

**SUBMISSIONS FOR STATE OF QUEENSLAND****11 MARCH 2011****Queensland Police Service  
(QPS)****Minister**

The Honourable Neil Roberts MP

Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Services

**Director-General**

Commissioner Robert (Bob) Atkinson

**A. Key Functions and Role of Department**

The QPS is the primary law enforcement agency for State of Queensland. The functions of the QPS are stated in s.2.3 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*. The major functions of the QPS are the preservation of peace and good order and the prevention and detection of crime. Due to the inherent nature of policing and the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions, the QPS has a multitude of effects that may impact upon members of the community. These effects are varied and include the exercise of police powers to arrest, summons, caution, detain, fingerprint, search, and apply for a medical examination (including the taking of blood samples). These powers are exercised by police under a number of different statutes and provide a mechanism for police to uphold the law.

The people of Queensland, like most societies, have an expectation of a safe and ordered lifestyle and the QPS seeks to uphold that expectation. The fundamental functions of police at times of natural disasters is the provision of services and the rendering of help reasonably sought in an emergency or otherwise, as required of officers under any Act or law or the reasonable expectations of the community. To

achieve its role the QPS actively cultivates relationships with other law-enforcement agencies/jurisdictions, government agencies at all levels, private industry, not-for-profit organisations and the community generally. In particular our relationships with the Queensland Department of Community Safety, the Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (which is responsible for Australian and regional emergency management in a national security context) are considered fundamental partnerships for the QPS.

The all hazards philosophy to national security and disaster management across all jurisdictions in Australia, underpins the QPS approach to disaster events.

## **B. Departmental Structure and Operation**

### **Structure**

The QPS is a multi-tiered, hierarchical organisation with the Commissioner of Police fulfilling, in effect, the role of the 'Chief Executive Officer'. Pursuant to s.4.8 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*, the Commissioner is responsible for the efficient and proper administration, management and functioning of the QPS in accordance with law. Section 4.8(2)(b) of this Act provides that the Commissioner of Police is responsible for the "determination of the appropriate organisational structure of the department".

In line with this responsibility, the Commissioner has issued a number of Executive Directions defining the organisational structure of the QPS. The Organisational Chart depicts the current structure of the QPS. A copy of the Organisation Chart is attached and marked 'QPS-1'.

Policing services are provided to the Queensland community through eight geographical regions which deal with operational and community policing issues in their areas. A copy of the Regional Map is attached and marked 'QPS-2'. The regions are supported by three state-wide commands that focus on criminal activities and networks, providing specialist operational resources, and ensuring professional practice and ethical behaviour. Additionally, the corporate service functions of, administration, finance, human resources, media and public affairs, and information



and communications technology are housed centrally in Brisbane and also provide state-wide whole-of-service support to the regions.

## **Corporate Governance**

High level, whole-of-service decision making is the responsibility of the Commissioner who is supported in this undertaking by the QPS corporate governance framework. There are two main areas to corporate governance within the QPS:

- Senior Executive Conference - governs mid to long-term planning and determines strategic direction; and
- Board of Management - governs short term planning and monitors the implementation of governance portfolio annual plans.

Both the Senior Executive Conference and Board of Management are supported by a number of governance committees aligned to particular governance portfolios within the QPS. A copy of the QPS Corporate Governance Hierarchy Chart is attached and marked 'QPS-3'.

## **Operational Decision Making**

At an 'operational level', the QPS decision making process is a dynamic and fluid one that is essentially interdependent on the scale and circumstances of an incident.

Pursuant to s.7.1 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*, the responsibility of police command vests in the police officer designated in accordance with established administrative arrangements (such as pursuant to structural frameworks established under the DM Act) or alternatively, the officer present at an incident who is 'most senior by rank'. This decision making process can also be described as the QPS 'chain of command' and is essentially determined by rank or seniority.

Simply put, as police first respond to an incident, the senior police officer present is in command and is responsible for determining the initial actions of police. As the incident escalates, command and the responsibility for decisions progressively transfers to higher ranking officers as they arrive at the incident site, such as a District Duty Officer (ordinarily, an officer at the rank of Senior Sergeant) through to the Regional Duty Officer (ordinarily, an 'operational commissioned officer' at the rank

of Inspector). If the scale of the incident warrants it, the QPS will initiate and staff a 'Police Forward Command Post' that may ultimately be further supported by a 'Major Incident Room' and/or a 'Police Operations Centre'. Progressively, more senior commissioned officers take command and control as an incident's magnitude or significance increases.

The QPS response to and management of incidents may vary depending upon whether it is the 'lead agency' or whether it is 'coordinating' a multi-agency response. At incidents involving a multi-agency response, the role of the QPS is one of coordination and each agency responding to the incident is responsible for its own command structure and operates within the parameters of the relevant legislation. It should be noted that the QPS does not generally command personnel from other agencies at incidents.

In a number of circumstances, the QPS as well as having a coordinating role, has specific authority to authorise, direct and control other agencies. Relevantly by way of example, when a disaster situation is declared, the District Disaster Coordinator, may authorise an ambulance officer, a fire officer, a health officer or other person to exercise declared disaster powers (see s.75: 'Authorisation for disaster situation' of the DM Act).

Irrespective of the identity of the lead agency, the QPS implements and adapts the 'Incident Command' structure to the specific type of incident to which it is responding (pursuant to s.1.13 of its Operational Procedures Manual - 'Incident command'). A copy of s.1.13 of the Operational Procedures Manual is attached and marked '**QPS-4**'.

Specifically regarding 'Disaster Management', the decision making structure incorporates additional roles and functions that are established by the DM Act. In effect this structure supplements the pre-existing operational decision making process and provides high-level support and guidance to the operational officers that are at the frontline of an incident. This ensures a coordinated approach to incident response and management.

The responsibilities and functions of these additional roles are further addressed below.

### **C. Specific Responsibilities under the Disaster Management Act 2003 and Other Relevant Legislation**

The broad general framework regarding ‘responsibility’ can be described as a multifaceted system with dual interrelated chains of command. The ‘normal’ (legislated within the *Police Service Administration Act* 1990) chain of command structure remains in place at all times. However, during a disaster such as a flood event, another chain of command is enlivened under the DM Act and exists symbiotically alongside the existing chain of command.

This second chain of command flows from the State Disaster Coordinator’s role to the DDCs and taps into the existing chain of command in terms of the use of or requirement for police resources. Ultimately the QPS responds to the event under the umbrella of the various disaster-related powers and through the use of the existing legislative authorities, functions and powers, including such Acts as the:

- *Police Service Administration Act* 1990
- *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act* 2000
- Various Transport Acts; and
- Criminal legislation.

This enables the incident management and other skills that all police are trained in to be directed towards disaster operations during an event.

Changes to the DM Act were enacted in late 2010 with the rationale of vesting the QPS with “primary responsibility for coordinating disaster operations at the state and district levels” (Hansard, 2nd reading speech, 8 June 2010, pp. 1858 – 1860). This is achieved through the creation of the role of the State Disaster Coordinator, who would in most cases, depending on the nature of the disaster, be a senior executive police officer. As well, the aim is achieved through “providing that chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of district disaster management groups will be appointed by the

Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service rather than the Governor in Council; providing that the executive officer in a district disaster management group will be a person appointed by the Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service” (Hansard, 2nd reading speech, 8 June 2010, pp. 1858 – 1860).

The QPS performs its disaster management role in partnership with other agencies. Police involved in disaster management functions or roles are still acting in the office of constable and as such still exercise police powers. There is significant cross-over in this regard primarily due to the nature of police powers being so well suited to emergency situations. An example is the flooded road scenario. A police officer may divert traffic where a road is flooded utilising the disaster management powers contained in the DM Act (provided a declaration is in place) or under Transport legislation. Police core business is generally not incompatible with the exercise of disaster management powers. Another example is where police were deployed to evacuation centres during the flood events in order to keep the peace, another day-to-day core police function recognised under the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act* 2000.

### **Disaster Management Act 2003**

Key roles fulfilled and powers exercised by police officers under the Act may be conveniently summarised as follows:

#### **Roles**

- S.21 – The Commissioner of Police must appoint an executive officer of the State Disaster Management Group (State Group);
- S.21A - the Executive officer is to provide support as directed by the Chair to help the State Group perform its functions;
- S.21B – the Chairperson of the State Group may if necessary appoint a State Disaster Coordinator. The Chair must consult with the Commissioner of Police before making the appointment. The State Disaster Coordinator will generally be of the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police (or higher) but a senior public official may also be appointed having regard to the nature of the disaster;
- S.21C – the functions of the State Disaster Coordinator are to coordinate the disaster response operations for the State Group, to report regularly to the State

Group, and to ensure that any strategic decisions of the State Group are implemented as well as to provide strategic advice;

- S.25(1) – The Commissioner of Police must appoint a person as the Chair of a District Group and a person as the Deputy Chair of a District Group;
- S.25A – Chair of a District Group is also the District Disaster Coordinator; and
- S.27 – The Commissioner of Police must appoint an executive officer of the District Group.

### **Declarations**

- S.64 – A District Disaster Coordinator may make a disaster declaration in relation to a disaster district or part of it with the approval of the Minister.

### **Powers**

- S.75 – persons may be authorised by the Chair of the State Group or a relevant District Disaster Coordinator to exercised declared disaster powers;
- S.77 – a District Disaster Coordinator (or relevant declared disaster officer – which is defined as a police officer or a person authorised) has broad general powers, including power to: control the movements of people; stock and vehicles; give directions; evacuate people; enter places; and to remove, demolish or destroy certain property;
- S.78 – a District Disaster Coordinator (or relevant declared disaster officer) has the power to give directions about property; and
- S.110 – Authorising persons to exercise rescue powers.

### **Relevant QPS Policy Documents and Manuals**

The roles of police officers under the DM Act provisions are reflected in a number of policy documents that are operationally relied upon by the QPS. Commissioner's Circular 22/10 dated 1/11/2010 details amendments to the relevant sections of the Operational Procedures Manual, namely ss.17.2, 17.3 and appendix 17.22 that relate to disaster and emergency management and reflects the changes made to the *DM Act that came into effect on the 1<sup>st</sup> of November 2010*. A copy of Commissioner's Circular 22/10 is attached and marked 'QPS-5'.

The Commissioner's Circular is electronically published on a state-wide basis to notify all personnel of the changes in the DM Act and the alterations affecting disaster and emergency management practices and procedures. In practice, the Commissioner's Circular pre-empts the actual changes to the Operational Procedures Manual which are ordinarily incorporated into the Operational Procedures Manual as part of routine revision.

### **Negotiated agreements/arrangements with Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ)**

The State Disaster Coordination Group coordinates the implementation of the State Disaster Management Group's legislative responsibilities for the purpose of facilitating disaster management preparedness and response outcomes for Queensland communities. As a State level working body of the State Disaster Management Group, the State Disaster Coordination Group is a focal point for the development and implementation of comprehensive disaster management plans for Queensland. During a disaster event the State Disaster Coordination Group member agencies have a responsibility for ensuring a suitably qualified officer is available to represent the agency in a Liaison Officer role, as required.

An agreement concluded prior to the start of the 2010/2011 flood events between the QPS and EMQ resulted in a 'joint chairing' arrangement of the State Disaster Coordination Group. It was agreed that EMQ would chair the Group for ordinary business meetings (8 per year) and to provide secretariat support, whilst the QPS would chair the Group for disaster response activities. During the recent response phase a senior police officer facilitated daily meetings in the form of a teleconference with each agency and the relevant District Disaster Coordinators.

The State Disaster Coordination Centre supports the State Disaster Management Group and provides an operational venue for the State Disaster Coordination Group to provide State level support to disaster management operations in accordance with the decisions of the State Disaster Management Group. The State Disaster Coordination Centre also ensures information about an event and disaster operations are communicated to all involved. Operations in the State Disaster Coordination Centre

are determined by the scale of the incident/event.

EMQ are responsible for staffing the relevant support cells (Planning, Logistics, Intelligence, and Operations) to operate the State Disaster Coordination Centre. During the recent flood event, a number of QPS officers were embedded in these cells to assist. This proved highly effective in many ways, from simple problem solving through to inter-agency communication.

## **D. Preparedness for Flooding Events Generally**

### **General Training**

The QPS is committed to having a law enforcement service that is responsive to the needs of the community. This includes the preservation of public stability through the maintenance of peace, order and safety in dealing with planned and unplanned events and incidents. The QPS recognises the need for its members to possess the ability to effect command, control and coordination of a diverse range of events. The QPS has the responsibility of creating a law enforcement organisation that is fully accountable, well-managed and characterised by the professionalism of its members. One strategy for achieving this goal is to ensure members of the Service are supported through the provision of education and practical training.

As a preliminary point, it must be acknowledged that police officers receive a vast and diverse range of education and training that adheres to the continuous improvement philosophy. The training is ongoing and ever-present and effectively builds on the operational experiences gained through an individual officer's years of service. The refined knowledge, skills and decisive decision making processes that form the basis of the QPS' robust incident management framework equally apply to all incident types, including flood events. It is this broad and diverse 'skills set' within its personnel that arguably is the QPS strongest asset and resultantly, it enables the QPS to effectively respond to large scale natural disasters.

By way of a brief overview, the skill sets of an individual officer are developed and honed over time with training commencing with the 'Initial Service Program' that equips new police recruits with the necessary knowledge and skills to be sworn in as a



Constable of Police and to effectively perform their duties in response to a wide variety of incident types. Following graduation from the Police Academy, they perform their first year 'on the job practical training' under the direct supervision of 'mentors' who are experienced operational officers. The mentor program in effect allows for the collaboration and sharing of knowledge and experience. 'First Year Constables' are required to successfully complete this year long program to confirm their appointment in the QPS.

This 'base knowledge' is then added to by the requirement for police officers to complete 100 'Competency Acquisition Program' points each year to enable progression to the next pay level within the various non-commissioned ranks (in addition to other requirements). Competency Acquisition Program books vary in 'points value' and provide training on a variety of topics within 'core training categories' and officers select Competency Acquisition Program books relevant to their area of operation or relevant to their specific functions and duties.

Relevant to this submission, the Competency Acquisition Program provides specific training on:

- Evacuation;
- Hazardous Materials;
- Fundamentals of Incident Management;
- Fundamentals of Disaster Management; and
- Briefings and Debriefings.

Furthermore, to progress from the rank of constable to senior constable, officers are required to complete the 'Constable Development Program'. The Constable Development Program is a three year program that constables may undertake when they have successfully completed the First Year Constable Program. The Constable Development Program is specifically designed to provide constables with the opportunity to develop skills, knowledge and behaviours in preparation for promotion to the rank of Senior Constable. Significantly, the Constable Development Program provides specific training for 'Operational Supervision and Leadership' and 'Managing Incidents'.



Progression from Senior Constable through to Inspector requires the completion of three separate levels of the 'Management Development Program'. Eligibility for each is determined by the substantive rank of the applicant and in effect, upon promotion, additional levels of training become available. Relevantly, 'Incident Management' and 'Leadership Skills' are key competencies for the Management Development Program.

Essentially, these programs are encapsulated within the Senior Leadership and Professional Development Program, which provides state-wide education and training to police and staff members up to the rank/level of Senior Sergeant / AO5 (or equivalent). This Program is coordinated by the 'Supervisor Development Unit' whose mission is to *'enhance the capability of the QPS' supervisors through the provision of high quality innovative and operationally relevant education and training'*.

For Commissioned and Senior Executive Officers, specifically those within the ranks of Inspector, Superintendent, Chief Superintendent and Assistant Commissioner, a variety of internal and external training courses and conferences are available to develop the skills and knowledge of the QPS' senior police officers. These include the National Security Conference, courses at the Australian Emergency Management Institute at Mt Macedon and courses conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The focus of these courses and conferences is on leadership and decision making and relevantly, 'Incident Command'. Incident Command is crucial to the management of all incident types, including disasters such as flood events.

The QPS has a world class 'Command and Control Course' that is the product of extensive research conducted with operational managers and through the review of operational incidents. Research and reviews indicated the need for a defined 'Incident Command System' and a distinct approach to training. This training need was also linked to ensuring the safety of personnel and the legal risk to which the QPS may be exposed if Police Forward Commanders were not adequately trained to manage operations/incidents for which the QPS has responsibility.

The Command and Control Course prepares and enables participants to effectively plan and command incidents in compliance with legislation and operational procedures in such a way as to maximise the safety of all persons involved in or affected by an incident. This course also provides incident commanders with training and practice in accordance with the recommendations of the Australasian Centre for Policing Research.

The theoretical foundation of the Command and Control Course is to improve incident command skills by:

- Defining those skills that make a police commander effective; and
- Providing commanders with expertise to 'assess' dynamic situations and use that assessment as a basis for informed decision-making.

An example of the strategies adopted by the Command and Control Course to boost decision-making is to provide learning experiences so police commanders can:

- Develop situational awareness;
- Project future states (evaluate courses of action) and explain what has occurred;
- improvise; and
- Adapt to unfamiliar events.

Overall strategies of the Command and Control Course are to allow participants the opportunities to:

- Engage in deliberate practice;
- Consider alternative resolution strategies;
- Provide feedback that is accurate, diagnostic and timely; and
- Engage in experiential learning.

Accumulated corporate knowledge together with the individual members' operational experiences, skills, abilities and knowledge combine with the broad training and development programs offered within the QPS to ensure that the QPS effectively manages any given incident. These traits are invaluable in preparing for and responding to disaster events.

## **Business Continuity Plans**

The term 'business continuity' means maintaining the uninterrupted availability of all key assets and business processes required to support core service delivery consistent with the Queensland Police Service Strategic Plan. Section 15.8 of the Operational Procedures Manual provides for the QPS business continuity considerations as part of the organisation's ongoing risk management planning.

Business continuity risks are identified and addressed by officers in charge, managers and supervisors of units in their 'Risk Management Plan'. This ensures a minimum consistent level of readiness throughout the QPS. These risks are viewed from a worst-case scenario perspective (i.e. a total loss of a resource, asset or system). Planning for worst case scenarios assists the QPS in responding to all incidents.

In practice, officers in charge or managers of units are required to assess their work areas and determine the extent to which they provide or support core service delivery. If a manager determines that the inability to perform their function for a period of 2-4 weeks after a disruptive event, would have no impact on core service delivery or no impact to any other area of the Service charged with such core service delivery, then that manager or officer in charge can record a 'nil Business Continuity Plan required' within the risk management plan.

Business Continuity Plans follow the template outlined in the Business Continuity Plan Handbook and Template (appendix 15.8 of the Operational Procedures Manual).

Officers in charge and managers are required to ensure that their work unit's risk management plan includes suitable risk treatments against at least, the following core service delivery business continuity risks:

- Loss of use of accommodation;
- Loss of energy;
- Loss of information technology/communications (phone/radio/computer network);
- Loss of staff; or

- Loss of transport (where appropriate to the work unit).

Additionally, officers in charge and managers are required to identify other specific resources, assets or systems critical to their ability to deliver core business services. They are to develop a Business Continuity Plan to deal with the loss of key assets or business systems. Risk treatments are to be included in the mandatory Business Continuity section of the risk management plans.

Furthermore, wherever practicable, officers in charge and managers are required to test identified risk treatment strategies for all core service delivery business continuity risks identified in their risk management plans at least once every twelve months.

The QPS recognises the significance of a Business Continuity Plan in preparing for and minimising potential risks relevant to a natural disaster such as a flood event and consequently, a Business Continuity Plan is a mandatory requirement for all stations and units within the risk management framework. The effectiveness of QPS Business Continuity Plans are being assessed.

### **Preparedness for Disaster Events Generally**

In addition to the broad training, Business Continuity Plans and risk management processes outlined above, the QPS has undertaken the following relevant activities in preparation for flood events generally:

- Preparation of District Disaster Management Plans in consultation with other key agencies and in compliance with the DM Act;
- Various training exercises over time at local, district and state levels that often involve a 'disaster management' or 'consequence management' component. Relevantly, the core principles of command and control remain the same regardless of whether the exercise scenario is a flood or other large scale natural disaster, or alternatively a significant event such as a large scale terrorism incident;
- The QPS conducts post-exercise comparative analysis of the predetermined objectives to the exercise outcomes to determine the validity of response practices and procedures and to identify areas within the QPS that require additional

training or resources; and

- Specifically relevant to weather events, a collaborative assessment of potential summer issues has been conducted annually since 2006. The QPS and other Queensland Government agencies report on their departmental summer issues at the CEO Leadership Team Meeting around November of each year. The various departments identify risks and their mitigation strategies for those risks. Summer storms and wild weather are standing agenda items for these meetings. Additionally, a Cabinet Submission was prepared to inform Cabinet about the matters raised in the whole-of-government assessment pertaining to the 'Schedule of Summer Issues'. This allows for multi-agency awareness regarding each department's risks and mitigation strategies and enhances the whole-of-government cooperative and collaborative approach to the summer storms risk assessments and planning.

## **E. Preparation and Response to 2010/2011 Flood Events**

### **Early Severe Weather Forecasts**

The BOM issued severe weather forecasts in the later part of 2010 specifically in reference to the La Niña event which had dominated the Australian climate for the six months preceding the flood event. The BOM forecasted severe weather patterns not dissimilar to weather events of 1974 and in particular, forecasted a likelihood of an increase in tropical cyclones. Cyclone numbers are typically higher than normal during the November to April period, with February and March the peak. Resultantly, the Eastern region was expected to experience a higher than average number of tropical cyclones, with about 6-7 tropical cyclones being forecast (the average value is 4 tropical cyclones).

In early November 2010 as a result of the BOM forecasts, the Queensland Government held a 'CEO Leadership Team Meeting' involving the Directors-General of all departments to specifically identify strategies for the severe weather predictions. The Commissioner attended this meeting for the QPS.

On 8 November 2010, the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) forwarded a memorandum to the eight regional Assistant Commissioners across the State and

provided an update on the advice from BOM.

The forecast of severe weather events coincided with the amendments to the DM Act and as a result the QPS conducted extensive training throughout Queensland (identified further under the relevant regional responses below) to support the role of the District Disaster Coordinators. This included the training of 59 Executive Officers to support the District Disaster Coordinators and the appointment of 13 temporary positions at the rank of Sergeant to assist in this role.

A number of meetings were held between the QPS and EMQ at the Kedron Park facility to ensure procedures between various agencies were understood and key relationships were established. This was facilitated by the QPS Operations Support Command and in particular by the co-chair of the State Disaster Coordination Group, Chief Superintendent Alistair Dawson who was supported by Assistant Commissioners Pointing and Henderson. This also included a number of discussion exercises developed by EMQ and held on 30 November 2010.

### **QPS Response – State Disaster Coordinator**

On 24 December 2010, the State Disaster Coordinator (SDC) Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart was appointed and began operations as the SDC at EMQ's facilities at Kedron Park.

As a result, a number of experienced officers from Operations Support Command were identified to support the State Disaster Coordinator and the chair of the State Disaster Coordination Group, providing advice and assistance in terms of coordination with other agencies and operating in a consultative manner as required under the DM Act.

Initially the roles of staff attached to the State Disaster Coordination Centre were in a support role to the State Disaster Coordination Group, however, it was quickly identified that a more structured approach was essential similar to the manner in which major incidents are currently managed within the QPS. This led to staff being designated within 'specific cells' including: secretariat; operational; logistical; and

planning. These cells have defined structure and functionality.

A copy of the 'QPS Support Structure to the State Disaster Executives' chart is attached and marked 'QPS-6'.

Rosters for staff were managed by staff from Operations Support Command and coordinated the appropriate rotation of staff to ensure consistency and manage fatigue. The scale of the flood emergency placed heavy demands on QPS personnel deployed to the State Disaster Coordination Centre and a need for a cadre of appropriately experienced officers who can be called upon at short notice to provide relief and support was identified. Subsequently, Deputy Commissioner Barnett arranged for approximately 100 police at the ranks of Inspector, Senior Sergeant and Sergeant from across South-East Queensland able to perform roles in the Centre.

Rosters were developed to allow for the 'shadowing' of officers not already trained in disaster management to work with the more experienced police working in the State Disaster Coordination Centre to ensure that consistency is maintained. This will be extended if necessary to ensure that a cadre of officers including administrative assistants can be called upon at short notice to undertake these duties.

### **QPS Support to the State Disaster Coordination Centre**

Senior Police Executives of the rank of Assistant Commissioner and Chief Superintendent were present at the State Disaster Coordination Centre for extended periods of time. These officers were supported by a team of QPS support staff. Initially the role of police was to support the State Disaster Coordination Group. However, as the events spread through Queensland a larger contingent of QPS members were deployed within the SDCC. Members were embedded into specific cells including secretariat, logistical/planning and intelligence. Officers maintained a presence within the intelligence cell on a 24 hour basis. This enhanced the ability to communicate easily with DDCs and DDMG Executive Officers which enabled the efficient gathering of intelligence. Officers deployed were generally experienced in search and rescue. A commissioned officer was initially present until midnight each shift, with the commissioned officer being present on a 24 hour basis during the more

critical periods of the weather events. The commissioned officer presence provided a direct physical representative of the QPS who liaised with EMQ staff to provide QPS advices. Throughout these events, the QPS continually assessed the needs of the SDCC and were able to respond by increasing support at any stage.

### **QPS Policing Priorities**

While responding to any incident including a disaster event, the QPS prioritises the allocation of its available human and physical resources based upon the following:

- Preservation of life;
- Maintenance of law and order;
- Protection of property; and
- Effective traffic management.

### **Brief Précis of 'Preparation and Response' - Per Relevant Police Region**

It must be noted that a number of Districts throughout the State are still in recovery mode following the flood events and police resources are still operationally deployed in those areas. In addition to the 2010/2011 flood event, officers and resources have been deployed to North Queensland to aid in the response and recovery following Cyclone Yasi. As a result information is still being identified and collated. Consequently, the following overview of the QPS response is preliminary and only represents a snapshot of significant events.

It should also be noted that the QPS response to flood related incidents was in addition to its day-to-day core functions and calls for service across the State.

For ease of reference, the following overview is structured by reference to police region/district and provides a chronology of events where relevant. The below information is based on interim data that is still being collated and no inferences should be drawn where the responses lack detail or are silent.



## Central Region

Mackay's preparation and response:

- 8 November 2010 – a QPS non-commissioned officer appointed as Executive Officer to the Mackay District Disaster Management Group;
- Executive Officer (Senior Sergeant Grace) and Operations Officer (Senior Sergeant Purcell) attended a 2 day course on 19 and 21 Oct 2010 conducted by the QPS Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch;
- EMQ also facilitated a number of workshops for Local Disaster Management Groups at around this time including:
  - Pre-season workshop;
  - Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements Workshop; and
  - Introduction to Qld Disaster Arrangements;
- Local Government training was also undertaken which included the implementation of the Guardian Disaster Management software; and
- Mackay District Disaster Management Group was due to review the District Disaster Management Plan; however, the severe weather events resulted in a postponement of this review process.

Gladstone's preparation and response:

- 8 November 2010 – a QPS non-commissioned officer appointed as Executive Officer to the Gladstone District Disaster Management Group;
- Gladstone Local Disaster Management Group review of local plans approved by Gladstone Council 16 November 2010;
- Gladstone District Disaster Management Group was scheduled to review plans but for the interruption of the recent event;
- Executive Officer (Sergeant Beckitt) and Deputy District Disaster Coordinator (Acting Inspector Dixon) attended a 2 day course on 19 to 21 October 2010 conducted by the QPS Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch;
- EMQ also facilitated a number of workshops attended by Gladstone Disaster management officers for the Local Disaster Management Group at around this time (as outlined above for Mackay);
- Approximately 13 Gladstone staff were trained in information and familiarity

- courses with regard to the Gladstone Disaster Coordination Centre;
- QPS and EMQ facilitated tsunami training and disaster management planning workshops during the relevant period;
- The “Enhance your preparedness for the Cyclone and Flood Season” information session was held in Gladstone on 13 October 2010 by EMQ; and
- Local Government training was also undertaken which included the implementation of the Guardian Disaster Management software.

Longreach’s preparation and response:

- 2 day training workshop at Townsville 18 to 19 October 2010 on the DM Act and the requirements of police in an emergency was attended by Longreach District Disaster Coordinator, Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer.

Rockhampton’s preparation and response:

- A number of District Disaster Management Group meetings were held in late 2010 – the focus was on strengthening relationships and networks between agencies and ensuring the appropriate representatives with the required authority were part of the District Disaster Management Group. Feedback has indicated that this established high level trust during the events and consequently the information flow was excellent and assisted members to perform their roles to a high standard;
- The need for a formal review of the plan was identified at the November 2010 meeting – however the review was delayed by the impact of the disaster;
- It was identified that the BOM advice allowed the District Disaster Management Group to implement pre-planning in the meetings prior to the event to excellent affect and contributed to the success of the response;
- District Disaster Coordinator (Acting Superintendent Peff), Executive Officer (Senior Sergeant Martin) and Operations Officer (Sergeant Cookson) attended a 2 day Disaster Management Arrangements – District Operations course conducted by the QPS Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch on 19 and 21 October 2010;
- EMQ also facilitated a number of workshops attended by Rockhampton Disaster Management officers for the Local Disaster Management Group at around this

time;

- Other training included:
  - Bushfire Assistance by Local Government (QRFS Rural Operations); and
  - Local Government training on the implementation of the Guardian Disaster Management software;
- The “Enhance your preparedness for the Cyclone and Flood Season” held in Rockhampton on 14 October 2010 by EMQ was attended by representatives from the District Disaster and Local Disaster Management Groups;
- Presentation was provided by Joint Operations Support Staff North Queensland at the November District Disaster Management Group meeting as well as an updated forecast presentation by BOM; and
- An induction checklist was prepared for all new District Disaster Management Group members.

Since 28 December 2010, Central Region has been supported by additional police personnel sourced from other regions and commands that were not directly affected by the flood events. The below listed stations received the following additional personnel in support of their local operations:

• Emerald	77
• Rockhampton	230
• Gladstone	8
• Theodore	19
• Moura	4
• Alpha	4
• Jericho	3
• Barcaldine	4
• Woorabinda	17
• Blackwater	2
• Mackay	1
• Total:	369 as at 21 January 2011.

## **Southern Region**

Roma's preparation and response:

- District Support Officer (Sergeant McKee) completed Executive Officer Disaster Management training late October 2010 as part of the response to changes in the DM Act;
- The Roma District was supported from a State level prior to the events with the supply of additional resources (officers) being placed in Surat, St George and Dirranbandi well before the flood water arrived;
- Regular consultation between the District Disaster Management Group and the Local Disaster Management Group occurred to ensure community safety and that plans were in place should entire towns be required to be evacuated; and
- Navy Sea-King air support was placed on standby from Roma and air support from Roma was placed in St George to cover the southern end of that District.

Warwick and Charleville's preparation and response:

- Information is still being collated and is yet to be finalised.

Toowoomba's preparation and response:

- Information is still being collated and is yet to be finalised;
- Given the significance of the events in Toowoomba and surrounding communities, some details of Toowoomba's response are provided under 'State Overview' below;
- Australian Defence Force support placed on 24 hour on-call on 10 January 2011;
- Assessments made of helicopter support available on 10 January 2011; and
- Air support (2 helicopters) brought in from NSW on 10 January 2011.

Since 2 January 2011, Southern Region has been supported by additional police personnel sourced from other regions and commands that were not directly affected by the flood events. The below listed stations received the following additional personnel in support of their local operations:

- Gatton 2
- Toowoomba 93

• Grantham	173
• Calvert	6
• Murphy's Creek	39
• Withcott	4
• Chinchilla	2
• Dalby	2
• Dirranbandi	2
• Roma	4
• St George	25
• Total:	352 as at 21 January 2011.

Ipswich's preparation and response:

- The District Disaster Coordinator, Executive Officer and one Deputy Executive Officer attended training at Police Headquarters in Brisbane on 19 July 2010 regarding awareness training for the upcoming DM Act changes;
- The Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer attended the Executive Officer Seminar at the QPS Academy at Oxley on 26 and 27 October 2010;
- The Deputy District Disaster Coordinator, Executive Officer and one Deputy Executive Officer also attended the South East Queensland Flooding Seminar on 15 December 2010;
- Training of 8 coordination centre staff in the 'Introduction to Disaster Management and Introduction to Disaster Coordination Centre operations' was conducted by EMQ and QPS staff on 22 December 2010; and
- Through 2009 and 2010 the Executive Officer has completed subjects through the Australian Emergency Management Institute at Mt Macedon and completed the Advanced Diploma in Public Safety (Emergency Management).

Since 11 January 2011, Ipswich District has been supported by additional police personnel sourced from other regions and commands that were not directly affected by the flood events. The below listed stations received the following additional personnel in support of their local operations:

• Ipswich	110
• Yamanto	5

- Total: 115 as at 21 January 2011.

### **North Coast Region**

Bundaberg's preparation and response:

- Information is still being collated and is yet to be finalised.

Maryborough's preparation and response:

- The District Disaster Coordinator (Superintendent Wardrope) has extensive past training in Emergency Coordination and was previously the District Disaster Coordinator at Innisfail during 'Cyclone Larry';
- The Executive Officer (Sergeant Behne) had completed Emergency Management courses during 2008 and 2009 and had attended the District Disaster Management Group Executive Officer courses at the QPS Academy in October 2010;
- EMQ facilitated a number of training courses over the previous 12 months including:
  - Establishment of District Recovery Centres;
  - Introduction to Qld Disaster Arrangements; and
  - Preparing for Cyclone Events.
- Other training included:
  - Bushfire Assistance by Local Governments (QFRS Rural Operations); and
  - Presentation on the Fraser Coast Regional Council Evacuation Plan.

Gympie's preparation and response:

- On 10 December 2010 Sergeant Mahon was appointed to the role of Executive Officer to the District Disaster Management Group. He was unable to take up the role due to being isolated in the floods and Acting Senior Sergeant Pool took up the role;
- The District Disaster Coordinator at the time (Acting Superintendent Van Saane) has completed 3 courses over the previous 10 years at Australian Emergency Management Institute at Mt Macedon in relation to Emergency Management;
- The District Disaster Coordinator, Deputy District Disaster Coordinator and Executive Officer all received recent training in Disaster Management Arrangements – District Operations from the QPS Disaster and Major Events

Planning Branch in November/December 2010;

- EMQ facilitated a number of training courses over the previous 12 months including:
  - Establishment of District Recovery Centres;
  - Introduction to Qld Disaster Arrangements; and
  - Preparing for Cyclone Events;
- Other training included:
  - Bushfire Assistance by Local Governments (QFRS Rural Operations); and
  - Presentation on the Fraser Coast Regional Council Evacuation Plan.

Sunshine Coast's preparation and response:

- A total re-write of the Sunshine Coast Regional Council Emergency Response Plan occurred recently due to council amalgamation;
- The Local Disaster Management Group Plan was reviewed and adopted as a result of the above;
- The District Disaster Management Group Plan was reviewed and adopted in late 2010;
- In 2010, 20 members enrolled in the Fundamentals of Disaster Management Competency Acquisition Program course and 5 of these have to date completed the relevant assessments;
- 1 Officer had completed Executive Officer training held on 28 October 2010;
- 15 people received training in the use of the Guardian Disaster Management software on 20 October 2010;
- A desktop training exercise was conducted (called 'Spring Cyclone') on 4 and 5 November 2010;
- A desktop 'airport emergency exercise' was conducted on 24 November 2010;
- The Disaster Management Conference was held in Gympie on 25 November 2010; and
- The District Disaster Coordinator and the Deputy District Disaster Coordinator have both attended the Australian Emergency Management Institute with a number of courses having been completed between them.

Redcliffe/Caboolture's preparation and response:

- Pre-planning included the review of the District Disaster Management Group Plan, the Aged Care Evacuation Plan and the completion and availability of Moreton Bay Regional Council flood maps and planning;
- The location of the District Disaster Management Group Coordination Centre was also established;
- The Executive Officer, Deputy District Disaster Coordinator and Deputy Executive Officer completed the Disaster Management Arrangements training on 27 October 2010;
- 8 Administration Officers from Redcliffe, Caboolture and Pine Rivers were provided with training from EMQ in the Task Tracker System for Disaster Management; and
- In August of 2010 a full operational exercise was held for all District Disaster Management Group representatives and Police personnel at Burpengary Police Station.

#### **Brisbane (Metropolitan North and South Regions)**

- Due to widespread predictions of significant rainfall and possible flooding the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group underwent extensive consultation and planning with the Brisbane Local Disaster Management Group and the Redland Local Disaster Management Group;
- 11 October 2010 – District Disaster Management Group Meeting was held;
- 21 and 22 October 2010 – QPS assisted EMQ to deliver training to all Local Disaster Management Group Staff. Training included awareness of the relationship between the Brisbane City Council and the District Disaster Coordination Centre and the overall Disaster Management Structure;
- 26 and 27 October 2010 – 6 Metropolitan North staff attended Executive Officer training conducted by the QPS Disaster and Major Events Planning Branch on impending structural, legislative and policy changes re the DM Act;
- 28 October 2010 – Local Disaster Management Group Meeting was held;
- 1 November 2010 – Transition presentation delivered to relevant personnel at Metropolitan North Region;



- 3 November 2010 – The Chair and Executive Officer attended Brisbane Immediate Action Team Training exercise conducted by the Local Disaster Management Group and Brisbane City Council involving a number of scenarios;
- 12 November 2010 - The Chair and Executive Officer attended Commonwealth Government pre-season briefings at EMQ's Kedron facility;
- 18 November 2010 – the Executive Officer, local police and members of Redlands Council attended a Redlands City Council desktop exercise involving Tsunami Strike;
- 30 November 2010 –Discussion Exercise was held at Kedron to examine the role of the State Disaster Coordinator in relation to a number of different scenarios;
- 30 November 2010 – desktop training delivered to all District Disaster Coordination Centre staff by way of a familiarisation course;
  - Training concepts were approved through Operations Support Command Education and Training Office and accredited and implemented;
  - Lectures and Lecture Plans developed; and
  - Lectures were delivered to 30 personnel from Metropolitan North Region and Metropolitan South Region. The exercise practiced the set up and operation of a District Disaster Coordination Centre;
- 1 December 2010 – Lectures delivered to Metropolitan North Region District Duty Officer's conference re the *DMA* legislation and new QPS Policy;
- 6 December 2010 – Teleconference was held regarding the floods in Central Qld;
- 9 December 2010 – Executive Officer evacuation planning meeting was held involving the Brisbane City Council, EMQ, Department of Community Safety, and the QPS. This session identified gaps in evacuation plans regarding emergency procedures and longer term placements;
- 10 December 2010 – Chair and Executive Officer attended EMQ meeting re Information Management across whole disaster management operations;
- 15 December 2010 – Chair and Executive Officer attended flooding conference at EMQ. Issues include flood mitigation through dam management methodology for flood and inundation predictions;
- 16 December 2010 – an Extraordinary District Disaster Management Group meeting was called to disseminate information gathered to date to all group

members;

- 21 December 2010 – Meeting was held at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility on the weather events across Queensland, and in particular the 200 – 300 mm of rain in the Gladstone and Bowen areas; and
- 22 December 2010 - Meeting was held at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility regarding the heavy rain between Cairns and Rockhampton. Additionally, the two (2) lows depressions were discussed (one in North East of the Coral Sea and the one in the Gulf of Carpentaria).

### **State Overview period from 23 December 2010**

- **23 December 2010** - Meetings at State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility regarding the rain events over the Christmas and New Year period;
- **24 December 2010** - Conference at Police Headquarters in relation to disaster arrangements. No major issues were identified. State Disaster Management Group Meeting at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility, chaired by the Director-General, Department of the Premier and Cabinet Mr Ken Smith regarding the possible cyclone identified off Cairns. Deputy Commissioner Stewart was appointed as the State Disaster Coordinator;
- **25 December 2010** - Meeting was held at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility. Deputy Premier Paul Lucas and Police Minister Roberts were in attendance. Category 1 cyclone 'Tasha' had crossed the coast south of Cairns at 5:30am tracking South/West in-land. Heavy rain was predicted for Rockhampton and inland. Briefings were obtained from the District Disaster Coordinators of those affected areas;
- **27 December 2010** - Meeting held at the State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility - areas of concern identified by the Gladstone District Disaster Coordinator: Town of 1770 became isolated; Taroom, Theodore, St George and Dalby were also areas of concern. Toowoomba had local flooding. Theodore - 350 residents moved to higher ground within Theodore. The District Disaster Coordinator for Rockhampton advised that indications were that in one week the Fitzroy River would be at 8 metres and that at 8.5 metres the Bruce Highway would be cut. At 8.9 metres, the airport would be closed. Emerald

reported that 300 homes were preparing to evacuate and the river under Vince Lester Bridge was at 12.2 metres;

- **28 December 2010** - Meeting was held at State Disaster Coordination Centre at EMQ's Kedron facility - Areas of concern were: Bundaberg - Burnett River; Fitzroy River was rising; Emerald - anticipated that Nagoa River would rise from 11.6 metres to 14 metres on Thursday and that the Vince Lester Bridge would go under water. Major issues were identified including: evacuation of Theodore; flooding in Bundaberg; resupply issue for Roma due to roads cut by water; Jericho and Alpha had sewerage issues. At 12:45pm, Theodore was evacuated to a mine located in Moura - 483 people air-lifted by helicopter. The river was at 14.6 metres and was expected to rise to 15 metres. Impact on the coal mines was identified;
- **29 December 2010** - Preparations were made regarding the expected closure of the Vince Lester Bridge. Emerald - prepared for evacuations; Dalby: water treatment plant was closed; Alpha and Jericho affected by flooding; Further evacuations in Bundaberg, Chinchilla and Dalby. Roma was now isolated by road and rail;
- **30 December 2010** - Emerald – the Nagoa River was still rising and rail services closed; Rockhampton – the Dawson River was still rising and was expected to exceed 8.5 metres and 140 houses inundated above floor height with a further 1000 house yards flooded. The University of Central Queensland nominated as the evacuation centre; St George – the river was increasing in height; Theodore - police remain in the town to provide a security presence;
- **31 December 2010** - Emerald – the Nagoa River reached 16.5 metres;
- **1 January 2011** - Bundaberg - Burnett River dropping; Emerald 1000 houses inundated, 500 people evacuated, Rail and Highway was cut; Surat - significant flooding; Dalby - water supply issues continued; and St George – the river continued rising with the peak predicted in mid-January;
- **2 January 2010** - Emerald - 474 people in evacuation centres; Dalby - 31 persons in evacuation centres; Bundaberg - 47 people in evacuation centres. QPS provided police personnel to assist;
- **3 January 2011** - St George - river still rising; Emerald - transition into recovery, Vince Lester Bridge has one lane open; Rockhampton - rail and airport closed,

highway south was closed whilst the highway north remained open. Police patrolled waterways in boats to prevent looting; Gladstone, Bundaberg and Longreach moved into the recovery phase; Surat and St George continued to prepare for flood. Water Police personnel were sent to St George; Dalby - evacuees returned home; Condamine - health issues identified i.e. septic tanks and foot rot;

- **4 January 2011** – Surat River Peaks;
- **5 January 2011** - Rockhampton - flood peak; Major General Mick Slater appointed to lead the Queensland Flood Recovery Taskforce;
- **6 January 2011** - Dalby - water trucks providing water; Emerald - resupply continuing; Theodore - transition into recovery phase;
- **7 January 2011** – 37,20 evacuees registered State Wide; Emerald - 59 persons in evacuation centres; Rockhampton - 350 persons in evacuation centres; Chinchilla - 24 persons in evacuation centres; Dalby - 26 persons in evacuation Centres; St George - 35 persons in evacuation centres; Theodore - all residents remained in the evacuation centre; and Rockhampton airport remained inundated; Surat moved to the recovery process;
- **9 January 2011** – Rockhampton - river levels steady at 9.15 metres; St George - Balonne River peaked; Dirranbandi - river reached record high level at 5.3 metres with levy banks holding;
- **10 January 2011** – Toowoomba and Lockyer Valley - significant event with confirmed fatalities. Areas impacted included Toowoomba, Murphy's Creek, Postman's Ridge, Withcott, Helidon, Grantham, Gatton, and Laidley; Police Operations Centre established at Police HQ. SERT and PSRT members deployed to support the Southern Region;
- **11 January 2011** - Operations conducted in affected areas of Lockyer Valley. Major Incident Room co-ordinated helicopter operations regarding evacuations in Grantham, Murphy's Creek and Forrest Hill. Police Operations Centre commences logistics to provide extra police resources to support Southern Region. 60 Academy Recruits on stand by. Operations conducted from Southern Region with the mission to minimise loss of life. Caboolture - reporting flash flooding in Kilcoy and Woodford areas; Ipswich - experiencing flooding, 20 extra personnel deployed to support Ipswich. Brisbane - preparing for major flooding in next 48

hours. Brisbane - RNA evacuation centre opens in preparation for high tide at about 0300hours Wednesday 12 January. Esk and Toogoolawah isolated. Ipswich: evacuation centre open; Laidley - 250/300 evacuees, Forrest Hill – 200/300 evacuations to Gatton. Search and recovery commenced in Murphy's Creek;

- **12 January 2011** - Brisbane and Ipswich experience major flooding. Brisbane River to peak at 5.2 metres at 0400 hours Thursday 13 January 2011. Team of investigators (Taskforce Galaxy) deployed to Toowoomba to support Coronial Investigations. Consideration was also given to damage to significant marine infrastructure including the 'The Drift' floating restaurant, the Moggill Ferry, the Riverside Walk, Dockside Marina and private piers and jetties. Further efforts were made to secure Island Barge at West End. 3,000 evacuees at RNA and 1,300 evacuees at QE2 Stadium;
- **13 January 2011** - Brisbane – 1,336 persons in evacuation centres; Ipswich 1995 persons in evacuation centres. Cyclone identified off Coral Sea with 50% chance of impacting on Queensland;
- **14 January 2011** – Search and Recovery continues in Lockyer Valley. 16 persons confirmed deceased. Brisbane Evacuation Centres – 1,326 persons; Ipswich Evacuation Centres - 881 persons. 192 Police moved to Central Region to support recovery operations and 159 to Southern Region to support recovery operations;
- **15 January 2011** - 16 confirmed deceased. Brisbane River levels slowly returning to normal levels. Brisbane evacuation centres - 1108 persons; Ipswich evacuation centres – 617 persons;
- **16 January 2011** - 18 people confirmed deceased. Brisbane evacuation centres - 589 persons; Ipswich evacuation centres – 261 persons;
- **17 January 2011** - 20 people confirmed deceased. Brisbane and Ipswich transition into recovery; Operation 'Safeguard' - contingent of 100 NSW, SA and Victoria Police conduct joint looting patrols with QPS officers for next 3 weeks;
- **21 January 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart's appointment as SDC terminated at 1700 hours;
- **28 January 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart appointed as the SDC in preparation for the response to Cyclones Anthony and Yasi;
- **31 January 2011** - Cyclone Watch – tropical cyclone Anthony - Cooktown to Yeppoon;

- **1-2 February 2011** – Police Operations Centre established in Brisbane in preparation for Cyclone Yasi. Public Safety Response Team personnel and Chief Superintendent deployed to Far North Region in support of Cairns. A second Chief Superintendent was deployed to Townsville to support Townsville operations. Additional Police from the south-east corner were made available for rapid deployment to support Northern and Far Northern Regions. Preparations for Yasi to cross the Queensland coast continued with self and mandatory evacuations commenced;
- **3 February 2011** – 0430 hours Category 5 tropical cyclone ‘Yasi’ crossed the coast between Cairns and Townsville. Mission Beach and Cardwell severely impacted. Police Operations Centre commenced and additional police deployed to the region;
- **4 February 2011** – District Disaster Coordinator for Cairns indicates Cairns city to be fully operational by Monday. Far Northern and Northern Police Regions move to recovery operations: and
- **11 February 2011** – Deputy Commissioner Stewart’s appointment as SDC terminated at 1700 hours.

Although information continues to be collated by these Regions, the immense scale of the QPS operations can be gleaned from the above chronology of events and as stated earlier, police operations are still continuing in these regions.

A more detailed overview of events is contained in the Situation Reports that were completed throughout the flood event. Copies of the ‘Situation Reports’ are attached as a bundle of documents and marked ‘QPS-7’.

### **QPS Media and Public Relations Branch Response to the Flood Event**

The QPS Media and Public Relations Branch has maintained a QPS ‘Facebook’ page since May 2010. The QPS Facebook page is linked to other social media networking sites including ‘Twitter’ and ‘YouTube’.

The QPS Facebook page has been a popular site since its inception, with approximately 6,500 followers prior to the flood event. This is roughly a similar number of followers to the Courier Mail Facebook site. The QPS following on Twitter was approximately 1,200 prior to the flood event.

On Tuesday 11 January 2011, approximately 80,000 people became followers of the QPS Facebook page and on Wednesday 12 January 2011 another 50,000 followers signed on.

Following the flood event the QPS Facebook page now has approximately 170,000 followers. The QPS currently has approximately 11,000 followers on Twitter.

During the worst of the crisis in South-East Queensland, the QPS had approximately 39 million story hits in a 24 hour period on its Facebook page. The number of story hits or 'impressions' was averaged out to approximately 450 impressions per second during the worst of the crisis. In one week more than 73,000 people watched the QPS YouTube videos.

Every time an update was posted by the QPS on Facebook, a 'tweet' was automatically generated on Twitter. During the worst of the crisis, the QPS was 'tweeting' every 10 minutes. Many people were able to follow the QPS Facebook page via their mobile telephones during the worst of the crisis when they were isolated with no power or radio access. This media strategy effectively filled a communications gap and enabled the QPS to communicate real-time with those people affected by the disaster. Furthermore, media outlets both nationally and internationally followed the real-time information updates from the QPS social network sites and 're-posted' critical information that in effect enhanced coverage exponentially.

The QPS also generated a number of stories entitled "mythbusters" designed to combat rumours and minimise panic during the crisis. By way of an example, a rumour surfaced alleging that the Wivenhoe Dam walls were suffering stress fractures



and cracking under the strain. This rumour was picked up by mainstream media and published on a leading news service. Within moments, the QPS contacted the Water Authorities and ascertained that there were no cracks whatsoever in the dam and published a “mythbuster” on the QPS Facebook page. The relevant news service withdrew the story concerning the cracks.

The community responded to the QPS media strategy by posting in excess of 500 messages of gratitude in a single ‘discussion thread’ and there are many threads of this nature praising the QPS efforts during this disaster.

The success of the QPS media strategy has been widely acknowledged. The QPS Media and Public Relations Branch have been approached nationally and internationally by many agencies seeking advice on the management of ‘social media’ in crisis situations.

## **F. Preparedness for Next Wet Season**

Although QPS operations are still continuing in many parts of the State in response to the events surrounding the 2010/2011 flood events, the QPS initiated the following activities that will directly impact on future preparedness.

### **Flood Crisis Review Group**

On 21 January 2011 the Commissioner approved the establishment of the Flood Crisis Review Group (FCRG) under the command of Assistant Commissioner Henderson.

The FCRG commenced operations on 24 January 2011 with the following terms of reference:

- Document the QPS response to the flooding and associated events;
- Facilitate the strategic debrief of the flood crisis;
- Assist in the development of the QPS response to the Commission of Inquiry into the State’s flood disaster;
- Coordinate issues of significance regarding coronial investigations; and
- Overview honours and awards for members within the Service who performed above and beyond the call of duty.



The FCRG have invited members to provide accounts and/or ideas relevant to the flood events. Members were advised that submissions can be made anonymously.

In terms of future QPS infrastructure needs for the Emergency Services Complex at Kedron, the FCRG is considering the QPS equipment needs.

Additionally, the FCRG will consider the development or enhancement of QPS policies within disaster management roles and will reflect the practical lessons learnt from the flood event in respect of the Kedron Facility and more broadly.

The FCRG will report on outcomes and recommendations once their brief is completed and at this time, a completion date is unable to be estimated.

### **Senior Executive ‘Hot Debrief and Disaster Planning Meeting’**

On 15 February 2011, the QPS held a whole-of-service ‘Hot Debrief and Disaster Planning Meeting’. The QPS Senior Executive participated in this meeting, which also included brief presentations from the Honourable Neil Roberts MP, Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Services and the Director-General of the Department of Community Safety, Mr Jim McGowan.

The agenda for the meeting included:

- Briefings by individual Assistant Commissioners and Directors on matters relevant to their respective Regions, Commands and Directorates; and
- Identification of opportunities for improvement relative to short-term, mid-term and long-term timeframes.

Opportunities for improvement covered the following broad areas of operation (order not indicative of priority or significance):

- Media;
- Education and Training;
- Business Continuity Plans;
- Traffic Management;

- Command and Control;
- Workplace Health and Safety;
- Evacuations and Centres;
- Human resource Management;
- Asset management;
- Local Disaster Management Group;
- District Disaster Management Group;
- Police Operations Centre;
- Staff Welfare;
- Legislation;
- Finance; and
- Information, Communications and Technology.

Due to the scale of the disaster, briefings exceeded the time available and the meeting's full agenda was unable to be completed. Further meeting/s or teleconference/s are anticipated in the near future to complete the hot debrief process.

### **District Debriefs**

The QPS has completed a number of district debriefs relevant to the flood event and those debrief outcomes are presently being collated by the FCRG. Debriefs are yet to be completed for Far Northern Region, Northern Region, and Central Region as a result of continuing operations relevant to tropical cyclone Yasi. Once Major Incident Rooms in those areas are finalised it is anticipated that debriefs will be completed shortly thereafter. Similarly, as a result of continuing operations by Taskforce Galaxy regarding the concurrent coronial investigation, some of Southern Region's debriefs are yet to be completed.

At this time, the QPS is unable to estimate a completion date for all debriefs.

### **Taskforce 'Galaxy'**

Following the tragic deaths of a number of people as a result of the flood events, the QPS, in consultation with the State Coroner, established a dedicated joint task force to

undertake the coronial investigation into these deaths. Taskforce Galaxy was established for this purpose and is staffed by experienced detectives from Southern Region and State Crime Operations Command.

On 27 January 2011, upon considering the terms of reference for the Commission of Inquiry, the State Coroner determined that the coronial investigation will focus on matters relevant to s.45 of the *Coroners Act* 2003.

It is anticipated that following the coronial investigation, Taskforce Galaxy will report on outcomes and recommendations relevant to the practices and procedures pertaining to coronial investigations following a large scale natural disaster.

At this time, the QPS is not able to estimate when the coronial investigation and the resultant outcomes and recommendations will be completed.

## **G. Indication of Relevant Documents Held by Department**

Immediately following their establishment, on 25 January 2011, the QPS Flood Crisis Review Group forwarded a state-wide all of service directive reminding all personnel actively involved in the QPS response to the flood events to identify and retain all information that may be pertinent to the 2010/2011 flood events.

This initial whole-of-service reminder was then reinforced by separate advice to the Regions, Commands and Directorates on 27 January 2011 providing the suggested policy and procedures for the retention of 'Flood Records'.

Subsequent advice then followed on 10 and 14 February 2011 from the Flood Crisis Review Group to the Regions, Commands and Directorates to further assist them in the identification and retention of relevant documents.

Those Regions, Commands, and Directorates are still identifying and collating relevant documents. It must be acknowledged that the QPS is still operationally deployed in locations around the State in relation to the flood event and subsequent severe weather events.

To date, the QPS has been able to identify that approximately 17,500 documents (in the following categories) are currently in existence which may be relevant to the recent flood event. However, an ongoing process is in place to identify further documents in existence within the Regions and Commands and the estimated number of 'documents' is expected to increase significantly.

At this time, documents have been identified in the following categories:

- Briefing Notes;
- Contracts/Agreements;
- Court briefs;
- Diary/Notebooks;
- Debriefing notes;
- Diagrams;
- Emails;
- Facsimiles;
- File Notes;
- Financial records;
- Intelligence briefings;
- Interactive Website including 'Livestream';
- Internet pages;
- Invoices;
- Letters;
- Logistics reports;
- Maps;
- Media releases;
- Meeting minutes;
- Memos;
- Memoranda of Understanding;
- Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangement documents;
- Other;
- Photographs;

- Plans;
- Policy documents;
- Power point presentations;
- Records of Interview;
- Reports;
- Rosters;
- Script;
- Service desk notification;
- Situation Report;
- Social network sites – Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube;  
(Note: The QPS generated an immense number of ‘internet communications’ via these mediums in response to the flood event.)
- Statistical documents;
- Telecommunications/satellite document;
- Timeline/Chronology; and
- Videos.

## Index of documents attached to QPS

Exhibit	Description
QPS-01	Organisational Structure for the Queensland Police Service
QPS-02	Regional Map
QPS-03	QPS Corporate Governance Hierarchy Chart
QPS-04	Section 1.13 of the Operational Procedures Manual
QPS-05	Commissioner's Circular 22/10
QPS-06	QPS Support Structure to the State Disaster Executives' chart
QPS-07	Situation Reports for:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brisbane;</li> <li>• Bundaberg;</li> <li>• Dalby;</li> <li>• Gladstone</li> <li>• Ipswich;</li> <li>• Maryborough;</li> <li>• Redcliffe/Caboolture;</li> <li>• Rockhampton</li> <li>• Roma;</li> <li>• Sunshine Coast</li> <li>• Toowoomba;</li> <li>• Warwick</li> </ul>


SOQ 11 March Submissions



**QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE**  
Organisational Structure  
as at December 2010

**Commissioner  
Queensland Police Service**

Office of the Commissioner




**Legend**

Direct Reporting ———  
Indirect Reporting - - - - -

'QPS-01'

## 'QPS-02'




See the [Map Sizes](#) page for further information on map size specifications.

To request a Region Map please complete the [Job Request](#) form.



## QPS Corporate Governance Hierarchy



QPS-03

*Note: a range of management committees, project teams, working groups, and formal and informal networks continue to support portfolio management functions outside the 'corporate governance' structure*

**'QPS-04'**


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[Previous](#) | [Manual](#) | [Chapter](#) | [Next](#)

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**1.13 Incident command**

Incident command relates to the authority and responsibility of the officer designated the role of command at an incident. This command role is supported by a command system (Incident Command System) and a command structure (Incident Command Structure).

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a command, control and coordination model. It is a process for the effective management of all personnel and resources. The ICS can be applied to any type of incident irrespective of the command structure. The System is based on five interlocking functional roles:

- (i) command;
- (ii) operations;
- (iii) planning;
- (iv) intelligence; and
- (v) administration and logistics.

An Incident Command Structure is the organisation of the functional roles to facilitate the effective deployment and coordination of resources at an incident. The structure consists of an Incident Management Team representing the functional roles. The degree of sophistication of the structure should be commensurate with the complexity and scale of the incident. The organisation of the functions and the specific responsibilities does not form a prescriptive structure to be adopted in all cases, it is capable of being adapted to suit the particular policing activity. This includes smaller scale incidents to major investigations, disaster and incident management, terrorist emergencies (TE) or chemical, biological and radiological emergencies (CBRE).

In most minor incidents the police forward commander (PFC) should be able to personally undertake each ICS role. As the incident increases in size or complexity these roles or functions can be delegated to individuals using a command structure that suits the policing activity.

**1.13.1 Police commander/emergency commander/TE commander/CBRE commander**

The role of the police commander (PC) which may include emergency commander, TE commander or CBRE commander if referred to in the context of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*, is to be responsible to the Commissioner for the overall management of an incident, the provision of strategic direction and guidance to the police forward commander (PFC) and the TE forward commander in TE, making decisions requiring a higher level of authority and the allocation of resources for the management and resolution of the incident.

The PC may perform this function from a police operations centre (POC). The PC may command one or more PFCs, depending on the circumstances.

The duties and responsibilities of the PC include:

- (i) where applicable, activating a POC;

- (ii) establishing the strategy and formulating the plan for managing the operational response to the incident;
- (iii) considering the declaration of an emergency situation, TE or CBRE under the provisions of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*. PCs should note that:
  - (a) a Declaration of an emergency situation under the *Public Safety Preservation Act* may only be made by a commissioned officer;
  - (b) a TE may only be declared by an appropriately qualified State or non-State police officer appointed by the Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or TE commander (in the appointment of a TE forward commander) (see s. 18.9: 'Terrorist emergencies' of this Manual); or
  - (c) a CBRE may only be declared by a State police officer of at least the rank of assistant commissioner nominated by a Deputy Commissioner (see s. 17.3.3: 'Chemical, Biological and Radiological Emergencies' of this Manual);
- (iv) ensuring that a log of events is commenced and maintained including matters such as:
  - (a) all searches of persons, including any unclothed searches;
  - (b) all searches of places;
  - (c) detentions of any persons;
  - (d) any directions given to any person or group of persons;
  - (e) delegations of any powers and functions;
  - (f) any movement of persons;
  - (g) any arrests of persons;
- (v) ensuring that information and intelligence is collected in relation to the incident;
- (vi) establishing:
  - (a) the parameters for the conduct of negotiations, i.e. the limits of acceptable concessions;
  - (b) the threshold for the use of force; and
  - (c) the public information policy to be adopted and where applicable considering the provisions of s. 17.6: 'Standard emergency warning signal' of this Manual;
- (vii) issuing any necessary instructions concerning the use of firearms by police, any restrictions on the use of sirens and warning lights etc;
- (viii) at the conclusion of the incident to ensure that any declaration of an emergency

situation made under s. 5 of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 17.3.1: 'Emergency situations', of this Manual;

(ix) at the conclusion of the incident to ensure that any declaration of a TE made under s. 8G: 'Terrorist emergency may be declared' of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 18.9: 'Terrorist emergencies', of this Manual; and

(x) at the conclusion of the incident to ensure that any declaration of a CBRE made under s. 12: 'CBR emergency may be declared' of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 17.3.3: 'Chemical, biological and radiological emergencies', of this Manual.

### 1.13.2 Police operations centre

A police operations centre (POC) is a location from where the police commander (PC) commands. This location should facilitate access to appropriate resources and communications to allow the PC to effectively resolve the incident.

In Brisbane the POC is located within the Major Incident Room (MIR), Police Communications Centre. The Brisbane POC consists of a radio communications and coordination room containing:

(i) the following communications equipment:

- (a) QPS computers;
- (b) secure telephones;
- (c) facsimiles;
- (d) tape logging of all radio channels and telephone facilities; and
- (e) radio communication facilities; and

(ii) the following staff:

- (a) a staff officer;
- (b) an intelligence function;
- (c) a collator;
- (d) a coordinator;
- (e) a logistics officer;
- (f) a message coordinator and messengers;
- (g) computer operators;
- (h) a communications manager from Radio and Electronics Section;
- (i) a communications supervisor, radio operators and telephone call takers;

(j) a liaison officer from the relevant regional criminal investigation branch or State Crime Operations Command; and

(k) a rendezvous officer who escorts personnel to and from the POC.

### 1.13.3 Police forward commander

The role of the police forward commander (PFC) is to be directly responsible for commanding, controlling or coordinating the activities of a diverse group of functional units which are necessary to assist them in the successful resolution of an incident.

A first response officer should where appropriate, assume the role of a PFC until relieved by an officer who is most senior by rank or another officer appointed as PFC at that particular incident.

The PFC should perform this function from a police forward command post (PFCP), which is normally located at or near the incident scene.

As soon as the PFC has been advised that an incident has occurred, his or her duties and responsibilities include:

(i) developing and maintaining situation awareness. Situation awareness refers to an awareness that includes three levels:

(a) perception of critical elements in the environment within the volume of time and space;

(b) comprehension of the meaning of the elements; and

(c) projecting the status of the elements into the near future.

Situation awareness allows a PFC to effectively direct initial actions and commence the planning process in managing or resolving the incident;

(ii) requesting from the police commander (PC) the strategic tasks and where appropriate, political guidelines within which the task is to be achieved, the key elements of these guidelines are likely to be:

(a) where appropriate, the parameters for the conduct of negotiations, i.e. the limits of acceptable concessions;

(b) the threshold for the use of force;

(c) the public information policy to be adopted and where appropriate consider a request to the officer in charge of the relevant region, to use the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (see s. 17.6: 'Standard emergency warning signal' of this Manual); and

(d) where appropriate, any specific political decision which may affect the conduct of response operations;

(iii) isolation and containment of the incident, including:

(a) the identification of strategies to manage workplace risks;

- (b) the development of strategies to resolve the situation or render the scene or area safe;
  - (c) rendering any necessary assistance to members of the public;
  - (d) considering, where necessary, a declaration of an emergency situation under the provisions of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*. A declaration of an emergency situation may only be made by a commissioned officer by virtue of s. 5 of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*;
  - (e) considering the declaration of a TE at a TE site under the provisions of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*, see s. 18.9: 'Terrorist emergencies' of this Manual. A TE may only be declared by an appropriately qualified State or non-State police officer appointed by the Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or TE commander (in the appointment of a TE forward commander); and
  - (f) considering the declaration of a CBRE under the provisions of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*, see s. 17.3.3: 'Chemical, biological and radiological emergencies' of this Manual. A CBRE may only be declared by a State police officer of at least the rank of assistant commissioner nominated by a Deputy Commissioner;
- (iv) where circumstances and advice from other emergency responders indicate that an incident involves or may involve a terrorist act, a situation report (SITREP) should be sent to:
- (a) the officer in charge of the relevant region; and
  - (b) the Duty Officer, Police Communications Centre, Brisbane;
- (v) where circumstances and advice from other emergency responders indicate that an incident involves a chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) substance, a situation report (SITREP) should be sent to:
- (a) the officer in charge of the relevant region; and
  - (b) the Duty Officer, Police Communications Centre, Brisbane;
- (vi) establishing:
- (a) the PFCP to command and coordinate the incident;
  - (b) an inner cordon and outer cordon (see s. 2.4.9: 'Guarding an incident scene' of this Manual) or in the case of a CBRE deploying staff in compliance with the provisions of s. 17.3.21: 'Chemical, biological or radiological incidents' of this Manual;
  - (d) a check point in close proximity to the PFCP; and
  - (e) a Media Centre in conjunction with the Media Liaison Officer. Where appropriate, see s. 1.13.5: 'Incident Management Team' of this chapter;
- (vii) requesting specialist support as required (e.g. SERT, EORT, Dog Squad,

Negotiators or DVIS etc.). Where a liaison officer is required from a specialist services support unit, refer to the call out procedures in Chapter 2: 'Investigative Process' of this Manual;

(viii) developing Incident Action Plans (IAP), including evacuation and surrender plans where applicable. For information concerning IAPs see s. 1.13.7: 'Incident action plans' of this chapter (see also Appendix 1.12 of this Manual).

(ix) conducting ongoing assessment to develop contingency plans;

(x) maintaining an accurate log of events throughout the incident including matters such as:

- (a) all searches of persons, including any unclothed searches;
- (b) all searches of places;
- (c) detentions of any persons;
- (d) any directions given to any person or group of persons;
- (e) delegations of any powers and functions;
- (f) any movement of persons;
- (g) any arrests of persons;

(xi) ensuring that the most effective secure communications system available exists between the inner cordon and PFCP;

(xii) assessing the logistic requirements and advising the PC of any resource that has been acquired or utilised under the *Public Safety Preservation Act* (only a commissioned officer may acquire resources under the *Public Safety Preservation Act*);

(xiii) assessing the personnel requirements which is to include consideration of interpreter and religious support;

(xiv) forwarding situation reports (SITREPS) to the PC and to the officer in charge of the region on a regular basis;

(xv) advising, through the PC, other appropriate agencies, such as the Queensland Ambulance Service, hospital, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service etc.;

(xvi) where applicable and in relation to the incidents provided for under s. 17.3: 'Incident management' of this Manual, ensure that PFCP staff, other police, emergency responders and civilians engaged on duty:

- (a) are aware of safe areas for movement;
- (b) are aware of the location of boundaries (e.g. inner and outer cordons, CBRE zones or crime scenes); and
- (c) do not move in unsafe areas without appropriate guidance;

- (xvii) briefing staff on a regular basis throughout the duration of the incident;
- (xviii) ensuring the receipt of timely information and where possible verifying the accuracy of the information;
- (xix) for terrorist related incidents, referring to the State Counter-Terrorism Plan;
- (xx) where appropriate, arranging a conference with the relevant emergency responders and specialists, in order to prepare plans to respond to the incident;
- (xxi) at the conclusion of the incident ensure that any declaration of an emergency situation made under s. 5 of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 17.3.1: 'Emergency situations', of this Manual;
- (xxii) at the conclusion of the incident ensure that any declaration of a TE made under s. 8G: 'Terrorist emergency may be declared' of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 18.9: 'Terrorist emergencies', of this Manual;
- (xxiii) at the conclusion of the incident ensure that any declaration of a CBRE made under s. 12: 'CBR emergency may be declared' of the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is revoked. See s. 17.3.3: 'Chemical, biological and radiological emergencies' of this Manual; and
- (xxiv) ensure that a post incident debrief is conducted including a Critical Incident Stress Debrief as applicable (see s. 20.1.8.2 of the Human Resource Management Manual).

#### 1.13.4 Police forward command post

A police forward command post (PFCP) is a field operations and communications centre from which a police forward commander (PFC) commands, manages and coordinates allocated resources. A PFCP may be established at any time when a situation develops requiring a specific response, it can range from a vehicle to a room containing communication and/or computer equipment. The PFCP can be progressively upgraded or relocated depending on the changing circumstances of the incident. The type of situation will dictate the size and degree of the sophistication of a PFCP.

The functions of a PFCP may be conducted from an operational command vehicle (OCV) or a regional communications vehicle (RCV). An OCV may be used at any incident where operational command and communications facilities are required in South East Queensland. RCVs are attached to regions and can provide similar facilities to that of an OCV.

The use of existing facilities in an area should be considered so that the PFCP is situated for effective command or coordination activities at the incident scene. The following factors should also be considered:

- (i) the PFCP should be:
  - (a) near the incident scene; and
  - (b) between the inner and outer cordon or in the case of a CBR incident, in the 'cold' zone;
- (ii) the nature of the threat:



- (a) safety;
- (b) protection and security of PCFP; and
- (c) duration and the possibility of the incident being protracted;
- (iii) the need for additional resources;
- (iv) access to the PCFP; and
- (v) a location conducive to establishing forward and rear link communications.

#### **1.13.5 Incident management team**

Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, the police forward commander (PFC)/emergency commander may establish an incident management team (IMT). The composition and staffing of a IMT should be flexible enough to meet the scale of the incident. It should be noted that officers attached to any cell in an IMT may perform more than one role.

#### **Command**

The command function is performed by a PFC, or emergency commander depending on the circumstances of the incident and is located at the police forward command post (PCFP). The PFC function is responsible for the command, control and coordination of resources in the tactical management of the incident. The command function should be allocated a staff officer to assist in the coordination of all the IMT functions and carrying out the functions/duties contained in s. 1.13.3: 'Police forward commander' of this chapter.

#### **Operations**

The operations function is responsible for carrying out the response activities described in an Incident Action Plan (IAP). This function reports directly to the PFC who holds overall responsibility and accountability for all incident response activities. The operations function consists of the operations officer and where applicable any assistant(s):

The operations officer is to:

- (i) assist the PFC/emergency commander in relation to coordination and control of operational aspects of the incident;
- (ii) manage and supervise operations using personnel who have been trained and are competent to perform the tasks assigned;
- (iii) assist in developing the response objectives and IAP;
- (iv) implement any IAPs; (v) brief and task personnel in accordance with the IAP;
- (vi) determine the need for and request additional resources through the PFC;
- (vii) overseeing the security of the area, including:
  - (a) deployment of resources to physically secure the site;

- (b) establishing a system for registration of all personnel entering and leaving the site;
- (c) where necessary, the identification of entry and access points to the site;
- (d) regulating and restricting the numbers of vehicles in the area;
- (e) directing unnecessary vehicles to be parked in an external parking area;
- (f) leaving vehicle ignition keys at a central location; and
- (g) observing the agreed guidelines between the Service and media organisations in relation to operating helicopters near scenes of police operations (see Appendix 1.13: 'Agreed guidelines for helicopters operating near scenes of police operations' of this chapter);
- (viii) ensure that a record is established containing the details of persons killed, injured, evacuated or taken into custody and the whereabouts of such persons; and
- (ix) collect situation reports (SITREPs) from staff for the information of the PFC/emergency commander.

### Planning

The planning function is responsible for preparing the IAP and contingency plans in consultation with members of IMT. The function consists of a planning officer and where applicable any assistant (s).

The planning officer reports directly to the PFC and:

- (i) is responsible for preparing a site plan of the incident or event depicting the location of:
  - (a) areas such as command posts, rest areas, assembly areas, marshalling areas, the media and triage areas, the location of other emergency responders etc.;
  - (b) areas or locations of importance;
  - (c) officers positioned at the outer and inner cordons or check points; and
  - (d) safe access routes into and through the area;
- (ii) is responsible for preparing appreciations in relation to the incident or event and making recommendations as to future resource requirements;
- (iii) should consult with the commander or liaison officers of each agency at the incident scene and determine a comprehensive inventory of available or needed resources;
- (iv) should assist officers performing special roles (e.g. the officer designated in charge of evacuation operations);
- (v) is responsible for developing the IAP and contingency plans;

(vi) liaising with technical specialists. Where a response to an incident requires a multi-agency response, consult with the liaison officers of each agency to determine the need for and availability of additional resources;

(vii) monitors SITREPs; and

(viii) makes recommendations on resource requirements.

### **Intelligence**

The intelligence function is responsible for collecting information concerning the incident, in particular:

(i) hazard or safety information;

(ii) information to be collected in accordance with s. 17.3.9: 'Tactically dangerous situations' of this Manual; and

(iii) information relevant to the investigation function.

In tactically dangerous situations the intelligence function is responsible for establishing an information display concerning the incident.

### **Administration and logistics**

The function consists of:

(i) an administration and logistics officer;

(ii) where applicable, an information officer;

(iii) a communications officer; and

(iv) any necessary assistant(s).

This function has the following responsibilities:

(i) acquiring facilities, services and materials, including personnel, in support of the management of the incident;

(ii) monitoring and recording incident related costs, personnel, equipment; and

(iii) the administration of all documentation and records related to the incident.

### **Administration and logistics officer**

The administration and logistics officer is to:

(i) identify support requirements for the incident in consultation with the PFC/emergency commander and other team members. Support requirements to be considered include:

(a) the resources that are allocated, available or en-route;

- (b) the capabilities and limitations of resources;
  - (c) additional personnel, equipment and consumables;
  - (d) transport of personnel, consumables and supplies;
  - (f) installation and maintenance of communications and technical advice;
  - (g) medical assistance for ill or injured; and
  - (h) provision of food and fluids to personnel;
- (ii) be responsible for processing requests for additional resources;
  - (iii) estimate future service and support requirements;
  - (iv) ensure that the acquisition of resources under the *Public Safety Preservation Act* is restricted to resources located within the declared geographic area of the emergency. (Resources outside this area that are required to resolve an emergency situation may be obtained by the procedures that would apply in non-emergency situations);
  - (v) ensure that adequate rest areas are provided for the other agencies (the 'emergency responders' as defined in *Public Safety Preservation Act*). Where practicable, rest areas should be located away from the incident scene; and
  - (vi) maintain records with regard to the location and deployment of resources.

### Communications officer

The communications officer:

- (i) should establish appropriate communications and ensure that an officer from Radio and Electronic Section is consulted as to the:
  - (a) establishment of a communications network between commanders of agencies, the police operation centre (POC) and the PFCP;
  - (b) security of communications e.g. is digital voice protection (DVP) radio or secure satellite phones required; and
  - (c) the use of mobile radio base stations available at district headquarters and the Radio and Electronic Section;
- (ii) is to coordinate radio frequencies for use by all agencies at the site;
- (iii) should determine the resource needs for radio communications at the incident scene. In remote areas, the successful use of HF Codan Selcall radio or Radphone may necessitate the use of communication centres outside that particular region or agency (i.e. Rural Fire Division communications, VKR in Cairns, Mt Isa, Roma, Charleville or the 40 channel Citizen Band radio);
- (iv) where appropriate, is to ensure compliance with the provisions of s. 14.25: 'Radio communications' of this Manual;

(v) is to ensure that a log of events is maintained in compliance with s. 2.4.7: 'Log of events' of this Manual; and

(vi) where no electronic communications system can be established, should organise a system of hand delivering messages to ensure the PFC can maintain contact with the officers under his control or to coordinate a response with other emergency responders.

### **Information officer**

The information officer is responsible for coordinating the collection of necessary information from the emergency responders relating to a terrorist incident or a CBR incident. This information relates to the forms referred to in s. 18.9: 'Terrorist emergencies' and s. 17.3.3: 'Chemical, biological and radiological emergencies' and contained within Appendix 17.14: 'Chemical, biological, radiological (CBRE) Forms' and Appendix 18.4: 'Terrorist emergency forms' of this Manual.

The information collected is required to be forwarded to the respective regional assistant commissioner through the CBRE commander or TE commander and is to be included in a report to Parliament (see ss. 8R and 43 of the *Public Safety Preservation Act*).

### **1.13.6 Support functions and roles**

The following support functions are additional to the five functional roles of the Incident Command System, refer to s. 1.13 of this chapter. These support functions perform an important role in assisting the Incident Management Team in performing the functions of the Incident Command System.

### **Investigation**

The investigation function consists of designated investigating officers who are responsible for any investigation in relation to the incident.

The officer in charge of the Investigation function is to ensure that the investigation of a crime scene is appropriately planned in consultation with other specialist police and where applicable, other emergency responders.

### **Tactical**

The tactical function consists of specialist police who are required for a tactical deployment including Special Emergency Response Team, Public Safety Response Team, Explosive Ordnance Response Team or arrest teams. The officer in charge of any specialist police is to work closely with the PFC or emergency commander in relation to:

- (i) the approval of tactical plans;
- (ii) the determination of the parameters within which the specialist police can initiate actions; and
- (iii) logistical support.

### **Liaison officers**

Liaison officers are members of other agencies or from within the Service who liaise closely with the PFC/emergency commander/TE commander/TE forward commander/CBRE commander during times of multi-agency response to an incident. Liaison officers are usually located at the PFCP and

should have direct communication links with the commander of the agency or Service organisational unit to which that officer belongs.

### **Media liaison officer**

Where practicable, the services of Media and Public Relations Branch should be used. Where this is not possible an officer should be appointed as a media liaison officer. The media liaison officer should:

- (i) maintain a log of media requests, responses, press releases and briefings;
- (ii) establish an area as a media centre to brief the media on operational requirements and remain in attendance with the media at all times, if not practicable however at least remain in attendance during any interviews;
- (iii) check media releases with the PFC/emergency commander and media operations room where practicable to ensure that statements will not prejudice future operations;
- (iv) ensure reasonable facilities are provided for media representatives where possible;
- (v) ensure the location of the media centre and other media facilities are known at the PFCP;
- (vi) ensure that the media does not impede operations or investigations and are kept at a safe distance;
- (vii) ensure where practicable, a regular flow of up to date information to the media;
- (viii) where practicable, allow media representatives to be in a position where they can obtain adequate visual footage of the incident;
- (ix) ensure the media operations room is kept up to date with information and events so information can be relayed to media who are not at the scene;
- (x) consider the use of a media conference for relaying information to the media and use the media operations room to coordinate any conference where held;
- (xi) create a list of who needs to be advised of important information (e.g. councils, police stations, hospitals, transport etc.); and
- (xii) comply with the appropriate provisions of s. 1.10.11: 'Information sought by media for public broadcast' of this chapter.

### **1.13.7 Incident action plans**

Incident Action Plans (IAPs) serve as an aid to assist a Police Forward Commander (PFC) in directing staff and resources to resolve an incident as efficiently and safely as possible. An IAP assists in defining a situation, the setting of objectives, the allocation of tasks and the coordination of staff. Depending on the scale, complexity, time factors and risk of the incident, an IAP could be a mental process for immediate decisions at an incident scene.


The IAP is an immediate course of action to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

- Isolate;
- Contain;
- Evacuate;
- Negotiate;
- Resolve;
- Investigate;
- Rehabilitate;
- Evaluate.

These objectives are collectively known by the acronym ICENRIRE.

For PFCs and first response officers, ICE (isolate, contain and evacuate) would be a primary consideration at most incidents. The remaining objectives of ICENRIRE could be addressed as the circumstances or need dictates. An IAP should not be confused with a deliberate plan like an operation order for a major event. However, if an unplanned incident occurred in the course of the implementation of an operation order an IAP could be applied to formulate an appropriate course of action to deal with that incident.

The process of forming and implementing an IAP is illustrated as follows:



### Appreciation and selecting a course of action

An appreciation can be mental or written and should be conducted before forming an IAP. An appreciation forms the basis of the IAP and is necessary in order to select a course of action (see 'Appreciations' in s. 1.5.3: 'Tactical planning - operation orders' of this chapter).

### Forming an Incident Action Plan

When a course of action is selected, an IAP should be formed within a framework of objectives reflecting the acronym ICENRIRE.

ICENRIRE means:

#### (i) Isolate:

The incident scene is isolated to:

- (a) preserve evidence;
- (b) prevent and minimise harm to others; or
- (c) locate persons of interest.



This is achieved by confirming the location of the incident or subject and through the deployment of a secure inner cordon, without compromising the safety or welfare of personnel;

**(ii) Contain:**

The incident is contained to:

- (a) minimise the loss of evidence;
- (b) minimise an escalation of the incident;
- (c) prevent or minimise the threat of escape where the incident relates to an offender;
- (d) where applicable, minimise the options open to an offender in terms of mobility;
- (e) minimise the contamination of the crime scene; or
- (f) enable agencies to focus on dealing with the incident.

This is achieved through the deployment of secure cordons and consideration of contingencies;

**(iii) Evacuate:**

Depending on the need, a specified area in and/or around the incident scene may be evacuated to:

- (a) reduce the risk of harm to others;
- (b) enable agencies to focus on dealing with the incident; or
- (c) where applicable, minimise the options open to an offender.

This is achieved through the development and execution of an evacuation plan and tactical deployment of personnel. Evacuees should be taken or directed to a place of safety without unnecessary exposure to risk

Evacuation may or may not be used as part of the IAP. This will depend on the type of incident and the potential danger involved;

**(iv) Negotiate:**

Negotiation will assist in the gathering of intelligence and provide time for further planning.

This is achieved through the deployment, where possible, of a trained negotiator. Negotiation can include directions in relation to the safe release of hostages and the execution of a surrender plan;

**(v) Resolve:**

An incident may be resolved through:

- (a) established procedures used by emergency services for the management of that specific type of incident;
- (b) the negotiation of a peaceful resolution;
- (c) an emergency action; or
- (d) deliberate action or intervention.

This is achieved by using organisational procedures, specialist support, planning, command and control;

**(vi) Investigate:**

The incident is investigated to establish:

- (a) the cause of the incident; or
- (b) the evidence for an offence;

This is achieved through the deployment of trained investigators;

**(vii) Rehabilitate:**

The incident scene is rehabilitated to return the affected area to its normal functioning. Depending on the nature of the incident, this may include coordinating the services of local authorities and environmental agencies; and

**(viii) Evaluate:**

The management of the incident should be evaluated to determine what worked well and what could be improved. The evaluation should include:

- (a) a critique of all Incident Command System roles and performance; and
- (b) a post incident debriefing.

The 'Isolate' and 'Contain' objectives of ICENRIRE will be of primary concern for first response officers. By carrying out these two actions, potential harm from the incident will be minimised and the PFC will be given time to analyse and plan an appropriate response.

When the objectives of the plan are established, a plan of action can then be developed for the circumstances of the incident. The development of the IAP can be a mental process that is expressed verbally or in writing. An IAP may include one or more courses of action to deal with different features of an incident or task.

### **Standard plans**

Standard plans are intended for responses to situations or contingencies that may arise while

implementing an IAP. The following standard plans may be used in appropriate circumstances:

- (i) a containment plan for an armed offender;
- (ii) a surrender - reception plan for a suspect or victim;
- (iii) a traffic management plan;
- (iv) an evacuation plan; or
- (v) an emergency action plan.

See [Appendix 1.14](#): 'Standard plans' of this chapter.

### **SMEAC model**

The method of delivering the instructions or orders for the implementation of the IAP is standardised by the use of the SMEAC model, either verbally or in writing. For an example of the SMEAC model see 'Sequence of orders' contained in [s. 1.5.3](#): 'Tactical planning - operation orders' of this chapter.

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**'QPS-05'**

**Circular No. 22/2010**  
**01/11/2010**  
**File No. DOC10/824350**

**DISASTER MANAGEMENT**

The Department of Community Safety commissioned an independent review of the disaster management arrangements in Queensland to analyse the practice of disaster management. This resulted in amendment to the *Disaster Management Act* and *Public Safety Preservation Act* which commenced on 1 November 2010. The amendments include changes to the processes and requirements for declaring a disaster situation, creation of the roles of State Disaster Coordinator and State Recovery Coordinator and establishment of temporary disaster districts.

In response to these amendments, changes to the following sections of the Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) have been developed:

- (i) s. 17.2: 'Disaster management';
- (ii) s. 17.3.1: 'Emergency situations'
- (iii) appendix 17.22: 'Chairpersons - District Disaster Management Groups'

The new procedures to be adopted by members are set out in this circular using the format that will be used when the contents are included into the OPM.

**Administration****POLICY**

The contents of this circular will be incorporated into Chapter 17: 'Major Incidents' of the Operational Procedures Manual in due course.

The contents of ss 17.2: 'Disaster management', 17.3.1: 'Emergency situations' and appendices 17.22: 'District Disaster Coordinators' and 17.23: 'Deputy Chairpersons' of the Operational Procedures Manual are hereby cancelled.

**ORDER**

Officers in charge are to note the contents of this circular and bring them to the notice of all members under their control.

**A C HENDERSON**  
**ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER**  
**(SPECIALIST OPERATIONS)**

## 17.2 Disaster management

Disasters and other related incidents are events in which a community faces severe danger and inc social structure and prevents the fulfilment of all or some of its essential functions. The *Disaster M* requires that each local government authority develops disaster management plans. These plans in activation of local resources in response to a disaster situation (for clarification of a disaster situati circular).

The DMA provides a framework of management groups to administer the functions of the Act for a

### State Disaster Management Group

The functions of the State Disaster Management Group (State group) are contained in s. 18: 'Fund membership of the State group consists of:

- (i) the Chief Executive of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet who is the chairperson. The functions of the chairperson are to manage and coordinate the business of the group and, if practicable, the group performs its functions, see s. 20A: 'Functions of chairperson of State g
- (ii) the Chief Executive of the Department of Community Safety;
- (iii) a number of persons, each being the chief executive of another department;
- (iv) an officer of the Department of Community Safety who is appropriately qualified to provi management; and
- (v) an officer of the Local Government Association of Queensland Ltd. (see s. 19: 'Membersh deputy chairperson of the group is appointed by the chairperson under s. 20: 'Chairperson a of the DMA.

The executive officer of the State group is appointed by the Commissioner and must provide suppo Chairperson to help the State group perform its functions (see s. 21A: 'Executive officer to provide

### State Disaster Coordinator

The chairperson of the State group may, if satisfied it is necessary, appoint a person as a State dis coordinate disaster operations for the State group after consultation with the Commissioner. (see s coordinator of the DMA)

Where the chairperson no longer considers it necessary for a State disaster coordinator to be appoi terminate the appointment, following consultation with the Commissioner.

The chairperson must advise each relevant District Disaster Management Group and Local Disaster an SDC has been appointed, or the appointment terminated.

An assistant commissioner will generally be appointed to the position of State disaster coordinator. official from another State government agency may be appointed to the role if the chairperson of tl appointment of the senior public official would be appropriate, having regard to the nature and circ

### POLICY

The functions of the SDC are to:

- (i) coordinate the disaster response operations for the State group;
- (ii) report regularly to the State group about disaster response operations;

(iii) ensure as far as reasonably practicable, that any strategic decisions of the State group a response operations are implemented; and

(iv) provide strategic advice on disaster response operations to district disaster coordinators.

(see s. 21C: 'Functions of State disaster coordinator' of the DMA.

### **State Recovery Coordinator**

The chairperson of the State group may, if satisfied it is necessary, appoint a person as a State recovery coordinator disaster recovery operations for the State group after consultation with the Commissioner of the Department of Community Safety. (see s. 21D: 'State recovery coordinator' of the DMA)

The SRC will generally be a public official from a State Government department other than the Ser

The functions of the SRC are to:

- (i) coordinate disaster recovery operations for the State group;
- (ii) report regularly to the State group about disaster recovery operations;
- (iii) ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that any strategic decisions of the State group a recovery operations are implemented;
- (iv) provide strategic advice on disaster recovery operations to government agencies perform operations.

(see s. 21E: 'Functions of the State recovery coordinator' of the DMA)

### **District Disaster Management Group**

Twenty three disaster districts for Queensland have been prescribed under the DMA.

A District Disaster Management Group (district group) has been established under s. 22: 'Establish disaster district. (see Appendix 17.22: 'Chairpersons of district groups' of this circular)

The functions of a district group are contained in s. 23: 'Functions' of the DMA. The district group c

- (i) a chairperson appointed by the Commissioner under s. 25(1)(a): 'Chairperson and deputy DMA. The functions of the chairperson are contained in s. 26: 'Functions of chairperson of district DMA. The chairperson is the district disaster coordinator (DDC) of the group, see s. 25A: 'District Coordinator' of the DMA. The functions of the DDC are contained in s. 26A: 'Functions of district coordinator' of the DMA (see also s. 17.2.1: 'District group members responsibilities' of this circular)
- (ii) a deputy chairperson appointed by the Commissioner under s. 25(1)(b) of the DMA;
- (iii) an executive officer appointed by the Commissioner under s. 27: 'Executive officer of district DMA;
- (iv) a person appointed by a local government (see s. 24(1)(d): 'Membership' of the DMA);
- (v) a number of persons, each of whom represents a department, the chief executive of the appropriate to be a member of the district group, having regard to effective disaster management district. These persons are to be appointed by the chief executive of the department, the member
- (vi) any other person appointed by the chief executive of the department considered appropriate of the district group, having regard to the effective disaster management of the disaster district

### Local Disaster Management Group

A Local Disaster Management Group (local group) is established by a local government for the local membership of a local group is contained in s. 33: 'Membership' of the DMA and consists of:

- (i) a chairperson, who is a councillor of a local government, as appointed by the relevant local government under s. 34(1)(a): 'Chairperson and deputy of local group' of the DMA. The functions of the chairperson are contained in s. 34A: 'Functions of chairperson of local group' of the DMA;
- (ii) a deputy chairperson, as appointed by the relevant local government for the local group;
- (iii) a local disaster coordinator, who is either the chief executive officer or an employee of the local government, as appointed by the chairperson of the local group under s. 35(1): 'Local disaster coordinator' of the DMA. The functions of the local disaster coordinator are contained in s. 36: 'Functions of local disaster coordinator' of the DMA; and
- (iv) other persons appointed as members of the group by the local council, one of which must be nominated by the chief executive of the Department of Community Safety. (see s. 33(2) of the DMA)

Generally, local groups are comprised of members of the relevant local council plus representatives of fire, ambulance and Emergency Management Queensland.

### Temporary Disaster District Group

A Temporary Disaster District Group (temporary district group) is established by the chairperson of a local government in consultation with the Commissioner, where the chairperson is satisfied that a disaster has happened or is about to happen, in two or more adjoining disaster districts. (See ss. 28A-28F of the DMA)

A temporary district group is responsible for the management of the disaster for the districts as directed by the Commissioner. Members of a temporary district group have the same functions and responsibilities of members of a local disaster management group under the DMA.

A temporary district group consists of:

- (i) a chairperson, appointed by the chairperson of the State group, after consultation with the Commissioner, under s. 28C: 'Appointment of chairperson and deputy chairperson of temporary district group' of the DMA;
- (ii) a deputy chairperson, appointed by the chairperson of the State group, after consultation with the Commissioner, under s. 28C of the DMA;
- (iii) a person nominated by each local government whose local government is entirely or partly in the district for which the temporary district group is established and is appointed by the chairperson of the temporary district group under s. 28B: 'Membership of temporary district group' of the DMA;
- (iv) a number of persons, each of whom represents a department the chairperson of the temporary district group considers appropriate to be represented on the group and who are appointed by the chairperson of the temporary district group under s. 28B of the DMA; and
- (v) any other person appointed by the chairperson of the temporary district group who the temporary district group considers appropriate to be a member of the group. (see s. 28B of the DMA)

### Functions of chairperson of temporary district group

The person appointed as chairperson of a temporary district group is also the district disaster coordinator of the temporary district group. The functions of the appointee:

- (i) as chairperson is to:





Relationship to other declarations table

Declarations that can be made	Powers used under declaration	Extensions and ending of declaration	
Disaster situation (DS) declared. DMA s. 64: Declaration	s. 75 DMA: Authorisation for DS  ss. 76 & 77 DMA: General powers  ss. 78 & 79 DMA: Powers about property	s. 66 DMA: Duration of DS  s. 67 DMA: Extension of DS  s. 68 DMA: Ending of DS: when it is no longer necessary to exercise declared disaster powers for the DS.	DS  s. 6 sto anc
Emergency situation (ES) declared. PSPA s. 5: Declaration of ES	s. 8 PSPA: Powers of emergency commander	s. 5(3) PSPA: ES continues until revoked  s. 6(1) PSPA: ES shall be revoked by the emergency commander, or if the emergency commander is unavailable a commissioned officer of the same or more senior rank, unless believed on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the declaration to remain in force	ES  s. 6 Act anc
CBRE declared. PSPA s. 12: CBRE may be declared	s. 18 PSPA: Powers of CBRE commander  s. 19 PSPA: Power to authorise exercise of particular powers  s. 23 PSPA: Powers of CBRE police officers  ss. 25 & 26 PSPA: Powers over property  s. 27 PSPA: Power to require name & address  s. 31 PSPA: Power to give particular directions  s. 32 PSPA: Power to detain	ss 13 & 14 PSPA: Extension of CBRE  s. 15(1) PSPA: Ending CBRE:  A CBRE must be ended when it is no longer necessary to continue to exercise CBRE powers to protect life or health at serious risk because of the CBR substance involved in the CBRE.  Lasts 24 hours, unless extended up to 7 days, then extended up to 14 days unless sooner ended because not necessary.	CB ow dec tim  s. 6 Act anc
Terrorist emergency (TE) declared. PSPA s. 8G: TE may be declared	s. 8C Function of TE commander  s. 8E Function of TE forward commander  s. 8L Grounds for exercise of power  s. 8M Power to control movement of persons	s. 8H PSPA: Extension of TE  s. 8I Ending TE:  A TE must be ended when it is no longer necessary for police officers to continue to exercise TE powers to protect life or health at serious risk.  Lasts 7 days, unless extended up to 14 days, unless sooner	TE hov dec tim  s. 6 Act anc

	<p><u>s. 8N</u> Power to search persons without warrant</p> <p><u>s. 8O</u> Power to require name and address</p> <p><u>s. 8Q</u> Power to direct officers of government agencies</p>	ended because not necessary.	
DS declared. DMA <u>s. 64</u> and or an ES declared. PSPA <u>s. 5</u>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for ES, however: once DS declared ES must be revoked unless believed on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the declaration under s. 5 of the PSPA to remain in force.</p> <p>Both powers can be used at same time</p>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for ES, however: ES must be revoked unless believed on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the declaration to remain in force.</p>	<p><u>s. 4</u> Act and</p> <p><u>s. 6</u> Act and</p> <p><u>s. 7</u> rev cor em uni offi ser on is r dec</p>
DS declared. DMA <u>s. 64</u> and CBRE declared. PSPA <u>ss. 4A</u> : Relationship with another declaration under another Act & 12	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for CBRE</p> <p>Both powers can be used at same time</p>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for CBRE</p>	<p><u>s. 7</u> (2) are lim res dec</p>
DS declared. DMA <u>s. 64</u> and TE declared. PSPA <u>ss. 4A</u> & 8G: Terrorist emergency may be declared	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for TE</p> <p>Both powers can be used at same time</p>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for TE</p>	<p><u>s. 7</u> are lim res dec</p>
ES declared. PSPA <u>s. 5</u> and CBRE declared. PSPA <u>ss. 4A</u> & 12	<p>As above for CBRE</p> <p>As above for ES</p> <p>Both powers of ES and CBRE can be used at same time, however, CBRE commander's powers override emergency commander in relation to CBRE area only</p>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for CBRE</p>	<p><u>s. 4</u> effi the situ wh dec</p> <p>CB ove cor CB</p>
ES declared. PSPA <u>s. 5</u> and TE declared. PSPA <u>ss. 4A</u> & 8G	<p>As above for TE</p> <p>As above for ES</p> <p>Both powers of ES and TE can be used at same time, however, TE commander's powers override emergency</p>	<p>As above for DS</p> <p>As above for TE</p>	<p><u>s. 4</u> effi the situ wh dec</p> <p>TE</p>

	commander in relation to TE area only		over cor are
CBRE declared. PSPA s. 12 and TE declared. PSPA s. 8G	As above for CBRE	As above for CBRE	s. 4
	As above for TE	As above for TE	ma thc to ope
	Both powers can be used at same time		ear

See also Appendix 17.21: 'Table comparing the declaration of a 'Disaster Situation', an 'Emergency Biological or Radiological Emergency' and a 'Terrorist Emergency' to various operational criteria' of Manual. This table allows a reader to see how the different emergency/disaster situations are similar sections of the appropriate Acts for quick reference.

### 17.2.1 District group members responsibilities

#### Chairperson - District group

In accordance with s. 25(1)a: 'Chairperson and deputy chairperson' of the DMA, district officers have chairpersons of district groups except for the Brisbane metropolitan area where the Assistant Commissioner North Region, has been appointed to that role. (see Appendix 17.22: 'Chairpersons of district group')

The chairperson of a district group is also the DDC for the group, under s. 25A: 'District disaster co POLICY

The chairperson of a district group is to:

- (i) manage and coordinate the business of the district group;
- (ii) ensure, as far as practicable, that the group performs its functions as prescribed under s the DMA;
- (iii) prepare, under s. 53: 'Plan for disaster management in disaster district' of the DMA, a disaster management plan which must be consistent with the disaster management guidelines. When the group considers it appropriate the plan may be reviewed or renewed. However, the group must review the plan at least once a year (See s. 55: 'Reviewing and renewing plan' of the DMA). The management plan must comply with s. 53 of the DMA. A district group must also keep a copy of the management plan, in written or electronic form, available for inspection, free of charge, by any person at the places the DDC of the group considers appropriate, and on payment of the appropriate fee of a copy of the plan. (See s. 56: 'Plan to be available for inspection etc' of the DMA.) The appropriate fee is decided by the DDC of the district group that is no more than the reasonable cost of providing a copy of the plan;
- (iv) ensure the Chief Executive, Department of Community Safety is advised of any temporary changes to the appointment of a chairperson, deputy chairperson or executive officer of a district group;
- (v) regularly report to the State group about the performance by the district group of its functions.

There is no provision under the DMA for the delegation of the functions of the chairperson of a district group.

#### District Disaster Coordinator – District group

The district disaster coordinator (DDC) of a district group is also the chairperson of the group. The district group is to coordinate disaster operations in the disaster district for the group, see s. 26A: 'District disaster coordinator' of the DMA. For a list of DDC positions see Appendix 17.22 of this circular.

The DDC of a district group may delegate the DDC's functions to an appropriately qualified member (7): 'Delegations' of the DMA.

#### PROCEDURE

When individual officers are serving in the capacity of DDC, officers in charge of regions or commands, another police officer is appointed to carry out the duties of district officer during the time the district disaster coordinator is in response to, in preparation for or during recovery from a disaster.

#### Deputy Chairperson - District group

In accordance with s. 25(1)(b) of the DMA, a police officer has been appointed as deputy chairperson

#### POLICY

Deputy chairpersons are responsible for:

- (i) assisting the chairperson to manage and coordinate the business of the district group;
- (ii) chairing meetings associated with the district group in the absence of the chairperson (see 'meetings' of the DMA);
- (iii) assisting the chairperson and executive officer of the district group, to review the district group's performance;
- (iv) the provision of timely and accurate advice to the DDC in matters relating to disaster management;
- (v) assisting the chairperson, in their role as DDC, in coordinating disaster operations in the district group;
- (vi) reporting to the district group on operational issues regarding the disaster;
- (vii) representing the chairperson when the chairperson is unavailable;
- (viii) undertaking the role of the DDC when delegated that function pursuant to s. 143(7) of the DMA;
- (ix) performing any other task or functions as required by the chairperson for the efficient and effective performance of the district group.

#### Executive officers – District group

#### POLICY

In accordance with s. 27(1): 'Executive officer of district group' of the DMA, a police officer has been appointed as executive officer for each district group.

The executive officer of a district group is to support the group in the performance of its functions, chairperson of the district group. Executive officers are responsible for:

- (i) the establishment of the District Disaster Coordination Centre (DDCC) including relevant procedures;
- (ii) the identification and training of staff to operate within the DDCC;
- (iii) the activation and operational management of the DDCC during times of actual or potential disaster;
- (iv) the provision of administrative and secretarial functions associated with the district group and recording district group meetings and records relating to disaster management;

- (v) maintenance and distribution of a contact list of all district group members;
- (vi) in conjunction with relevant stakeholders, reviewing district disaster plans;
- (vii) liaison with Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) in the development and conduct of operational preparedness of district and local disaster management plans, functional sub-plan operations;
- (viii) assisting EMQ with facilitating disaster management training in the district;
- (ix) facilitation of post disaster event debriefs;
- (x) the establishment of, and liaison with a network of relevant agencies, to provide advice on emerging trends which may have an impact in disaster districts;
- (xi) the provision of timely and accurate advice to the DDC in matters relating to disaster management;
- (xii) in conjunction with EMQ, disseminating information on disaster preparedness to QPS and other networks;
- (xiii) representing the DDC when required, including providing briefings on behalf of the DDC;
- (xiv) ensuring the district group fulfils its legislative responsibilities, see s. 23: 'Functions' of the district group;
- (xv) providing assistance to the district Counter Terrorism Liaison Officers to ensure that an effective link exists between crisis and consequence management arrangements for any disaster situation or terrorist incident; and
- (xvi) performing any other tasks or functions as required by the DDC for the efficient and effective operation of the district group.

### 17.2.2 Declaration of a disaster situation

A disaster situation may be declared under the *Disaster Management Act* (DMA):

- (i) for the State, or part of the State, by the Minister and the Premier under s. 69: 'Declaration of a disaster situation';
- (ii) for a disaster district, or part of it, and with the approval of the Minister, by a district disaster management committee (DDC) under s. 64: 'Declaration'.

### POLICY

A DDC for a disaster district may, with the approval of the Minister, declare a disaster situation for a district if it is satisfied:

- (i) a disaster has happened, is happening or is likely to happen, in the disaster district; and
- (ii) it is necessary, or reasonably likely to be necessary for the DDC or a declared disaster of the district, to exercise its declared disaster powers to prevent or minimise any of the following:
  - (a) loss of human life;
  - (b) illness or injury to humans;
  - (c) property loss or damage; or
  - (d) damage to the environment.

Before declaring a disaster situation, the DDC is to take reasonable steps to consult with:

- (i) the district group for the disaster district; and
- (ii) each local government whose area is in, or partly in, the declared area for the disaster situation.

A DDC intending to declare a disaster situation is to consult with the Assistant Commissioner responsible for the disaster situation is intended to be declared and advise the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) or the on call Deputy Commissioner;

- (i) complete section 1 of a Form DM 02: 'Declaration of a disaster situation - district level'. This form is available on QPS Forms Select;
- (ii) transmit by facsimile the completed form to the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC);
- (iii) send copies of the Form DM 02 to the State Duty Officer Police Communications Centre (SDOPCC), the relevant Deputy Commissioner and the officer in charge of the relevant region; and
- (iv) when Ministerial approval is given and upon receipt of Form DM 02, with sections 2 and 3, implement the relevant provisions of the DMA to deal with the disaster situation and exercise powers as required.

### Oral declaration of a disaster situation

A DDC may make an oral declaration of a disaster situation if the DDC considers it necessary to exercise powers before an approved form can be obtained and completed (see s. 65(5): 'Form and notice of disaster situation can not be declared orally where the DDC considers that it is only reasonably likely that the declared disaster powers under s. 64(1)(b): 'Declaration' of the DMA. The need to exercise powers before making an oral declaration.

Ministerial approval is still required before an oral disaster situation declaration takes effect. To obtain approval, the DDC should contact the SDCC by phone and urgently request that the Minister's approval be sought. The contact number for the DDC should be provided at this time to enable the Minister to contact the DDC.

If practicable, prior to making an oral declaration the DDC is to consult with the Assistant Commissioner responsible for the area where the disaster situation is intended to be declared and advise the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) or, after hours, the on call Deputy Commissioner.

Where a DDC makes an oral declaration of a disaster situation under s. 65(5) of the DMA the declaration must be recorded in the approved form as soon as reasonably practicable after the oral declaration. See s. 17.2.2: 'Declaration of a disaster situation' of this circular.

### Declared disaster powers - declared disaster officers

The following definitions apply in respect to powers for declared disaster situations:

**'declared disaster officer'**, for a disaster situation, means:

- (i) a police officer; or
- (ii) a person authorised under s. 75(1): 'Authorisation for disaster situation' of the DMA, to exercise declared disaster powers for the disaster situation.

**'declared disaster powers'** means the powers of a DDC or declared disaster officer under sections 64 and 78: 'Power to give direction about property' of the DMA.

Section 75(2) of the DMA provides that a police officer may exercise declared disaster powers for the disaster situation if a declared disaster officer, a police officer, for the disaster situation has the powers given under Part 4 of the DMA.

3: 'Powers of district disaster coordinators and declared disaster officers', ss. 76: 'General provision Requirements for direction about property' of the DMA.

#### POLICY

A relevant DDC for the disaster situation, under s. 75(1) of the DMA, may authorise any of the following declared disaster powers for the disaster situation:

- (i) an ambulance officer;
- (ii) a fire officer;
- (iii) a health officer; and
- (iv) a person who is member of a class of persons the relevant DDC is satisfied has the necessary experience to exercise the powers.

An authorisation under s. 75(1) of the DMA may:

- (i) be general or limited to a particular, or a particular class of, ambulance officer, fire officer or other person;
- (ii) be given on conditions; and
- (iii) be given orally or in writing but if given orally must be put in writing as soon as reasonably practicable.

A failure to put an authorisation in writing does not invalidate the authorisation or anything done under s. 75(4) of the DMA).

Under s. 76 of the DMA these powers may only be exercised:

- (i) during the period of the disaster situation; and
- (ii) to do any of the following:
  - (a) ensure public safety or public order;
  - (b) prevent or minimise loss of human life, or illness or injury to humans or animals;
  - (c) prevent or minimise property loss or damage, or damage to the environment; or
  - (d) prepare for, respond to, or recover from, the disaster situation.

A declared disaster officer may exercise a power only subject to the conditions, on which the person is authorised to exercise the power (of the DMA).

The powers that can be exercised are contained in s. 77: 'General Powers' and 78: 'Power to give directions' of the DMA.

In a disaster situation, the relevant DDC, if appropriate, is to invoke the provisions of s. 1.13: 'Incident Management Manual', and is to:

- (i) continually monitor the disaster situation and liaise with other agencies responding to the disaster; and
- (ii) as the need arises, authorise under s. 75(1) of the DMA, ambulance officers, fire officers, and health officers.

other persons to exercise declared disaster powers, or give directions about the circumstances under another Act may be exercised during the period of the disaster situation. When issuing giving directions the following forms are to be used, where appropriate, and the directions are to be followed in their completion. These forms are available on QPS Forms Select:

(a) Form DM 01: 'Direction about the exercise of powers under other Acts during a disaster situation' (see s. 9: 'Directions about powers under other Acts during disaster situation'). This form allows a relevant DDC for the disaster situation to give directions about the exercise of powers under another Act may be exercised during the period of the disaster situation.

(b) Form DM 08A: 'Authorisation for an individual to exercise declared disaster powers' Division 2: 'Authorising persons, and powers, for disaster situations', ss. 74: 'Application for authorisation' and ss. 79 of the DMA). This form allows a relevant DDC for the disaster situation to authorise an individual to exercise declared disaster powers for the disaster situation under ss. 77 and 78 of the DMA.

(c) Form DM 08B: 'Authorisation for a category or class of persons to exercise declared disaster powers' (see s. 75(1)(d) of the DMA). This form allows a relevant DDC for the disaster situation to authorise ambulance officers, fire officers, health officers and persons, who are members of a category or class of persons the DDC is satisfied has the necessary expertise or experience to exercise the powers under s. 77 and s. 78 of the DMA.

(d) Form DM 09: 'Notice to remove or demolish or destroy a building or other structure in a disaster situation'. This form is intended for a DDC to approve that a declared disaster officer may exercise powers under s. 77(1)(h) of the DMA; and

(e) Form DM 10: 'Notice of direction about property'. This form is to be given to the owner of the property when directed to put the property under the control or at the disposal of a person stated in the direction under s. 78 and 79 of the DMA. Where the property is a residential or business premises, a declared disaster officer may give a direction under s. 78(1) of the DMA only with written approval of a relevant DDC. When giving the direction the DDC must warn the person that it is an offence to fail to comply with the direction unless that person has a reasonable excuse (see s. 116: 'Failure to comply with direction' of the DMA);

(iii) advise the SDCC, at any time a declaration of a disaster situation requires to be extended longer necessary to exercise declared disaster powers for the disaster situation. In relation to disaster situations by a DDC, Forms DM 03: 'Extension of a disaster situation - district level' and DM 04: 'End a disaster situation - district level', are to be used as appropriate. In relation to the declaration of a disaster situation by the Minister and Premier, the SDCC is to be advised so that the Forms DM 06: 'Extension of a disaster situation - State level' or DM 07: 'End a disaster situation - State level' are completed at that centre as appropriate.

Forms DM 03, DM 04, DM 06 and DM 07 are available on QPS Forms Select;

(iv) immediately after:

(a) the disaster situation has ended under ss. 66 or 71 of the DMA; or

(b) receiving a completed Form DM 04, including the Minister's approval to end the disaster declaration, from the SDCC;

inform the relevant declared disaster officers, regional assistant commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) of the ending of the declaration; and

(v) at suitable time and place as soon as practicable following the ending of a disaster situation, brief all key personnel and support agencies, and ensure that any necessary amendments are made to disaster management plans.

### Rescue powers



**POLICY**

An emergency situation may occur where rescue powers may be required to be exercised in particular with the situation (an emergency situation in this policy is a situation other than one declared under *Preservation Act* (PSPA)). As the need arises DDCs are to:

(i) authorise under s. 110: 'Authorising persons to exercise rescue powers' of the DMA, a person powers in relation to an emergency situation that may arise during the disaster situation. For DM 11: 'Authorisation of persons to exercise rescue powers' (see ss. 110, 111: 'Power to enter 'General powers' of the DMA) may be used. This Form is available on QPS Forms Select.

Prior to any authority being given, the DDC is to be satisfied on reasonable grounds it is necessary for a person to exercise rescue powers in relation to an emergency situation to ensure the following are carried out effectively:

(a) rescue or similar operations in an emergency situation;

(b) other operations in an emergent situation to:

- help injured persons; or
- protect persons or property from danger or potential danger associated with the emergency situation;

(ii) if the authorisation under paragraph (i) is given orally, ensure that the authorisation is put in writing as reasonably practicable thereafter (see s. 110(3) of the DMA); and

(iii) ensure that a person authorised under paragraph (i) exercises the rescue powers in accordance with the authorisation, subject to any conditions contained therein and subject to the provisions of ss. 110, 111 of the DMA.

**Compensation****POLICY**

A person who suffers loss or damage because of the exercise, or purported exercise, of a power under the DMA, including a power under ss. 107, 108: 'General provision about powers', 111 or 112 of the DMA may apply to the compensation for the loss or damage. When a Form DM 09: 'Notice to remove or demolish or destroy structure in a disaster situation' or Form DM 10: 'Notice of a direction about property' is given, the person who suffers loss or damage is advised of the provisions of Part 11: 'Provisions about compensation' of the DMA, and where appropriate provide that person with a copy of Form DM 12: 'Application for compensation' or alternatively advise the person that Form DM 12 can be obtained by contacting the Disaster Operations Services, Department of Community Safety (see Contact Directory of this Manual).

Forms DM 09, DM 10 and DM 12 are available on QPS Forms Select.

**17.2.3 Responsibilities of the Service in disaster management****POLICY**

In addition to the powers and responsibilities included in ss. 17.2.1: 'District disaster coordinators', 'Disaster situation' the Service's responsibilities in relation to disaster management include:

- (i) providing executive support to the State Disaster Management Group;
- (ii) coordinating the disaster response operations for the State group when a QPS officer is a Disaster Coordinator;

- (iii) providing executive support to the District Disaster Management Groups;
- (iv) establishing and management of District Disaster Coordination Centres;
- (v) coordinating disaster operations in the disaster district for the district group, including the appropriate resources and support to help local groups carry out disaster operations;
- (vi) managing and coordinating the business of district groups;
- (vii) ensuring, as far as practicable, that district groups perform their functions;
- (viii) providing membership on each Local Disaster Management Group;
- (ix) preserving peace and good order;
- (x) prevention of crime;
- (xi) maintaining any site as a possible crime scene;
- (xii) coronial investigation procedures;
- (xiii) disaster victim identification;
- (xiv) establishing temporary mortuaries;
- (xv) traffic control, including assistance with road closures and maintenance of road blocks;
- (xvi) coordinating evacuation operations;
- (xvii) coordinating search and rescue operations;
- (xviii) coordinating evacuations and receptions;
- (xix) registering evacuees and assisting with inquiries regarding evacuations in conjunction with QPS and Red Cross will undertake this role via the National Registration and Inquiry System;
- (xx) security of damaged premises;
- (xxi) responding to and investigating traffic, rail and air accidents;
- (xxii) guidance on Counter-Terrorism issues.

#### **17.2.4 Earthquakes**

Technical information about earthquakes can be obtained from Geoscience Australia, Canberra (see POLICY

District officers are to:

- (i) establish a police forward command post (PFCP) and where practicable, a public inquiry centre;
- (ii) consider the safety of members of the public and emergency service personnel in the affected area;
- (iii) establish contact with the Duty Officer, PCC, Brisbane who has a contact telephone number in Canberra which can provide technical information concerning earthquakes. Inform:

and other related matters can then be monitored and communicated to the PFCP;

(iv) where appropriate, evacuate all persons not involved in rescue, response, or recovery of safety (see s. 17.4: 'Evacuation' of the Operational Procedures Manual);

(v) prepare for the probability and likely effects of aftershocks;

(vi) coordinate the rescue of any persons trapped. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (agency in urban search and rescue situations;

(vii) liaise with the State Emergency Service (SES) or local council concerning barricading an

(viii) ensure that personal particulars of persons entering areas affected by the earthquake a

(ix) assess the damage to emergency services facilities or equipment;

(x) liaise with other organisations such as:

(a) the local electricity authority;

(b) the works department of the local government authority;

(c) Queensland Transport concerning road disruptions; and

(d) Queensland Rail concerning rail disruptions;

(xi) determine if any special plans or sub-plans contained in the local disaster management plan activated;

(xii) request attendance of the Disaster Victim Identification Squad (DVIS) in cases of multiple

(xiii) secure affected areas while the disaster response takes place; and

(xiv) coordinate local government authorities regarding:

(a) clearing of debris from public areas;

(b) repairing damaged drainage systems;

(c) assessing safety of damaged buildings through the local authority, planning or works inspectors;

(d) assistance in establishing evacuation areas for those persons displaced by the earthquake

(e) provision of barricading and support equipment such as lighting.

The Duty Officer, PCC, Brisbane is to:

(i) establish contact with and seek advice from Geoscience Australia, Canberra;

(ii) where applicable, remain as the point of contact between the advisory organisation and the commander (PFC); and

(iii) communicate all information in relation to the earthquake, its aftershocks or any predicted

### 17.2.5 Exotic diseases in animals

Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, is the lead agency for exotic animal disease emergencies which occur in:

- (i) Queensland; or
- (ii) other states or territories and pose a threat to Queensland.

Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, developed the QLDVET Plan. This is a threat specific sub-plan of the State Disaster Plan and is part of the CCG. The person responsible at a local level is the Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries regional disease control centre. This person will be a senior Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries veterinarian.

Details of the Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries QLDVET Plan are contained in the SCDC

#### POLICY

Members of the Service receiving advice of a suspected outbreak of an exotic disease are to:

- (i) notify Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries;
- (ii) immediately advise the district officer and report what activities have been undertaken; and
- (iii) advise and liaise with the QPS Stock Investigation Squad.

The area to be controlled will depend upon the extent of the suspected infected area and the type of disease. The first steps taken within Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries is for a diagnostic team to undertake a definite diagnosis. Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries will decide whether or not to initiate control procedures.

When an exotic animal disease has been identified, Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries will establish a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) as near as practicable to the outbreak site. A State Disease Control Headquarters is established in Brisbane.

Under the *Exotic Diseases in Animals Act* there are four classifications of controlled areas. Each has a different meaning according to the nature of the classification. The four classifications are:

(i) **Infected premises:** An inspector on being satisfied that an exotic disease or animal pathogen is being present, is required to define the boundary of the area and quarantine it by giving written notice to the owner. Quarantine shall continue for ninety-six hours from the giving of the notice or until the responsible Minister. No person, animal, property, animal product or pathogen, and biological material shall be permitted to leave or enter the area, except with the permission of an inspector;

(ii) **Restricted areas:** The effect of such a notification is similar to that of an Infected premises. The Minister may notify any area as a restricted area in respect of any exotic disease specified in the Act. It includes circumstances where it has not been confirmed that an exotic disease is present with the opinion of the chief inspector, that there is a real possibility that the disease is present and may be introduced into the area from elsewhere.

Unless a licence has been first obtained in the approved form from an inspector, no person shall bring, move or remove any animal, carcass, animal product, animal pathogen or biological material, fodder, property, vehicle or vessel or anything likely to spread the exotic disease into, within or from the area;

(iii) **Standstill zones:** Such notifications are to specify the species or class of animals and the type of carcass, animal product, biological preparation, property, vehicle or vessel to which they apply. Notwithstanding that a licence may have been issued under s. 11: 'Licence required for movements' of the *Exotic Diseases in Animals Act*.

For as long as a stand still zone continues, a person shall not move or cause, suffer, permit a person to move any animal of a species or class specified in the notification, or any article or the exotic disease specified in the notification from a holding or premises within the standstill place either within or outside the boundaries of the standstill zone, or from any place outside standstill zone into the standstill zone; and

(iv) **Control areas:** Such notifications may specify the species or class of animals to which Control areas are used to prohibit, regulate or control the exposure, movement or the holding of animals of a species or class in the notice. The powers of the chief inspector and inspectors of areas is contained in s. 19: 'Powers of chief inspector and inspectors' of the *Exotic Diseases in Animals Act*

Officers are to assist inspectors in enforcing the powers and functions of the *Exotic Diseases in Animals Act*

District officers are to nominate a senior officer to act as a liaison officer to coordinate the Service's Primary Industries and Fisheries.

Service responsibilities with regard to incidents related to exotic diseases in animals include:

- (i) traffic control where it may be necessary to divert traffic flow around an infected area;
- (ii) ensuring that the provisions of s. 16: 'Helping public officials exercise powers under other Powers and Responsibilities Act' are complied with when police have been called to assist an incident under the *Exotic Diseases in Animals Act*;
- (iii) obtaining sufficient staff to perform the functions required by an inspector;
- (iv) stock movement control to monitor the movement of animals to and from a controlled area;
- (v) establishing security patrols, interception sites and check points. These locations should include those consisting of at least one officer and one inspector from Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries;
- (vi) tracing of suspected stock, infected material and persons (e.g. refrigerated semi-trailers suspected infected meat);
- (vii) assisting Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries officers with the investigation of incidents;
- (viii) assisting with the destruction of stock under the direction of the veterinarian in charge of premises or property; and
- (ix) ensuring radio communications operate effectively; (depending upon the magnitude of the incident it may be advisable to arrange for deployment of the operational command vehicle).

District officers are responsible for collating information as to the costs incurred by the Service in a disaster. Details of the costs incurred are to be forwarded to the officer in charge of the Service to recover those costs from Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries, Department of Employment and Innovation.

### 17.2.6 Bushfires

The location and the circumstances related to a bushfire will determine which authority will be the agency may also be designated in a disaster plan for a disaster district. Authorities responsible for bushfires may include:

- (i) Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) - urban and rural operations;
- (ii) Queensland Forest Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service for state forests; or
- (iii) local government authorities.

Legislative provisions relating to the control of fires in Queensland are contained in the *Fire and Re-forestry Act*. These Acts make provision for the prevention, control and suppression of fires and for resulting from fires.

#### POLICY

Officers attending a bushfire are to:

- (i) assist and give reasonably necessary help to officers of the lead agency. In providing this to comply with the provisions of s. 793: 'Helping at fire or hazardous materials emergency' of *and Responsibilities Act*, where appropriate;
- (ii) in consultation with the office in charge of the lead agency identify the best access route emergency vehicles (uphill and upwind if possible);
- (iii) ascertain the number of persons in, or likely to be in the area and account for all casual and confirmed number), including dead, injured and the total number of persons. This information transmitted to the local PCC;
- (iv) seek descriptions of any suspects if the cause of the fire is suspicious;
- (v) secure evacuated areas to guard against unauthorised entry; and
- (vi) comply with the provisions of s. 13.8: 'Fires' of this Manual.

Where it has been identified that a bushfire is encroaching upon and potentially threatening a community, agency officers should coordinate a planned and appropriate response in relation to ordering the evacuation or allowing the identified residents to remain within their properties to defend against fire (See s. 5 direction of authorised fire officer' of the *Fire and Rescue Service Act*). See also s. 17.4: 'Evacuation Procedures Manual'.

A police forward commander (PFC) should:

- (i) establish communications with the local bush fire control centre to monitor the fire's move (one of the greatest dangers associated with such fires is the possibility of being trapped following wind direction);
- (ii) in consultation with the officer in charge of the lead agency, consider a request to the local authority to disconnect power to the affected area;
- (iii) where appropriate, alert the local controller of the SES, local government, hospitals, relevant authorities and volunteer organisations; and
- (iv) ensure that all volunteers and staff under their control are accounted for.

#### 17.2.7 Cyclones, floods or storm tides

##### POLICY

Generally, incidents which involve cyclones, floods or storm tides are handled by local authorities. The Local Disaster Management Group 'local group' is usually given operational responsibility for these incidents and are to consider these situations in the context of existing disaster management framework e.g. Disaster Management Framework. See also ss. 17.2: 'Disaster management' and 17.3: 'Incident management' of the Operational Procedures Manual.

Officers should consider the following hazards and where practicable take appropriate precautions in the following situation:

- (i) fallen or exposed power lines, including those which may be in or under water;

- (ii) the danger of power lines coming into contact with boats or boat occupants as a result of
- (iii) snakes and spiders seeking refuge in hollow walls, rafters, ceilings of houses and vessels
- (iv) sheets of roofing, iron or other debris being blown about by strong winds;
- (v) the volume and force of water involved; and
- (vi) the potential danger to life of any person entering the water.

Police forward commanders (PFCs) should:

- (i) determine priorities for assisting the community;
- (ii) ensure that measures are taken to protect the public from fallen power lines, wash-outs, unsafe places and flooded areas;
- (iii) ensure sufficient staff are available to assist in the implementation of any local disaster r
- (iv) where necessary, consult with:
  - (a) the chair of the local group;
  - (b) engineers and storm tide technical advisors from the relevant local government au
  - (c) the Bureau of Meteorology;
- (v) coordinate all evacuations (see s. 17.4: 'Evacuation' of the Operational Procedures Manu
- (vi) liaise with Queensland Transport regarding road conditions and Queensland Rail regardir appropriate (if the road and rail links to an affected area are impassable, all evacuations wol out by air);
- (vii) deploy personnel to make local checks of changing flood or tide heights in accordance w plans. Information concerning changing flood or tide heights are to be reported to the local g Bureau of Meteorology;
- (viii) where required, establish and update the relevant QPRIME occurrence; and
- (ix) arrange regular media releases to the local community concerning the situation.

### 17.2.8 Space debris

While most space debris disintegrates and burns up entirely on re-entry into the atmosphere, it is of considerable size and weight to reach the Earth's surface. Over recent years, thousands of objects orbit, varying in size from a few cubic centimetres to complete space laboratories equipped with many tonnes.

Some orbiting space vehicles were designed with safety mechanisms to allow components to separate on re-entry. This may facilitate the burning-up process. However, the trajectory of these detached components may differ from the forecast path of the main vehicle and multiple re-entry events could occur over a period of days or result in multiple activations of this plan for a single space vehicle.

The Australian Contingency Plan for Space Re-Entry Debris (AUSCONPLAN-SPRED) has been prepared by the Commonwealth, and support State and Territory departments or authorities involved in activities arising from the re-entry of space debris.

The Commonwealth Government, through Emergency Management Australia (EMA), has the responsibility for the safe removal of radioactive space debris. The Emergency Services Division, Department of Communications and the Space Central Control Group (CCG), is responsible for development and maintenance of threat-specific space debris. The Disaster Coordination Centre will advise the Service as to the forecasted re-entry of any space debris.

### **Warning phase**

Police involvement will commence with a warning of the forecasted re-entry indicating the possibility of space debris on Australia in seven days time. The warning is characterised by the issue of the codeword SPRED-AUSCOMPLAN-SPRED.

Where the Service is advised of a codeword SPRED-WHITE the Duty Officer, Police Communications, will receive SITREPs from the State Disaster Coordination Centre on the progress of the projected re-entry.

### **PROCEDURE**

The **Duty Officer, PCC**, Brisbane is to ensure that regular SITREPs are provided to the:

- (i) Superintendent, Communications Branch;
- (ii) Superintendent, Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch;
- (iii) Operations Coordinator, Operations Support Command; and
- (iv) officers in charge of regions that may be affected by the re-entry of space debris.

Officers in charge of any region which may be affected by the re-entry of space debris upon being advised by district officers under their control:

- (i) are advised to make plans for the preparatory and post impact phases; and
- (ii) appoint PFCs to establish incident management teams in their area of responsibility.

### **Preparatory phase**

The preparatory phase begins when the forecasted re-entry indicates a probability of impact of space debris in seven days time. The preparatory phase is characterised by the issue of the codeword SPRED-YELLOW from the Disaster Coordination Centre.

### **PROCEDURE**

The **Operations Coordinator, Operations Support Command** is to:

- (i) appoint a member from Operations Support Command to act as a liaison officer to:
  - (a) the State Disaster Coordination Centre;
  - (b) officers in charge of likely to be affected regions; and
  - (c) the Operations Coordinator, Operations Support Command;
- (ii) seek approval of the Assistant Commissioner, Operations Support Command for the issue regarding the predicted impact; and
- (iii) request PFCs to report the impact of any suspected space debris to the Superintendent, Event Planning Branch.



The liaison officer is to provide SITREPs to the Superintendent, Disaster and Major Event Planning

The **Superintendent, Disaster and Major Event Planning Branch** is to:

- (i) assume the role of police commander for the overall coordination of the policing response of the police response is the responsibility of the PFCs in the relevant regions;
- (ii) ensure that radiation monitoring personnel from the Radiation Control Centre, Queensland placed on standby and where necessary assist with their deployment to an affected area;
- (iii) collate all information forwarded from the regions on possible sightings or re-entry of such information should be forwarded to the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC); and
- (iv) ensure the SDCC is consulted in relation to the following arrangements:
  - (a) the arrival of the Australian Space Debris Emergency Search Team (ASDEST);
  - (b) the progress of Emergency Management Australia (EMA) in analysing tracking data to locate all possible space debris;
  - (c) deployment of search aircraft to commence delineation of the estimated impact site;
  - (d) where the ASDEST field headquarters is to be established.

#### **Post impact phase**

The post impact phase begins when there is impact of space debris in Australia. The post impact phase issue of the codeword SPRED-RED from the AUSCOMPLAN-SPRED.

#### **PROCEDURE**

PFCs should:

- (i) ensure that sufficient police and other emergency support personnel, equipment and facilities deployment and use as required at the incident scenes;
- (ii) ensure sufficient radio communications equipment is available;
- (iii) assist the local counter disaster committee to implement any threat specific plan;
- (iv) advise the district officer;
- (v) record and confirm all reports of debris impact (there may be more than one);
- (vi) notify the Duty Officer PCC, Brisbane of the impact locations;
- (vii) establish an outer cordon at a distance around the point of impact as directed by EMA. The type of radioactive material will determine the distances selected;
- (viii) advise on, or establish a suitable site for a helipad and landing facilities for fixed wing aircraft refuelling sites for aircraft;
- (ix) consider a declaration of an emergency situation under s. 5: 'Declaration of emergency' of the *Safety Preservation Act*;
- (x) ensure security measures are implemented to stop unauthorised persons entering the outer restricted areas;

- (xi) take up with and brief members of the ASDEST upon their arrival;
- (xii) ensure security of any temporary storage area for radioactive debris if established by ASDEST;
- (xiii) provide or arrange an escort for the movement of radioactive debris in conjunction with the relevant divisions through which the material will be transported;
- (xiv) ensure regular SITREPs are despatched to the Duty Officer, PCC, Brisbane; and
- (xv) comply with the provisions of s. 1.4.6: 'Responsibilities of regional duty officer, district commander or supervisor' of this Manual.

### 17.3.1 Emergency situations

The *Public Safety Preservation Act* (PSPA) provides for the declaration of an Emergency situation (ES). An ES may be declared by any commissioned officer.

Relevant terms are defined in the Schedule to the PSPA.

'Emergency situations' are dealt with under Part 2, ss. 5: 'Declaration of emergency situation', 6: 'Effect of declaration under Disaster Management Act 2003', 7: 'Power to delegate', and 8: 'Powers of emergency commander' of the PSPA.

The term '**Emergency situation**' means:

- (i) any explosion or fire;
- (ii) any oil or chemical spill;
- (iii) any escape of gas, radioactive material or flammable or combustible liquids;
- (iv) any accident involving an aircraft, or a train, vessel or vehicle;
- (v) any incident involving a bomb or other explosive device or a firearm or other weapon;
- (vi) any impact of a naturally occurring event such as a flood or a landslide; or
- (vii) any other accident;

that causes or may cause a danger of death, injury or distress to any person, a loss of or damage to any property or pollution of the environment, includes a situation arising from any report in respect of any of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) which if proved to be correct would cause or may cause a danger of death, injury or distress to any person, a loss of or damage to any property or pollution of the environment (see Schedule of the PSPA).

*(Note - an ES is one of those events which are set out in paragraphs (a) to (f) having the resultant effect of causing the outcome mentioned in the definition. Therefore, if:*

*(i) the event mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f):*

*(a) does not cause; or*

*(b) is not likely to cause;*

*danger of death, injury or distress to any person, a loss of or damage to any property pollution of the environment; or*

*(ii) if any report of an event mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f), which if proven to be correct:*

*(a) would not cause; or*

*(b) is not likely to cause,*

*a danger of death, injury or distress to any person, a loss of or damage to any property or pollution of the environment,*

*then an ES has **not** arisen.)*

### Use of an ES for disaster events

For a number of disaster events, the initial response by the Service may be adequately dealt with through declaration of an ES under the PSPA.

A minor disaster event may be satisfactorily addressed under the PSPA without the need to seek access to the powers available under a disaster situation declaration made pursuant to *Disaster Management Act (DMA)*.

However in all such cases the emergency commander must remain cognisant of the requirements of s. 6 of the PSPA, which requires an emergency situation to be revoked if a declaration for a disaster situation under the DMA has also been made unless the emergency commander or commissioned officer believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the PSPA declaration to remain in force.

In determining whether a situation should continue to be dealt with under the PSPA, or if declaration of a disaster situation under the DMA is appropriate, consideration should be given to the scale, nature and timeliness of the event.

The **scale** of an event refers to the extent to which the event impacts the community. Section 13: 'Meaning of disaster' of the DMA defines a disaster as:

*'...a serious disruption in a community, caused by an event, that requires a significant coordinated response by the State and other entities to help the community recover from the disruption'*

The **nature** of the event refers to the definition of an emergency situation under the PSPA, which includes:

*'...any impact of a naturally occurring event such as a flood or a landslide'*

While a flood or landslide would generally be considered a natural disaster, and the DMA the more appropriate legislation to use, under certain circumstances the PSPA may be used to provide an immediate response to the impact of events such as these, where public safety is at immediate risk.

The **timeliness** of the event refers to the speed with which the event should be dealt with. It may be beneficial to have the matter dealt with using the PSPA for speed of response and to ensure the safety of members of the public (also considering the scale and nature of the event). A PSPA declaration can be made significantly quicker than a declaration under the DMA.

If the event is such that the response needs to be dealt with under the DMA, the district disaster coordinator (DDC) for the area where the event is occurring or likely to occur should be consulted and briefed. A disaster situation under s. 64: 'Declaration' of the DMA can only be made by the DDC for the relevant disaster district with the approval of the Minister. Once the declaration is made, the powers under s. 77: 'General powers' of the DMA are then available to the relevant DDC.

### Handover considerations

A handover of control of an event from powers under an ES to powers under a DMA declaration needs to be planned to ensure no gaps occur in powers available to public officials, and no unnecessary risk to public safety occurs.

When an emergency commander, or if the emergency commander is not available, another commissioned officer of the same or more senior rank, determines that the emergency situation declaration is to be revoked pursuant to s. 6 of the PSPA, prior to revoking the emergency situation declaration transition of control of the incident should be planned with the DDC. In planning the handover the following key issues should be considered:

- (i) availability of suitable resources to take over management of the incident site from the Service resources (some incidents may involve only Service resources);
- (ii) briefing of all persons who will be involved in the management of the incident under the DMA to ensure an understanding of the relevant provisions of that legislation; and
- (iii) time and date for the transition to take effect. A record of the agreement for handover should be in writing.

The term 'emergency commander' means the commissioned officer who declares that an ES exists in respect of a specified area (see Schedule and s. 5 of the PSPA).

### **Declaration of emergency situation**

#### **POLICY**

If at any time a commissioned officer is satisfied on reasonable grounds that an ES has arisen or is likely to arise the commissioned officer may declare that an ES exists in respect of an area specified by the commissioned officer.

Once an ES is declared, and the emergency commander is satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to effectively deal with that ES, he or she (and any other police officer acting on his or her instructions) may use the powers contained in s. 8: 'Powers of emergency commander' of the PSPA.

A commissioned officer who declares an ES (the emergency commander), is to:

(i) as soon as practicable after he or she declares that an ES exists, issue and sign a certificate to that effect. The certificate is to set out the nature of the ES, the time and date it was declared to exist and the area in respect of which it exists (see QP460: 'Emergency Situation Declaration Certificate' on QPS Forms Select);

(ii) when invoking the provisions of s. 8: 'Powers of emergency commander' of the PSPA, in relation to any 'resource surrender direction', 'resource operator direction', 'help direction' or in taking control of any resource:

(a) ensure that any such resource is:

- located and used in the area specified and for the duration of the declared ES;
- in a safe condition and note any pre-existing damage prior to use;
- operated only by trained or appropriately licensed persons and that the person operating the resource is not placed in danger; and

(b) in cases where any such resource has been used, damaged or destroyed, advise the possible claimant of the provisions of s. 46: 'Compensation for use of, damage to or destruction of property' of the PSPA;

(c) in cases of personal injury suffered by a person subject of resource operator direction or a help direction:

- advise the injured person or the possible claimant of the

provisions of ss. 45: 'Compensation for personal injury' of the PSPA. A person acting under a resource operator direction or a help direction is taken, for the *Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act*, to be employed by the Commissioner (see s. 45 of the PSPA). See also Appendix 17.13: 'Powers of responders under PSPA 1986 (generally)' of the Operational Procedures Manual;

- comply with the relevant provisions of:

- s. 21.4: 'Notification, recording, reporting and investigation of work-related incidents and injuries' of the Human Resource Management Manual; and

- s. 22.1: 'Worker's Compensation' of the Human Resource Management Manual, in particular s. 22.1.4.5: 'Officers in Charge/Managers'; and

(d) in the report forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations) pursuant to point (v), include information outlining whether compensation may be an issue under the provisions of s. 45 and 46 of the PSPA and estimates of the compensation that may be claimed.

(iii) when delegating the powers of an emergency commander pursuant to s. 7: 'Power to delegate' of the PSPA, ensure that the relevant section of the QP460: 'Emergency Situation Declaration Certificate' is fully and accurately completed;

(iv) revoke the declaration when the ES no longer exists and note the time and date of the revocation on the QP460: 'Emergency Situation Declaration Certificate'. (i.e. When the ES no longer causes, or no longer may cause, a danger of death, injury or distress to any person or any loss of or damage to property or pollution to the environment.) If the emergency commander is unavailable, another commissioned officer of the same or more senior rank is to revoke the declaration and complete the revocation certificate; and

(v) where the commissioned officer making the declaration is attached to a region, forward the QP460: 'Emergency Situation Declaration Certificate', together with a report, to the Deputy Commissioner (Regional Operations), alternatively where the commissioned officer is attached to a command, to the Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Operations), within fourteen days of the declaration of the ES. The relevant Deputy Commissioner will subsequently forward the certificate to Registry for retention for a period of at least six years in accordance with s. 5(5) of the PSPA.

#### ORDER

The declaration that an ES exists shall continue until revoked by the emergency commander or if the emergency commander is unavailable, another commissioned officer of the same or more senior rank (see s. 5(3) of the PSPA).

If an ES is later declared to be a terrorist emergency (TE) or a chemical, biological or radiological emergency (CBRE), the declaration of the ES has no effect for the area or for all or part of a situation for which the TE or the CBRE has been declared to exist. An ES is affected by the existence of a TE or a CBRE only while the TE or CBRE is in force (see s. 43A of the PSPA). This means, all the powers that come with an ES also apply to the CBRE or TE area, however, the CBRE commander, TE commander or TE forward commander overrides any powers of the emergency commander in the CBRE or TE area respectively for the extent of the declaration.

An ES that is in force when a disaster situation is declared pursuant to the DMA is to be revoked by the emergency commander, or if the emergency commander is unavailable, another commissioned officer of the same or more senior rank, unless the emergency commander or commissioned officer believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the declaration under s. 5 of the PSPA to remain in force (see s. 6 of the PSPA).

**Appendix 17.22**  
**(s. 17.2.1)**


**Chairpersons – District Disaster Management Groups**

The following QPS District Officer positions have been appointed Chairpersons of District Disaster Management Groups under s. 25(1)(a) of the *Disaster Management Act*.

<b>District Disaster Management Group</b>	<b>Appointee</b>
Brisbane	Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan North Region
Bundaberg	Superintendent, Bundaberg Police District
Cairns	Superintendent, Cairns Police District
Charleville	Inspector, Charleville Police District
Dalby	Inspector, Dalby Police District
Gladstone	Inspector, Gladstone Police District
Gold Coast	Superintendent, Gold Coast Police District
Gympie	Superintendent, Gympie Police District
Innisfail	Inspector, Innisfail Police District
Ipswich	Superintendent, Ipswich Police District
Logan	Superintendent, Logan Police District
Longreach	Inspector, Longreach Police District
Mackay	Superintendent, Mackay Police District
Mareeba	Inspector, Mareeba Police District
Maryborough	Superintendent, Maryborough Police District
Mt. Isa	Superintendent, Mt. Isa Police District
Redcliffe	Superintendent, Redcliffe Police District
Rockhampton	Superintendent, Rockhampton Police District
Roma	Inspector, Roma Police District
Sunshine Coast	Superintendent, Sunshine Coast Police District
Toowoomba	Superintendent, Toowoomba Police District
Townsville	Superintendent, Townsville Police District
Warwick	Inspector, Warwick Police District



## 'QPS-06'

QPS Support Structure to the State Disaster Executives

"QPS-07"

)

**BRISBANE**

**Queensland Police Service  
Major Incident Room Brisbane  
Situation Report (Sitrep)**

**Date:** 11 January 2011  
**Time:** 1115 hrs  
**Sitrep:** #1

<i>Tally</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Unknown</i>	<i>Total</i>
Confirmed deceased	3	4	2	9
Missing persons			11	11
				20

**Deceased details:**

- [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]  
(recovered)
- [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] (recovered)
- 1 x female & 2 x children [REDACTED] family in light truck at 1342 Gatton – Helidon Rd (recovered)
- 2 x persons (names not provided) Kitchener/James Street Toowoomba (recovered)

**Key Geographical Areas of Concern:**

- Murphy's Creek, Helidon, Withcott, Grantham, Toowoomba Range, Toowoomba City, Mt Kynoch, Minden.
- Road access blocked via Warwick and Esk.
- Warrego Highway, Glenore Grove impeded. Heavy vehicles are to provide transport across Glenore Grove.

**MISSION:**

*To support the police response to flooding in South East Queensland.*

**TASKS:**

- *To gain situational awareness as to the scale of the event in Brisbane Police Districts, Ipswich Police District and Toowoomba Police District;*
- *To identify the location of police resources deployed to the flooding incident; and*
- *To co-ordinate police resources to support the police response*

**MIR STRUCTURE**

Commander                      AC Henderson  
Deputy Commander        Supt Chelepy

Staff Officer	Sgt Carroll-Clay
Ops T/Leader	Insp Harland
	PO4 Moffitt
	PO2 Bellet
	A/Sgt Price
Planning T/L	Insp Rohweder
	Sgt Wann
Adm/Logistics T/Leader	AO Ely
	Hanlon
	Sgt Dawson
Intell T/Leader	Insp Harland
Media T/leader	Simon Kelly
Investigations T/L	Det Insp Ian Charlston
DVI Liaison	Insp Baker
SARMAC Co-ord	S/Sgt P Appleyard
Air Wing Coord	Sgt Sean Hanlen

### **MIR Activity**

#### Sourcing:

- Sgt Jim Murphy ( ) Coordinating and Liaising with State SARMAC. Search Coords Simon Goodwin ( ), Tony Harm and Lindsay Kurht attending.

#### Acquisition:

- AFP has supplied 10 x 4WD vehicles (and 6 staff for 2-3 days)
- ADF has provided 2 x Blackhawk helicopters and 2 x Sea King helicopters for 11/1/11.
- Rescue #500 & Rescue #510 EMQ Helicopters
- QAS to provide Paramedic Team to Grantham and Murphy's Creek search areas.
- QFRS to provide Swift Water and Tech Rescue Team to Murphy's Creek and Grantham.

#### Major issues:

- The death toll is anticipated to increase.
- 2 x Blackhawks currently grounded due to weather and 2 x Sea Kings inbound to Amberley to refuel but cannot reach Amberley due to weather
- Warrego Highway currently cut between Ipswich and Gatton- will hinder additional staff deployments.
- There may be a requirement to ensure more traffic/other personnel are deployed to the affected districts to support police operations (as per DDC request).
- On going sourcing will be required over next week in relation to staff and equipment.

- LANSAR – imperative that every dwelling/out building etc is search in the flood zone. An aerial recon will be required to establish the debris field and the search area extent (as wide as the debris field).
- Downstream effect on Wivenhoe Dam and Brisbane River in Brisbane.

QPS POC Activity:

- Planning Cell currently mapping hydrology information and engaging in forward planning in relation to this
- Operations Cell coordinating SITREPS, maintaining Occurrence Sheet, coordinating Air Wing and deployment of ADF helicopter resources, overseeing task allocation.

Media and Public Information:

- At this stage all media enquiries are being handled by Police Media Unit (Police Headquarters, Brisbane).

## **Disaster District Activity**

### **Toowoomba Disaster District**

Current police resources (for 11/01/11):

- (6a-2p) 9 x General Duties, 5 x Traffic, 7 x Detectives, 4 x Tactical Crime
- (2p-10p) – 4 x detectives, 2 x Traffic, 8 x General Duties
- (10p-6a) – 2 x detectives, 7 x General Duties
- 20 x QPS officers to be transported via helicopter from Archerfield tasked to Forest Hill
- 40 x QPS officers on standby at Oxley Academy
- 2 x Sea King Helicopters & 2 x Blackhawk helicopters deployed to Forest Hill for evacuations to Gatton. Next evacuations for helicopter operations are from Grantham. 2 x Blackhawks currently grounded due to weather and 2 x Sea Kings inbound to Amberley to refuel but cannot reach Amberley due to weather. Attempting alternative fuelling arrangements via road transport (1115 11/1/11)
- EMQ helicopter #500 currently grounded due to weather. Helicopter #510 just sourced diesel to fly missions, but needs to refuel with Avgas next.

Resource requirements for next 12-24 hours:

- QPS and SES staff to assist in ground search of waterways and surrounds between Spring Bluff and Warrego Highway (significant distance)
- Nil additional police required for Toowoomba at this stage (1100 11/1/11)

Current operations:

- An MIR (OPERATION JULIET DREW) has been established at Southern Region, Regional Office and staffed throughout the night of 10/1/11.
  - The MIR has focused on the processing of Missing Person Reports received as a result of the flood event. A large number of persons remain unaccounted for at this time however it could be reasonably assumed that a number of these persons are safe but are uncountable.
- Toowoomba CBD is in lock-down. Numerous road closures within CBD area specifically either side of West Creek.
- Local Police from the Toowoomba District have continued to patrol and conduct searches of properties, roadways and water courses. These activities have been supported by staff from the Ipswich District and Operations Support Command.
- Forward Command Post established at Murphy's Creek State School (4630 5259) and Grantham. LDMG's activated in Toowoomba and Lockyer Valley. DDCC activated.
- Impromptu Evacuation Centres at Murphy's Creek, Grantham and Gatton.
- Coordination activities have continued throughout the night between the Toowoomba DDC and SDCC for resource assistance during the daylight hours of the 11/01/2011.
- Sandy Creek (Forest Hill) and Laidley Creek (Laidley) has made large scale evacuations of both towns at request of LDMG.
- Priorities as per OPERATION JULIET-DREW SITREP at 11am
  - Evacuation of people from Forest Hill and Laidley
  - Withdrawal of people from Murphy's Creek including police due to imminent flood warning
  - Recovery of deceased.

#### Specific Operations:

- 0930 11/1/11 – Informant Simon Johnston (QFRS) states helicopter #220 to 104 Lowood Rd, Minden; 2 x adults on roof of residence & 1 x child unknown age washed away.
  - 0930 11/1/11 – (QFRS) helicopter #220 attending 212 Gitten St Withcott to evacuate 2 x adults and 2 x children from residence; dwelling surrounded by water and shifting.
-

**S L CHELEPY**  
**Supt**  
**Deputy POC Commander**  
**11 January 2011**

Version – 1.0 21/12/10



## Local Disaster Management Group Situation Report

<b>TO:</b>	<b>District Disaster Coordinator, Brisbane</b>
<b>C.C.</b>	CEO, Redland City Council Manager, Operations & Maintenance, Redland City Council Manager, Marketing & Communications, Redland City Council Superintendent, Wynnum Police District Inspector Peter Harding, QPS DD Executive Officer, Brisbane Disaster District
<b>FROM:</b>	<b>Chair, Local Disaster Management Group</b>

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Sitrep No.</b>
<b>10 Jan, 2010</b>	<b>1815 hrs</b>	<b>1</b>

### SITUATION OVERVIEW

#### Executive Summary


Following recent heavy rains, a section of retaining wall at a building site at the northern end of Wellington Point (end of Main Road) just adjacent to the Recreational Park has collapsed and a land slip of the fill has occurred. The site has been identified as a significant hazard by Council and Geo-Technical Engineers have been engaged to assess the site and provide advice on the public risk.

The Redland City Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) met at 2pm to discuss the issue and take action to mitigate the risk.

The attached aerial photograph identifies the hazard area.



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Shop

Retaining walls

#### Weather (Local observations)

Severe weather warning current. Currently - Light rain. Refer [www.bom.gov.au](http://www.bom.gov.au). Forecast rain, heavy at times with local thunder. Moderate east to north east winds, fresh at times. Tuesday: Rain periods.

#### Damage Assessment Overview (Include brief Summary of effects)

A section of retaining wall located on the western side of property situated on Main Road, Wellington Point has collapsed and a large quantity of landfill has slid down onto the portion of Main Road. Refer photos.



- Council engaged David Starr and Associates, Geo-technical engineers to make an assessment of the site.
- Starr and Associates have provided information on the site at a meeting of the LDMG.

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- The following is a précis of that meeting:
  - The site is unsafe.
  - The backfill behind the retaining walls is saturated and probably not been compacted properly. There is a significant risk of further wall failures.
  - Short term – barricades need to be erected. Concrete with steel mesh along the middle of the road on the western side of the point (Main Road). Steel fencing to be erected along the eastern edge of the eastern road.
  - 6Foot steel fencing to be erected along the northern end in front of the shop. Engineers have been asked to provide a detailed site plan with fencing requirements.
  - There is a risk of the northern wall collapsing and cannot guarantee safety of the building situated at the northern end of the wall (shop).
  - The top of the site is unsafe to work on and it is imprudent to do any works on the top of the site at this stage. Do not move the current earth slip (debris) from western side as it is assisting to support the slip.

**A more detailed preliminary report from Starr and Associates has been requested for this evening.**

#### **Media Issues (Include brief details of any media related issues)**

A media release was issued by Council today regarding the wall collapse and landslip. Television stations have been on site and shown media interest.

## **REPORTS**

#### **Summary of Past 24 Hours (Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)**

See above (Damage Assessment)

#### **Projected Operations for Next 24/48 Hours (Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)**

##### **Current Action Taken:**

Barriers and fences have been erected to secure site, including the shop/cafe and car park at rear. Police have negotiated voluntary evacuations for tonight for the shop/cafe. Temporary access through carpark in place for residents at the end of the cul de sac. Traffic control to operate through the night.

Due to significant long term risk to public in area of road and shop there is a critical need to control movement of persons and vehicles in and out of at risk areas and around hazard, turn off/disconnect power and gas supplies to at risk areas for up to 7 days.

The site is supported on three sides by a very high tiered retaining wall. One side (western) has collapsed near the corner of the northern side with a large quantity of fill slipping down and encroaching onto the road. The northern end of the retaining wall abuts a large free-standing besser brick wall which stands on the boundary of a large building. Refer photo.

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Geo-Tech engineers believe that there is a significant risk that this northern wall will fail and that it will impact upon the car park at rear. They advised that the car park should not be used and that they could also not guarantee the safety of the building. They advised that the building should be evacuated.

They have also verbally stated that the walls may need to be demolished and at present it is unsafe to do any remedial work.

Medium Term Action: Control movement of persons in, out and around hazard. Take remedial action to secure and make site safe.

In addition to this problem, there is a partial road closure on Main Road (Causeway) approx. 500 metres south of the site. This has been caused by subsidence of the road. Council has erected traffic lights to manage traffic movement. Further investigation and design of rectification works may take several weeks.

Geo-Technical engineers have been requested to provide a report.

## SOCIAL

### Population

Deceased:	N/A
Injured:	N/A
Missing:	N/A

### Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	N/A
Numbers Registered at Centres:	N/A



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Numbers Staying in Centres:	N/A
Origin:	N/A

**Community Recovery Centres**

Locations:	N/A
Opening hours:	N/A
Numbers Utilising Centre:	N/A
Issues	N/A

**Health**

Public Health:	N/A
Mental Health:	N/A

**INFRASTRUCTURE****Transport***(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Road:	Access to point restricted due to hazard and closures. Need to control vehicular traffic into site.
Rail:	N/A
Marine:	MSQ have been advised re boating movements in and around point and will place an exclusion zone on all shipping tomorrow (11/1/11) to restrict sight-seers.
Other:	

**Structures**

Homes and Streets:	Building site located at Main Road, Wellington Point. No apparent risk to homes however residential unit in shop has been evacuated.
Council:	N/A
Government Offices:	N/A
Schools:	N/A
Hospitals:	N/A
Dams:	N/A

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**Services**

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	N/A
Mobile Telephone Network:	
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	

**Power** *(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)*

Mains power:	N/A
Auxiliary power;	

**Water**

N/A
-----

**Sewerage**

N/A
-----

**ECONOMIC****INDUSTRY**

Sector:	N/A
Sector:	
Finance:	

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**ENVIRONMENT****Environmental Impact**

N/A


Prepared By:	Date:	Time:	Signature:
M.Morrison	10/1/11	1800	

Authorised By:	Date:	Time:	Signature:
N. Clarke	10/1/11	1800	

**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**



**QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE  
DISTRICT DISASTER CO-ORDINATOR  
BRISBANE**



## SITUATION REPORT

**NUMBER:** 2      **DATE:** 11/01/2011      **TIME:** 0930

**INCIDENT / OPERATION:**

**DDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level 1)
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**LDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level1)	Redlands:	Alert
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~~Alert - monitor situation - no action required~~  
~~Lean Forward - on stand by - prepared but not activated~~  
~~Stand up - activated~~

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

**CURRENT THREAT:**

- Flooding/Inundation
- Damage to public/private infrastructure

**DDC / DDMG PRIORITIES:**

- Monitor potential threats
- Activate appropriate resources to respond

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS:** (Since last SITREP)

- Improved weather forecasts showing rain easing to showers with possibility of thunder storms for Brisbane area
- 

**POTENTIAL ISSUES:**

- Urban inundation localised flooding. Hydrological projections indicate at risk suburbs *Albion, Auchenflower, Bowen Hills, Brisbane City, Bulimba, Chelmer, Coorparoo, East Brisbane, Fairfield, Fig Tree Pocket, Fortitude Valley, Graceville, Hemmant, Indooroopilly, Kangaroo Point, Lytton, Milton, Moggill, Murarrie, New Farm, Newstead, Norman Park, Oxley, Pinkenba, Rocklea, Sherwood, South Brisbane, Tennyson, Yeronga, Yerongpilly, Windsor and Wacol.*

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2.

- Damage to public/private infrastructure

**STRATEGIC ASSESMENT:**

- Impact to Brisbane expected to be limited due to measure taken current dam release & reduced rainfall in the past 10 hours.
- Expected localised flooding consequence of tidal influences combined with dam releases Wivenhoe & Somerset.

**LDMG REPORTS:**

Brisbane:	Localised flooding Road closures causing minor traffic disruptions Request of DDMG for 20,000 sand bags delivered to Newmarket
Redlands:	Minor localised flooding Partial collapse retaining wall Main Rd Wellington Point ongoing response lane closed some traffic disruption will require further attention potential for DDC declaration to assist in management & rehabilitation

**AGENCY REPORTS:**

EMQ:	Activated and participating within the DDCC (Shane WOOD)
FIR:	
SEQ Water:	
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM):	Updates provided through BoM predictions
QFRA	No reported issues at this time
QAS	No reported issues at this time
SES	
Other Agencies:	No reported issues at this time

**COMMUNITY IMPACTS:**

- Community appraised of developments through SDCC media releases, individual agencies alerts with BCC & Redlands Council media alerts
- 

**ADDITONAL COMMENTS / ISSUES:**

- Peak events predicted 1400hrs Wednesday 12/01/2011 high tide mark Brisbane river & adjoining low lying suburbs.
- The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer Creek flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

**NUMBER:**

**DATE:**

**TIME:**



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2.

Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Sunday 16 January in varying degrees.

- Potential to enact provisions of DMA on request of Redlands LDMG re Wellington Point land slippage.

**Next SITREP issued at: 0930hrs 11/01/2011**

**Prepared by: A/S/Sgt Greg Matthies**

**Approved by:**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Name:

Position:

Date and time:

Distribution:

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

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
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**QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE  
DISTRICT DISASTER CO-ORDINATOR  
BRISBANE**



## SITUATION REPORT

**NUMBER:** 3                      **DATE:** 11/01/2011                      **TIME:** 1330

**INCIDENT /OPERATION:**

**DDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level 1)
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**LDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level1)	Redlands:	Alert
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Alert – monitor situation: no action required  
Lean Forward – on stand by: prepared but not activated  
Stand up – activated

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

**CURRENT THREAT:**

- Flooding/Inundation
- Damage to public/private infrastructure

**DDC / DDMG PRIORITIES:**

- Monitor potential threats
- Activate appropriate resources to respond
- Prepare for and assist with evacuation of up to 3,500 premises in affected areas

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS:** (Since last SITREP)

- Improved weather forecasts showing rain easing to showers with possibility of thunder storms for Brisbane area
- Current water levels for Brisbane river are 6000 cumecs
- Wivenhoe Dam is at 74m – change to primary objective of monitoring and ensuring the dam is not compromised
- High tide is 1330hrs and will be today's peak
- Likelihood of 8759 premises to be affected
- State level disaster declared by Premier
- Port of Brisbane is closing at midnight until further notice

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2.

**POTENTIAL ISSUES:**

- Urban inundation localised flooding exacerbated by releases from Wivenhoe
- Damage to public/private infrastructure

**STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT:**

- Impact to Brisbane: up to 22,000 residences will be impacted, 8759 premises will be directly affected, approx 3,500 premises to be evacuated
- Expected localised flooding consequence of tidal influences combined with dam releases Wivenhoe & Somerset.

**LDMG REPORTS:**

Brisbane:	Localised flooding Road closures causing minor traffic disruptions No major events, however events in the northern suburbs, Pine Rivers District may impact Brisbane
Redlands:	Minor localised flooding No further since last Sitrep

**AGENCY REPORTS:**

EMQ:	Activated and participating within the DDCC (Shane WOOD)
FIR:	
SEQ Water:	
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM):	Updates provided through BoM predictions
QFRA	Sourcing additional staff, focus on fast water rescue
QAS	No reported issues at this time
SES	
QR	Bowen Hills depot – If it floods, 120 electric trains will be out of action
Other Agencies:	No reported issues at this time
Health Service	Wesley Hospital may be cut off – no plan to evacuate at this stage Non urgent medical procedures cancelled

**COMMUNITY IMPACTS:**

- Community appraised of developments through SDCC media releases, individual agencies alerts with BCC & Redlands Council media alerts
- BCC has commenced a communication strategy utilising letter-drop, SMS and door knock in affected areas to commence evacuation processes

**ADDITIONAL COMMENTS / ISSUES:**

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

NUMBER: 3

DATE: 11/1/11

TIME: 1330hrs

**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**

2.

- Peak events predicted 1400hrs Wednesday 12/01/2011 high tide mark Brisbane river & adjoining low lying suburbs. As at Thursday, evacuations may no longer be feasible
- The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer Creek flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Sunday 16 January in varying degrees.
- Potential to enact provisions of DMA on request of Redlands LDMG re Wellington Point land slippage.
- Media reports of evacuation of CBD are inaccurate and Police Media has been advised to rectify.

**Next SITREP issued at: 1500hrs 11/01/2011**

**Prepared by: S/Sgt Teena Blagden**

**Approved by: Assistant Commissioner Martin**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Name: P Martin

Position: DDC Coordinator

Date and time: 11/1/11 1330hrs

Distribution:

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

**NUMBER: 3**

**DATE: 11/1/11**


**TIME: 1330hrs**

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QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

DISTRICT DISASTER CO-ORDINATOR  
BRISBANE



## SITUATION REPORT

NUMBER: 4 DATE: 11/01/2011 TIME: 1500

INCIDENT /OPERATION:

DDMG STATUS:

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level 1)
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LDMG STATUS:

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level1)	Redlands:	Alert
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Alert – monitor situation: no action required Lean Forward – on stand by: prepared but not activated Stand up – activated
---

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

CURRENT THREAT:

- |  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flooding/Inundation</li> <li>Damage to public/private infrastructure</li> </ul> |
|--|

DDC / DDMG PRIORITIES:

- |   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitor potential threats</li> <li>Activate appropriate resources to respond</li> <li>Prepare for and assist with evacuation of in excess of 3,500 premises in affected areas</li> </ul> |
|---|

KEY DEVELOPMENTS: (Since last SITREP)

- |   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved weather forecasts showing rain easing to showers with possibility of thunder storms for Brisbane area</li> <li>Current water levels for Brisbane river remain predicted for 6000 cumecs, however may get to 6,800cumecs and 4.2m by Thursday <b>NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE</b></li> <li>Potential for 6,500 properties to be inundated and up to 15,000 evacuated <b>NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE</b></li> <li>Wivenhoe Dam is at 74.31m – Primary objective of monitoring and ensuring the dam is not compromised – releases have not been increased yet. Somerset gates have been closed</li> </ul> |
|---|

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2.

- High tide was 1330hrs and no reports of inundation of buildings in greater Brisbane area
- Road and bikeway disruptions only. Eagle Street Pier and surrounding businesses and bike/pathways have been closed as at 1405hrs
- Evacuation centres established at the Caboolture library and RNA showgrounds (no pets, enquiries continuing with RSPCA).
- Redcliffe DDC stood up
- Self evacuating occurring at Bulimba

**POTENTIAL ISSUES:**

- Increase in releases from Wivenhoe will impact urbanised flooding
- Closure of Somerset gates will impact water levels north of the dam
- Large scale evacuations, plans still being developed for pets
- Damage to public/private infrastructure

**STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT:**

- Impact to Brisbane: up to 22,000 residences will be impacted, 8759 premises will be directly affected, approx 3,500 premises to be evacuated – **revised to 6,500 inundated properties and up to 15,000 people evacuated.**
- Expected localised flooding to continue on 11/1 with majority of impact north of Brisbane.

**LDMG REPORTS:**

Brisbane:	Localised flooding Road closures causing minor traffic disruptions No major events, however events in the northern suburbs, Pine Rivers District may impact Brisbane
Redlands:	Minor localised flooding No further since last Sitrep

**AGENCY REPORTS:**

EMQ:	Activated and participating within the DDCC (Shane WOOD)
FIR:	
SEQ Water:	Dam release updates as per previous
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM):	Updates provided through BoM predictions
QFRA	Sourcing additional staff, focus on fast water rescue
QAS	Nursing home at Newfarm being evacuated, no issues
SES	
QR	Flooding on Caboolture line – 300 people stranded at Petrie, 600 at Strathpine and 500 at Baldhills. Buses unable to access roads to transport people out. Major issues anticipated with workers trying to

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

NUMBER: 4

DATE: 11/1/11

TIME: 1500hrs

**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**

2.

	get home past Strathpine. North Pine River – shipping containers are colliding with rail bridges causing concern for structural damage.
Other Agencies:	No reported issues at this time
Maritime Aust	Brisbane River – Indooroopilly area – 10 – 15 pontoons likely to be dislodged. Tug on standby, POC advised by phone that water police may be requested to assist.

**COMMUNITY IMPACTS:**

- Community appraised of developments through SDCC media releases, individual agencies alerts with BCC & Redlands Council media alerts
- BCC has commenced a communication strategy utilising letter-drop, SMS and door knock in affected areas to commence evacuation processes

**ADDITIONAL COMMENTS / ISSUES:**

- Peak events predicted 1400hrs Wednesday 12/01/2011 high tide mark Brisbane river & adjoining low lying suburbs. As at Thursday, evacuations may no longer be feasible
- The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer Creek flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Sunday 16 January in varying degrees.
- Potential to enact provisions of DMA on request of Redlands LDMG re Wellington Point land slippage.
- As a result of exaggerated media reports of the current situation, a Police Media Liaison Officer has been appointed at the DDMG to assist with further media updates.

**Next SITREP issued at: 16300hrs 11/01/2011**

**Prepared by: S/Sgt Teena Blagden**

**Approved by: Assistant Commissioner Martin**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Name: P Martin

Position: DDC Coordinator

Date and time: 11/1/11 1500hrs

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

**NUMBER: 4**

**DATE: 11/1/11**

**TIME: 1500hrs**

**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**

2.

Distribution:

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

**NUMBER: 4**

**DATE: 11/1/11**

**TIME: 1500hrs**




**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**



**QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE**

**DISTRICT DISASTER CO-ORDINATOR  
BRISBANE**



## SITUATION REPORT

**NUMBER:** 5                      **DATE:** 11/01/2011                      **TIME:** 1630

**INCIDENT / OPERATION:**

**DDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level 1)
-----------	------------------------

**LDMG STATUS:**

Brisbane:	Lean Forward (Level1)	Redlands:	Alert
-----------	--------------------------	-----------	-------

*Alert – monitor situation: no action required  
Lean Forward – on stand by: prepared but not activated  
Stand up – activated*

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

**CURRENT THREAT:**

- |  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flooding/Inundation</li> <li>• Damage to public/private infrastructure</li> </ul> |
|--|

**DDC / DDMG PRIORITIES:**

- |   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor potential threats</li> <li>• Activate appropriate resources to respond</li> <li>• Prepare for and assist with evacuation of in excess of 3,500 premises in affected areas</li> </ul> |
|---|

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS:** (Since last SITREP)

- |   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved weather forecasts showing rain easing to showers with possibility of thunder storms for Brisbane area</li> <li>• Current water levels for Brisbane river remain predicted for 6000 cumecs, however may get to 6,800cumecs and 4.2m by Thursday <b>NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE</b></li> <li>• Potential for 6,500 properties to be inundated and up to 15,000 evacuated <b>NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE</b></li> <li>• Wivenhoe Dam is at 74.31m – Primary objective of monitoring and ensuring the dam is not compromised – releases have not been increased yet. Somerset gates have been closed</li> </ul> |
|---|

## SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE PROTECTED QPOL

2.

- High tide was 1330hrs and no reports of inundation of buildings in greater Brisbane area
- Road and bikeway disruptions only. Eagle Street Pier and surrounding businesses and bike/pathways have been closed as at 1405hrs
- Evacuation centres established at the Caboolture library and RNA showgrounds (no pets, enquiries continuing with RSPCA).
- Redcliffe DDC stood up
- Self evacuating occurring at Bulimba

### POTENTIAL ISSUES:

- Increase in releases from Wivenhoe will impact urbanised flooding
- Closure of Somerset gates will impact water levels north of the dam
- Large scale evacuations, plans still being developed for pets
- Damage to public/private infrastructure

### STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT:

- Impact to Brisbane: up to 22,000 residences will be impacted, 8759 premises will be directly affected, approx 3,500 premises to be evacuated – **revised to 6,500 inundated properties and up to 15,000 people evacuated.**
- Expected localised flooding to continue on 11/1 with majority of impact north of Brisbane.

### LDMG REPORTS:

Brisbane:	Localised flooding Road closures causing minor traffic disruptions No major events, however events in the northern suburbs, Pine Rivers District may impact Brisbane
Redlands:	Minor localised flooding No further since last Sitrep

### AGENCY REPORTS:

EMQ:	Activated and participating within the DDCC (Shane WOOD)
FIR:	
SEQ Water:	Dam release updates as per previous
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM):	Updates provided through BoM predictions
QFRA	Sourcing additional staff, focus on fast water rescue
QAS	Nursing home at Newfarm being evacuated, no issues
SES	
QR	Flooding on Caboolture line – 300 people stranded at Petrie, 600 at Strathpine and 500 at Baldhills. Buses unable to access roads to transport people out. Major issues anticipated with workers trying to

### SITUATIONAL REPORT

NUMBER: 4

DATE: 11/1/11

TIME: 1500hrs

**SECURITY IN-CONFIDENCE  
PROTECTED QPOL**

2.

	get home past Strathpine. North Pine River – shipping containers are colliding with rail bridges causing concern for structural damage.
Other Agencies:	No reported issues at this time
Maritime Aust	Brisbane River – Indooroopilly area – 10 – 15 pontoons likely to be dislodged. Tug on standby, POC advised by phone that water police may be requested to assist.

**COMMUNITY IMPACTS:**

- Community apprised of developments through SDCC media releases, individual agencies alerts with BCC & Redlands Council media alerts
- BCC has commenced a communication strategy utilising letter-drop, SMS and door knock in affected areas to commence evacuation processes

**ADDITIONAL COMMENTS / ISSUES:**

- Peak events predicted 1400hrs Wednesday 12/01/2011 high tide mark Brisbane river & adjoining low lying suburbs. As at Thursday, evacuations may no longer be feasible
- The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer Creek flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Sunday 16 January in varying degrees.
- Potential to enact provisions of DMA on request of Redlands LDMG re Wellington Point land slippage.

**Next SITREP issued at: 16300hrs 11/01/2011**

**Prepared by: S/Sgt Teena Blagden**

**Approved by: Assistant Commissioner Martin**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
Name: P Martin  
Position: DDC Coordinator  
Date and time: 11/1/11 1500hrs

Distribution:

**SITUATIONAL REPORT**

**NUMBER: 4**

**DATE: 11/1/11**

**TIME: 1500hrs**

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Sitrep No.</b>
<b>12/01/2011</b>	<b>0600</b>	<b>6</b>

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### Weather (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly however the current forecast is for rain periods with possible heavy falls (25-50mm). Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview (Include brief Summary of effects)

- Drift restaurant – formerly Oxleys on the River was assessed as a threat to valuable infrastructure should it breach moorings and be carried downriver. Brisbane Harbour master assessed situation and deployed two (2) tugboats who advised that they had been compromised by the rising tide and excessive current, situation to be monitored into AM 12/01/11 and concentrated efforts will be targeted towards The Island barge.
- Flood modeling of 12000 cumecs is currently being utilized for planning purposes(modeling completed), however it is believed that flows may fall to 10500 cumecs, A revised prediction is expected to be provided by B.O.M post 8am on 12/1/2011
- Modeling of a 12000 cumecs flow indicates that up to 43879 properties will be impacted, with 38043 residential and 5836 commercial premises may be inundated
- Controlled release of water from Wivenhoe Dam will affect the Brisbane River potentially reaching 6.5 metres which is 1 metre higher than the 1974 floods.
- Currently 182 people are at the RNA evacuation centre with a capacity for 3000. An unofficial evacuation centre had been established at the Yeronga Primary School. This is not a sanctioned evacuation centre, having been established by the P & C. Some concerns are held that this evacuation centre may be within future evacuation zones. Arrangements are currently being made to establish an evacuation center at the QEII sports Stadium with a view to servicing MSR evacuations.
- Wivenhoe/Somerset's Dams. Key points of report are as follows:
  - 1 - Strategy involves ensuring dam security and attempting to prevent initiation of the first fuse plug at EL75.6m.
  - 2 - Sluices have been closed at Somerset which will result in high water levels upstream at Kilcoy.
  - 3 - In past 12 hrs 370mm have fallen in the area around Wivenhoe dam. At 1600hrs BOM advised 50-100mm are forecasted.
  - 4 - The current expectation is that the dam has reached a steady state (outflow equals inflow) without significant rainfall.
  - 5 - The dam is expected to peak below 75.5m AHD which is 600mmm below the first fuse plug initiation level.
  - 6 - The flood Operations Centre is continuing to monitor rainfalls and water levels through the Brisbane and Pine Catchments and reviewing operating strategy every 30minutes.
  - 7 - It should be noted that the flow in the lower Brisbane river in 1974 was about 9,500m<sup>3</sup>/s.
  - 8 - At 2100hrs Wivenhoe Dam was 74.95m AHD holding 2,223,000 megalitres (190.8%) and slowly dropping.
- Brisbane LDCC advises that as of 11/1/2011 sandbag distribution has included.

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Stafford 15,600 sandbags distributed to members of the public.  
 Zillmere 19,500 sandbags distributed to members of the public.  
 Darra 16,250 sandbags distributed to members of the public.  
 Balmoral 5,850 sandbags distributed to members of the public.  
 Newmarket 4368 sandbags distributed to members of the public.  
 Eagle Farm 3000 sandbags distributed to members of the public.

Advice is still pending regarding current stocks.

- Evacuations have been or are currently being undertaken in Milton/Torwood, Oxley, Darra Village,
- Major roads have been cut as a consequence of water inundation including Granard Rd, West Lake Drive, Centenary Highway, Coronation Drive,
- Suncorp Stadium is now closed due to rising flood waters and will not be available as a evacuation centre.
- The Stamford Hotel has self evacuated with Energex having cut the power to the premises
- An evacuation centre will be established at QEII Stadium post 8am on 12/1/2011 with an estimated capacity 1300 capacity.
- 500 beds are currently available between the two evacuations centers with additional beds on order
- Energex have advised that they will have commenced phased power disconnections to flooded areas with CBD disconnections to commence at 08:30 on 12/1/2011.
- The Brisbane river has burst its banks at Brisbane Corso Map 179 L9 with 20 meter width of water flowing into Downs Park
- Inundation of river side assets including boardwalks, parks and moorings is being experienced along the entire reach of the river
- Flood evacuation zones modeled on 12000 cumecs include Wolston Correctional Facility and Brisbane Womens Prison. Inundation levels will be minimal and should not necessitate evacuation. Advice to be provided to QCS

### 3. Media Issues

*(Include brief details of any media related issues)*

- Media releases have been posted urging people not to travel to the CBD or flood prone areas on 12/1 or 13/1/2011
- Media have been reporting unofficial evacuation centres which may be subject to evacuation at a latter time
- Inaccurate reporting / commenting is being noted on social media as to impacts and occurrences
- Following activation of the QEII evacuation centre a media strategy needs to be developed to ensure a consistent message is provided regarding approved evacuation sites

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

*(Include brief details of operations; visits; etc)*

Scheduled inspections of RRG area – 10726 properties.

#### North.

Scheduled inspections completed: 1200(100%) including Pinkenba, Wooloowin, Albion & Bowen Hills

53 rapid assessments completed 33 outstanding

Significant events Road closure at Wyampa Road Boondall

Some localized flooding in Bowen Hills & Albion

#### South

Scheduled inspections completed: target number unknown(72%) including Rocklea Sherwood Willawong Wacol Oxley

Significant events: mobile Phone communications appear limited

#### Central

Scheduled inspections completed: 3100(100%) including New Farm Newstead Brisbane CBD West End

Significant events: Holman Street chemical storage secured

Rapid Response assist evacuation of Vincent St Auchenflower

Mobile Phone communications appear limited

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**West**

Scheduled inspections completed: 3255(30%) Including Auchenflower  
 Significant events: Mobile Phone communications appear limited  
 Normal Park Creek burst its banks at Eastern Subburbs Soccer Club

**East**

Scheduled inspections completed: 1165(64.7%) Including Cannon Hill  
 40 Rapid assessments  
 Significant events: Brisbane River and Moreton Bay closed to boating traffic  
 Campers on Moreton Island have been relocated to Tangalooma Resort

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

*(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)*

- Significant inundation is expected today(12/1/2011) peaking at 4.5 meters (Major flooding level) at 2pm with a second larger peak at 5.5meters at 3am on 13/1/2011
- Response operations will focus upon community engagement advising self evacuation, evacuation of inundated areas, traffic control, and public order patrols.
- Evacuations centres will be brought on line progressively with identified need.

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Off Deployed		
EMQ:		
QFRS:		
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	<p>Brisbane is expecting flood activity during the next 72 hours as the Brisbane river levels are expected to rise due to flood run off from the Wivenhoe and the and the Brisbane river catchment. Brisbane MIR (QPS) has been activated and QFRS has deployed 1 Senior officer as a liaison officer.            An eIAP has been established in the Brisbane ROCC,, #500000</p> <p>Taringa and Rocklea Fire Stations have been evacuated. Mount Ommaney Fire Station is on watch and preparing for evacuation. There have been a number of buildings we have been unable to access due to floods which the fire alarms have activated. Firecom is keeping a log of these buildings.</p> <p>Planning being undertaken for Brisbane Police Headquarters should power outages and flooding affect the CBD.</p> <p>Energex has started to cut power within the CBD which is creating an abnormal number of alarm activations</p> <p>Incidents</p>	

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	2043 hrs - 4 pumps, 12 staff, water rescue, [REDACTED] Caboolture, Woman and 18mth old child. 2338 hrs - 8 pumps, 15 staff, Evacuate homes surrounded by water. [REDACTED] Oxley.(on going). 0207 hrs - 2 pumps, 8 staff, Evac Units, [REDACTED], Kangaroo Point, - Flooding
--	--

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds 500 Beds</li> <li>The QEII centre is to be opened by 0800hours (approximately). Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	It is noted that an unofficial Evacuation Centre at Yeronga Primary which has currently accommodated approximately 30 families is not an officially sanctioned centre due to the fact that it potentially may be within the flood zone whereby any people may have to be evacuated a second time
Numbers Staying in Centres:	182
Origin:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

### 10. Health

Public Health:	
Mental Health:	



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**INFRASTRUCTURE****11. Transport***(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	Minor disruption due to weather
Road:	Low lying roads are experiencing inundation
Marine:	Brisbane River and Moreton Bay closed to boating
Other:	Flood evacuation zones modeled on 12000 cumecs include Wolston Correctional Facility and Brisbane Womens Prison. Inundation levels will be minimal and should not necessitate evacuation. Advice to be provided to QCS

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	
Government Offices:	
Schools:	
Hospitals:	
Dams:	

**13. Services**

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	Brisbane City Council and Queensland Ambulance Service trunked radio networks operate out of Waterfront Place. It is anticipated that this site will lose power early on 12/1/2011. Advice to date is that there are adequate back up resources in the building to maintain service at this stage
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Mains power:	Energex have advising that a phased termination of Power to the CBD will commence at 0800 12/01/2011 Power to Stamford Plaza and QUIT Garden Point disconnected as of 2330 11/1/2011
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
<b>Water</b>	



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<b>Sewerage</b>	

## ECONOMIC

### 14. INDUSTRY

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

## ENVIRONMENT

### 15. Environmental Impact

--

## LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

### TOWN (for Premiers Report)

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

### 16. Updates to District/Local Contacts

Changes to Contacts:	
----------------------	--

<b>Author:</b> A/Insp Bosley	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 05:00	<b>Sign off:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Time:</b>
<b>Signature</b> A/C DOYLE			<b>Signature</b>		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of **Emergency Services**  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Sitrep No.</b>
<b>12/01/2011</b>	<b>0800</b>	<b>7</b>

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### 1. Weather (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly however the current forecast is for rain easing.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview (Include brief Summary of effects)

- The Island barge remains a threat, MSQ working on anchoring the barge.
- Flood modeling of 12000 cumecs is currently being utilized for planning purposes(modeling completed), however it is believed that flows may fall to 10500 cumecs, A revised prediction is expected to be provided by B.O.M post 8am on 12/1/2011
- Modeling of a 12000 cumecs flow indicates that up to 43879 properties will be impacted, with 38043 residential and 5836 commercial premises may be inundated
- Controlled release of water from Wivenhoe Dam will affect the Brisbane River potentially reaching 6.5 metres which is 1 metre higher than the 1974 floods.
- QEII sports Stadium activated as an evacuation centre and is in use.
- Wivenhoe/Somerset's Dams. Key points of report are as follows:
  - 1 - Strategy involves ensuring dam security and attempting to prevent initiation of the first fuse plug at EL75.6m.
  - 2 - Sluices have been closed at Somerset which will result in high water levels upstream at Kilcoy.
  - 3 - The current expectation is that Wivenhoe continues to drop gradually and remains monitored.

### 3. Media Issues (Include brief details of any media related issues)

- No change.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region***(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)***North.**

Pine Rivers Bridge remains closed due to road damage.

Young's crossing closed.

Loss of electricity and phone lines to Petrie area – including Petrie Police station. QBuild and Energex working on issues.

One house in Tennis Ave, Ashgrove close to inundation – residents self-evacuated.

**South and West**

Evacuations: Ground floor apartment block in Beesley St, West End. Self Evac;

Entire unit block at 65 Orleigh Street, West End. Self Evac.

Self evacuations taking place at Hyde Road.

Inundations of parkland and roads continue. Ground floor and carpark inundations at 2 apartment blocks (above); QPAC carpark; Merivale and Glenelg Streets, South Bank inundated from storm water drains, no businesses yet affected.

**Central**

Situation Stable, anticipated flooding will further impact low lying areas as the day progresses.

**East**

Bayside – no change, slippage continues to be monitored.

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours***(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)*

- Significant inundation is expected today (12/1/2011) peaking at 4.5 meters (Major flooding level) at 2pm with a second larger peak at 5.5meters at 3am on 13/1/2011
- Response operations will focus upon community engagement advising self evacuation, evacuation of inundated areas, traffic control, and public order patrols.
- Evacuations centres will be brought on line progressively with identified need.

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		
EMQ:		
QFRS:		
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	Brisbane is expecting flood activity during the next 72 hours as the Brisbane river levels are expected to rise due to flood run off from the Wivenhoe and the and the Brisbane river catchment. Brisbane MIR (QPS) has been activated and QFRS has deployed 1 Senior officer as a liaison officer.	

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

	<p>An eIAP has been established in the Brisbane ROCC,, #500000</p> <p>Taringa and Rocklea Fire Stations have been evacuated. Mount Ommaney Fire Station is on watch and preparing for evacuation. There have been a number of buildings we have been unable to access due to floods which the fire alarms have activated. Firecom is keeping a log of these buildings.</p> <p>Planning being undertaken for Brisbane Police Headquarters should power outages and flooding affect the CBD.</p> <p>Energex has started to cut power within the CBD which is creating an abnormal number of alarm activations</p> <p>Incidents  2043 hrs - 4 pumps, 12 staff, water rescue, [REDACTED] Caboolture, Woman and 18mth old child.  2338 hrs - 8 pumps, 15 staff, Evacuate homes surrounded by water, [REDACTED] Oxley (on going).  0207 hrs - 2 pumps, 8 staff, Evac Units [REDACTED], Kangaroo Point, - Flooding</p>
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## SOCIAL

### Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds projected capacity of 3000</li> <li>The QEII centre - Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	It is noted that an unofficial Evacuation Centre at Yeronga Primary which has currently accommodated approximately 30 families is not an officially sanctioned centre due to the fact that it potentially may be within the flood zone whereby any people may have to be evacuated a second time
Numbers Staying in Centres:	To be advised by LDMC
Origin:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**10. Health**

Public Health:	
Mental Health:	

**INFRASTRUCTURE****11. Transport***(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	Ipswich line terminating at Darra North Coast lines open with restrictions Restricted services running (hourly)
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation
Marine:	Brisbane River and Moreton Bay closed to boating Evacuations occurring in Yeronga and Dutton Park areas.
Other:	Flood evacuation zones modeled on 12000 cumecs include Wolston Correctional Facility and Brisbane Womens Prison. Inundation levels will be minimal and should not necessitate evacuation. Advice to be provided to QCS

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	
Government Offices:	
Shools:	
Hospitals:	
Dams:	

**13. Services**

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	Brisbane City Council and Queensland Ambulance Service trunked radio networks operate out of Waterfront Place. It is anticipated that this site will lose power early on 12/1/2011. Advice to date is that there are adequate back up resources in the building to maintain service at this stage – no further advice at this time.
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	

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Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

**ECONOMIC****4. INDUSTRY**

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

**ENVIRONMENT****15. Environmental Impact**

Unknown
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**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS****TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Changes to Contacts:

<b>Author:</b> S/Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 09:00	<b>Sign off:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Time:</b>
<b>Signature</b> A/C Martin	<b>12/1/11 0900</b>		<b>Signature</b>		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1000	8

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### 1. Weather (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly however the current forecast is for rain easing.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview

*(Include brief Summary of effects)*

- The Island barge remains a threat, MSQ working on anchoring the barge.
- Moggill Ferry has broken one line and is on the bank – proposal is to scuttle the ferry if it looks to be breaking free – unable to access to secure at this stage, sought ADF support.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift. – collided with rail bridge, no damage.
- Goodwill Bridge closed due to debris against pylons.
- Flood modeling of 12000 cumecs is currently being utilized for planning purposes(modeling completed), however it is believed that flows may fall to 10500 cumecs, A revised prediction is expected to be provided by B.O.M post 8am on 12/1/2011

### 3. Media Issues

*(Include brief details of any media related issues)*

- No change.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

*(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)*



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**Metro South**

Evacuations: Ground floor apartment block in Beesley St, West End. Self Evac;  
 Entire unit block at 65 Orleigh Street, West End. Self Evac.  
 Self evacuations taking place at Hyde Road.

Inundations of parkland and roads continue. Ground floor and carpark inundations at 2 apartment blocks (above); QPAC carpark; Merivale and Glenelg Streets, South Bank inundated from storm water drains, no businesses yet affected.

Wellington point – Main Road causeway being monitored for stability.

West End and South Bank Stations being evacuated to Dutton Park Station s precautionary measure.

**Metro North**

Milton/Auchenflower, New farm/Newstead, Teneriffe and City CBD major risk areas.

Stamford Hotel in CBD has self-evacuated about 180 guests

Major road closures: Coronation Drive and Milton Rds.

20 residents self evacuated in Auchenflower/Milton area.

Self evacuations occurring in Fortitude Valley area.

Possible gas leak near Brunswick and Welsby Streets, source not yet identified.

Goodwill Bridge closed to pedestrian traffic due to debris impacting pilons.

Prisoners from Brisbane Watchhouse being transported to Strathpine Watchhouse.

Suncorp Stadium is closed and not available for evac.

Moggill State School has been set up as a local evac centre, QPS, SES and Uniting Church staffing.

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

*(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)*

- Unchanged.

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		
EMQ:		
QFRS:		
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.	

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## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds projected capacity of 3000</li> <li>The QEII centre - Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	Yeronga Primary School and Moggill State School unofficial centres. Enquiries being made with LDMC to arrange for registering of Yeronga as an evac centre, or have it closed. No immediate risk of flooding.
Numbers Staying in Centres:	To be advised by LDMC
Origin:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

### 10. Health

Public Health:	
Mental Health:	

## INFRASTRUCTURE

### 11. Transport

(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation
Marine:	As above only
Other:	

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	
Government Offices:	
Schools:	
Hospitals:	
Dams:	

**13. Services**

<b>Communications</b> (If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> (If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**ECONOMIC****14. INDUSTRY**

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

**ENVIRONMENT****15. Environmental Impact**

Unknown
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**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS****TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Changes to Contacts:	
----------------------	--

<b>Author:</b> S/Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 10:00	<b>Sign off:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Time:</b>
<b>Signature</b> C/Supt Dunn	<b>12/1/11 10</b>		<b>Signature</b>		

**SITREP : #008 – (15:30HRS) Monday 10 January 2011****SITUATION REPORT  
WEATHER**

Current: Issued at 4:50 am EST on Monday 10 January 2011

**Forecast for Monday**

Rain, heavy at times. Local thunder. Moderate to fresh SE to NE winds.

City: Max 25 Bayside: Max 25

**Tuesday** :Rain periods, possible thunder Min 22 Max 25

**Wednesday** :A few showers Min 22 Max 27

**Rainfall**

Moderate to heavy rainfall has been recorded in the Upper Brisbane and Stanley Rivers in the last 12 hours with totals up to 90 mm. Totals for the last 24 hours range from 100 to 325mm.

Mt Glorious recorded 100 mm in the last 12 hours.

Rainfall of similar magnitudes is expected in the 12 to 24 hours around the downstream catchments as the system tracks south.

A severe weather warning remains current for heavy rainfall in the dam catchment areas.

**FLOOD INFORMATION CENTRE (FIC)**

Has predicated that at 2pm on Wednesday 12 January 2011. Approximately 455 properties flooded and 7731 properties partial flooded.

**FloodWise Road Closures – Current Status**

Victoria Street Windsor, Marshall Road Salisbury, Colleges Crossing Karana Downs, Mt Crosby Weir Mt Crosby, Bowhill Rd Durack, Bowhill Rd Willawong, Boscombe Rd Brookfield.

**Brisbane River - Flood flow Conditions :****Current objectives**

- Continue increasing releases to discharge flood waters but keep impact downstream to minimum.

**Wivenhoe Dam Release: (Full Supply Level 67.00 m AHD)**

River levels upstream of the dam have peaked and are falling slowly with significant inflow being generated from the intense heavy rainfall. Flows in the Brisbane River at Gregor's Ck have peaked at 7,350m<sup>3</sup>/s at 23:00 on Sunday 9 January. This peak is bigger than January 1974 and February 1999 at this location.

The dam level is rising quickly, with the current level being 70.77m AHD (storing 450,000 ML). Estimated peak inflow to the dam just from the Upper Brisbane R is around 8,800m<sup>3</sup>/s and, at this stage, the dam will reach at least 73.3 m AHD during Tuesday morning. Given the rapid increase in inflow volumes, it was necessary to start to increase the release from Wivenhoe during Monday morning.

Fernvale Bridge approaches and Mt Crosby Weir Bridge have been inundated and both bridges are now closed.

The current release rate from Wivenhoe Dam is around 2,000m<sup>3</sup>/s (172,000ML/day). Gate opening will continue to be increased during Monday and the release is expected to increase to at least 2,600m<sup>3</sup>/s in the next 12 to 24 hours and further depending on downstream flows..

Since the commencement of the event on 02/01/2011 approximately 275,000ML has been released from the dam, with an event total approaching 1,600,000ML without further rain and as much as 2,100,000ML with forecast rainfall of (both including Somerset outflow). At this stage, releases will continue until at least Sunday 16<sup>th</sup> January 2011.

#### **Impacts downstream of Wivenhoe Dam**

The projected Wivenhoe Dam releases combined with Lockyer flows and local runoff will mean that all crossings downstream of Wivenhoe (Twin Bridges, Fernvale, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir and Colleges Crossing) will be adversely impacted until at least Saturday 15 January in varying degrees.

Water levels in the lower Brisbane River will be impacted by the combined flows of Lockyer Ck, Bremer River, local runoff and releases from Wivenhoe Dam. If the predicted rainfall eventuates in the downstream tributary catchments the resultant combined flows in the lower Brisbane may exceed the threshold of damaging discharge in the urban areas within the next 24 to 48 hours.

Somerset Regional, Ipswich City and Brisbane City Councils have been advised of the updated Wivenhoe operating strategy.

#### **Somerset Dam (Full Supply Level 99.00 m AHD)**

The dam level at 05:00 was 102.84 m AHD and rising (storing 193,000 ML above FSL). Peak inflow to the dam is estimated to be about 4,200 m<sup>3</sup>/s based on observed rainfall and could be as high as 5,000m<sup>3</sup>/s with additional forecast rainfall. Five sluice gates are open releasing about 1,100m<sup>3</sup>/s (95,000ML/d) into Wivenhoe Dam. At this stage the dam lake level will reach about 103.5 m AHD on Monday afternoon. Areas around Kilcoy will continue to be adversely affected.

The FIC is maintaining a watch and is in contact with the BoM and SEQWater.

#### **Ferry Operations**

West End and Teneriffe terminals have been closed due to high tide and will be re-opened shortly. Normal operations are expected to continue until close tonight. Moggill ferry not operating due to debris in river.

#### **BMTMC**

The following roads are currently being affected by localised flooding within the Brisbane Metropolitan area:

Due to heavy rain fall, the following roads are closed in the Brisbane Metropolitan Area:  
 Kangaroo Gully Rd, Bellbowrie  
 Lancing St, Pullenvale.  
 Paradise Road, Larapinta  
 Illaweena Street Drewvale  
 Youngs Crossing Road, Joyner

Wembley Rd, Berrinba  
 Rafting Ground Rd at Rees Way, Greentrees Ave and Deerhurst Rd, Brookfield  
 Widdop St Clayfield  
 Melton St Nundah  
 Gap Creek Road Brookfield  
 Marshall Road Rocklea  
 Formosa Rd between Stanborough and Dairy Swamp rd Gumdale  
 Murphys Creek Road, Lockyer  
 Manly Rd between New Cleveland Rd and Castlereas St, Manly  
 Ropley Rd, Wynnum West  
 Rosewood Warrill View Rd, Rosewood  
 Strathpine Road is between Kremzoe Rd and Gympie Rd  
 Motorists are advised not to enter floodwaters and to seek alternative routes.

- Due to heavy rain fall, the following roads are reported to have water across them  
 Brisbane Metropolitan Area:

- Telegraph Rd and Norris Rd intersection Bracken Ridge.
- Zillmere Rd and Newman Rd Boondall
- Murial Av and Sherwood Rd Rocklea.
- Gympie Rd after Beams Rd left lane

**KHOLO - KHOLO BRIDGE 01:36 PM 10/01/2011**

The Kholo Bridge has been closed due to a water release from Wivenhoe Dam.

- **MILTON - PARK ROAD 01:36 PM 10/01/2011**

There is a stationary truck in the right lane on Park road before Milton road under the rail bridge.

- **MOGGILL - MOGGILL FERRY 01:37 PM 10/01/2011**

The Moggill Ferry is OUT of service.

- **WINDSOR - NORTHEY STREET 01:39 PM 10/01/2011**

Due to flooding the westbound lanes on Northey St are currently closed.

**BCC Action Plan**

An Action Plan exists for 10 January 2011 for On Call and Operational arrangements. This Action Plan included the SES, Contact Centre, Local Asset Services, Compliance and Regulatory Services, City Waste, Brisbane City Works, Disaster Management Group and the Flood Information Centre.

**LAS**

There are 15 staff at each depot working on flood issues, approx 240 staff for BCW.

**RRG**

Ongoing patrols of known hotspots and monitoring of weather and environmental conditions. RRG has confirmed that all the effected roads have signs in place.

**SES**

As at 1045 hours 108 jobs received. It is an even split between height safety and sandbags requests ie 54 each. 9 Jobs have been completed.

At present we have 5 teams in the field. The IMT team is running out of Newmarket at HQ and Shane Bunney is the controller.

**Sand Bags: 54**

**Tarps: 54**

**CONTACT CENTRE**

The current situation is include in the call centre scripting updates are being included as they become available.

**Communication Response**

Preparations are well in hand to provide a letter box drop to likely effected residents and a leaflet drop on cars parked in likely flood effected areas.

**ASSESSMENT FUTURE FORECASTS**

Tuesday 1pm High Tide 3.34 metres

Wednesday 2pm high tide 3.7 metres

**Impacts:**

- Water over boardwalk at Cultural Centre, bikeways along the river, and roads Albion, Newstead.
- Ferry Terminal closures at West End and Teneriffe
- Bus – Some disruption to routes
- Road – Some closures and traffic congestion
- Bridge closures- Savages Crossing, Bartons Bridge, Kholo Bridge, Colleges Crossings, Fernvale Bridge, Mt Crosby Weir

Advice form SEQ Water and BOM indicated that the above heights will increase with continued rainfall. Assessment of input is currently being investigated.

**The DMG and FIC continue to monitor the situation.**

Please note: To all business units please provide your Sitrep reports 60 minutes prior to the LDCC Sitrep closing time.

**Sitrep closing times**

3:30pm

10:00pm

2:00am

6:00am



Please include the following where applicable:

1. Staff numbers deployed
2. Habitable area flooded
3. Tarps/sandbags provided to residents and stock on hand
4. Local media issues
5. Contact Centre scripting
6. SES jobs

Signoff

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1200	9

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### Weather (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview

*(Include brief Summary of effects)*

- The Island barge remains a threat, MSQ working on anchoring the barge – being assessed as to whether scuttling is an option, however it is unlikely that could be effected prior to the peak this afternoon, so focus is currently on securing.
- Moggill Ferry – no change.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift – collided with rail bridge, inspection underway – pontoon heading out towards the bay.
- BP pipeline at Whytes Island has significant debris impacting it and a yacht stuck under/against it. Information is it has not yet breached, but inspections are being conducted.

### 3. Media Issues

*(Include brief details of any media related issues)*

- No change.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

*(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)*

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**Metro South**

Evacuations: Self evacuations continuing in Norman Park, West End areas.

Staging post arranged at Mt Ommaney to gather displaced persons and transport to QEII evac centre.

No change to Bayside area.

**Metro North**

Irregular power disruptions are continuing, no major issues.

Power expected to be cut to Albert St, Margaret St, Ann St, Eagle St and Queen St areas.

Flooding has commenced at Suncorp Stadium.

BP pipeline at Whytes Island has significant debris lodged and a yacht also lodged against it. It has not yet been breached, however inspections are underway.

**OVERALL**

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area.

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		
EMQ:		
QFRS:		
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.	

**SOCIAL****7. Population**

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

## 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds projected capacity of 3000</li> <li>The QEII centre - Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	RNA – 270 QEII – 55
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
Origin:	

## 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

## Health

Public Health:	
Mental Health:	

## INFRASTRUCTURE

### 11. Transport

*(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Marine:	As above only
Other:	

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil
Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.
Dams:	

**13. Services**

<b>Communications</b> (If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> (If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

**ECONOMIC****14. INDUSTRY**

Sector:	
---------	--

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Sector:	
Finance:	

## ENVIRONMENT

### 15. Environmental Impact

Unknown
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## LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

### TOWN (for Premiers Report)

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

### 16. Updates to District/Local Contacts

Changes to Contacts:	
----------------------	--

Author: S/Sgt Teena Blagden	Date: 12/1/2011	Time: 12:00	Sign off: AC Martin	Date: 12/1/11	Time: 12:00
Signature			Signature		

**Queensland Police Service  
Police Operations Centre Brisbane  
Situation Report (SITREP)**

**Date:** 13 January 2011  
**Time:** 2400 hrs  
**Sitrep:** # 9

<b>Disaster District</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Info Source</b>
	5	6	11	Toowoomba MIR (Sitrep 1630 12/1/11)
	1	0	1	Ipswich MIR (verbal 2210 12/1/11)
	6	6	12	

<b>Disaster District</b>	<b>Grave Concerns</b>	<b>Concerns</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Info Source</b>
	9	34	43	Toowoomba MIR (Sitrep 1630 12/1/11)
	9	34	43	

**Note:** Entries in **Bold** are latest additions to Sitrep.

**Current Situation:**

- Preparation for tasking of additional helo assets for 13/1/11.
- Arrangements for management of 240 ADF staff to be deployed in SEQ from 13/1/11. 120 staff to Lockyer valley. 60 staff to be deployed in 5 Districts in Brisbane for 13/1/11 and another 60 staff will be available from 0800hrs on 13/1/11. Operational management arrangements undertaken for coordination of further taskings.
- Closure of Gateway Bridge at 2324hrs subject to passing of partial structure from Riverside Walkway.
- Programmed movement of staff for 13/1/11 :-
  - Toowoomba 9 x SCOC
  - Ipswich 5 staff
  - (Rockhampton 16)
- Additional 5 staff from Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GRMPA) offered and accepted to support Water Police crewing operations.
- RES advised plan in plan for sustaining QPS radio repeater network.
- Deployments

- 182 staff currently deployed to Southern Region
  - Toowoomba (154)
  - Ipswich (28)
- 110 staff currently deployed to Central Region (Rockhampton).

#### POC Focus:

- **Request for 4 replacement staff for Dalby**
- **Request for 22 replacement staff for Rockhampton – only 16 can be transported at this stage on Aiwing. Arrangements for further staff on following day.**
- Planning re DVI issues and support.
- Initial DVI team currently undertaking Phase 1 DVI duties which include the retrieval and recovery of deceased.
- Plan for repatriation of deceased persons to Brisbane approved by A/C Henderson
- Media strategy re DVI involvement approved by A/C Henderson
- Ongoing liaison with DDC's regarding additional resources required.
- Ongoing liaison with helicopter resources to facilitate evacuations as required.
- Continuity plans for ongoing POC commitment.

#### POC Activity

##### Sourcing:

- **2 Sea King helicopters have been grounded for repairs**
- **ADF advise they have 10 Unimogs and 240 personnel available for deployment in SEQ.**
- 113 QPS personnel available for deployment (including 30 members DVI trained).
- Offer of assistance received from SA Police (x10 personnel)
- 6 PC staff currently attached CMC have offered their assistance (x1 has been deployed so far).
- On going sourcing and management of rotary winged aircraft to facilitate deployments.

##### Acquisition:

- **50 NSWPOL officers to arrive on 18/1/11 (x2 NSWPOL Liaison Officers currently in POC to coordinate) Further 50 staff from Victoria and South Australia will also arrive early next week.**
- x10 4WD vehicles (AFP) and x6 staff (AFP) in Toowoomba
- x2 Blackhawk helicopters and 2 x Sea King helicopters (ADF)
- Lifesaver #5 & Casino 273 helicopters
- QAS to provide Paramedic Team to Grantham and Murphy's Creek search areas.
- QFRS to provide Swift Water and Tech Rescue Team to Murphy's Creek and Grantham. (Adjusted to Dalby at request of SDCC)
- ADF Liaison Officer at POC to facilitate support to police response.

##### Major issues:

- Brisbane CBD experiencing significant flooding..



- Warrego Highway currently cut between Ipswich and Gatton still hindering additional staff deployments.

**R W Waugh**  
**Superintendent**  
**Deputy POC Commander**  
**12 January 2011**

**Appendix**

**MIR STRUCTURE**

**Current – 1800-0600 (12/1/11- 13/1/11)**

POC Commander	AC Wright	
Deputy POC Commander	Supt Waugh	

**Next – 0600-1800 (12/1/11)**

POC Commander	AC Henderson	
Deputy POC Commander	Supt Chelepy	

# Helicopter Taskings – Op Juliet Drew

(Accurate as at 2330 hrs 12/01/2011)

Helicopter	Crew	Call Sign	Mobile	Capacity	Task
EMQ	█ (Pilot)	Rescue 500	█	7	
EMQ	█	Rescue 510	█	7	
QFRS	█ (Pilot)	220	█ Pilot	3	
Black Hawk 1		Black Hawk 201	Capt █ █ █ Amberley	10	
Black Hawk 2		Black Hawk 220	Capt █ █ █ Amberley	10	
Sea King 2		Shark 22	Major █ █ █	10	Down for repairs.
Sea King 1		Shark 21	Major █ █ █	10	Down for repairs

# Helicopter Taskings – Op Juliet Drew

(Accurate as at 2330 hrs 12/01/2011)

Life Saver 5	██████████ (Pilot)	VH-NVG	██████████		
Casino 273	██████████ (Pilot)  ██████████ & (Crewmen)	Helitack 273			
QFRS		Firebird 462			

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> Brisbane District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1400	10

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### Weather (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview (Include brief Summary of effects)

- The Island barge remains a threat, all personnel have been forced to leave the area due to flood water levels. A crew has voluntarily remained on board with sufficient capacity to run the barge for an extended period and intend to maintain it's location under it's own power.
- Moggill Ferry – 1.5 tonne ancor being airdropped to location to assist in securing – ADF assisting and Harbour Master assisting.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift – collided with rail bridge, inspection underway – pontoon heading out towards the bay.
- BP pipeline at Whytes Island – yacht has been removed and debris dislodged, no damage to pipeline and pipe is not in active.
- Anticipated 300m of floating walkway along the river will detach and become mobile.

### 3. Media Issues (Include brief details of any media related issues)

- No change.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region (Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**Metro South**

Evacuations: Self evacuations continuing in Norman Park, West End areas and Windemere Rd, Sinnamon Park.

Besides The Island barge, no significant issues. All road closures being managed and all refusals to self evacuate being recorded.

No change to Bayside area.

**Metro North**

Numerous power disconnections underway by Energex that will impact large numbers of premises and traffic lights. Consultation occurring to ensure occupants are informed and policing of intersections conducted where necessary.

Roma Street grid no expected to be disconnected at this time.

Evacuations in BCD supported by Negotiators where occupants are refusing to leave. Records are being kept both north and south of locations that refuse to self-evacuate. NO FORCED EVACUATIONS at this time.

100 students at summer camp at UQ (Kings College). All safe and well, no need for action.

The Oaks River Apartments being self-evacuated.

Myer Centre carpark closed.

Victoria Bridge closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

William Jolly Bridge to be closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

Numerous road closures in Valley and Breakfast Creek areas, including ICB.

BP pipeline at Whytes Island – update as above.

**OVERALL**

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area.

**Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		

Version ~ 1.01a 11/01/2011

EMQ:	
QFRS:	
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time
Resources Available:	
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Dying:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds projected capacity of 3000</li> <li>The QEII centre - Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> <li>Non-official evac centre set up at Moggill Uniting Church</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	RNA – 400 (includes 67 elderly persons) QEII – 91 Moggill – 20 Yeronga – nil, closed down.
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
in:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

### 10. Health

Public Health:	
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Mental Health:	
----------------	--

## INFRASTRUCTURE

### 11. Transport

*(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation BCC buses will be disrupted as at 1300hrs, running limited priority services only.
Marine:	As above only
Other:	

### 12. Structures

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil
Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.
Businesses:	

### 13. Services

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

## ECONOMIC

### 14. INDUSTRY

Sector:	
tor:	
Finance:	

## ENVIRONMENT

### 15. Environmental Impact

Unknown
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## LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

### TOWN (for Premiers Report)

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

### 16. Updates to District/Local Contacts

Changes to Contacts:	
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Author: S/Sgt Teena Blagden	Date: 12/1/2011	Time: 14:00	Sign off: AC Martin	Date: 12/1/11	Time: 14:00
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

<b>Signature</b>		<b>Signature</b>	
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of **Emergency Services**  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1400	10

### SITUATION OVERVIEW

#### 1. Weather

(Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

#### 2. Damage assessment Overview

(Include brief Summary of effects)

- The Island barge remains a threat, all personnel have been forced to leave the area due to flood water levels. A crew has voluntarily remained on board with sufficient capacity to run the barge for an extended period and intend to maintain it's location under it's own power.
- Moggill Ferry – 1.5 tonne ancor being airdropped to location to assist in securing – ADF assisting and Harbour Master assisting.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift – collided with rail bridge, inspection underway – pontoon heading out towards the bay.
- BP pipeline at Whytes Island – yacht has been removed and debris dislodged, no damage to pipeline and pipe is not in active.
- Anticipated 300m of floating walkway along the river will detach and become mobile.

#### 3. Media Issues

(Include brief details of any media related issues)

- No change.

### REGIONAL REPORTS

#### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**Metro South**

Evacuations: Self evacuations continuing in Norman Park, West End areas and Windemere Rd, Sinnamon Park.

Besides The Island barge, no significant issues. All road closures being managed and all refusals to self evacuate being recorded.

No change to Bayside area.

**Metro North**

Numerous power disconnections underway by Energex that will impact large numbers of premises and traffic lights. Consultation occurring to ensure occupants are informed and policing of intersections conducted where necessary.

Roma Street grid no expected to be disconnected at this time.

Evacuations in BCD supported by Negotiators where occupants are refusing to leave. Records are being kept both north and south of locations that refuse to self-evacuate. NO FORCED EVACUATIONS at this time.

100 students at summer camp at UQ (Kings College). All safe and well, no need for action.

The Oaks River Apartments being self-evacuated.

Myer Centre carpark closed.

Victoria Bridge closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

William Jolly Bridge to be closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

Numerous road closures in Valley and Breakfast Creek areas, including ICB.

BP pipeline at Whytes Island – update as above.

**OVERALL**

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area.

**Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

EMQ:	
QFRS:	
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time
Resources Available:	
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RNA Showgrounds projected capacity of 3000</li> <li>The QEII centre - Estimated capacity 1300 with 300 beds currently available</li> <li>Non-official evac centre set up at Moggill Uniting Church</li> </ul>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	RNA – 400 (includes 67 elderly persons) QEII – 91 Moggill – 20 Yeronga – nil, closed down.
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
Dead in:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

### 10. Health

Public Health:	
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Mental Health:	
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## INFRASTRUCTURE

### 11. Transport

*(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation BCC buses will be disrupted as at 1300hrs, running limited priority services only.
Marine:	As above only
Other:	

### 12. Structures

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil
Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.
Shops:	

### 13. Services

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	

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<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

**ECONOMIC****14. INDUSTRY**

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

**ENVIRONMENT****15. Environmental Impact**

Unknown
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**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS****TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Changes to Contacts:	
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<b>Author:</b> S/Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 14:00	<b>Sign off:</b> AC Martin	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/11	<b>Time:</b> 14:00
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

<b>Signature</b>		<b>Signature</b>	
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> Gympie DDC
<b>CC:</b>	Disaster Co-ordination Centre
	Ph: 54801444 (0418771086)
	Fx: 54821385

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
13/01/2011	1100hrs	010

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### 1. Weather (Local observations)

Moderate rainfall across the South Burnett. Minimal rainfall in Gympie and Gympie Hinterland.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview (Include brief Summary of effects)

Structural deterioration of up to 15 business premises in Gympie to date due to water affects.  
 Significant structural damage to Imbil Bridge over Yabba Creek, unusable for prolonged period.  
 Significant structural damage to Vic Olsen Bridge, Tuckekoi.

### 3. Media Issues (Include brief details of any media related issues)

Nil

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region (Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)

South Burnett LDMG is heavily involved in resupply arrangements for Nanango, Kingaroy and Murgon and staffing and managing of evacuation centre at Kingaroy, Nanango, Blackbutt and Murgon.

Gympie LDMG is heavily involved in restoration and resupply arrangements for Gympie, Imbil, Kandanga, Woolooga, Kilkivan and Amamoor.

Police escort of 33 supply trucks from Pomona to Gympie for major resupply of Gympie, Maryborough and Bundaberg was completed by 9am on 13/1/11. Supply trucks continued north to Maryborough and Bundaberg via Bruce Highway.



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Cherbourg LDMG heavily involved in resupply and restoring of water and sewerage services to the community.

### 5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours

(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

Continued watch by both DDMG and LDMG's.

Resupply of water and sewerage services to Cherbourg community through support from Ergon and local council employees. Prolonging availability of useable water by having generator delivered to community. Issues with serviceability of water pumps. Work on problem ongoing, Outcome as to strategy to undertake for long term supply of services will be known by

Development and execution of resupply operation for major retailers in Gympie, Maryborough and Bundaberg was conducted at 7am 13/01/11. 33 trucks escorted to Gympie via diversion route. Nil concerns.

## FACTS AND STATISTICS

### Response

SES Tasks:	<b>Received:</b> Gympie – 75 Murgon – 10 Kingaroy – 22	<b>Completed:</b> Gympie – 72 Murgon – 10 Kingaroy – 22
SES Numbers Local:	Gympie – 40 Murgon – 16 Kingaroy – 15	
Deployed:	Gympie – 15 Murgon – 4 Kingaroy – 6	
Staff Deployed MQ:	1	
QFRS:	12 x local staff and equipment 2 x Maryborough deployed in Gympie	
QAS:	Gympie CBD - 7, Southside - 6 Kingaroy - 4 Murgon - 3 Nanango - 2 Proston - 1	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	Nil – being monitored by DDMG and LDMGs	

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil further deceased
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Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

## 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	6
Numbers Registered at Centres:	102
Numbers Staying in Centres:	87 (Blackbutt 15 people staying in motels but eating in Town hall)
Origin:	Gympie – Civic Centre (30) & Pavilion (7), Murgon PCYC (40), Blackbutt Town Hall (15), Kingaroy Town Hall (6), Nanango Cultural Centre (4)

## 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	Gympie Civic Centre & Gympie Pavilion
Opening hours:	0900 - 1500
Numbers Utilising Centre:	Gympie Civic Centre (30), Gympie Pavilion (7)
Issues	Welfare payments, counselling support

## 10. Health

Public Health:	Nil Concerns
Mental Health:	Nil Concerns

# INFRASTRUCTURE

## 11. Transport

*(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil
Rail:	Operational

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Road:	<p><b>As at 1400hrs 12/01/2011 –</b></p> <p>Blackbutt to Moore CLOSED</p> <p>Blackbutt to Brisbane CLOSED</p> <p>Blackbutt Range CLOSED</p> <p>Cherbourg to Murgon CLOSED (at 0800hrs 1.1m over bridge, falling slowly)</p> <p>Cherbourg to Wondai CLOSED (at 0800hrs 2m over Krebs Crossing)</p> <p>Goomeri to Nanango CLOSED</p> <p>Goomeri to Kilkivan OPEN</p> <p>Gympie to Brisbane CLOSED</p> <p>Gympie to Tin Can Bay OPEN</p> <p>Imbil to Kenilworth OPEN</p> <p>Imbil to Gympie CLOSED</p> <p>Kilkivan to Gympie CLOSED</p> <p>Kingaroy to Kumbia OPEN</p> <p>Kingaroy to Wondai OPEN</p> <p>Kingaroy to Nanango OPEN</p> <p>Kumbia to Dalby OPEN</p> <p>Murgon to Wondai CLOSED</p> <p>Nanango to Blackbutt OPEN</p> <p>Wondai to Chinchilla CLOSED</p> <p> Bruce Highway north of Gympie to Maryborough – OPEN</p> <p>Bruce Highway south of Gympie to Brisbane – CLOSED</p> <p>Gympie to South Gympie over Kidd Bridge – CLOSED</p> <p>Normanby Bridge – OPEN</p> <p> Diversion route between Gympie and Pomona – OPEN to sedans and trucks rated below 15 tonne.</p> <p> As at 1000hrs Mary River at 15.09 meters and falling slowly.</p>
Marine:	Nil
Other:	Nil

## 12. Structures

Homes and Streets:	No structural damage to streets within DDC area, however further assessment to be made when waters recede from Cherbourg and Murgon areas. Water damage to approximately 47 residences across DDC area.
Council:	Operational
Government Offices:	Operational
Schools:	Closed for School Holidays
Hospitals:	Operational

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Dams:	All either full or over capacity, Bjelkie Petersen, Boondooma (4m over spillway), Borumba
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### 13. Services

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	Telephone services restored PM 12/01/2011
Mobile Telephone Network:	Mobile services restored PM 12/01/2011
Radio (2-way):	Operational
Broadcast Radio / TV:	ABC radio and commercial outlets continue to support with provisional advice and updates.
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Main power:	Energex is currently reconnecting power in accordance with their Emergency Action plans. Power has been restored to residents in the Imbil Division and parts of the Gympie Division. Power restored to Cherbourg township at 11am 12/01/2011 however, power to the water treatment plan has not been restored.
Auxiliary power:	Nil
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	All Operational
<b>Water</b>	
	All Operational
<b>Sewerage</b>	
	All Operational

## ECONOMIC

### 14. INDUSTRY

Sector:	<p>Private Enterprise –</p> <p>Gympie CBD has stopped operating until the flood waters recede below 14m, could possibly be up to three days. Remainder of Gympie business sector and District shopping and business sectors all operating as per usual.</p> <p>Resupply is urgently required for Cherbourg store and community in general. Half of the resupply (essential items) was delivered 11/01/11 &amp; 12/01/11, however the other half will be delivered over next 48 hours.</p> <p>Resupply issues addressed within Murgon, Nanango, Goomeri, Kilkivan and Gympie areas due to LDMG efforts and roads gradually re-opening.</p> <p>LDMGs and DDC will continue to plan resupply schedules and address logistical issues</p>
Sector:	
Finance:	

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**ENVIRONMENT****15. Environmental Impact**

Nil
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**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS****TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Lympie	0	0	0	0	0	3	
Cherbourg	3	7	0	0	10	0	X
Murgon	1	3	0	0	0	0	

*\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).*

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Changes to Contacts:	Nil
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<b>Author:</b>	<b>Date:</b> 13/01/2011	<b>Time:</b> 1400	<b>Sign off:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Time:</b>
<b>Signature</b>			<b>Signature</b>		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> Brisbane District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1600	11

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### Weather

(Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview

(Include brief Summary of effects)

- The Island barge remains a threat, all personnel have been forced to leave the area due to flood water levels. A crew has voluntarily remained on board with sufficient capacity to run the barge for an extended period and intend to maintain it's location under it's own power. Further advice being sought from engineers and experts on scuttling the vessel.
- Moggill Ferry – 1.5 tonne ancor being airdropped to location to assist in securing – ADF assisting and Harbour Master assisting – strategy continuing.
- Significant issues anticipated from movement of pontoons, vessels and floating walkways, multi-jurisdictional strategies being put in place to address damage risk in these areas.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift – collided with rail bridge, inspection conducted and is structurally sound.
- Anticipated 300m of floating walkway along the river will detach and become mobile – Pylons are 5m, peak is expected to be 5.5m. Advice being sought from ADF on prospect of breaking walkway apart to mitigate damage when it floats free.

### 3. Media Issues

(Include brief details of any media related issues)

- Ensuring advice for evacuees to register with the Red Cross to maintain accurate records.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

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#### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)

##### Forecast of effect:

21,000 streets, 19,000 residences and 3,500 commercial properties likely to be affected. Potential of 16,000 evacuees.

##### Metro South

Suburbs at greatest risk are Mt Ommaney, Jindalee, Chelmer, Graceville, Sherwood and Oxley. Flood boats have been requested and activated to Jindalee and surrounding areas. Evacuations are continuing.

Centenary Hwy is closed to southbound traffic.

Fast rising flood waters in Bulimba area with houses expected to be inundated. At this stage flooding to yards only in all suburbs.

Sherwood Station has lost power and is functioning under reduced capacity. Likely to be cut off to vehicles shortly.

Power has been lost to the Academy resulting in loss of staging area if required.

No change to Bayside area.

##### Metro North

Numerous power disconnections underway by Energex that will impact large numbers of premises and traffic lights. Consultation occurring to ensure occupants are informed and policing of intersections conducted where necessary.

20 premises in Brisbane CBD have had power disconnected. A further 11 are expected to be disconnected at 1600hrs.

Power disconnection at the Marque Hotel resulted in one group of persons trapped in lift, resolved through temporary re-connection of power.

Roma Street grid not expected to be disconnected at this time.

Evacuations in CBD supported by Negotiators where occupants are refusing to leave. Records are being kept both north and south of locations that refuse to self-evacuate. NO FORCED EVACUATIONS at this time.

Significant impact in Windsor area – 1m of flood water in yards. Self evacuations continuing and movement of property, particularly along Enoggera Creek.

South East Freeway closed northbound from Herschel Street.

Victoria Bridge remains closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

William Jolly Bridge remains closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

Numerous road closures in Valley and Breakfast Creek areas, including ICB.

BP pipeline at Whytes Island – all secure.

##### OVERALL

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area. Assistance to Energex in CBD working well.

#### 5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours

(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

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## FACTS AND STATISTICS

### 6. Response


SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		
EMQ:		
QFRS:		
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time	
Resources Available:		
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.	

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### 8. Evacuations

 Evacuation Centres Activated:	RNA Showgrounds Capacity of 3000, will take pets The QEII centre - Capacity 1300, considering capacity for pets Yeronga State School (now official site) Capacity of 300  Unofficial sites: 68 families have been billeted through church groups. Education Qld are assisting with identified schools as potential sites and staffing.  <u>Following are centres identified and on standby:</u> Kedron Waveil Services Club, North Brisbane – capacity of 600 beds, 30-60min notice required. Morningside RSL – capacity 100 beds, 5min notice required. Hibiscus Sports Complex, Upper Mt Gravatt – capacity 600 beds, no notice required.
Numbers Registered at Centres:	Red Cross have set up registration process.  RNA – 400 QEII – 110 Moggill – 20 Yeronga – 30 families
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
Origin:	



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**9. Community Recovery Centres**

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

**10. Health**

Public Health:	<p>Issues with evacuation of high care patients and locating suitable housing as Evac centres are not suitable. Consultation occurring with Redlands Shire council with numerous locations identified to be further explored for suitable housing. Wesley Hospital continues to function and current evac plan suitable as long as rail and power is accessible.</p> <p>Issue identified with deceased persons at isolated nursing homes with no refrigeration. Processes being put in place to utilize SES to transport undertakers (reportable deaths, procedures in place to ensure appropriate reporting conducted).</p>
Mental Health:	

**INFRASTRUCTURE****11. Transport***(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation BCC buses running limited priority services only.
Marine:	As above only
Other:	

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.
Dams:	

**13. Services**

<b>Communications</b> <i>(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> <i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited
<b>Water</b>	
<b>Sewerage</b>	

**ECONOMIC****14. INDUSTRY**

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

**ENVIRONMENT****15. Environmental Impact**

Unknown
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**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS**

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* *these figures are daily total (not cumulative).*

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Changes to Contacts:	
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<b>Author:</b> S/Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 14:00	<b>Sign off: AC Martin</b>	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/11	<b>Time:</b> 14:00
<b>Signature</b>			<b>Signature</b>		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of Emergency Services  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> Brisbane District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	1800	12

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

### 1. Weather

(Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview

(Include brief Summary of effects)

- The Island barge remains a threat – work underway to arrange scuttling as the safest alternative.
- Moggill Ferry – 1.5 tonne ancor being airdropped to location to assist in securing – ADF assisting and Harbour Master assisting – strategy continuing.
- Significant issues anticipated from movement of pontoons, vessels and floating walkways, multi-jurisdictional strategies being put in place to address damage risk in these areas.
- Oxleys on the River pontoons have broken free and is adrift – collided with rail bridge, inspection conducted and is structurally sound.
- Anticipated 300m of floating walkway along the river will detach and become mobile – Pylons are 5m, peak is expected to be 5.5m. Advice being sought from ADF on prospect of breaking walkway apart to mitigate damage when it floats free.
- Goodwill Bridge has been inspected and is safe, however unable to safely dislodge debris at this time. The Drift Restaurant impacted with no damage caused. Unlikely to be able to withstand an impact from the Island if it were to drift.

### 3. Media Issues

(Include brief details of any media related issues)

- Ensuring advice for evacuees to register with the Red Cross to maintain accurate records.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region***(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)***Forecast of effect:**

23,300 properties effected including 18,776 residential properties – figures are not for total inundation, that is still unknown.

**Metro South**

Major flooding in South Bank business centre, roads inaccessible. No residences affected as yet.

Bulimba / Hawthorne area, significant flooding, limited issues for residences, high set properties, only yard inundation.

Crown St and Norman Ave, Norman Park completely flooded – full extent unable to be ascertained.

Suburbs of Mt Ommaney, Jindalee, Chelmer, Graceville, Sherwood and Oxley remain flooded. Flood boats have been requested and activated to Jindalee and surrounding areas. Evacuations are continuing.

Report of boat moorings near Colmslie Recreational Reserve, Morningside in danger of coming loose being monitored.

Mt Ommaney Station has lost power and running on generators.

No change to Bayside area.

**Metro North**

Numerous power disconnections underway by Energex that will impact large numbers of premises and traffic lights. Consultation occurring to ensure occupants are informed and policing of intersections conducted where necessary.

20 premises in Brisbane CBD have had power disconnected. A further 11 are expected to be disconnected at 1600hrs.

Significant impact in Windsor area – 1m of flood water in yards. Self evacuations continuing and movement of property, particularly along Enoggera Creek. No inundation of actual houses yet.

Sydney Street jetty broken loose from mooring at New Farm.

Previously advised closures remain.

**OVERALL**

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area. Assistance to Energex in CBD working well.

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours***(Major problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)*

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

SES Numbers	
Local:	
Deployed:	
Staff Deployed	
EMQ:	
QFRS:	
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time
Resources Available:	
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.

## SOCIAL

### Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

## 8. Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<p>RNA Showgrounds Capacity of 3000, will take pets The QEII centre - Capacity 1300, considering capacity for pets Yeronga State School (now official site) Capacity of 300</p> <p>Unofficial sites: 68 families have been billeted through church groups. Education Qld are assisting with identified schools as potential sites and staffing.</p> <p><u>Following are centres identified and on standby:</u> Kedron Wavell Services Club, North Brisbane – capacity of 600 beds, 30-60min notice required. Morningside RSL – capacity 100 beds, 5min notice required. Hibiscus Sports Complex, Upper Mt Gravatt – capacity 600 beds, no notice required.</p>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	<p>Red Cross have set up registration process.</p> <p>RNA – 350 (figure from LDMC – unknown why dropped) QEII – 105 (as above) Moggill – 28 Yeronga – 35 families Other unofficial centres – unable to confirm</p>
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
Origin:	

## 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
------------	--

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

## 10. Health

Public Health:	Issues with evacuation of high care patients and locating suitable housing as Evac centres are not suitable. Consultation occurring with Redlands Shire council with numerous locations identified to be further explored for suitable housing. Wesley Hospital continues to function and current evac plan suitable as long as rail and power is accessible. Issue identified with deceased persons at isolated nursing homes with no refrigeration. Processes being put in place to utilize SES to transport undertakers (reportable deaths, procedures in place to ensure appropriate reporting conducted).
Mental Health:	

## INFRASTRUCTURE

### 11. Transport

*(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation BCC buses running limited priority services only.
Marine:	As above only
Other:	

### 12. Structures

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil
Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

Dams:	
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### 13. Services

<b>Communications</b> (If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Telephone Network:	
Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b> (If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)	
Power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited – bus services into CBD have been suspended.
<b>Water</b>	
	4 pump stations without power – Pullenvale, Seventeen Mile Rocks, Archerfield and Bellbowrie. 1,830 customers without water. Further outages expected due to power shutdowns.
<b>Sewerage</b>	
	56 sewer pump stations without power or flooded. 3 major wastewater treatment plants flooded (Karana Downs, Oxley, Fairfield) <b>no impact on residents.</b>  Forecast impacts: 91 sewer pump stations flooded, 4 major wastewater plants flooded (Karana Downs, Fairfield, Oxley and Wacol) <b>minimal impact on residents expected.</b>

## ECONOMIC

### 14. INDUSTRY

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

## ENVIRONMENT

### 15. Environmental Impact

Unknown
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Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

**LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS****TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

*These figures are daily total (not cumulative).*

**16. Updates to District/Local Contacts**

Changes to Contacts:	
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<b>Author:</b> S/Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 18:00	<b>Sign off: AC Martin</b>	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/11	<b>Time:</b> 18:00
<b>Signature</b>			<b>Signature</b>		

# SITREP

## BCC Local Disaster Coordination Centre SITUATION REPORT

Phone: 3403 38108  
Facsimile: 3403 3



### TO:

- ☐ Brisbane City Local Disaster Management Group
- ☐ Lord Mayor
- ☐ Chief Executive Officer
- ☐ Disaster District Coordinator
- ☐ Regional Manager EMQ

**EVENT NAME:** January 2011 Flood Event

**SITREP NUMBER:** 12

**DATE:** 13/01/2011

**PRIORITY:** Routine

**PERIOD:** 2200hrs – 0200 hrs

**EVENT TYPE** Flood

## OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

- Modelling and preparation is well under way in preparation for the higher flood levels.
- Mapping for the 1200 has been completed

### CURRENT ACTIVITIES:

#### BCW

- Bridges tarping teams have ceased work over night and will recommence work in the morning.
- Sand supply is keeping up with demand, additional 20,000 bags sourced from EMQ at Midnight. Sufficient supplies to last overnight. Resourcing is not an issue; hundreds of volunteers are continuing to arrive at all depot locations. Further deliveries arranged for Wednesday morning

#### Contact Centre

GOS for 24 hour period 11/1/10 - 39.74% Average Handling Time 11/1/10 - 229 secs. Calls have reduced in the last hour.

As at 1am, 3 calls in queue with a wait time of less than 1 minute.

Systems now down for change to Holland Park Server.

Calls still mostly regarding flood levels & whether residents need to evacuate,

ISB will be migrating FEA (estimated 4 hours), Ellipse (estimated 4 hours) and CSD/WebCMS (estimated 1 hour), with plans for these applications to be operational again at Holland Park (or rolled back and re-operational at BSQ) from 5.00am Wednesday, in readiness for the increase in calls from that time. Contact Centre has been advised of the relevant system outages.

Note that any calls to Contact Centre in the period during the migration (midnight - 4/5am Wednesday) will be handled manually, and any flood-related jobs will therefore NOT be entered into the Mobile Scheduling and Dispatch system. Please let me know if you have any questions or require additional information.

## LAS

LAS North have continued to bag sand and distribute to the public from the LAS Operations Depot at Lathe Street, Virginia. Initial issues regarding a continuous supply of sand have been resolved.

LAS Staff were involved in the rescue of Kangaroos who had jumped onto the Gateway Motorway in an effort to escape the chest high floodwaters that had covered their habitat in the Tinchy Tamba Wetlands at Bald Hills.

The Region is running short of 'Road Closed' signs and 'Water over Road' signs. If the requirement increases we may need to engage a traffic control provider to sign additional road closures.

R.I.M.T.- Based at Carindale Regional Centre

Shift change for RIMT conducted at 23:30.

Present Incident Controller (Craig Hardie ph [REDACTED]). Dennis Hourigan. Noel Lawrence. Michael Hinze.

Operations are being conducted out of Jean Howie Drive (LAS Parks Operations East Depot):

Present on site are Operations Co-Ordinator and 6 LAS Operations Staff and approx 60 volunteers as of 00:30hours. Earlier on in the evening volunteer numbers had been in excess of 100.

Sandbagging is being conducted at Balmoral Depot with various trucks shipping in loads of sand. Council Field Officers are assisting with the loading of 'Class 22' vehicles and being directed to Hawthorne Park for offload.

Earlier demand for sandbags has subsided, possibly due to time of night but are still being collected. Operations estimate that approx 7000 sandbags have been bagged and distributed as of 01:00am 12/01/2011 and will continue to bag up as long as materials continue to be delivered to Balmoral.

There have been requests for the following from the operations depot at Balmoral.

- Bottled water. (50+ volunteers with limited access to drinking water)
- Mobile flood light trailer. (Balmoral is poorly lit and not set up for night operations)

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## FUTURE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES:

**ISSUES:****Resources**

Nil to report

**Evacuation**

- The QEII evacuation centre has been approved for opening. Red Cross advise that they planning for an opening in the morning. They will confirm with LDCC at approximately 0800 hrs.

**ADMINISTRATION:**

- Nil to report

**OVERALL ASSESSMENT:**

- Based on 12000 series inundation maps an estimated 43879 properties are likely to experience some flooding.
- 12000 m<sup>3</sup>/s is about 5.5m AHD profile
- Using core lan data this equated to 38043 residential and 5836 commercial properties
- At 2311hrs FIC confirmed the following

Property status	Property Group	Property count	People
Flooded	Commercial	3499	0
Flooded	Other	1182	0
Flooded	Residential	19601	46115
Partially Flooded	Commercial	2243	0
Partially Flooded	Other	1097	0
Partially Flooded	Residential	11944	27542

- This information is calculated by overlaying the inundation maps over core lan data. Where the property falls fully inside the inundation zone it is considered fully impacted. Where the property is divided inside and outside the inundate it is considered partially flooded. This information is generated using computer simulation and can be replicated with different inundation levels. As with any computer generated information minor errors may occur however this is considered the best available.

*See Annex A for detailed report of predicted affects.*

**Annex A to SITREP No: 11****Date:****12.01.1011****Period:****To: 0200 hrs****0800 hrs****AREAS AFFECTED**

<b>ITEM</b>			<b>COMMENTS</b>
<b>Impact Scale</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>and</b>	<p>Water has risen through the Golf Course and has reached the rear of 46 Westlake Drive and many people are now leaving their houses.</p> <p>QFRS are requesting Police assistance in the Oxley suburbs re evacuations particularly around the Colwel Street area.</p>
<b>Communications</b>			<p>A revised handout has been developed for residents removing Hawthorne Park Depot from the list.</p> <p>Residents were informed through a CSA that they could register with Volunteer QLD if they wished to assist. They were asked residents not to go to Council depots to volunteer to fill sandbags. Residents encouraged to assist neighbours, family and friends first. They</p>
<b>Electricity</b>			<p>ENERGEX advise that a number of streets in the CBD will have power cut commencing at 0800 hrs prior to any flooding. ENERGEX have provided a list of streets that are likely to be affected. A CSA will be drafted to support the ENERGEX response and encourage residents in these locations to seek alternate accommodation.</p> <p>Zeon network is currently running normally, with the exception of loss of two sites in western Brisbane - Mt Stradbroke and Esk likely to due lightning. These sites are outside normal BCC operational area.</p> <p>The Waterfront Place building is the location of the Zeon switching core and without power then BCC Zeon communications will be impacted. The Waterfront Place building has its own on site generator backup, however this has limitations.</p>
<b>Water Supply</b>			No issue
<b>Sewerage</b>			No issue
<b>Gas</b>			No issue
<b>Transport</b>			<p><b>Current road closures:</b></p> <p>80 roads are currently closed across Brisbane Metropolitan area as of 12 midnight 12/01/11</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is 2 feet of water over road and rising, inbound lanes of Centenary Motorway 500m South of Jindalee Exit have been closed by Police.</li> <li>• water is over Yalambree Road Jindalee cutting off a detour route for the inbound lanes of Centenary Motorway as of 0050hrs.</li> </ul>

	<p>Kendall Street Oxley has 3 feet water over and rising.</p> <p>Noble Street and Fairfield Road intersection has been closed and Brisbane Corso has been closed adjacent to Stimpson Street.</p> <p>Beaudesert Road, Salisbury between Granard Rd and Evans Rd inbound and outbound closed</p> <p><b>Public Transport closures:</b></p> <p>All CityCats and CityFerry services will not be running.</p>
<b>Hospitals/Schools etc</b>	No issue
<b>Public Services</b>	No issues
<b>Properties/Buildings</b>	<p>The water is now entering the depot site at Perrin Park 12.15am Council Officers will ferry goods and equipment from Perrin Park to Mt Cootha until 6.00am or lesser time depending on the flooding situation at Perrin Park.</p> <p><b>71 George Street</b> City Property has advised that power will be cut to 171 George Street from Wednesday 12th January morning. The <a href="http://www.ourbrisbane.com">www.ourbrisbane.com</a> web site and the online payments gateways, which are housed in this building, will be offline. Contact Centre has been advised.</p> <p><b>West End Repository</b> It is envisaged that this facility will be affected by floodwater, CBMS has organised some trucks and staff to arrive on site at 7.30am Wednesday to meet ISB staff, collect the archives and take them to Acacia Ridge.</p> <p><b>Data Centres</b> Council's ICT DR plan has been initiated, with the migration of the Production instances of the relevant Priority 1 applications from BSQ to Holland Park Data Centre commencing shortly after midnight early Wednesday morning. Planning and migration of Priority 2 systems and migration of some additional Priority 1 infrastructure to the Holland Park Data Centre will continue from Wednesday day and Wed/Thu night into Thursday day.</p> <p>City Property will be on site at Fairfield Gardens Ward office at 7.30 to commence removal of materials from the ward office and the library. The IT Team will be there around 9.30 to remove all IT equipment.</p> <p><b>Ward offices that may be impacted</b></p> <p>Bracken Ridge - very slight possibility of overland flow. Ward Office staff will monitor and advise tomorrow afternoon if they feel that further action is warranted. NOTE: The roof is leaking - again - this should be addressed once and for all and not spot repairs as been the habit to date.</p> <p>Deagon - very slight possibility - Cr Newton will monitor and advise</p>

tomorrow afternoon if she feels further action is warranted.

Enoggera - slight overland flow on Samford Road. Don't think that any action is warranted in this case. Have left a message for Cr Wyndham to call me back in this regard.

Hamilton - overland flow along Racecourse Road. Will have the ward office assess and advise tomorrow afternoon if they require further action.

## STATUS REPORT

ITEM	COMMENTS
<b>Supply Problems</b> (Food, clothing, etc)	No issue
<b>Equipment</b> (Sandbags, lighting, etc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hawthorne Park has been closed for sandbag collection due to the number of fights occurring.</li> <li>20 LAS have bagged 80M3 of sand between 1500 h and 2200 h Tuesday 11 Jan 2011.</li> <li>LAS Ops staff were relieved as at 2200 hrs by civilian volunteers supervised by three LAS staff.</li> <li>As at 1100 h LAS North have approx 4,000 sand bags available to the public. A magnificent effort by staff and volunteers.</li> <li>Sandbagging will resume at Mt Cootha @ 6.00am - 12/01/2011</li> </ul>
<b>Labour</b> (Volunteers, contractors, etc)	There are still 25 volunteers sandbagging at Perrin Park. They will continue for another 30 - 60 minutes - sandbagging will then cease and residents will then need to be redirected to other depots to collect sandbags.
<b>Media Issues</b>	Media releases are being prepared concerning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
<b>Political Issues</b>	No issue
<b>City Waste Issues</b>	No issues
<b>External Stakeholder Issues</b>	No issue
<b>Internal Work Unit Issues</b>	No issue

## JOB REPORT

DESCRIPTION	LAS	SES	Veg	EH	RAT
Number of jobs received					
Number of jobs generated by Regional Incident Management Team					
Total number of jobs					
Total number of jobs completed to this time					
Total jobs remaining					



Expected delay for teams to new jobs (if known)					
Number of teams activated					

District	Sand Bags Distributed to Public (9am - 1am)	Current Sand Bag Levels			Jobs Received	Jobs Completed
		BCC	Volunteers	Total		
Stafford	11,000	15	80	95	N/A	N/A
Zillmere	12,000	8	40	48	1	N/A
Darra	6,000	8	100	108	N/A	N/A
Balmoral	12,000	8	200	208	N/A	N/A
Newmarket	6,000	3	50	53	N/A	N/A
Eagle Farm	650	8	0	8	N/A	N/A
Bridges (Tarping)	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Road Surfaces	Nil Night works					
Road Sweeper	9 Sweepers available. (Not yet Tasked)					

## Evacuations REPORT

From:	To:	Persons Evacuated:
various	RNA	
TOTAL EVACUATED: 60		

## AUTHORISATION:

Name: Stuart Pickering- Incident Controller

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date and Time: 13/01/11 - 0200 hrs



Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011



**Queensland Government**  
 Department of **Emergency Services**  
 Emergency Management Queensland

## Situation Report

<b>To:</b> State Disaster Co-ordination Centre	<b>From:</b> Brisbane District Disaster Management Centre
<b>CC:</b>	

Date	Time	Sitrep No.
12/01/2011	2000	13

## SITUATION OVERVIEW

 **Weather**  
 (Local observations)

Rain has eased significantly and likely to continue decreasing until Friday.  
 Flooding is impacting upon roadways, pathways, residences and businesses.

### 2. Damage assessment Overview

*(Include brief Summary of effects)*

- The Island barge remains a threat – strategies are still under consideration as to the best course of action as scuttling may not be.
- Moggill Ferry – 1.5 tonne ancor being airdropped to location to assist in securing – ADF assisting and Harbour Master assisting – strategy continuing but delayed due to weather issues, not likely to recommence until daylight. Master of the vessel is on board and confident control can be maintained.
- Significant issue of floating walkway (300m). Advice that the Gateway Bridge is built to withstand a ship strike and there should be no damage from the walkway. Damage concern to pipelines – tugs to be used to deflect if necessary. Decision made to leave walkway in tact and monitor.
- Across the river from the walkway is a marina with vessels moored that is also at significant risk of coming adrift – request forwarded to SDMC for assistance.

### 3. Media Issues

*(Include brief details of any media related issues)*

- No change.

## REGIONAL REPORTS

### 4. Summary Of Past 24 Hours By DDMG / LDMG / Region

*(Include brief details of operations; visits, etc)*

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**Forecast of effect:**

23,300 properties effected including 18,776 residential properties – figures are not for total inundation, that is still unknown. No change to this forecast. Anticipated peak of 5.2m at 0400hrs.

**Metro South**

Upper Mt Gravatt and Morningside Police Stations have lost all telephone communications.

Dutton Park and Mt Ommaney Stations have lost power and running on generators.

Sherwood Station still operating without power.

No change to Bayside area.

**Metro North**

Numerous power disconnections underway by Energex that will impact large numbers of premises and traffic lights. Consultation occurring to ensure occupants are informed and policing of intersections conducted where necessary.

29 premises in Brisbane CBD have had power disconnected. A further 4 are expected to be disconnected at later.

Traffic lights at intersection of Kingsford Smith Drive and Nudgee Rd, Hamilton will be out for up to 3 days.

No reports of inundation of residences in flooded areas as yet. Some recession of water levels noted Noble and Newmarket Rds, and Sandgate Rd near ICB.

Advice from DIAC that the BITA detention centre at the Brisbane Airport has been evacuated to the Virginia Palms Motel, no issues.

BWD District Office relocated to Indooroopilly Station due to power outage.

Previously advised closures remain.

Large numbers of spectators gathering along the river, particularly Hamilton area, requiring management.

**OVERALL**

A traffic management plan has been put in place and being run centrally for the greater Brisbane area. Assistance to Energex in CBD working well.

**5. Projected Operations For Next 24/48 Hours**

or problems next 24/48 hours. Anticipated resource requirements, including food re-supply)

- Traffic Management
- Security patrols of evacuated areas
- Assistance to displaced persons

**FACTS AND STATISTICS****6. Response**

SES Tasks:	Received:	Completed:
SES Numbers		
Local:		
Deployed:		
Staff Deployed		
EMQ:		

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

QFRS:	
QAS:	Nil QAS assets involved at this time
Resources Available:	
Problems Encountered:	Evacuations along the river are being assisted by SES, main issues of debris in river and adrift vessels, pontoons and barges being monitored by MSQ and Waterpolice.

## SOCIAL

### 7. Population

Deceased:	Nil
Injured:	Nil
Missing:	Nil

### Evacuations

Evacuation Centres Activated:	<p>RNA Showgrounds Capacity of 3000, will take pets The QEII centre - Capacity 1300, considering capacity for pets Yeronga State School (now official site) Capacity of 300</p> <p>Unofficial sites: 68 families have been billeted through church groups. Education Qld are assisting with identified schools as potential sites and staffing.</p> <p><u>Following are centres identified and on standby:</u> Kedron Wavell Services Club, North Brisbane – capacity of 600 beds, 30-60min notice required. Morningside RSL – capacity 100 beds, 5min notice required. Hibiscus Sports Complex, Upper Mt Gravatt – capacity 600 beds, no notice required.</p>
Numbers Registered at Centres:	<p>Red Cross have set up registration process.</p> <p>RNA – 350 (figure from LDMC – unknown why dropped) QEII – 105 (as above) Moggill – 28 Yeronga – 35 families Other unofficial centres – unable to confirm</p>
Numbers Staying in Centres:	
Origin:	

### 9. Community Recovery Centres

Locations:	
Opening hours:	
Numbers Utilising Centre:	
Issues	

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**10. Health**

Public Health:	Issues with evacuation of high care patients and locating suitable housing as Evac centres are not suitable. Consultation occurring with Redlands Shire council with numerous locations identified to be further explored for suitable housing. Wesley Hospital continues to function and current evac plan suitable as long as rail and power is accessible. Issue identified with deceased persons at isolated nursing homes with no refrigeration. Processes being put in place to utilize SES to transport undertakers (reportable deaths, procedures in place to ensure appropriate reporting conducted).
Mental Health:	

**INFRASTRUCTURE****11. Transport***(If roads, airstrips etc closed, include estimated time of opening)*

Aviation:	Nil impact on air travel at this time
Rail:	No change.
Road:	Numerous roads are experiencing inundation BCC buses running limited priority services only.
Marine:	As above only.
Other:	

**12. Structures**

Homes and Streets:	
Council:	Nil
Government Offices:	Nil
Schools:	Nil
Hospitals:	Wesley isolated, no issues.
Dams:	

**13. Services****Communications***(If communications out, include estimated time of reconnection)*

Telephone Network:	
--------------------	--

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Mobile Telephone Network:	Communication via mobile network is problematic which is hampering recovery operations
Radio (2-way):	
Broadcast Radio / TV:	
<b>Power</b>	
<i>(If power out, include estimated time of reconnection)</i>	
Mains power:	Phased outages not impacting adversely at this stage.
Auxiliary power:	
<b>Public Transport</b>	
	Limited – bus services into CBD have been suspended.
<b>Water</b>	
	4 pump stations without power – Pullenvale, Seventeen Mile Rocks, Archerfield and Bellbowrie. 1,830 customers without water. Further outages expected due to power shutdowns.
<b>Sewerage</b>	
	56 sewer pump stations without power or flooded. 3 major wastewater treatment plants flooded (Karana Downs, Oxley, Fairfield) <b>no impact on residents.</b>  Forecast impacts: 91 sewer pump stations flooded, 4 major wastewater plants flooded (Karana Downs, Fairfield, Oxley and Wacol) <b>minimal impact on residents expected.</b>

## ECONOMIC

### 14. INDUSTRY

Sector:	
Sector:	
Finance:	

## ENVIRONMENT

### 15. Environmental Impact

Unknown
---------

## LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

**TOWN (for Premiers Report)**

Version – 1.01a 11/01/2011

	Houses still inundated	Yards still inundated	Houses evacuated	People evacuated	Houses affected	Businesses affected	Towns cut off (isolated)
Flooded							
Partially flooded							
Please add towns as req.							

\* these figures are daily total (not cumulative).

#### 16. Updates to District/Local Contacts

Changes to Contacts:	
----------------------	--

<b>Author:</b> Sgt Teena Blagden	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/2011	<b>Time:</b> 18:00	<b>Sign off: AC Martin</b>	<b>Date:</b> 12/1/11	<b>Time:</b> 18:00
<b>Signature</b>			<b>Signature</b>		

**Queensland Police Service  
Police Operations Centre Brisbane  
Situation Report (SITREP)**

**Date:** 13 January 2011  
**Time:** 2400 hrs  
**Sitrep:** # 13

<i>Disaster Area</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Info Source</i>
	8	6	14	Toowoomba MIR (Sitrep 1700 13/1/11)
	1	0	1	Brisbane DDC (Sitrep 1500 13/1/11)
	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	

<i>Disaster Area</i>	<i>Grave Concerns</i>	<i>Concerns</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Info Source</i>
	12	72	85	Toowoomba MIR (Sitrep 2136 13/1/11- likely to be revised before next sitrep at 0600 hrs)
	<b>12</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>85</b>	

**Note:** Entries in **Bold** are latest additions to Sitrep.

**Current Situation:**

- No local Helicopter current taskings until first light.
- A marked State Traffic Task Force vehicle has been deployed to identify open and accessible routes from Brisbane to Toowoomba. Once identified, route will be monitored to advise of any closures.
  - Commencing 14/1/11 State Traffic Task Force is deploying 4 officers for road closures in Grantham-Helidon area, 2 officers in 2 high visibility vehicles between 0600 to 1800 hrs until further advised.
- Another DVI Team has been placed on standby from 14/1/11 for response into Lockyer Valley. As bodies will be located in state of deterioration they are most likely to be unidentifiable and require DVI processing.
- Disaster Victim Identification:

- 6 DVI personnel have finalised recovery of 1 DVI on site at Grantham
- 1 DVI coordinator at Toowoomba MIR
- **(As at 1715 hrs 13/1/11) 2 bodies have been transported to JTC by ADF helicopter.**
- Future movement of personnel for 14/1/11:-
  - **(as at 1845 hrs 13/1/11) Additional 12 officers to be transported to Rockhampton by Airwing (pm 14/1/11) – with 15 officers out.**
- ADF search and recovery
  - Locker Valley: 117 Army personnel & 10 Bushmaster PMV
  - Brisbane: 120 Army personnel (a further 60 will be available AM 14/1/11)
  - The process for deployment is being facilitated through the POC.
  - Requests for ADF support are to be made by a DDO (or above) and are to be called though to the POC on [REDACTED] or on [REDACTED]
  - Ipswich: 100 RAAF personnel (RAAF LO at Yamanto MIR).
- Deployments (as at 1830 hrs 13/01/11)
  - 202 staff currently deployed to Southern Region
    - Toowoomba (153) **currently – further 6 on 14/1/11**
    - Ipswich (49) **currently – 24 on 14/1/11**
  - 225 staff currently deployed to Central Region (Rockhampton).
    - **12 in /17 out on 14/1/11**

#### POC Focus:

- **Continuing concept planning for anti-looting taskforce**
- **Planning for staff relief of divers and SAR coordinators at Grantham (awaiting request from Toowoomba MIR)**
- **4 personnel to St George and 2 personnel to Dirranbandi (to be deployed 14/1/11)**
- Planning re DVI issues and support.
- Ongoing liaison with DDC's regarding additional resources required.
- Ongoing liaison with helicopter resources to facilitate evacuations as required.
- Continuity plans for ongoing POC commitment.

#### POC Activity

#### Sourcing:

**Nil further for this period.**

- **(As at 2000 hrs 13/1/11) Reserve list - Upwards 141 QPS personnel available for deployment (including 30 members DVI trained).**



- On going sourcing and management of rotary winged aircraft to facilitate deployments.

#### Acquisition:

- (As at 2000 hrs 13/1/11) Interstate Police deployment from 17/1/11 - NSWPOL 55 officers (1 Supt, 3 Insp, 1 A/Sgt, 50 general duties). VICPOL 41 officers (1 A/Insp 40 general duties), SAPOL 12 officers (1 Sgt, 1 Logistics Officer 10 general duties).
- Arrangements made for training, induction, transport, accommodation, and meals have been made. Further consultation with interstate commanders with regards to logistics is continuing.

(as at 2000 hrs 13/1/11)

- 11 boats, 1 jet ski, 9 RIBs & 12 crew offered by Surf Lifesaving
- 7 staff from Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GRMPA) offered and accepted to support Water Police crewing operations – **to be tasked by Brisbane Water Police.**
- 10 4WD vehicles (AFP) and 6 staff (AFP) in Toowoomba
- **7 Blackhawk helicopters (Army), 4 Kiowa helicopters (Army) and 2 Sea King helicopters (Navy) (subject to ADF tasking first)**
- 2 Rescue Helicopters (EMQ) – **deployed Goondawindi for evacuation of hospital. Not available for 14/1/11 at this stage.**
- **Casino 273 helicopter – AM available 14/1/11**
- **QFRS 220 helicopter – available 14/1/11 taskable through SDCC**

#### Major issues:

- Brisbane CBD experiencing significant flooding.
- Warrego Highway currently cut between Ipswich and Gatton still hindering additional staff deployments.

**R W Waugh**  
**Superintendent**  
**Deputy POC Commander**  
**13 January 2011**

#### Appendix

#### **MIR STRUCTURE**

##### **Current – 1800-0600 (13/1/11- 14/1/11)**

POC Commander	AC Wright	
Deputy POC Commander	Supt Waugh	

##### **Next – 0600-1800 (14/1/11)**

POC Commander	AC Henderson	
Deputy POC Commander	Supt Chelepy	

EMQ	█ (Pilot)	Rescue 500	█	3	Redeployed 1600hrs to Goondiwindi for evac of hospital.
EMQ	█	Rescue 510	█	5	Redeployed 1600hrs to Goondiwindi for evac of hospital.
QFRS	█ (Pilot)	220	█ Pilot	3	Tasked by Premier & SDCC
Black Hawk 1		Black Hawk 201	Capt █ █ Amberley	10	Tasked to ADF tasks AM 13/1/11. █
Black Hawk 2				10	Tasked to ADF tasks Lockyer Valley AM 14/1/11
Black Hawk 3					Tasked to ADF tasks Lockyer Valley AM 14/1/11
Black Hawk 4					Tasked to ADF tasks Lockyer Valley AM 14/1/11
Black Hawk 5					Tasked to ADF tasks Lockyer Valley AM 14/1/11
Black Hawk 6					Tasked to ADF tasks Lockyer Valley AM 14/1/11
Black Hawk 7					14/1/11 availability U/K being confirmed by ADF

Sea King 1					14/1/11 availability U/K being confirmed by ADF
Sea King 2		Shark 22	Major [REDACTED]	10	Down for repairs.
Kiowa 1				2 Observati on platform only	14/1/11 availability U/K being confirmed by ADF
Kiowa 2				2 Observati on platform only	14/1/11 availability U/K being confirmed by ADF
Life Saver 5 (West Pac)	[REDACTED] (Pilot)	VH-NVG	[REDACTED]		Tasked to QFRS for taskings.
Casino 273	[REDACTED] (Pilot) [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] (Crewmen)	Helitack 273	[REDACTED]		Tasked to Esk for EMQ/SES damage assessment of Somerset LDMG.

QFRS		Firebird 462			Observation only – Tasked by Premier & SDCC
CHC	<div></div> (Pilot)	CHC 7	<div></div>		Completing passenger transport from Bris to Twmba for Dr/MH staff.