of such requests.

87. It is my opinion that given the importance of training, EMQ or another State agency should develop a consistent, State-wide disaster management curriculum.

Regarding the need for effective and consistent State coordination of resources during large events

88. There is a need for effective and consistent State coordination of resources during large events, and I have provided examples above that illustrate this need.

89. All systems used must be agreed to and understood by all parties prior to an activation.

90. Moreover, some of the difficulties experienced with the management of logistics and RFAs, and uncertainty surrounding roles of agencies as outlined in the examples above, appear to have been further exacerbated by an inconsistent application of an incident management system at all levels and across all agencies within the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements. While the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) is used within the Gold Coast City Local Disaster Coordination Centre and many of the response and recovery agencies (eg, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service) AIIMS does not appear to have been used universally.
91. The Inquiry should consider recommending implementation of a common incident management system across the State.

Date: 14 April 2011

Warren Day
ABBREVIATIONS

LDC  Local Disaster Coordinator
DMU  Disaster Management Unit
ECDM Executive Coordinator Disaster Management
GCCC Gold Coast City Council
IMT  Incident Management Team
SDCG State Disaster Coordination Group
GCDCC Gold Coast Disaster District Coordinator
GCOPSO Gold Coast Operations Support Officer
SRC  Somerset Regional Council
LVRC Lockyer Valley Regional Council
HSC  Hinchinbrook Shire Council
RFA  Request for Assistance