Rather than go through the whole text I would like to address, I have attached a copy of a couple of forum posts I have written to outline my view/concerns over the way the Wivenhoe Dam was managed leading up to and during the flooding event that affected Ipswich and Brisbane.


The question of whether Wivenhooes holding levels prior to the event and the way it was answered (as per what was published) and being modeled, would have had minimal impact on the damage that was done as a result of the floods. There is no doubt that there would have been areas affected by flooding based on the Toowoomba/Lockyer floods, but the question that needs to be addressed is 'whether the operations of Wiviahoe contributed to the extent of damage that occurred in Ipswich and Brisbane leading up to the final outcome'.

Even though I consider myself knowledgeable in many areas, I am in no way an expert in any hydrology, but I am confident that the example I describe in the attachment, if evaluated by experts, would see merit in my suggestion based on the events that unfolded in that week..the question is how much would it have made a difference? As I don't have the figures involved at my disposal, only your team would be able to say or find out with confidence.

My concern is that these proceedings will be limited to specific guidelines that may not involve possibilities/scenarios outside of what is already stated in the manuals, how-ever I feel strongly that all possible scenarios and possible actions should be considered. That fact that this has occurred once with Wivanhoe in place suggests it can happen again in the future, however the outcome of future events will depend on how it is handled at that time.

The attachments are just a copy of 2 posts that I made on a forum I am a member of that outlines, what I believe would have been a preferred management option of Wivanhoe relating to the event.

Thankyou for your time and allowing me to send you my views on the matter and that the outcome of the sittings can be used to safeguard the citizens of Ipswich and Brisbane from a similar event or a potentially catastrophic event in the future.

Regards

Mr Jasmin (Jason) Sladok

8/02/2011
Great pics posted there.

I guess I will be one of those people to stand up to say the SEQW were very (extremely) lucky their gamble paid off, but would be far from saying they managed Wivenhoe well.

The reasoning behind this statement is as follows:

The rain event that affected inflows into Wivenhoe was also responsible for Toowoomba, and the Lockyer valley flooding. For some 48 hrs they knew that the Lockyer flows were coming and would join Brisbane River below the catchment, yet they did not release maximum flows from Wivenhoe. Only when they realised that maybe Wivenhoe won't hold all the inflows from its own catchments, that they opened all the gates and drained their butt cheeks to hope for the best and save the dam (as well as half of Brisbane if the overflow was breached)...by this stage, the Lockyer levels were already almost merging with the Brisbane River...some 48 hrs after the initial weather event. They opened all the gates and this then joined with the pending lower floods. This definitely impacted on the final flood heights that were reached.

Let's assume for a moment that Wivenhoe wasn't there during this event and held nothing back. The flows from that catchment (because of its close proximity to Brisbane river) would have primarily already travelled down the Brisbane River prior to the flood reaching the Brisbane River. I don't know how best to give a visual presentation on this...maybe a y-shaped gutter with a short length on one side and a long one on the other, you pour a cup of water into each side at the same time, the shorter side will disperse the water before the water from the long side reaches the same point, but if you pour water into the long one then wait before pouring into the shorter length, the two flows combine effectively meaning more volume of water coming out the other end.

In effect, what they did was hold back the water (as the above example) and then release it at the most crucial time which merged with the flood waters.

This event cannot be compared to 74 as the weather event that triggered it is not in the same league and lasted much longer.....There was one controllable variable all along in this case and that was inflows into Brisbane River from Wivenhoe.

They did a great job at the last minute to save the wall and half of Brisbane, only because in the end they had no choice, if they controlled flows the right way to begin with, then they would be worthy of a pat on the back and more people would have their homes and livelihoods still in order.

Post 2

I remember on the radio when the 'inquiry' was first coined. People rieging in saying 'what a waste of money, cant change nature'...if only they knew how close they were to coppering it worse the Grantham because of the way the wivenhoe catchment was managed and decisions that were made.

Just remembered too and wanted to clarify above post...as far as I am aware, the gates at Wivenhoe to discharge into the Brisbane river come into play after consumption capacity exceeds 100% (Dam capacity being 200%). At the time of the rain event it was at 97%, when it reached the flood gates level (and rising rapidly) they should have opened all gates fully, this would still maintain consumption at 100% then they should have backed the outflows off once the Lockyer flood reached the Brisbane river before opening them after the peak passed from the Lockyer, this would have resulted in good operational management of a major facility in a dynamically changing scenario, and levels in the dam wouldn't have reached the levels they did.

The inquiry will be a must, regardless of cost. The management of the facility cannot be managed solely on a 1 or 2 possible scenario basis in a book. All possible models should be examined and evaluated to ensure the best possible outcome when this situation occurs again...they were DAM lucky (pun intended ), it could have been a hell of a lot worse.